HISTORY OF THE FRONTIER CORPS
KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA

Rifat Nadeem Ahmad

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ژوند دَ ننګ مرګ دَ ننګ

Lt Col Rifat Nadeem Ahmad

HISTORY OF THE FRONTIER CORPS KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA

HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North)
Peshawar

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To the Frontier Scouts

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Foreword

په داسې خاوره جنګ کې انختې یم چې هر بنده ئې په زړَوَرتیا او مـ انه کې دَ ازمری نه زیات بهادر او دَ دې نه ې هر قدم زما فو ونو دَ پاره دَ سختې نه خالی نه دې. ستا په خیال کې یو سکندر دې خو دلته میشته دَ هرئ مور و ئ سکندردے.

"اسکندرِ اعظم"

I am involved in the land of a leonine and brave people, where every foot of the ground is like a wall of steel, confronting my soldier. You have brought only one son into the world, but everyone in this land can be called an Alexander.

"Alexander the Great"

The Frontier Corps from its very birth till today has been defending as well as policing one of the most turbulent and rugged frontiers of the world. It has to its credit a record of outstanding service, battle honours, and a history of great valour defending as well as policing one of the most turbulent and rugged frontiers of the world in the face of insurmountable odds. The Frontier Corps

can rightly be called the Custodian of the Ancient Passes and was deliberately formed from the indigenous Pakhtun inhabitants for maintaining peace among the most formidable and warlike tribes. The Frontier Scouts have traditionally been officered from the best that the Army could muster to command a Force which remains deployed in an inhospitable terrain full of challenges.

I found the records of the Frontier Corps' glorious history to be rather fragmented. As Commander of this proud outfit, I felt the need for a more comprehensive archive to formally record and preserve its traditions, operational undertakings and regional challenges that this force has seen and participated in. This detailed compilation will also highlight the sacrifices of our valiant comrades and pay homage to those heroes who laid their lives in the defence of their Motherland.

The Frontier Corps was raised as an Irregular Corps of Khyber Jezailchis in 1878, during the turbulent period of the Second Afghan War. It subsequently formed the nucleus of a world renowned Scout Force of North West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) spread from the Karakoram Range in the north to the Mekran Coast of Balochistan, covering an area of over 2500 miles. Firstly in 1974 and then 2017, this Force has been split up into four separate entities. Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North), the parental Corps, has the honour of guarding 786 km of frontier from Chitral to the Spin Ghar (Koh-i-Sufaid) at the junction of Kurram and Khyber.

Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North) Headquartered at Bala Hisar has stood shoulder to shoulder with Pakistan Army in the defence of the country. It is actively engaged in uprooting terrorism as well as defending the Pak-Afghan border. The Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North) has displayed exemplary valour in operations against militancy. To this end, it has sealed off the international border with fencing and active deployment. In addition to that the Force oversees the Torkham

Border Crossing at the gateway of historic Khyber Pass. The Frontier Corps lives by its traditions encapsulated in its motto, ژوند دَ ننګ مرګ دَ ننګ.

In the end, I extend my warm felicitations to the author for compiling over one and a half century, rich history of the Frontier Corps.

Long Live the Brave Scouts of the Frontier Corps.

Major General
Noor Wali Khan
Inspector General Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North)
13 February 2024

Preface

The Frontier Corps is a paramilitary Civil Armed Force of Pakistan deployed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan to guard the western frontier and maintain law and order in the tribal districts. It was raised by the British more than a hundred years ago to keep peace on the turbulent Northwest Frontier of India. After decades of failed attempts to pacify the independent Pakhtun[1] tribesmen of the Frontier,[2] particularly in Waziristan, they carried out a bold experiment by forming Militias[3] from among the very tribesmen whom they were to police. These Militias were stationed in the tribal belt along the western frontier and were named after the areas from where they recruited and operated. Despite some early setbacks, the initiative turned out to be a resounding success. After the Third Afghan War of 1919, the Waziristan Militias were reorganized and renamed as Scouts.

The next decades kept the Frontier Corps continuously engaged in operations on the Frontier. It provided the Scouts with the opportunity to develop their unique outlook and fighting techniques. The lightly armed and mobile Scout, himself a tribesman intimately familiar with the area and its people, was more than a match for his adversary. However, his tribal background and the unique nature of his job required a different breed of officers to command him, who were selected after careful scrutiny. Appealing to British romantic notions of the Frontier, service with the Scouts carried much prestige and attracted the more enterprising and adventurous officers, who spoke the language of their men and understood their culture. Commanding the Scouts however, was never a routine job. The loyalty and obedience of the proud Pakhtun tribesmen is not given easily. It has to be earned by leading through example, and by respect and understanding of their customs and traditions. An officer of the Scouts ignores them at his own peril.

The Frontier Corps is like no other military force in the world. Its origin, ethos and mystique are rooted in the history, land and culture of the independent tribes of the Northwest Frontier. The reason for the enduring fame of the Scouts is not only their daring exploits but also their ability to adapt to changing circumstances without compromising their distinct character. Raised to enforce British imperial authority on the intransigent frontier tribesmen, the Frontier Corps quickly reoriented itself after Independence into a national institution entrusted with keeping peace in the semi-autonomous tribal areas. At the turn of this century, it transformed itself into a well-honed counterinsurgency force to face the unprecedented terrorist threat. Through all the vicissitudes of time, the Frontier Corps has maintained its legendary reputation of a unique and formidable fighting force.

This book is another addition to the growing body of work on the Frontier Corps. I have adopted a narrative style in recounting the story of the Scouts, which I hope would be more readable and interesting. The account covers the history of the entire Frontier Corps until 1974, when it was bifurcated into separate corps for the North West Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Balochistan. From there onwards, the focus is on Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. I am greatly indebted to all the authors, who over the years have chronicled the history of Frontier Scouts. The detailed and painstaking records of their British officers were invaluable in understanding the development of the Frontier Corps. At the same time, books by Pakistani authors, and interviews with serving and retired officers, JCOs and men of the Corps, were vital in gaining an insight into the customs and working of modern Scouts.

Researching the History of Frontier Corps was a delightful journey of discovery, while visits to units of the Corps were a rare honour. Observing the Scouts in their element, with their unmistakably proud bearing and *esprit de corps*, you cannot help

but realize that you are in the company of extraordinary men. As many former and present officers of the Frontier Corps proudly professed, service with the Scouts is a privilege. My only regret is that I did not get the opportunity to serve with them during my military service.

I am grateful to Major General Noor Wali Khan, HI (M), Inspector General Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North), for inviting me to write this History. He and his staff at Fort Bala Hisar accorded me the traditional Scout hospitality, as did the Commandants, officers and men of the units that I had the privilege to visit. Their keen interest in the project was a source of great encouragement. I am especially indebted to Colonel Liaqat Ali, who was my liaison with Headquarters Frontier Corps and arranged all my visits to the Scouts. I am also obliged to the Council, National Army Museum, the Trustees, Imperial War Museums, and the Royal Geographical Society, for permission to reproduce illustrations in their collections. In the end, my deepest gratitude to Major Sajid Butt and my brothers Nash'at & Omar, for procuring important documents from the United Kingdom; and to Major General Sohail Ilyas, Brigadier Saadullah Fatmi, Brigadier Nasir Saeed Khattak, Colonel Hidayat Ullah, Major Tariq Hakim and Mr Mian Imran Shah for their valuable assistance.

Rifat Nadeem Ahmad
Rawalpindi
January 2024



1. The Northwest Frontier.

1
The Enigma of the Frontier

For more than a hundred years, the Northwest Frontier of India loomed large in the imagination of the British. However, this vague and undefined frontier was a recent conception. The Mughal Empire had extended from Kabul to Bengal and there was no frontier in between. In 1747, Ahmad Shah Abdali founded the Afghan state by wresting control of what are now Afghanistan and Pakistan from an enfeebled Mughal emperor. But he was not the only contender for pieces of the crumbling Mughal Empire. Resurgent Sikh and Maratha warlords, who had long chafed under Mughal rule, were vying to set up their own states. Over the next fifty years, the Indus Valley, which now makes up Pakistan, became the battleground of a bitter struggle for supremacy between the Afghans and the Sikhs. In early 19th century, the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh emerged victorious and expelled the Afghans from Punjab. It was only then that an ill-defined frontier took shape between the two states, which would find lasting fame as the Northwest Frontier.[1]

In the meantime, the British had conquered most of India east of Punjab. While they were consolidating their gains in South Asia, another imperial power in the north was conquering the khanates of Central Asia. The Russian Empire had been expanding inexorably towards Afghanistan. This caused much anxiety to the British rulers of India for the safety of their South Asian conquests. As early as 1830, British politicians were raising concerns about the perceived Russian threat to India. With only Afghanistan separating the two imperial powers, a tussle ensued between them to gain influence over the hapless country, which came to be known as the 'Great Game'.[2] It would consume British attention for the better part of a century. This obsession with the Russian

threat led to repeated attempts to exercise control over Afghan affairs. In 1839, they sent a large military force to Kabul to install the deposed Shah Shuja on the Afghan throne, as their client. The mission ended in disaster with the annihilation of the retreating British Army at the hands of Afghan tribesmen in 1842.[3] The humiliating defeat and loss of prestige further fed into British paranoia and firmly focused their attention towards Sindh and Punjab.

The Indus Valley was divided between the Sikh kingdom in Punjab* and Kashmir in the north, and the Baloch emirate of Sindh in the south. Towards the southwest, the vast and sparsely populated expanse of Balochistan was nominally under Afghan rule but was actually controlled by local chiefs (Sardars). In 1843, the British invaded and conquered Sindh. By 1846, they were also in control of the Sikh kingdom, which had become riven with internal dissent following the death of Ranjit Singh. After the Second Anglo-Sikh War of 1849, the British annexed the Sikh kingdom, which brought them to the Afghan frontier and the fiercely independent Pakhtun tribes inhabiting the area.†

The Pakhtun Heartland

The area west of the River Indus is populated by Pakhtun tribes of Indo-Aryan stock, whose origins are lost in antiquity although their presence as a distinct ethno-cultural group has been recorded for at least a thousand years. The Pakhtun heartland extends from western Afghanistan to the Pakistani province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the east and northern Balochistan in the south. Over the centuries, Pakhtuns had been extending the boundaries of their homeland. This movement, generally in small

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* Until the formation of North West Frontier Province in 1901, the areas now comprising Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were part of Punjab.

† Also known as Roh (Seraiki name for Suleiman Mountains), Yaghistan (the Land of Rebels) and Ilaqa Ghair (Un-administered Territory).

groups but at times as mass migration or invasion was mostly from west to east. It was driven by various factors like economic pressure, civil strife or war. While the Pakhtun area ends at the Indus, the river has never been a barrier for them. Two great Pakhtun dynasties, the Lodhis and the Suris, ruled over North India in the 16th century, while Pakhtun soldiers, traders and nomads settled all over India from Punjab to Bengal. This migration is still going on within Pakistan and Pakhtuns are found in large numbers from Rawalpindi to Karachi.

Pakhtuns are divided into numerous tribes united by shared bonds of language, culture and religion. However, each tribe (*qaum*) and clan (*khel*) has its own distinct character. A striking feature of Pakhtun society is their egalitarian and democratic tradition, with the absence of a strong feudal system, particularly in the mountainous tribal belt. Tribal elders or Maliks exercise some influence but their authority is subject to the consent of the tribesmen. Disputes are usually settled by tribal assemblies called *jirgas*. Attachment to Islam, martial traditions and adherence to the honour code of *Pakhtunwali*, are essential parts of Pakhtun identity.[4] They however, are not the only ethnic group inhabiting the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. East of the River Indus, Hindko-speaking people are settled in Hazara, while the mountainous Kohistan north of Swat is mostly inhabited by non-Pakhtun tribes. Further north in the mountain fastness of Chitral, dwell the Chitralis, a distinct ethnic and linguistic group.[5]

A chain of mountains running north to south from the Hindu Kush to Koh-i-Suleiman passes through the middle of the Pakhtun heartland, forming a great mountain barrier between the Indus plain and Afghanistan. Several passes at Khyber, Kurram, Tochi, Gomal and Bolan offer access through these mountains. These mountains from Bajaur to Pishin in Balochistan are home to the independent Pakhtun tribesmen, who were never subjugated by any external power. While their kin in the fertile lowlands could

pursue more productive activities, the tribesmen from the mountains were constrained by circumstances beyond their control. The barren and mountainous landscape offers few economic prospects beyond subsistence farming or pastoralism. Denied any opportunity of meaningful economic activity by geography, they resorted to raiding the settled areas* or feuding among themselves to supplement their meagre resources. Meanwhile, control of the mountain passes allowed them to levy toll on travellers, caravans and even armies.[6] Many a mighty conqueror came to grief in these passes and only managed to get through after paying the toll to their implacable guardians.

The Pakhtun tribesman acknowledges no authority, local or otherwise, and pays no taxes. Every man is a king. This utter self-assurance is evident in his unmistakably proud bearing. The steep mountains and narrow defiles of his homeland make it ideal country for ambush of which he is a past master. Feuding is a way of life in the Tribal Areas and every tribesman goes armed. The rifle is their most prized possession and they earned great fame as skilled marksmen in the 19th century. Fearless, tough and skilled at guerrilla warfare, the tribesmen have earned the reputation of fearsome fighters. Pride in their culture and strong bonds of kinship within the family, clan and tribe drive their fierce independence and resistance to external control. Hard countries breed hard men, and so is the case in the Tribal Areas.

The remote and difficult terrain of the Tribal Area had resulted in the isolation of its tribes, who jealously guarded their independence. The march of various empires over the centuries had largely passed them by. The Mughals tried to stamp their authority on them but faced fierce resistance and eventually decided to leave them alone. The Afghans, their ethnic kin, like the Mughals tried to co-opt them by enlisting them in their army but

* Areas under British administration were known as ‘Settled Areas’, as opposed to the semi-independent ‘Tribal Areas’.

were wary of imposing their authority.[7] The capture of Peshawar by the Sikhs in 1823, gave a religious dimension to tribal resistance. Although the Sikhs wisely stayed away from the Tribal Areas, the brutality of the Sikh regime in the settled areas aroused the tribesmen's religious and patriotic sentiments and provoked bitter conflict. The mountainous tribal belt became no-man's-land and the *de facto* frontier between the Afghan and Sikh states.[8] It was this ill-defined frontier that the British inherited from the Sikhs in 1849.

The Closed Border Policy

The British never attempted to formally annex the Tribal Areas, and their legal status was vague and undefined. Theoretically, they were a British protectorate, even though the tribesmen never acknowledged their authority.[9] The British did not interfere in tribal affairs. They exercised control over the tribes through a system of collective tribal responsibility known as 'Indirect Rule'. Deputy Commissioners of the districts bordering the Tribal Areas dealt with the tribes through tribal Maliks or influential middlemen from the settled areas. The British signed separate agreements with the tribes, who were expected to keep the roads and passes in their areas open, and to refrain from raiding the settled areas or harbouring fugitives. In return, they were given economic inducements in the shape of allowances, civil work contracts and employment in the Army and Civil Armed Forces. Violation of agreements was met with a host of retaliatory measures, varying from fines and withdrawal of allowances to seizure of property or individuals.[10]

More serious transgressions resulted in economic blockade of the offending tribe or punitive military operations with destruction of crops and villages. Having meted out the punishment, the troops would then withdraw. It was dubbed as the 'Butcher and Bolt' policy.[11] For military operations, the British

relied on the Punjab Frontier Force, a composite force of cavalry, infantry and artillery, especially raised for frontier operations and directly under the orders of the Government of Punjab. The force, stationed in a string of cantonments along the frontier, was backed by a tribal militia called the Border Military Police, which dealt with minor transgressions and formed the outer perimeter of the defensive line against the tribesmen.[12]

During the First Afghan War, the British had felt the need of trained scouts with local knowledge, who could guide them through unfamiliar territory. With that in mind, they raised a unit of cavalry and infantry in 1846, called the Corps of Guides. The Guides were selected for their resourcefulness and initiative and were recruited from among Pakhtuns, Punjabi Muslims, Sikhs, Dogras and Gurkhas. The experiment was so successful that a brigade of five infantry and cavalry regiments was formed in 1849. Initially called the Trans-Frontier Brigade, it was redesignated as Punjab Irregular Force in 1851, and Punjab Frontier Force in 1865. The force was augmented by adding the Corps of Guides, and several units of infantry and mountain artillery, making it a small self-contained army.[13] The Punjab Frontier Force or 'Piffers' as they were informally called, would go on to earn everlasting fame for their military exploits on the Frontier.

The British policy on the Northwest Frontier was largely formulated by Sir John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner of Punjab, who later became the Viceroy of India. Lawrence was wary of getting entangled in tribal affairs. Focused on the Russian threat, he advocated a policy of non-interference in Afghanistan so as not to provoke the Russians. He even suggested making the River Indus as the frontier of British India, which he believed could be easily defended in the event of a Russian invasion.[14] This hands-off approach towards Afghanistan and the Tribal Areas was known as the 'Closed Border Policy' or 'Masterly Inactivity'. However, the policy did not bring about any change in the

tribesmen's behaviour, and between 1849 and 1881, the Punjab Frontier Force had to launch more than thirty punitive expeditions in the Tribal Areas.[15] The apparent ineffectiveness of the Closed Border Policy led to increasing calls for a more aggresive approach in securing the Frontier.

Meanwhile in Sindh, the British had implemented a different system. On the Sindh frontier, they were faced with incursions by marauding Baloch and Brahui tribesmen from Balochistan. The Sindh frontier was under the administrative and military charge of Major (later Brigadier General) John Jacob, the Political Superintendent of Upper Sindh. Jacob, a remarkable man of multifaceted talents, took a different approach in dealing with the challenge. Instead of waiting for the tribesmen to launch a raid, he would pre-empt them by sending sorties of the Scinde Irregular Horse, to nip the problem in the bud. To achieve this, he relied on an efficient intelligence network, while his cavalry kept a close eye on any sign of trouble by patrolling far and wide in the tribal territory. At the same time, he refrained from inflicting collective punishment on the tribesmen.[16] This was in stark contrast to the Butcher and Bolt policy of collective punishment practised in Punjab.

There was much debate about the merits and demerits of the two systems. However, the situation in Sindh was different from Punjab. For one, the Sindh frontier was much more open and shorter than the 700-mile mountainous Punjab frontier and thus much easier to police. Secondly, the nature of the Pakhtun and Baloch tribal systems also differed significantly.[17] While feudalism was almost non-existent among the Pakhtuns, in Baloch society, the Sardar was paramount.[18] Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman, who was appointed Assistant Commissioner of the southern Punjab district of Dera Ghazi Khan in 1866, exploited this to develop a new system of tribal pacification in Baloch areas. He implemented a policy of non-interference in tribal affairs and relied on the

Sardars through monetary inducements to keep the Baloch tribesmen under check. Military force was only used when peaceful methods failed.[19]

In 1876, Sandeman persuaded the Khan of Kalat to hand over the strategically important Quetta and Bolan Pass to the British. The Khan of Kalat was a vassal of the Afghan king and technically, Balochistan was Afghan territory. Amir Sher Ali of Afghanistan was greatly perturbed by British encroachment on his domain. Suspicious of British intentions, he had been resisting British demands to place a Resident in Afghanistan. In 1878, a Russian military mission arrived uninvited in Kabul. The overriding British strategic concern on the Northwest Frontier was not the tribesmen but the Russian threat. Presence of the Russians in Kabul sent alarm bells ringing all the way to London. When the British tried to despatch a mission of their own, a nervous Sher Ali, feeling squeezed between the two imperial powers, refused to accept it. The British decided to settle the matter with military force.[20] It was the end of the Closed Border Policy and Masterly Inactivity.

The Forward Policy

In November 1878, the British invaded Afghanistan and occupied Jalalabad, Kurram and Kandahar. The Afghans soon sued for peace and signed the Treaty of Gandamak in May 1879, relinquishing control of their foreign affairs to the British. They also ceded the districts of Sibi and Pishin along with Kurram Valley and Khyber Pass. However, within weeks of his arrival, the British Resident and his military escort were killed by mutinous Afghan soldiers. This led to resumption of hostilities and occupation of Kabul by the British. After months of fighting, which included a painful defeat at Maiwand, the British withdrew from Afghanistan in 1881. At the same time, they annexed all Afghan territories in northern and western Balochistan, which were

formed into a province in 1887.[21] This extended their western frontier to the Arabian Sea and added a large population of Pakhtun and Baloch tribesmen to their rule.

The Second Afghan War led to a review of British policy on the Frontier. Meanwhile, the new Amir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan was unhappy at the loss of Afghan territory and there was evidence of Afghan incitement in the Tribal Areas. To counter the Afghans, advocates of a more aggressive approach called for advancement of British military posts into the tribal territory to secure the mountain passes. It was called the 'Forward Policy'. However, to achieve that, the frontier between Afghanistan and British India had to be first demarcated. After gaining the consent of a reluctant Afghan king, the new political boundary called Durand Line after the British officer, who carried out the survey, was demarcated in 1894-95. The arbitrary process left some tribes split by the new frontier. The newly delimited tribal area was divided into the Political Agencies of Malakand, Khyber, Kurram, North and South Waziristan.[22] The tribesmen, whose homeland was being demarcated, were not consulted.

The consequences of the Forward Policy were predictable. Driven by a fear of loss of independence and incited by their mullahs and the Afghan Government, the frontier tribes from Malakand to Waziristan rose up in a great uprising in 1897.[23] This time, the conflagration was not only widespread but also more serious, as the tribesmen had been acquiring the more sophisticated rifles to replace their antiquated jezails.* It took a major deployment of the Indian Army to quell the uprising, costing much in blood and treasure. The Forward Policy had met the fate of its predecessor. New thinking was required if the British were to cope with their unending Frontier problem.

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* Hand-made muzzle-loading muskets with long barrels used by the frontier tribesmen in 19th century. The weapon was famous for its accuracy at long ranges and was used with deadly effect by Pakhtun snipers.

New thinking came in the form of a new Viceroy. Lord Curzon was appointed Viceroy of India in 1899. He was a pragmatic man, who understood the Frontier better than his predecessors. Despite opposition from the Punjab establishment, he forced through wide-ranging reforms. The foremost was the creation of North West Frontier Province* in 1901, by separating Hazara and the districts west of the Indus from Punjab. It was a practical measure that greatly facilitated the people of the province in legal and administrative matters. At the same time, frontier affairs were to be administered separately by implementing the Sandeman model of indirect rule through officers of the Indian Foreign Department directly under the control of the Viceroy. However, his most consequential decision concerning this History was to withdraw the Army from the Tribal Areas and to replace it with Militias recruited from the tribesmen.[24]

Meanwhile, events far removed from the Northwest Frontier had resulted in a rapprochement between the Russians and the British. In 1907, they signed a treaty pledging to respect the territorial integrity of Afghanistan and maintain it as a buffer state between the two powers. At the same time, the Russians conceded control of Afghan foreign policy to the British.[25] The Great Game was finally over but not the British problems on the Frontier.

* Renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on 19 April 2010.

2
Birth of the Frontier Corps

Lord Curzon came to the Viceroyalty of India with solid credentials of a foreign policy hawk and a firm advocate of the Forward Policy. However, soon after taking charge in 1899, he realized that the situation on the Northwest Frontier was untenable. Already well-travelled and well-versed in regional affairs, he embarked on a review of British policy on the Frontier. Curzon came to the conclusion that British frontier policies of the last fifty years had been a failure and needed a new direction.[1] He decided to adopt a conciliatory approach towards the frontier tribesmen. He considered the policy of collective punishment counterproductive, while the expense of punitive operations and maintenance of military garrisons in tribal territory were financially unviable.[2] To the dismay of his military commanders, he decided to withdraw the Indian Army from the Tribal Areas and replace it with locally recruited militias under British officers. The Army was to be concentrated in cantonments in the border districts, ready to support the Militia at short notice. For this, he proposed a major overhaul of road and rail communications.[3]

In Curzon's opinion, the Government of Punjab due to its remoteness from the Frontier and its local responsibilities was unable to effectively govern the frontier region. At the same time, the Viceroy was unable to exercise direct control over frontier affairs due to the tedious process of working through the Punjab bureaucracy. He believed that the only remedy for the problem was to create a new province from the *trans*-Indus districts directly under the control of the Viceroy. This was not a new idea and had been proposed as early as 1877, by Lord Lytton, the then Viceroy.[4] But it fell to the forceful personality of Lord Curzon to push through its implementation.

2. The North West Frontier Province 1901.

NWFP & Tribal Agencies

On 9 November 1901, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) was created as a Chief Commissioner's Province with Lieutenant Colonel Harold Deane as the Chief Commissioner, who was also Agent to the Governor-General. As Chief Commissioner, he was the administrative head of the province, while as Agent to the Governor-General, he exercised political control over the Tribal Areas. The new province comprised of the five settled districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, each under a Deputy Commissioner. Meanwhile, the tribal area between the new province and the Afghan frontier was divided into the five Agencies of Malakand, Khyber, Kurram, North and South Waziristan, each under a Political Agent (called Political Officer until 1902). The Tribal Agencies had been established earlier, starting with Khyber in 1879, Kurram in 1892, North & South Waziristan and Malakand in 1895-96.[5]

The Malakand Agency encompassed the mountainous regions of Chitral, Dir, Swat, Bajaur and Kohistan. These areas were different from other tribal areas due to their feudal nature, which made their control easier for the British. Chitral was a semi-independent Princely State in the far north, ruled by a hereditary prince called Mehtar. Its non-Pakhtun population was generally peaceful. Dir, Swat and Bajaur were mostly inhabited by Yusufzai and Tarkalani tribesmen under their Nawabs and Khans.[6] Towards the north of Kohistan, the British established Gilgit Agency in the State of Jammu & Kashmir in 1877, to secure their northern frontier from Russian and Chinese threats. Affairs of Gilgit Agency were looked after by a Political Agent, who reported to the British Resident in Kashmir.[7]

South of Malakand was the Khyber Agency inhabited mostly by Afridis. After the Second Afghan War, the British forced the Afghans to cede the strategic Khyber Pass. Meanwhile,

3. Frontier Tribes.

the Afridis were persuaded to stop charging toll from traders and travellers. In return for keeping the pass open, they were paid allowances by the British. The Afridis are a large and powerful tribe divided into eight major clans spread from the Khyber and Tirah to Kohat. Their relations with the British were cordial for the most part, although the Zakha Khel Afridis of Bazar Valley being less dependent on British largesse were also less agreeable. The Mohmands towards the north of Afridis however, were more restless. The main reason for that was the Durand Line, which had split the tribe into two. This was exploited by the Afghan Government to incite the tribe and create problems for the British.[8]

South of Khyber was the Kurram Agency, also acquired after the Second Afghan War and formally annexed in 1892, on the request of its Turi tribesmen, who felt threatened by some of the tribes that surrounded them on all sides. The scenic Kurram Valley is generally fertile and its inhabitants did not cause any trouble to the British. Other important tribes of Kurram and the adjoining district of Kohat were the Orakzais, Bangash and Khattaks. They were mostly peaceful and were recruited widely in the Indian Army.[9]

The southern part of the Tribal Areas from Lower Kurram to the River Gomal formed the two tribal agencies of Waziristan, the bane of the British for a hundred years. The vast mountainous and mostly barren area is inhabited by Wazirs and Mahsuds, and the smaller tribes of Daurs and Bhittanis. The Wazirs and Mahsuds were the most belligerent and intractable of all the frontier tribes and caused no end of trouble for the British.[10] South of the River Gomal started the Zhob Agency of the Chief Commissioner's Province of Baluchistan, inhabited by Shiranis and Kakars.[11]

The main difference between NWFP and other provinces of India was that its administrators from the Chief Commissioner to Deputy Commissioners and Political Agents were all drawn from the Indian Foreign Department rather than the Indian Civil Service.

Meanwhile, legal affairs in the Tribal Areas and to some extent in NWFP were dealt under the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). FCR was first promulgated in 1872, to regulate legal affairs of Pakhtuns by traditional means using the *jirga* system. It was revised in 1887 and 1901. It empowered the Deputy Commissioner or the Political Agent to refer civil and criminal cases to a council of tribal elders called the *jirga*, nominated by him. The *jirga* after its investigation submitted its findings to the Deputy Commissioner or the Political Agent, who had the final authority to pass a judgement. While on the face of it, FCR was acceptable to the Pakhtuns because it used their own traditional *jirga* system to settle disputes in accordance with their *riwaj* (social customs), bypassing the cumbersome and prolonged legal formalities of the civil legal system.[12] However, its other draconian provisions dealing with collective punishment of the guilty party's family, clan or tribe made it a black law.[13]

The Indian Political Service

The Indian Foreign and Political Department or the Indian Political Service (IPS), as it came to be known in 1937, was a curious entity, unique to British India. The term 'political' was misleading, as the service had nothing to do with politics in the usual sense of the word. Rather, it dealt with British relations with other states within India and in its neighbourhood. Formed in 1783, the Service was under the direct control of the Viceroy. It drew two-thirds of its officers from the Indian Civil Service and one-third from the Indian Army. This elite group of officers or 'Politicals', as they were called, had three different roles to fill. They were posted as diplomats in neighbouring countries such as Persia (Iran) and Afghanistan; they served as Residents in the semi-independent Princely States of India, where they looked after British interests; and they were posted as Political Agents and Deputy Commissioners in frontier agencies and districts.

Volunteers for the Indian Political Service were only accepted after thorough and rigorous scrutiny.[14] These officers were a vital part of the British imperial enterprise and several of them like Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman, Colonel Sir Robert Warburton, Lieutenant Colonel Sir Harold Deane, Lieutenant Colonel Sir George Roos-Keppel and Sir Olaf Caroe, to name a few, earned legendary fame for their work on the Frontier.

The Indian Political Service was the sole preserve of the British. Unlike the Indian Civil Service, which was gradually opened up to the Indians, the British were most reluctant to accommodate them in the Political Service. One of the earliest and the most famous of them to break the glass ceiling was Sahibzada Sir Abdul Qayyum Khan of Swabi, who rose to become the first Chief Minister of NWFP in 1937.[15] After the opening of the Officer Corps of the Indian Army to Indians in 1917, a trickle of Indian officers, mostly Muslims, were admitted in the IPS. Prominent among them were Major General Sahibzada Syed Iskander Ali Mirza (first President of Pakistan), Colonel Abdur Rahim Khan (first Pakistani Ambassador to the United Nations) and Major Sahibzada Mohammad Khurshid (first Pakistani Governor NWFP).[16] In 1947, out of 124 officers of IPS, only 17 were Indians; twelve of them Muslims. At independence, the IPS was not retained by India or Pakistan, and its officers were absorbed by the Civil and Foreign Services.[17]

The Political Agent was the lynchpin of ‘Indirect Rule’ practiced by the British in tribal agencies. The Tribal Area, although a British protectorate, was considered ‘independent territory’ since it was an ungoverned space not under the authority of any local or external entity. The British conducted their relations with the tribes through Political Agents, preferably by peaceful means such as negotiations, payment of allowances and employment opportunities. And when these did not work, through the application of military force. However, the Political Agent

always strived to avoid military action, as it was considered a failure on his part.[18]

The Political Agent's responsibilities were varied and often onerous, requiring both tact and firmness, and needed a deep understanding of the culture and customs of the tribes in his charge. "It was his job to settle trouble of all kinds—inter-tribal fights, raiding into settled districts, highway robbery, kidnapping, murder and mayhem—before it blew up into a situation which required the intervention of a brigade of regular troops. The forces at his disposal were the Khassadars and the Scouts. His reaction to any disturbances would be on a carefully graduated scale: first the Khassadars, then the Scouts; only as a last resort, the Army".[19]

Khassadars are a type of tribal police first employed in the Khyber Agency in 1906, although the khassadari system was only implemented on a proper footing after the Third Afghan War of 1919. "The khassadars were recruited, trained and administered entirely under tribal arrangements".[20] They did not wear a uniform, brought their own weapons and their salaries were paid to the tribe as part of the tribal allowance. The Khassadars performed the tasks of arresting fugitives, keeping the roads open in tribal territory, providing escort to the Political Agent and acting as liaison between him and the tribe. However, they were not under British authority and could not be relied upon when there was any conflict of interest.[21]

Another type of armed police deployed on the tribal border was the Frontier Constabulary. It was raised in 1913, to replace the Border Military Police, a tribal levy* armed and paid for by the British to police the border between tribal and settled areas. However, their performance over the years had been poor and it was decided to replace them with a disciplined force under the command of British police officers. The Frontier Constabulary was

* A quasi-official armed tribal force enlisted for law enforcement duties by local authorities.

recruited from the settled districts and was deployed in a string of posts within the administrative border of NWFP. Its main task was to guard this border and prevent any raiders from the tribal territory from entering the settled districts. It was a mobile force, which could quickly concentrate at a threatened point, and worked in close cooperation with the Frontier Corps. However, the Frontier Constabulary was under the control of the Deputy Commissioners and not the Political Agents.[22]

Raising of the Frontier Militias

The main armed force at the disposal of the Political Agent was the Frontier Militia. Lord Curzon wanted the Army out of the Tribal Areas and replaced with paramilitary irregular troops raised from among the tribes and commanded by army officers. The formation of these militias however, was not a new idea. It was first proposed by Sir Robert Sandeman, when he was raising tribal levies in Balochistan. He wanted military officers to command them to provide the necessary leadership and discipline. But his proposal was rejected by the Government on financial grounds. It was the ubiquitous Russian bogey that finally allowed him to realize his goal. In 1885, there was a border clash between the Russians and the Afghans at Panjdeh, which re-ignited the Russian threat in British minds. Sandeman used the incident as an excuse to occupy Zhob in 1889. At the same time, he gained the sanction to raise a paramilitary unit, the Zhob Levy Corps, commanded by an army officer. Unlike tribal levies, the new corps was modelled on military lines and was to relieve the Army on frontier posts.[23] The first of the Frontier Militias was born.

Meanwhile in Khyber, the British had requisitioned a tribal levy in 1878, called the Khyber Jezailchi Corps. The levy was renamed as Khyber Rifles in 1887, and reorganized as a paramilitary militia in 1899. By the time Curzon became Viceroy of India in 1899, a third militia had been raised in Kurram Agency

in 1892. Curzon had travelled widely on the Frontier in 1888, when he met Sandeman. In 1894, he visited Khyber and met Colonel Robert Warburton, the Political Officer of Khyber, who was trying to persuade the Government to reorganize Khyber Rifles on paramilitary lines. Apparently, these officers were able to convince him about the merits of militias, as he became an ardent supporter of the scheme. In 1895, he even wrote a newspaper article promoting the idea of raising a militia in Chitral under British officers. The military commanders however, had reservations about training and arming tribesmen, whose loyalty was suspect, especially in Waziristan. They were particularly discouraged by the recent experience of an exercise in South Waziristan, where Richard Bruce, the Commissioner of Derajat had tried to replicate the Sandeman model and raised tribal levies to guard the Gomal Pass. The experiment quickly fell apart, when the levies were attacked by the tribesmen, convincing the generals about the futility of recruiting tribesmen to keep peace. Lord Curzon however, was determined in his resolve and in 1900, ordered the raising of militias in Waziristan.[24]

The Frontier Militias were organized on military lines. Each corps had one battalion of around 850 men divided into companies and platoons. A small proportion of the men were mounted. Each corps was commanded by a Major seconded to the Foreign Department from the Indian Army for a period of three years. He was assisted by two army officers posted as Second-in-Command and Adjutant/Quartermaster, although the number of officers varied according to the size of the corps. Most of the officers were from the Punjab Frontier Force, who already had experience of service on the Frontier and spoke Pashto. Companies and platoons were commanded by Militia Officers (JCOs). The rank structure was based on that of the Army. The Militia were dressed in khaki uniform like the rest of the Army and were armed with Snider breech-loading rifles.[25]

Their mission was to man frontier forts, patrol the border, picquet the roads, provide protection to officers and contractors building roads, apprehend raiders, guard prisoners, and to carry out reconnaissance and gather intelligence. They operated within the tribal territory, where they had to not only intercept raiders but also fight them on their own ground, which required high standards of discipline, physical fitness and training.[26] They were called Militia because initially, most of them were recruited for service in their own tribal area. After the Third Afghan War of 1919, when the Waziristan Militias faltered, the policy of local recruitment was modified and their designation was changed to Scouts.[27]

The Militia were deployed in detachments in frontier forts and posts. “But their role was essentially mobile and their characteristic manoeuvre was the *gasht* or patrol of never less than a platoon in strength, and covering as a matter of course thirty miles a day at a steady five miles in the hour”. The strength of the Militia lay in their familiarity with their operational area and their mobility. Unencumbered by heavy weapons or equipment, they could cover long distances in a short period of time unlike the Army, with whom they sometimes worked in cooperation. “Their superior mobility enabled them to move wide to a flank and secure lightly held positions ahead of the slow-moving (army) column”, while their local contacts allowed them to provide latest intelligence to army commanders.[28]

The Frontier Militia was neither trained nor equipped to assault prepared positions or fight major engagements with tribal *lashkars*. That was the job of the Army, the last line of defence. Behind the Militia, the Indian Army was held in reserve in strategically located cantonments.[29] In 1903, Lord Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army delocalized all military units. Consequently, much to the dismay of Frontier authorities, the Punjab Frontier Force was disbanded and its units became liable for service anywhere in India or abroad. Henceforth, the

Army was to act only as a back-up for the Militias, which were the main military force in Political Agencies. However, in time of war or a major outbreak of violence, the Army assumed operational control and the Militia came under its command, while the Political Agent took on an advisory role.[30]

Recruitment of the tribesmen to police their own tribes and to fight against their kin was a gamble. However, the tribesmen were only too happy to join the militias and were also encouraged by their tribes. During Curzon's tour of the Frontier in April 1900, the tribal Maliks assured him that they were proud to see their young men serve in the militias. The promise of a regular salary was a strong inducement for the impoverished tribesmen. Another incentive was the opportunity to partake in their favourite pastime of fighting, while the prospect of going armed with the latest rifle was an added attraction. The militiaman had no problem fighting his fellow tribesmen, since feuding was part of his culture. He was not encumbered with any notions of nationalism in the modern sense, and did not owe allegiance to the British Crown or the Government. His loyalty lay with his officers, who had to earn it.[31]

Which is why officers of the Frontier Militias were chosen with utmost care. Service with the Militia meant prolonged periods of isolation and a life of danger. But it also offered better pay and a generous leave, besides much prestige.[32] It attracted the more adventurous officers, especially in the Waziristan Militias, where the general feeling was "that service therein might mean a short life, if an exciting one".[33] However, appointment in the Militia was not a routine matter. They were selected after stringent scrutiny to ascertain their suitability. Lieutenant Colonel Sir George Roos-Keppel, the Chief Commissioner of NWFP and a former Commandant of Kurram Militia and Khyber Rifles, when asked about the selection procedure of officers in the Frontier Militias, replied that he personally selected each officer after thorough vetting and knew every one of them personally.[34]

As a latter-day officer of South Waziristan Scouts recalled, "Life in those early militia days was very tough. The main posts at Wana and Sarwekai were rough things by comparison with the later posts of the South Waziristan Scouts' days, yet the officers' quarters provided some comfort and tinned and bottled food helped to give the local foods some variation".[35] At the same time, there were compensations too. Besides the generous pay and leave, although in South Waziristan Militia it could mean a long ride to reach their destination,[36] the officers enjoyed much freedom of action and initiative. And since there were no regulations to govern the Militias, administrative duties were simpler, with no returns, indents or audits to hassle the officers.[37]

By the time Lord Curzon left India in 1905, the Frontier Militias were a fully organized paramilitary force. The Northwest Frontier of India from Chitral to Zhob was being looked after by six corps of Militia. To these was added another corps for Gilgit in 1913, bringing the entire frontier under their watch. During this period, the militias were regularly engaged in operations and acquitted themselves well.

The Zhob Militia

In December 1889, Colonel Robert Sandeman received the Government's authorization to raise an irregular paramilitary unit under army officers to be called the Zhob Levy Corps. It was raised at Apozai (later Fort Sandeman; now Zhob) by Captain WAD O'Mealy, 1st Regiment of Cavalry, Punjab Frontier Force (11 Cavalry), who was posted as their Commandant in February 1890. Recruitment started in June. Their sanctioned strength was 526 infantry and 416 cavalry. The class composition was 200 Ghilzais and 100 Brahuis, while the rest were Pakhtuns from Zhob, Quetta and Pishin. The Corps was organized and uniformed on military lines, and armed with Snider rifles. Its mission was to guard the frontier from the River Gomal to Pishin, man frontier

posts vacated by the Army,[38] prevent raids from Afghanistan and Waziristan, and to keep the Gomal Pass open for traffic.[39] It was responsible for the protection of 180 miles of frontier from Loi Band to Gul Kach, besides local law enforcement within Zhob Agency. The Corps was directly under the orders of the Political Officer of Zhob Agency.[40]

With the raising of Zhob Levy Corps, a new start was made in frontier management. The Zhob Levy Corps soon earned the reputation of a highly trained and efficient force. Over the next decades, it underwent a number of reorganizations, with changes in designation and class composition. In 1911, it was designated as Zhob Militia, reverting to Zhob Levy Corps in 1920, and then again to Zhob Militia in 1928. By 1939, its strength had risen to 1400 men in eight companies of infantry and one company of Mounted Infantry under six British officers. Most of its manpower was drawn from Pakhtun tribesmen of Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier.[41]

The Kurram Militia

The British first occupied Kurram in 1878, at the start of the Second Afghan War. The area was mostly inhabited by the Shia Turi tribesmen, who were often in conflict with their Sunni neighbours. Kurram had been occupied by the Afghans as recently as 1850, and the Turis were unhappy with their rapacious conquerors. Under the Treaty of Gandamak in 1879, the Afghans relinquished administrative control of Kurram to the British. In 1880, the tribesmen petitioned the British to recognize their independence, which was accepted. However, incessant feuding among the Turis created a disturbed state in the valley and in 1892, the British annexed Kurram and created Kurram Agency on the request of the tribesmen themselves. It was an unprecedented event, as Kurram was the only tribal area, whose inhabitants had

welcomed British occupation and remained friendly towards them throughout.[42]

The same year, the British raised Kurram Militia to replace the Army in Kurram, as they had done in Zhob. However, unlike the Zhob Levy Corps, it was a militia in its true sense, as it only recruited Turi tribesmen from within the agency. The only exception was a company of 100 Mahsuds. The Militia was composed of 1200 men distributed into two battalions. It was raised as Turi Militia at Balish Khel on 18 October 1892, by Captain CM Dallas, the Assistant Commissioner of Kurram Agency. In December, Captain EWSK Maconchy, DSO, 4th Sikh Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force (6 FF), took over as Commandant, while Lieutenant George Roos-Keppel, Royal Scots Fusiliers, was posted as the Adjutant. These two officers completed the organization and training of the Corps. Soon after, it moved to Parachinar and was renamed as Kurram Militia. Its mission was to guard the Afghan frontier and assist the political authorities in administration of the Agency.[43]

Within a few years of its raising, Kurram Militia was engaged in frontier operations for which it earned much praise. During the frontier uprising of 1897, Orakzai and Chamkani tribesmen planned an attack on Sadda and Parachinar. On 1 September, the post of Balish Khel manned by 20 rifles of Kurram Militia was attacked by Massuzai Orakzais. The militiamen gallantly defended the post for five hours until relieved by the Army. Meanwhile, a detachment 200 rifles joined an Army column in repulsing a 2000-strong Massuzai *lashkar* near Sadda on 16 September.[44] The Kurram Militia took part in further operations with the Army until complete pacification of the tribes in December of that year.[45] Two years later, another uprising of Chamkanis was suppressed by a combined force of Kurram Militia, 22nd Punjab Infantry (7 Punjab) and a tribal *lashkar* under Captain George Roos-Keppel.[46] In 1902, during the Mahsud

Blockade, Kurram Militia sent 210 men to Thall for operations against Kabul Khel Wazirs.[47]

The Khyber Rifles

The strategic importance of Khyber Pass, the principal trade route between India and Central Asia, was fully exploited by the Afridis of Khyber, who controlled the barren hills surrounding the winding pass. They levied toll at gunpoint from all who wished to pass, from travellers and traders to entire armies.[48] During both the First and Second Afghan Wars, the British had to fight their way through a gauntlet of Afridi marksmen. For the British, maintenance of Khyber Pass as a secure line of communication was of vital importance. In November 1878, they occupied the pass and the following year, forced the Afghans to relinquish their claim over it. At the same time, they assured the tribesmen that they had no desire to extend their control over them or to interfere with their independence. Their only concern was the unmolested passage of traffic through the pass. This led to a treaty between the Afridis and the British in February 1881. In return for an annual subsidy, the tribesmen accepted the responsibility for the security of the road, pledged not to levy tolls or launch raids and to furnish a tribal levy of Jezailchis to protect the caravans travelling through the pass. Having concluded the agreement, British forces withdrew from Khyber in March 1881.[49]

The man behind the British enterprise in Khyber was Captain (later Colonel Sir) Robert Warburton, Political Officer of the newly formed Khyber Agency. Warburton was a remarkable man with an unusual background. The son of a British army officer and an Afghan princess, he had great empathy for the tribesmen, whose culture and language he understood, and who accepted him as one of their own. This mutual respect allowed Warburton to amicably manage the affairs of Khyber Agency to the satisfaction of both parties. Warburton was fortunate to have as his assistant

another notable man in the person of Captain (later Colonel Nawab Sir) Muhammad Aslam Khan, the Commandant of Khyber Rifles. Aslam Khan was the son of Sardar Usman Khan, vizier and cousin of Shah Shuja, the last Saddozai king of Afghanistan. When the Saddozai dynasty was overthrown in 1843, Usman Khan was given refuge by the Afridis. Aslam Khan, himself a man of commanding presence and great qualities, was able to appeal to those old loyalties among the Afridis.[50] These two remarkable men shaped the affairs of Khyber for eighteen years and their names are inextricably linked with Khyber and Khyber Rifles.

In November 1878, when the British invaded Afghanistan, their passage through Khyber Pass was opposed by the tribesmen. The British brokered a deal with Afridi Maliks, who in return for payments, agreed to allow them safe passage, and provide a levy of 335 tribesmen armed with jezails to protect Khyber Pass. These Jezailchis would later earn fame as Khyber Rifles.[51] On 17 August 1879, Lieutenant Gilbert Gaisford, 5th Punjab Infantry (10 FF), was appointed their Commandant. At the end of the war, the Khyber Jezailchi Corps were retained by the British under the terms of the treaty signed with Afridis on 17 February 1881. The Government also decided to appoint a native officer to their command and on 1 March, Captain Gaisford was posted out.[52] He was replaced by Risaldar Major and Honorary Captain Sardar Muhammad Aslam Khan, 5th Bengal Cavalry, who at that time was posted as Assistant Political Officer at Landi Kotal.[53]

The Khyber Jezailchis were an irregular outfit with loose discipline and no formal military training. Indifferently dressed and armed with their antiquated jezails, their appearance could hardly have inspired much confidence. But they were ideally suited for the role assigned to them.[54] Captain Aslam Khan immediately set about putting them in shape. According to Warburton, “When he (Aslam Khan) took charge they were an untidy, unkempt band of excellent men, very good material for warfare in any country,

but without any discipline or *esprit-de-corps*. The tribesmen called them Sur-Lakkais, or red-tails, from a piece of red tag stuck in their turbans to distinguish them from the rest of their brethren. By dint of patience, we persevered in the course we had adopted, knowing for certain from long experience that the Afridi recruit was just as proud of a good, well-disciplined corps as either Goorkha, Pathan, or Sikh, all that he objected to being interference with his ancestral tribal customs".[55] Soon, their hard work paid off and the Jezailchis started looking and acting like a disciplined force. Aslam Khan would command the Corps for 16 years until 1897, when he was appointed Political Officer of Khyber Agency on Warburton's retirement.[56]

The Jezailchis soon proved their worth by turning out to be a loyal and effective force, prompting the Punjab Government to record that, "the Khaibar on Kafila day is as safe as a high road in India".[57] In February 1882, some Zakha Khel Afridis attacked a caravan near Ali Masjid. They were met with a fusillade of musket fire by two companies of Khyber Jezailchis, ironically enough, composed of Zakha Khels. The marauders were forced to beat a hasty retreat. The Khyber Jezailchis had passed their first test, vindicating Warburton's trust in them.[58]

The Khyber Jezailchis were renamed as Khyber Rifles in 1887, because by now, they were armed with rifles instead of jezails.[59] Their strength was 550, and as a mark of trust in which they were held, they were permitted to serve outside their home territory.[60] However, they continued to be governed by the agreement of 1881, which had placed them under tribal control. But gradually, the Corps was "regularized" and the tribal control ended. In 1888, just before their departure on the Black Mountain Expedition, they were issued with uniforms and armed with Snider rifles.[61] Their new uniform was the army issue khaki blouse (*kurta*), loose baggy knee-length knickerbocker trousers with putties (woolen or cotton bandage-like strips of cloth wound

around lower legs), brown leather belts, Peshawari *chaplis* and khaki pagri with the distinctive red tag. The Khyber Rifles for all practical purposes had become a paramilitary unit in their outlook and organization.[62]

In 1888, serious disturbances broke out in the Black Mountain Range of northern Hazara, when a blood feud among Yusufzai tribesmen spilled over into settled territory. The tribesmen went on a killing spree, which included two army officers and four sepoys. After the tribesmen ignored British terms of submission, military action was ordered.[63] Although not obliged to serve outside Khyber, the Khyber Rifles enthusiastically volunteered for service with the Hazara Field Force, preparing to launch a punitive expedition in the Black Mountains. It was a measure of their high reputation gained in the Khyber that the services of Khyber Rifles were readily accepted.[64]

Major Aslam Khan led the 350-strong contingent of Khyber Rifles. It was the first time that a Frontier Corps unit operated outside its home territory. The operation began on 1 October and was over within weeks, with the tribesmen eventually submitting to the British in November. The Khyber Rifles received much praise for their dash and gallantry in charging enemy *sangars* (stone breastworks) up the steep mountain slopes. Major General JW McQueen, Commander of the Hazara Field Force reported: “Their rapidity of movement over the hills and familiarity of the tactics pursued by the enemy have proved them to be troops of the very best material”.[65] The unit earned six Indian Orders of Merit (IOM)* for gallantry. Prominent among them was Subedar Major Mir Akbar Khan, who was decorated for numerous acts of bravery under fire. He led his men from the front in several attacks on the hostile tribesmen. During an attack on a village, the fearless officer charged a group of six tribesmen to save a

* Until they became eligible for Victoria Cross in 1911, the Indian Order of Merit was the highest gallantry award available to Indians.

wounded sepoy. Another recipient of IOM was Jemadar Mohammed Ghalli, who fearlessly led his men in frontal attacks on six different occasions.[66]

In March 1891, the Khyber Rifles found themselves back in the Black Mountains on another punitive expedition. Lieutenant Colonel Aslam Khan, despite his advancing years, insisted on leading his men. On 21 March, a detachment of Khyber Rifles came under fire from a *sangar* on a hill. The charge up the hill was led by Colonel Aslam himself and succeeded in dislodging the hostiles.[67] Their splendid performance in the Black Mountain expeditions earned the Khyber Rifles many accolades and gained them the reputation of a formidable fighting unit. However, six years later, their existence was seriously threatened and almost spelt the end of the Corps.

In 1897, the entire Frontier from Malakand to Waziristan erupted in a great tribal uprising. In Khyber, some mullahs on the instigation of the Afghans declared jihad and persuaded the Afridis in joining the insurrection. On 17 August, a 10,000-strong Afridi *lashkar* with 1500 Afghan horsemen advanced towards Landi Kotal. The 825 men of Khyber Rifles distributed on posts were not in a position to withstand such an onslaught. Captain FJH Barton, the new Commandant of Khyber Rifles, requested military reinforcements from the Commissioner of Peshawar, who instead, ordered him to withdraw to Jamrud at the eastern end of Khyber Pass, along with Abdul Karim Khan, the Assistant Political Officer. The retirement of the Commandant had a negative effect on the morale of his troops, whose loyalty was already being tested by the presence of their kinfolk among the *lashkar*. Some of them deserted, while a few joined the rebels.[68]

Meanwhile, the tribesmen looted and burnt Fort Maude, Ali Masjid, Landi Kotal and all other posts of Khyber Rifles. The isolated and outnumbered garrisons put up a gallant fight but were eventually overrun by overwhelming forces. Subedar Mursil Khan

gallantly defended Landi Kotal Fort for 24 hours before he was killed in a fierce firefight on 25 August. One of his sons was at his side, while two were outside with the *lashkar*. They were sent in to ask him to surrender but he refused, threatening to shoot them if they did not leave. It was a poignant example of the dilemma of divided loyalties faced by the men of Khyber Rifles during those testing times. Seven men of Khyber Rifles were killed with another seven wounded during the uprising. The disintegration of Khyber Rifles led to the closure of Khyber Pass. In the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel Aslam Khan, the new Political Officer of Khyber, had rushed to Jamrud from Peshawar to remind the Afridi Maliks of their obligations under the treaty of 1881. The Maliks, however, pleaded helplessness.[69]

The events in the Khyber could not have occurred at a more unfortunate time, as Colonel Warburton had left on retirement and Colonel Aslam Khan was at Peshawar taking over the charge of Political Officer. Warburton had been pleading with the Government for years to appoint officers to Khyber Rifles, who could take over when he and Aslam Khan retired. However, the Government's tardy response meant that Captain Barton, the new Commandant of Khyber Rifles, was still in settling down phase, when the rebellion broke out. The new Commandant's inexperience notwithstanding, what everyone had failed to understand was that the loyalty of Khyber Rifles was to Warburton and Aslam Khan and not to the British Government. As soon as these two men departed, the steadiness of the Corps was compromised. To compound the problem, when the situation in Khyber became serious, the authorities in Peshawar deprived Khyber Rifles of their Commandant and then failed to support them with regular troops. However, it is a credit to the Khyber Rifles that despite being abandoned by the authorities, most of the men remained loyal and managed to reach Jamrud.[70] Lieutenant General Sir William Lockhart, Commander Tirah Field Force

wrote: “I think it highly creditable to the Khyber Rifles that, when left to their own resources, they fought as well as they did”.[71]

The British assembled the Tirah Field Force of two divisions under General Lockhart to crush the Afridi revolt. Colonel Warburton was recalled to active duty and appointed Chief Political Officer of the Field Force. The force invaded the Afridi stronghold of Tirah on 18 October, followed by Bazar Valley and Khyber Pass. The tribesmen’s resistance was eventually broken and on 2 April 1898, their Maliks offered their submission. The British imposed harsh penalties including heavy fines and the return of all stolen weapons and property of Khyber Rifles.[72] Although the Khyber Rifles had ceased to exist as a unit, some of them had regrouped at Jamrud and a detachment of the Corps was in the vanguard of the force, which retook Ali Masjid in December 1897. As the British re-established control over Khyber, the rest of the scattered men of Khyber Rifles also returned and the Corps was reformed at Jamrud in March 1898.[73]

After the end of hostilities in 1898, the authorities decided to reorganize Khyber Rifles as an irregular paramilitary corps under British officers on the pattern of Kurram Militia. The Corps was to be armed, equipped and trained by the Government. It was to be a militia, recruited locally but liable for general service. Its mission as before was to escort and protect caravans through the Khyber Pass from Jamrud to Torkham on the Afghan frontier, a distance of 25 miles. An Army Moveable Column at Peshawar was to be prepared to render prompt support in case of any emergency.[74]

In June 1899, the Khyber Rifles were reorganized under Captain Barton according to the new arrangement. Their strength was 1250 men divided into two battalions, with six companies each of 100 men, and Mounted Infantry of 50 sowars. Eight companies were recruited from among the different clans of Afridis, while the rest were composed of other tribes of Khyber

such as the Shinwaris and Mullagoris. They were authorized six British officers, whose term of appointment was five years except the Commandant, who was appointed for seven. The Corps was uniformed as before and also acquired a pipe band. The new Headquarters of Khyber Rifles were at Jamrud, with a strong detachment at Landi Kotal. The remainder were deployed on posts between the two locations.[75] In 1906, the Headquarters relocated to Landi Kotal. The appointments of Political Officer of Khyber Agency and Commandant Khyber Rifles were combined, and in 1900, Captain George Roos-Keppel was appointed to both positions.[76]

The first test for the reorganized Khyber Rifles came in 1907, when the Zakha Khel Afridis of Bazar Valley renewed their raiding in the settled areas. The Border Military Police, armed with old Snider rifles was no match for the tribesmen, who during the last decade had acquired the more advanced Martini-Henry rifles from Afghanistan through a sophisticated smuggling network based at Muscat in the Persian Gulf. Lieutenant Colonel Roos-Keppel initially responded by withholding the annual allowance of the Zakha Khels. This angered the tribesmen and they approached the Afghans for aid, who were only too happy to support them against the British. The tribesmen renewed their raids with a vengeance and by 1908, the situation for the British had become intolerable. In February, the Bazar Valley Expeditionary Force of three infantry brigades under Major General Sir James Willcocks was assembled at Peshawar to invade the Zakha Khel stronghold. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Roos-Keppel was to lead a flanking move from Landi Kotal with 800 men of Khyber Rifles and a Gurkha battalion to cut off the tribesmen's escape route to Afghanistan.[77] Before moving out, he assembled the Corps, which included 350 Zakha Khels, and offered them the choice of six months' leave in case they did not want to fight their kin. Not a single man took up the offer.[78]

On 14 February 1908, the Field Force began its advance into Zakha Khel territory and within a week, pounded them into submission. Meanwhile, the Khyber Rifles had sealed their escape routes into Afghanistan. On 27 February, the Zakha Khels submitted. Accolades poured in for the splendid performance of Khyber Rifles. General Willcocks credited their rapid advance and exemplary conduct as one of the reasons for the swift British victory.[79] As a reward for their outstanding performance, service in the Khyber Rifles was made pensionable, which until then was not available to them.[80]

The dust had hardly settled in the Khyber Pass, when a new threat appeared in the form of Mohmands, who were unhappy with British plans, since shelved, of constructing a railway line through their territory. In April, they began assembling a large *lashkar* of 10,000 men, many of them Afghans. On 1 May 1908, the *lashkar* attacked Landi Kotal Fort, defended by 600 men of Khyber Rifles under Lieutenant Colonel Roos-Keppel. The Khyber Rifles again proved themselves equal to the task, when they beat back repeated attacks by the tribesmen for three days. On 4 May, the siege was lifted on the arrival of an army brigade, which dispersed the *lashkar*. Meanwhile, at the post of Michni Kandao, fifty men of Khyber Rifles under Subedar Tor Khan fought off 4000 tribesmen after 17 hours of fierce fighting.[81]

The Zakha Khel and Mohmand operations re-established the reputation of Khyber Rifles as a well-trained and effective force. The person responsible for this was their Commandant Lieutenant Colonel George Roos-Keppel, who had honed them into a fine fighting outfit. In July 1908, he was appointed Chief Commissioner of NWFP and Agent to the Governor-General. His appointment to such high office was a recognition of his stellar qualities and achievements on the Frontier. Roos-Keppel was from a British regiment, which was unusual, as most officers of the Political Service were from the Indian Army. Despite that, he made

a place for himself in the Foreign Department through sheer dint of hard work and commitment. As Chief Commissioner of NWFP, his enduring legacy is the establishment of Islamia College Peshawar on the pattern of Aligarh University. His proficiency over the Pashto language was such that he even wrote a book on Pashto grammar, besides translating several Pashto texts into English. He had a great affinity for Pakhtuns, and Sir Olaf Caroe described him as "a Pathan among Pathans."[82] A man of forceful personality, his effective Frontier administration earned him lasting fame and admiration. In September 1909, on the request of all ranks of Khyber Rifles, he was appointed their Honorary Colonel.[83]

The Waziristan Militias

The Wazirs and in particular, the Mahsuds, were the most independent-minded and belligerent of all the frontier tribes. Their incessant raiding into the settled areas made them a thorn in the side of the British, while their intransigence made any political settlement impossible. The difficult and inaccessible nature of their territory made military operations in Waziristan a daunting task. Although the British invaded Waziristan no less than 17 times between 1852 and 1939, they were unable to pacify it.[84] Having failed militarily, they tried to follow Sandeman's example by implementing the Maliki system in Waziristan, with payment of allowances to Maliks and raising of tribal levies in 1895, to guard their lines of communication. However, the scheme fell apart due to the hostility of the tribesmen, who were averse to all authority including that of their Maliks. Richard Bruce, the Political Officer, who had raised the levies, felt that their failure was due to the absence of army officers to command them, whose posting had been refused by the authorities. When Lord Curzon proposed the idea of replacing the Indian Army in Waziristan with militias in 1899, he took his cue from the satisfactory state of the three militia

corps in Zhob, Kurram and Khyber, which were all under the command of army officers.[85]

Meanwhile, the situation in Waziristan had been unsettled for some time. In 1894, the Mahsuds objected to the presence of British troops on their territory and attacked the Wana camp of British Boundary Commission, which was demarcating the frontier with Afghanistan. In response, the British invaded Waziristan and brought it under their permanent control. The territory was divided into the Agencies of North and South Waziristan and military cantonments were established at Miranshah in Tochi Valley and Wana in the south. The operation kept the Mahsuds quiet for some time but in 1897, the Wazirs of Tochi Valley rose up in revolt, while in 1900, the Mahsuds resumed their attacks. The man suspected of being the chief instigator of violence was a Mahsud religious leader called Mullah Powindah, who wielded considerable influence over the tribesmen. The renewed attacks led to a blockade of the Mahsuds in December, which lasted until 1902, when they eventually submitted.[86]

It was in this setting that orders were issued in May 1900, for the raising of North and South Waziristan Militias, for the protection of Tochi and Gomal Passes respectively. They were to be concentrated in commanding forts along strategic routes, ready to "strike in force when necessary". In case of need, they were to be supported by moveable military columns based at Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. The militias were to be under the control of Political Officers of Tochi and Wana. Each corps was to be the size of a battalion of 850 men, divided into two 'Wings' of four companies each. Fifty of the men were to be mounted. They were placed under three Indian Army officers posted as Commandant, Second-in-Command and Adjutant. Lord Curzon personally selected the Commanding Officers: Captain AF Ferguson-Davie, DSO, 3rd Sikh Infantry (5 FF), for North Waziristan Militia, and Major Richard Harman, DSO, 4th Sikh Infantry (6 FF), for South

Waziristan Militia. In preparation for the new raisings, they were posted to Richard Bruce's Tochi and Wana Levies in late 1899. They were to absorb all suitable men of the levies into the militias. As a precautionary measure, it was decided that half the strength of Waziristan Militias would be recruited from outside the two agencies. On receiving their orders in May, both officers visited Kurram to observe the working of Kurram Militia.[87]

The North Waziristan Militia was raised at Idak on 1 June 1900. The new Commandant had been authorized to nominate his own officers. Captain Ferguson-Davie selected Lieutenant JF Finnis, 3rd Sikh Infantry, as his Second-in-Command and Lieutenant Charles Godwin, 3rd Punjab Cavalry (11 Cavalry), as his Adjutant. Lieutenant Godwin recalled that, "the advantages held out were—an adventurous life, allowances in addition to the ordinary pay of the Indian Army, also a very free hand and the promise of the status of political officers". Some of the Militia Officers (JCOs) and all the drill instructors were posted in from the Punjab Frontier Force. The nucleus of the Corps was formed by Tochi Levy, whom Lieutenant Godwin described as "local tribesmen armed with a 'Tower musket' and given a khaki pugri (turban). They were under the control of the Political Agent, and arrested anyone he wanted, that is if they could, and usually they couldn't! They arrested persons they didn't like, and then made up a case against them. They interrupted raiding gangs if it suited them, or shut themselves in their Towers and also shut their eyes. They really had quite an impossible role to carry out, and I don't blame them for what they left undone".[88] It was from this inauspicious beginning that one of the finest units of the Frontier Corps got its start.

The Headquarters of North Waziristan Militia were initially established at Bannu, and recruitment drive was started. The Militia mostly took in Wazirs with some Daurs. Later, a company each of Mahsuds and Afridis was added. Meanwhile, the Deputy

Commissioner of Bannu, who was tasked with recruiting the *cis*-Frontier men, selected Marwats, Bannuchis, Khattaks and others. The Militia moved to Idak, where it was formally raised on 1 June 1900. The training of the men started in earnest and they were issued with Snider rifles and the standard army uniform of khaki pagri, kurta and loose baggy trousers with putties. The only difference being the *chaplis* for footwear. A parade was ordered after the issue of uniforms for the Commandant's inspection. The Adjutant went for a preliminary inspection and "nearly fainted. All the new coats were a dirty black and covered in smears. The Waziri Subedar came up grinning with pride and said the men had spent the whole night rubbing *dumba* (sheep) fat into the new Khaki to make it waterproof".[89]

Even before the North Waziristan Militia had been brought up to strength, they started taking over posts from the Army. Within two months of their raising, they were sent into action, when two companies were attached with a punitive expedition against the Madda Khel Wazirs at Maizar. The officers found their conduct most encouraging. Later that year, the Mahsud Blockade was enforced and the Militia was deployed on the blockade line. The next two years were spent building new posts at Saidgi, Khajuri, Thall, Isha, Tut Narai, Datta Khel and Spina Khaisora. While the Army was confined to its camps, the "Militia did all the patrolling, picquetting and pursuing of raiding parties". There were no manuals of tactics or procedures to guide them, and the officers devised their own by learning from experience. They soon learnt that it was a waste of time chasing the raiders, who were hardly ever caught. The best way to stop raiding was to launch a counter-raid. When news of raiders was received, the Militia from their local intelligence network usually knew where they had originated, and would raid that village and bring back hostages and cattle. It was a crude but effective tactic.[90]

For leisure, the officers indulged in *shikar* and fishing, and played golf, for which they laid out two 'golf courses' at Idak and Miranshah. The golf courses were mere patches of dirt with armed guards for protection but the officers were quite pleased with them. Meanwhile, the men played hockey and football. Everyone remained busy. Lieutenant Godwin recalled, "I was 2½ years in Tochi. I never slept more than a week at headquarters or any post, and spent the rest of my time on tour, paying the men, inspecting and training them. I never had an idle moment, and looking back on it, I consider it the happiest time of my life".[91] In October 1904, Headquarters of the North Waziristan Militia shifted to Miranshah, which became their permanent home.[92]

The South Waziristan Militia was raised at Tank on 1 July 1900.[93] It recruited three companies of Mahsuds and one of Wazirs from within the Agency, while its *cis*-Frontier manpower was drawn from Bhittanis, Gandapurs and other Pathans of Dera Ismail Khan along with Punjabis. The Militia Headquarters moved to Wana and assumed responsibility for the protection of Gomal Pass. When the Mahsud Blockade was imposed, Mahsuds in the Militia were discharged. They were reinstated after the lifting of the blockade in 1902. In the meantime, training and organization of the Militia continued and it gradually took over posts from the Army.[94] Like its sister militia in the north, the South Waziristan Militia were also dressed in khaki and armed with Snider rifles.

Things were working out smoothly in the Tochi Valley. However, Major Harman in South Waziristan was facing a different problem in the form of Mahsuds. It was not that they were bad soldiers. In fact they have been described as "the finest fighters in the world".[95] In the Indian Army, they were recruited by the Baluch battalions, where they performed well.[96] During the First World War, the Mahsuds of 129th Baluchis (11 Baloch), who served in France and East Africa, "seemed to revel in the fighting".[97] But that might have been because in the Army, away

from home, they were not susceptible to local intrigues. Meanwhile, as if to underscore their unpredictable nature, the Mahsuds of 130th Baluchis (12 Baloch) refused to fight against the Turks and had to be disbanded.[98] As soldiers, they were well liked by their officers both in the Army as well as in the Militia. However, it was their volatile nature, especially while serving in their own area that was the cause of anxiety for their officers in South Waziristan Militia.[99]

By 1904, the two Militias were up and running. There was a semblance of peace in the two agencies and raiding had been appreciably reduced. The Militias took over the responsibility for all military posts in Waziristan and the Army was withdrawn except for the garrison at Jandola.[100] In September, the Government declared the militia experiment as "satisfactory beyond all our expectations". However, appearances can be deceptive, especially in Waziristan, and the verdict was premature. That same month, Captain JB Bowring, the Political Agent, was murdered in his sleep by a Mahsud sepoy at the post of Sarwekai. The culprit claimed that he had killed the officer because he was sleeping with his feet towards Mecca. He was sentenced to death. But that brought up another problem. The clan of whoever carried out the execution would then be embroiled in a blood feud with the murderer's clan. An acceptable solution was found, when his own brother, a Naik, agreed to execute him to avoid any blood feud.[101]

Lieutenant Colonel Richard Harman, the Commandant, tried to take preventive measures by carrying out vetting of all Mahsud recruits through their Maliks and Mahsud Militia Officers. This was resented by Mullah Powindah, who had been infiltrating his men in the Militia. Retribution was quick in coming. In January 1905, Colonel Harman was bayoneted to death by a Mahsud sepoy, while having dinner in the Mess at Wana. His last words were, "They've got me. I knew they would". Events had taken an ominous turn and all 400 Mahsuds in the Militia were disarmed.

But it was not the end, and in November, the Brigade Major of Bannu Brigade was shot dead by a Mahsud ex-militiaman.[102]

In 1906, the Mahsuds renewed their raids and there appeared to be a deliberate plan to assassinate British officers in Waziristan, who were virtually prisoners in their forts.[103] The British suspected that Mullah Powindah was behind the assassination of officers and was trying to destroy the militias. That year, under pressure from the Mullah, the Mahsud *jirga* withdrew tribal guarantees and Mahsud companies in South Waziristan Militia were permanently disbanded, although the Mahsud company in North Waziristan Militia was retained.[104] Mullah Powindah continued to create trouble for the British until his death in 1913. In his single-minded determination to preserve the independence of the Mahsuds, Mullah Powindah was an implacable foe of the British for more than twenty years.[105] He would not be the last.

The Chitral Scouts

The State of Chitral, located among the lofty peaks of Hindu Kush, was completely isolated from the rest of the country. The Mehtar of Chitral, who felt threatened by the Afghans, was friendly toward the British and the population was peaceful. In 1892, he died and a dynastic struggle ensued among his heirs. On the request of the new Mehtar, a British Political Officer with a small military escort was despatched to Chitral. Meanwhile, taking advantage of the unrest, Umra Khan, the Khan of Jandool in Dir invaded Chitral and besieged the British mission in 1895. Two relief columns were despatched from Gilgit, and Peshawar through Malakand Pass. After a brief campaign, Umra Khan was defeated and the British assumed control of Chitral's external affairs. At the same time, the Malakand Agency was created comprising Chitral, Dir and Swat, and military garrisons were permanently based in Malakand and at Drosh in Chitral. However, the Russian threat

continued to tax British minds, especially the safety of the northern passes through which an irregular force could gain access to Chitral from Russian Turkestan.[106] To guard against such a contingency, the Political Officer of Chitral recommended the raising of a 'Corps of Scouts' of 'trained cragsmen' from Chitral, to scout the remote mountain passes and to act as a screen and delaying force until the arrival of the Army. This was something that Lord Curzon had advocated as early as 1895, and he ordered the raising of Chitral Scouts in 1903.[107]

The Chitral Scouts were raised at Chitral on 23 July 1903, by Captain Henry de Courcy O'Grady, 59th Scinde Rifles (1 FF).[108] Their initial strength was 500 men under the command of two British officers, later increased to a thousand men divided into two wings. The Chitral Scouts were a militia, as the men were all locally recruited and were called for training for only one month in a year. They were armed with Martini-Henry rifles and dressed in khaki uniform and the Chitrali cap called *pakol*. The Headquarters of the Corps were situated at Chitral and the Mehtar was appointed their Honorary Commandant. In the absence of any internal or external threats, the Scouts had a peaceful routine, although they had the reputation of being excellent marksmen and passionate polo players. Their only significant engagement was during the Third Afghan War, when they repulsed an Afghan incursion in 1919. Lack of action in the following years led to some deterioration in their standards. In 1931, they were reorganized by Captain HCL Youngman and Lieutenant William Sandison, who started proper training and regular *gashting*. In 1942, the military garrison at Drosh was withdrawn and Chitral Scouts were reorganized as a full-time paramilitary corps responsible for the defence of the State. Their designation was changed to Chitral State Scouts and they came under the administrative control of the Frontier Corps. They reverted to their original designation of Chitral Scouts in 1956, when Pakistan became a republic.[109]

The Corps of Gilgit Scouts

Gilgit and Baltistan are called the 'Roof of the World', where the mighty Himalayan, Karakoram and Pamir mountain ranges converge. The area was under the control of the Maharaja of Kashmir since 1849. However, due to its remoteness, the Maharaja's writ was weak. The British first explored the region in 1870. Concerned about the vulnerability of northern passes to Chinese and Russian ingress, they established Gilgit Agency in 1877. The Agency was withdrawn in 1881, only to be reinstated in 1889, following fresh concerns about Russia. They also wanted to keep a close eye on the local chiefs and their relations with Russia and China. Initially, the maintenance of law and order was the responsibility of Kashmir State forces. But after the rebellion in Hunza and Nagar in 1891, when the Indian Army had to be called in to suppress the revolt, the British raised a force of levies for local policing directly under their control.[110] In 1913, they decided to disband the levies, whose performance had been unsatisfactory, and replace them with a militia under British officers on the pattern of Chitral Scouts and with a similar role.[111]

The Corps of Gilgit Scouts was raised at Gilgit on 1 October 1913, by Captain FH Bridges, 5th Gurkha Rifles.[112] The Corps was under the control of the Political Agent of Gilgit and was commanded by a British Captain with another officer as Assistant Commandant. Initially, the Corps consisted of 656 men divided into eight companies of 80 men each, recruited from Hunza, Nagar, Yasin, Gilgit, Gupis, Kuh Ghizar and Punial. Like their counterparts in Chitral, they were a militia, and the men were called for training one month in a year. They were armed with .303 Lee Enfield rifles and dressed in grey or khaki uniforms with their traditional *khoi* caps. Companies and platoons were commanded by Scout Officers, who were mostly relatives of the local Rajas and Mirs. These officers wielded considerable influence. Expense for

the upkeep of the Corps was borne by the Kashmir Durbar. Besides keeping a watch over the northern passes, Gilgit Scouts were also responsible for local law enforcement. In addition to their Headquarters at Gilgit, they were deployed on three posts at Chilas, Gupis and the 11,500-foot high Kalamdarchi on the Chinese border.[113]

Gilgit Scouts were famous for their legendary marching endurance and speed. According to Major WA Brown, "It was on patrol, or *gasht* as it is called, that the Gilgit Scouts came into their own and I defy any other troops in the world to compete with them in mountain craft, endurance, trail work and camp life. The kit for gashting would consist of *chaplis*, woollen socks (leather socks if snow was likely to be encountered), grey *partugs* or baggy trousers, a grey shirt, a brown *koi*, a rifle and bayonet, seventy rounds of ammunition in a bandolier, a greatcoat slung on the back, one blanket between three men, a water bottle, three days' rations in a haversack, first field dressing, and anti-glare glasses for snow and sun. A patrol would consist of anything from ten to thirty men and would normally be led by an officer. Patrols would average 20-25 miles a day over incredibly steep and mountainous country. A patrol was entirely independent and self-contained for three days. There was an occasion, when I was Commandant, when a Hunza platoon covered the fantastic distance of 120 miles in two and a half days from Kalamdarchi Post on the southern slopes of the Hindu Kush to Gilgit".[114]

Service with the Gilgit Scouts was much sought after by British officers fond of mountaineering. The entire area was breathtakingly beautiful, the population was friendly and peaceful, and Gilgit was a family station. British officers could indulge in mountain climbing and *shikar* to their heart's content. The local sports of polo and falconry were added attractions.[115] The Gilgit Scouts did not see much action, although during the First World War, eight companies were deployed on the Chinese border, while

three companies were sent to Chitral to guard the northern passes during the Third Afghan War.[116] In 1935, Gilgit Agency was leased by the British from the Maharaja, and all Jammu & Kashmir troops were withdrawn. The Gilgit Scouts were reorganized on the pattern of other Frontier Scouts, and in 1937, they came under the administrative control of Inspecting Officer, Frontier Corps. The British assumed all expenses for their maintenance. They were now embodied for duty all year round and were responsible for the internal and external security of the entire Agency.[117] Despite their outstanding qualities, Gilgit Scouts remained in the background and out of limelight until 1947, when they burst on the scene by raising the flag of freedom in Gilgit and Baltistan.

The Mekran Levy Corps

With the raising of Chitral Scouts, most of the western border of India had come under the watch of Frontier Militias, with the exception of the frontier with Persia. This vast and sparsely populated area was unpoliced on both sides of the frontier, which the British wanted to secure by raising a militia on the pattern of Zhob Levy Corps. Consequently, the Mekran Levy Corps was raised at Mastung by Captain Frank McConaghey, 5th Punjab Cavalry (12 Cavalry) on 5 July 1904. In December, the Corps proceeded to Panjgur, which became its permanent headquarters. The Corps was composed of 200 infantry and 140 Mounted Infantry; all recruited from among Sarawan Brahuis. It was deployed on a number of posts along the Persian frontier. The Commandant of the Corps was the Assistant for Mekran to the Political Agent of Kalat. He was assisted by an Adjutant, who was an officer of the Indian Army. Besides policing the frontier, the Mekran Levy Corps was also responsible for local law enforcement. Service conditions in the remote and harsh area were tough but unlike the militias on the Northwest Frontier, the Mekran Levy Corps had a peaceful existence.[118]

The Chagai Levy Corps

At the same time, to protect the Nushki-Seistan trade route and to strengthen the posts on the Sanjrani frontier, a body of mounted men, better armed and equipped than ordinary levies, called the Chagai Levy Corps (now Nushki Militia), was formed in 1905, from District Levies originally raised in 1896. They were classified as 'First Class Levies', and posted at Diwan Chah, Kacha, Robat and Seistan, with their Headquarters at Nushki. Their strength was 128, enlisted from among Rustamzai Brahuis of Kalat and Rakhshani Baloch tribesmen. The Corps was commanded by an Assistant Superintendent of Police and Levies.[119] Later, he was replaced by a Native Officer of the Indian Army, who served as Adjutant under the supervision of Political Agent Chagai, who was also the *ex-officio* Commandant.[120] In January 1921, the Corps was disbanded for administrative reasons.[121] It was re-raised on 1 July 1925, and made responsible for 600 miles of Chagai frontier.[122]

Establishment of the Frontier Corps

By 1906, there were five corps of Militia on the Northwest Frontier. All of them were operating independently under their Commandants without any central authority to supervise their affairs. While the term 'Frontier Corps' to describe them collectively had been in use since 1903,[123] it was a rather nebulous entity without any headquarters or authority. An officer of the Indian Army was posted as 'Staff Officer to the Chief Commissioner for Border Military Police and Militia in the North-West Frontier Province', to look after Militia affairs but he had no authority to inspect the Militia or exercise any control over them. In June 1906, the Chief Commissioner of NWFP proposed that, "An officer of the rank of Colonel be appointed as Inspector-General of Irregular Forces in the North-West Frontier Province, responsible for all arrangements pertaining to the efficiency of

these corps". The Government approved the proposal but changed the designation to 'Inspecting Officer, Frontier Corps'. His tenure was limited to three years.[124] Initially, only the Khyber Rifles, Kurram Militia and the two Waziristan Militias were in his charge.

Lieutenant Colonel WC Barratt, DSO, 51st Sikhs (3 FF), Staff Officer to the Chief Commissioner for Border Military Police and Militia in the North-West Frontier Province, was appointed as the first Inspecting Officer, Frontier Corps, on 25 March 1907. He was to "be in command of the militia and responsible for their efficiency and discipline", for which he was to periodically inspect them. The existing arrangements, under which the Commandants were responsible for the drill, discipline, and interior economy of their corps, while being subordinate to the Political Agent in political and operational matters, were to continue as before.[125]

At the same time, Second Lieutenant Khan Muhammad Akbar Khan of the Imperial Cadet Corps, was appointed Orderly Officer to the Inspecting Officer on 2 May 1907.[126] A year later, he requested to be transferred and the post was abolished. In 1901, Lord Curzon had established the Imperial Cadet Corps to impart military training to Indian aristocracy. However, these officers were not allowed to serve in Indian units until 1917, when nine of them, including Akbar Khan, a landlord of Mardan, were granted King's Commissions in the Indian Army. Commissioned in the Imperial Cadet Corps on 4 July 1905, he had a distinguished service record during the First World War, and served as Second-in-Command of 1/124th Baluchistan Infantry (6 Baloch) during the Third Afghan War in 1919. After resigning his commission in 1921, he held important positions including Member of the Council of State. For his distinguished services, he was knighted, created a Nawab and granted the honorary rank of Lieutenant Colonel.[127] Lieutenant Colonel Nawab Sir Muhammad Akbar Khan of Hoti, KBE, CIE (1885-1952), holds the distinction of being the first Pakistani officer of Frontier Corps.

The Inspecting Officer, Frontier Corps (IOFC), was appointed by the Chief Commissioner (later Governor) of NWFP, usually from among ex-Commandants of the Frontier Corps. In 1921, his designation was changed to Inspecting Officer, Frontier Corps, and Secretary to the Chief Commissioner; becoming Inspecting Officer and Secretary, Frontier Corps, NWFP, in 1932. As the designation implied, his status was that of a Secretary in the provincial administration. He was responsible for the over-all administration of the Frontier Corps units of NWFP. In 1937, the Gilgit Scouts were also placed under his supervision, followed by Chitral Scouts in 1942. However, his authority was only supervisory and administrative, while the operational control of these corps remained with the Political Agents, who answered to the Chief Commissioner of NWFP in his capacity as Agent to the Governor-General. Meanwhile in Balochistan, the Agent to the Governor-General for Baluchistan exercised both operational as well as administrative control over Frontier Militias. In 1937, the administrative control of Zhob Militia was also transferred to the IOFC.[128]

The Inspecting Officer or 'Chief Scout', as he was informally called, was assisted by a small civilian staff of a Comptroller of Finance and a few clerks. He controlled the budget allocation of different corps and co-ordinated their affairs including allotment of weapons and equipment. He also supervised their training and organization, and acted as liaison with the Army High Command. The IOFC was vested with considerable legal powers in matters relating to discipline within the Frontier Corps. As his responsibilities increased during the Second World War, two officers were posted to his staff to assist him. He was also made responsible for the postings of officers of the Frontier Corps. At the same time, his appointment was upgraded to Brigadier and was redesignated as Inspector General and Secretary, Frontier Corps, NWFP, in 1943.[129]

3
The Militia Experiment

The decade leading up to the First World War was unusually quiet on the Frontier. Even during the testing years of the war, when the world was engulfed in a horrific conflagration of death and destruction, its killing fields appeared remote from the mountains and valleys of the Northwest Frontier of India. Although the region could not entirely escape from the effects of the Great War, the situation on the Frontier remained under control. It seemed that the British experiment of withdrawing the Army from the Tribal Areas and replacing it with Frontier Militias had been a resounding success. But all that changed a year later in 1919, when an ill-conceived military adventure by a beleaguered Afghan king brought Lord Curzon's frontier system crashing down.

First World War

The First World War was a period of great anxiety for the administrators of the Frontier. The Indian Army was committed overseas and the war with Turkey had inflamed religious passion of Muslims all over India. It was an opportunity for the Afghans and Britain's other foreign foes, Germany and Turkey, to foment trouble on the Frontier. However, the Afghans remained neutral and the efforts of the Germans and Turks to incite the tribesmen largely failed. But the mullahs were preaching jihad and the situation remained tense, especially in Waziristan.[1]

The first incident occurred in Kurram in October 1914, when a *lashkar* of Afghan tribesmen attacked the village of Walai China but was repulsed by Kurram Militia.[2] Meanwhile, further south, a 2000-strong *lashkar* of rebel tribesmen from Khost in Afghanistan invaded Tochi Valley in November. The North

Waziristan Militia under their Commandant Major GB Scott immediately attacked the invaders, inflicting heavy losses on them and forcing them to flee across the frontier. The raid led to the mobilization of Bannu Moveable Column to deal with the threat from Afghanistan.[3]

In January 1915, another *lashkar* from Khost crossed into Tochi Valley. On 7 January, Captain Eustace Jotham with a dozen Mounted Infantry of North Waziristan Militia moved out from Miranshah to locate the Afghan *lashkar*. At Spina Khaisora, a few miles west of Miranshah, the detachment was ambushed in a *nullah* by some 1500 tribesmen. As the militiamen were galloping away to safety, the horse of one of the sowars was shot under him. Captain Jotham turned around to rescue the wounded sowar but was surrounded by the tribesmen. After a fierce struggle in which he killed several assailants with his sword, the gallant officer was finally cut down, riddled with bullets and slashed by a dozen cuts. Meanwhile, Daffadar Darim Khan dismounted and provided covering fire to his men until they had all made it to safety. Captain Eustace Jotham was awarded the Victoria Cross for his gallantry and selfless sacrifice, while Daffadar Darim Khan received the Indian Order of Merit.[4]

In the meantime, Lieutenant NH Prendergast, the Post Commander at Boya, had also set out with 20 sowars to look for the Khostwals. Soon after, his platoon came under fire and was pinned down. Lieutenant Prendergast had landed in a difficult situation. But luckily for him and his men, they were rescued just in time by a relieving force of 70 Mounted Infantry led by Major Scott and Subedar Major Tor Khan.[5] Major Scott charged the tribesmen, while Lieutenant Prendergast carried out a flanking attack. The tribesmen were soon driven back after suffering more than 50 casualties. The North Waziristan Militia was praised for "the dash and spirit they displayed in the action against great odds and after a long march".[6]

The Khostwals returned in March 1915, with a force of around 10,000 men. On 26 March, the Bannu Moveable Column advanced from Miranshah to confront the invaders. Meanwhile, 300 men of North Waziristan Militia under Major Scott along with a section of Mountain Artillery had moved out the previous night and after a long march, arrived in the *lashkar's* rear. The Army attacked the *lashkar* at dawn, driving them towards the waiting militiamen. Caught between the two forces, the Afghans were completely routed and driven across the frontier after suffering 200 killed and 300 wounded. The British Commander attributed the success to the skilful manoeuvre and sound conduct of operations of North Waziristan Militia and the bold leadership of their Commandant, Major GB Scott.[7]

Meanwhile north of Peshawar, the mullahs were successful in rousing the Mohmands into religious fervour. In April 1915, a Mohmand *lashkar* invaded British territory near Shabkadar but was driven back by the Army. After another attack by a bigger *lashkar* in October, the British decided to impose a blockade of Mohmand territory. The blockade line extended from Michni to Abazai and consisted of fortified blockhouses connected by electrified barbed wire.[8] The Khyber Rifles actively participated in the operations and were deployed on the left flank of the blockade line including Michni, where they fought off a determined attack by Mohmands. In April 1916, the tribesmen relented and asked for terms of settlement, and the blockade was lifted, only to be re-instated six months later. It led to the rearming of all militia corps with .303 Lee Enfield rifles and raising of a new corps to deal with Mohmands.[9] The Mohmand Militia was raised at Shabkadar by Major EC Smith, 22nd Punjabis (7 Punjab), on 7 September 1916,[10] and took over the blockade line in August 1917.[11]

In South Waziristan, the Mahsuds had been on the warpath since 1916, launching devastating raids in the districts of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu. Soon, they turned their attention to the

South Waziristan Militia. On 1 March 1917, a *lashkar* of some 3000 Mahsuds surrounded the post of Sarwekai garrisoned by 250 men of South Waziristan Militia under Major FL Hughes. The tribesmen cut off telegraphic communication and subjected the post to highly effective sniping from Garesi Sar, a commanding feature about 1400 yards away. That night, Major Hughes sent out a party of 100 to occupy the feature. However, it became difficult to supply them due to sniping by the tribesmen and he decided to withdraw the men. Next morning, he took out a party of 50 men halfway to the hill to cover the withdrawal. The Mahsuds pounced at the opportunity. Both parties were attacked and after fierce hand-to-hand fighting, Major Hughes and 20 of his men were killed, while 10 were wounded and 11 captured. Mahsud casualties were 15 killed and 20 wounded. It was with great difficulty that Subedar Mohibullah was able to extricate the rest of the men. The post held out until 9 March, when it was relieved by the Derajat Moveable Column. By then, the tribesmen had dispersed.[12]

Mahsud success at Sarwekai further emboldened them, and between April and June, they killed 5 army officers and 239 Other Ranks in different incidents. On 9 May, Major LP Collins of 1/4th Gurkha Rifles, commanding Sarwekai Post, received intelligence of a Mahsud raiding party on its way back to Shahur. Major Collins decided to intercept the raiders. That night, he took out a force of 250 Gurkhas, 80 men of 11th Rajputs and 120 South Waziristan Militia under Subedar Mohibullah, and deployed them on picquets near Palosi Ziarat. Early next morning, on seeing smoke rising from a *nullah* a thousand yards away, he ordered Subedar Mohibullah to take a party of 50 Gurkhas and 50 Militia, and draw the raiders towards the picquet line. Mohibullah surprised and shot up a party of Mahsuds cooking their breakfast. Mahsud retaliation was swift. A *lashkar* of around 500 tribesmen counterattacked the picquets, and it was with great difficulty that the force withdrew towards Sarwekai, having lost 39 killed,

including two British officers, 63 wounded and 70 missing. Around 70 Mahsuds were also killed in the encounter.[13]

Meanwhile, in Tochi Valley on 31 May, a group of about 40 Mahsuds, some of them ex-militiamen, led by Musa Khan, carried out an audacious raid on the North Waziristan Militia post of Tut Narai, five miles east of Datta Khel. It was a well-planned operation, carried out on a holiday, when except for the sentries, all weapons of the post were locked away in the Quarter Guard. Seven tribesmen, two of them disguised as women, approached the post posing as innocent passers-by. They persuaded the unsuspecting sentry to buy them sweets from the post canteen. As he turned towards the gate, he was shot dead. They then rushed the gate, shooting dead the guard commander and the sentry on the wall. Meanwhile, the rest of the gang, which was hiding in the bushes of a nearby *nullah*, rushed the post and locked the garrison in their barracks. Although the sentries in the two watchtowers and the Subedar in charge of the post, despite being severely wounded, fired back, the gang, now augmented by 400 tribesmen, was able to make its getaway with 59 rifles and 120,000 rounds of ammunition.[14]

In June 1917, the British assembled the South Waziristan Field Force at Jandola to deal with the Mahsuds. The Field Force, which included 250 rifles of South Waziristan Militia under their Commandant Major GEP Davis, marched through Mahsud territory wreaking havoc on the tribe. The force was supported by the Royal Flying Corps. It was the first time that the British used aircraft in operations on the Frontier. On 2 July, the Mahsuds, who were stunned by the ferocity of British onslaught, sued for peace and accepted British terms.[15] Until the end of the war in 1918, there was relative calm on the Frontier. The Frontier Militias had performed well and ended the war with their reputations intact. No one could have predicted at the time that the coming year will sound the death knell for the Militia system.

Third Afghan War 1919

In February 1919, King Habibullah Khan of Afghanistan was assassinated. He was succeeded by his son Amanullah Khan after a brief dynastic struggle. The new king's hold on power was tenuous and he was facing the prospect of revolt. Beset with internal problems, he embarked on a plan to attack India, and raised the standard of jihad. While the very idea of an Afghan invasion sounds strange, it might have had certain merits at the time. India was in a state of ferment. Indian demand for Self Rule was gaining strength, spurred on by opposition to the infamous Rowlatt Act, which culminated in the Jallianwala Bagh massacre on 13 April 1919. Meanwhile, the Muslims were unhappy at the treatment being meted out to Turkey by the victorious Allies. By May 1919, the situation in Punjab and NWFP was extremely tense. Amanullah calculated that with the British distracted by civil unrest, even limited gains would help rally his people behind him, raise his prestige, and divert attention from his domestic troubles. By declaring jihad, he also hoped to rally not only the frontier tribesmen but also the Muslims of Punjab and NWFP to his cause. While he might have misread the situation in India, he was not off the mark in his calculations regarding the tribesmen.[16]

The Afghan Army was 50,000 strong, but it was poorly trained, equipped and led. The Afghans intended to rely heavily on the formidable frontier tribesmen. Afghan agents were active in inciting them in the cause of Islam and were distributing money, arms and ammunition. At the same time, they also tried to make common cause with Indian revolutionaries.[17] The Afghans planned their offensive on three fronts: Khyber, Kurram and Chaman, with a subsidiary effort in Chitral. They intended to use army detachments to raise the tribesmen under the banner of jihad, while holding the main army back. They anticipated that a major tribal uprising in British rear would disperse their forces, providing them with an opportunity to strike a blow.[18] On 4 May 1919, the

Afghans occupied the village of Bagh in Khyber on the Indian side of the border. The British were surprised by the incursion. The relative calm on the Frontier during the previous years had made them complacent. Only in January that year, Roos-Keppel had written to the Private Secretary of Viceroy that, "Everything on the Frontier is so extraordinarily peaceful that it is safe to prophesy a quiet summer".[19] On 6 May, Britain declared war on Afghanistan.

Khyber: The tribal areas adjoining Afghanistan were lightly held by the Frontier Militias. On 6 May, orders were issued for the mobilization of Indian Army. The troops earmarked for the Afghan campaign were organized into the 'North-West Frontier Force' and 'Baluchistan Force', while on 30 May, the Bannu and Derajat Brigades were designated as 'Waziristan Force'.[20] Meanwhile, Afghan subversion in the tribal area was beginning to produce restlessness among Afridis and Mohmands, although there were no overt signs yet of any hostility. The Afghan advance in Khyber was cautious, which allowed the British to reinforce Khyber Rifles at Landi Kotal with an infantry brigade on 7 May. The Khyber Rifles now came under military control. They remained deployed on their posts, while their 400-strong garrison at Landi Kotal was utilized as covering troops.[21]

As the British despatched reinforcements to Khyber, Afghan propaganda about an impending uprising in Peshawar and the call to jihad started bearing fruit, and on 8 May, some men of Khyber Rifles deserted with their weapons. Meanwhile, a British attack on Afghan positions in Khyber was repulsed on 9 May. The combined effect of these sowed further doubts in the minds of the tribesmen including the isolated picquets of Khyber Rifles, who started believing that a British defeat was imminent. On 10 May, a picquet of Khyber Rifles deserted its post. However, most of the men under their Commandant Lieutenant Colonel CH Campbell remained steady, as the British renewed their attack on Afghan positions in Khyber.[22]

By 12 May, the Afghan Army was in headlong retreat. Next day, the British occupied Dakka in Afghanistan, 13 miles from Landi Kotal, preparatory to an advance on Jalalabad. A detachment of 250 men of Khyber Rifles formed part of the column that advanced on Dakka and conducted themselves well. While these operations were going on, Afridis started showing signs of hostility. Over the next three days, military convoys in the Khyber Pass came under sustained and heavy attacks, and a growing number of Khyber Rifles deserted their posts. On 16 May, they were relieved of their duties in the pass.[23] To forestall a mutiny and further desertions with weapons, the Corps was assembled on parade at Jamrud and was offered the choice of discharge from service. The offer was taken up by 1180 men. Of the remaining strength, some were adjusted in a Military Police battalion, while the rest were formed into the Khyber Levy Corps. The latter was a Khassadar-like force, who were assigned the role of protecting Khyber Pass. The Khyber Rifles had ceased to exist, and was disbanded on 18 May.[24]

Mohmand: Meanwhile on 14 May, two Afghan infantry battalions supported by artillery entered Mohmand territory north of Peshawar. Five days later, they reached Ghalanai, 13 miles northwest of Shabkadar, where the Mohmand Militia under Major OD Bennett was still deployed on the old blockade line. Although the Mohmands, unimpressed with the poor state of Afghan troops and still feeling the effects of the blockade of 1916-17, refused to join in, a *lashkar* of 4000 tribesmen, mostly Bajauris, began assembling in support of the Afghans. The British immediately despatched an infantry brigade to evict the invaders and on 23 May, the Afghans withdrew and the *lashkar* dispersed. The Mohmand Militia remained steadfast throughout the war.[25]

Kurram: Just as the British were preparing to advance on Jalalabad, news reached of a large Afghan force under General Nadir Khan (later King Nadir Shah) advancing towards Thall in

Lower Kurram. The British were aware of the presence of Nadir Khan at Matun in Khost, from where he could advance against either Kurram or Tochi. But due to a shortage of troops, they had adopted a defensive posture in Kurram. Defence of the Agency was in the hands of Kurram Militia under Major PCR Dodd. The Militia's strength was 1450, divided into two wings, besides 80 sowars of Mounted Infantry. It was also equipped with two 10-pounder mountain guns. On 7 May 1919, it was reinforced with 1/57th Wilde's Rifles (9 FF), a squadron of 37th Lancers and a section of Mountain Artillery. Meanwhile, 300 ex-sepoys of Kurram Militia were re-enlisted to free the Militia for border defence. Although the situation in Kurram was worrying, unlike other agencies, there was no risk of a tribal uprising, as the tribesmen were staunchly on British side against their old enemies, the Afghans.[26]

The defence of Kurram Agency posed a particularly daunting challenge. Kurram is a 60-mile long salient jutting into Afghanistan, extending from Peiwar Kotal in the north to Thall in the south. In 1919, it was surrounded on all sides by hostile forces. Towards the north and west were the Afghans, while in the south and east were the tribes of Darwesh Khel Wazir, Orakzai and Zaimukht, who were showing signs of hostility. There were two potential routes by which the Afghans could invade Kurram: through the Peiwar Kotal Pass or along the River Kurram through Kharlachi. Accordingly, Major Dodd deployed two strong detachments of the Militia at Peiwar village and Lakka Tiga south of the River Kurram. The rest of the Corps was deployed on a string of posts between Parachinar and Thall, while 400 were held in reserve at Parachinar. Over the next three weeks, only minor exchanges of fire took place on the Kurram Front. During this period, British forces in Kurram were reinforced and in the last week of May, 60th Brigade arrived under Brigadier General AE Fagan, who took over operational control. The Kurram Militia was



4. The Kurram Valley 1919.

given the responsibility of watching the frontier, while the Army was held in reserve at Parachinar.[27]

Afghan incursions in Upper Kurram began on 26 May, when they attacked Kurram Militia outposts guarding the villages near Peiwar. Captain RH Wilson immediately moved out of Ghundi Khel with 200 rifles and drove back the invaders. Next day, the Afghans renewed their attack but were again repulsed with heavy losses. On 28 May, they surrounded the Militia post at Kharlachi. A relief column of 75 rifles of Kurram Militia and two troops of 37th Lancers was sent from Parachinar and drove back the Afghans, who lost 29 men killed.[28]

After being repulsed in the north, the Afghans turned their attention south. They planned an attack from Jaji Maidan through Lakka Tiga in order to link-up with the Orakzais and Zaimukhts, and cut Kurram into two. On 28 May, an Afghan force of 3000, supported by five guns, advanced towards Lakka Tiga. In an

audacious move, Lieutenant RP Beamish, in command of 200 infantry and 80 Mounted Infantry at Lakka Tiga, counter-attacked the invaders on a 4-mile front. After two days of fighting, the Afghan offensive came to a halt. In the meantime, an Orakzai *lashkar* was gathering in Khurmana Valley. On 29 and 30 May, it launched an attack on the Militia post at Badama near Sadda. Subedar Gul Khan counterattacked the tribesmen with a force of 100 militiamen from Badama and Sadda, along with some Turi volunteers, and drove them back after killing twenty. His own loss was one sepoy killed. Meanwhile Captain FW Champion, who was at Shabak Pass with 200 Mounted Infantry of Kurram Militia, ambushed an Afghan convoy on its way to Matun from Thall on 31 May, killing nine Afghan soldiers.[29]

With the Afghans now on the defensive, Brigadier General Fagan decided to launch a raid inside Afghanistan from Kharlachi. During the night of 2 June, a force of 100 infantry and 50 Mounted Infantry of Kurram Militia along with a company of 3rd Guides Infantry, two troops of 37th Lancers and two mountain guns under the command of Major Dodd advanced towards the Afghan Army post at Amir Thana. Early next morning, under the cover of artillery fire, Kurram Militia assaulted the post, forcing the Afghan garrison to surrender. After burning the post, the mounted troops advanced on Mir Kalai, headquarters of the Afghan general, who abandoned his post and fled with his troops. After burning two Afghan forts, the force returned home. The losses of Kurram Militia were two killed and five wounded, while Afghan losses were sixty killed.[30]

Despite an armistice being in place, the Afghans launched a determined attack from Peiwar Kotal on 5 June, and after driving back Militia outposts, threatened Teri Post. A force of 100 infantry and 30 Mounted Infantry was sent from Parachinar to evict the intruders. Although the Militia checked the Afghans, they continued their attack throughout the night, and after pushing back

Turi tribesmen protecting the flanks of the Militia, threatened to envelop them from the left. The 57th Wilde's Rifles and two mountain guns were despatched as reinforcements but the Afghans continued to press their assault. Finally, on 7 May, they disengaged and withdrew to Peiwar Kotal. This was the last action of the war against the Afghans in Upper Kurram.[31] However, the Orakzais and Zaimukhts remained unsettled and there were several incidents of violence.

On 30 July, a *lashkar* of Orakzais and Zaimukhts gathered in Khurmana Valley to attack the Militia posts at Badama and Sadda. On receiving intelligence about the impending raid, four aircraft were sent to locate the *lashkar*. One of the planes was shot down by the tribesmen and the pilots were seriously injured. In a dramatic rescue, men of Kurram Militia raced towards the downed aircraft ahead of the tribesmen and rescued the pilots.[32] For his outstanding conduct in the war, Major Dodd was awarded the Distinguished Service Order.[33] Three of his men received the IOM, while seven were awarded the Indian Distinguished Service Medal (IDSM).[34] Kurram Militia's performance during the war was outstanding. They were the only unit of the Frontier Corps, which fulfilled the mission for which it was raised. They received much praise for their conduct, including from the Commander-in-Chief of Indian Army, who reported that, "Throughout the whole period of the operations the behaviour of this corps has been deserving of the highest praise".[35]

While the Kurram Militia was fighting its brave little war, Nadir Khan surprised the British by taking the more difficult route along River Kaitu. On 27 May, he arrived in front of Thall. Although he enjoyed overwhelming military superiority, he was hesitant and failed to take the fort. On 31 May, the British despatched a relief force to Thall. On approach of the British force, Nadir Khan withdrew to Afghanistan on 2 June. The next day, an armistice was signed, bringing an end to hostilities.[36]



5. Waziristan 1919.

North Waziristan: The Frontier Militias were not trained or equipped to fight regular forces backed by artillery. At the time of their raising, it had been clearly laid down that in case of war or a major tribal uprising, they would be immediately supported by the Army. However, in 1919, there were no troops in Waziristan to support them. Consequently, the British decided to withdraw the scattered and isolated Militia outposts. While the decision made military sense, it did not anticipate its political consequences. On 23 May, Nadir Khan began his advance from Matun along the River Kaitu. From there, he could either move against Miranshah in Tochi Valley or towards Thall in Lower Kurram. As soon as he crossed the frontier, large numbers of Wazirs started joining his force. On receipt of the news of his approach, the North Waziristan Militia posts at Spinwam and Shewa near Thall were ordered to immediately withdraw and fall back to Miranshah. During the

withdrawal, the Wazirs attacked the column and 16 Mohmand militiamen were captured. On 25 May, vacation of all militia posts in Upper Tochi was ordered. Before withdrawing, the Militia burned their stores to prevent them from falling into the hands of the tribesmen. The departure of North Waziristan Militia and burning of their posts had disastrous consequences. It led the tribesmen to believe that the British were fleeing in the face of a victorious Afghan Army.[37]

The advance of Nadir Khan and the withdrawal of the Militia produced feverish excitement among the tribesmen. The men of North Waziristan Militia could not remain immune from events unfolding around them and became disaffected. During the withdrawal from Datta Khel, Tut Narai and Spina Khaisora on the night of 25 May, the Militia column was attacked and in the ensuing confusion, 150 Wazirs deserted. At Miranshah, where most of the demoralized Militia, including 600 Wazirs had arrived, the situation was fast deteriorating. Two companies of regular troops from the nearby cantonment of Dardoni were hurriedly sent to Miranshah and took over control of the gates and walls of the fort. However, by 27 May, the Wazirs and Afridis, who formed a large proportion of North Waziristan Militia, were openly mutinous. Meanwhile, their British officers were confined to the Mess, protected by the Orakzai platoon, although the mutineers had not threatened them. That night, the Wazirs led by two of their officers made holes in the wall of the fort and deserted with their weapons. Only 11 Wazirs, including the indomitable Daffadar Darim Khan refused to join the mutineers, along with Khattaks and Orakzais.[38]

In Lower Tochi, all Militia posts were attacked on the night of 26 May, and the garrisons of several of them deserted with their weapons. However, the Khattaks remained loyal and managed to reach Saidgi and Idak with their equipment. After the departure of the disaffected militiamen, the situation in North Waziristan

Militia improved.[39] During this period, large numbers of tribesmen had gathered in the hills near Miranshah, Dardoni and Idak in anticipation of evacuation of the these garrisons. On 1 June, an Army column with 250 Militia moved out from Dardoni and demolished the towers from where the tribesmen were sniping at Miranshah. The tribesmen finally dispersed on the arrival of a relief column from Bannu on 4 June.[40]

South Waziristan: As these events were unfolding, the situation in South Waziristan took a different turn. During most of May, the Agency had remained calm. The South Waziristan Militia with its Headquarters at Wana was deployed on 12 outposts. Its strength was around 1800, out of which 780 were Afridis and 230 Wazirs. Khattaks, Orakzais, Yusufzais and other Pathans made up the rest. Seven officers were posted to the Corps under Major GH Russell, the Acting Commandant.[41] Due to their remoteness from the main theatre of war, the authorities in Wana believed that South Waziristan Militia could stay at their posts. However, "the news of the evacuation of the Upper Tochi posts arrived at Wana on 25 May like a bolt from the blue". The Political Agent and Major Russell decided to immediately evacuate the Militia posts before the tribesmen became aware of the situation in Tochi and had time to rise up in revolt.[42]

According to the evacuation plan prepared beforehand, Militia posts towards the west of Khajuri Kach were to withdraw to Mughal Kot in Zhob, while the posts of Nili Kach and Sarwekai in the east were to fall back on Murtaza in Derajat. On the evening of 26 May, Major Russell despatched Captain HR Traill, and Lieutenants RE Hunt and AR Barker to Karab Kot with 60 infantry and 10 Mounted Infantry. They were to evacuate the garrisons of Karab Kot, Tanai, Toi Khula and Khajuri Kach to Mughal Kot. He then assembled the Militia Officers and informed them about his decision to evacuate Wana at once. The officers dispersed to make the necessary arrangements. Soon after, shots were heard and he



6. Major Russell's march to Mughal Kot, 26-27 May 1919.

was informed by Subedar Major Maqan Khan, a Bhittani, that the Wazirs and Afridis led by their officers had seized the fort's keep, with the garrison's water supply, rations, treasure, arms and ammunition, and draft donkeys. Complete pandemonium reigned in the fort and Major Russell decided to immediately leave for Zhob with the 300 men, who had remained loyal. There were no Wazirs among them and only a few Afridis.[43]

Only eight camels were available to carry casualties, and all baggage was left behind. The column left Wana at 2200 hours. It consisted of four officers of South Waziristan Militia, the Medical Officer, Garrison Engineer, 290 Militia, and 100 camp followers and non-combatants, including Sardar Bahadur Mohammad Yar Khan, the Extra-Assistant Commissioner. Around 100 of the Militia were recruits with little training. Progress of the column was painfully slow due to the summer heat and the civilians, who

found it difficult to keep up. After a night march of 20 miles, the column arrived at the Militia post of Toi Khula on the River Gomal early in the morning. As the column approached the post, it was fired upon by its garrison and by tribesmen from the surrounding hills, causing several casualties. After loading the casualties on camels, Major Russell decided to proceed to Mughal Kot, which was 14 miles away.[44]

The men, exhausted after the long night march, made the steep ascent to Tesh Plain with great difficulty due to the extreme heat. No water was available on the barren plain and groups of tribesmen had appeared to harass the column. A platoon of Shiranis, who had mutinied earlier at Wana, now joined the column after changing their minds. On reaching Tesh, a column of Militia from Karab Kot under Captain Traill joined up at noon. Captain Traill had been having adventures of his own. After reaching Karab Kot the previous night, he successfully evacuated the garrison and fired the post. Here, Lieutenant Barker left for Khajuri Kach with 10 Mounted Infantry. After disarming the Wazir militiamen at Tanai, Captain Traill's party next reached Toi Khula, which had earlier fired on Major Russell's column. Traill's men were also fired at and Taza Gul, an Afridi Jemadar, went up alone to investigate. The intrepid officer after gaining entry to the post disarmed the garrison's 18 Wazirs. After destroying the weapons and ammunition of the post, the party moved towards Tesh to join Major Russell.[45]

As the march towards Mughal Kot was resumed, greater number of tribesmen appeared, and the column had to fight every step of the way. During the last two miles, the column was assisted by picquets of Zhob Militia from Mughal Kot. One mile short of the post, they were joined by Lieutenant Barker and six sowars. When Lieutenant Barker left Karab Kot for Khajuri Kach on 26 May, four Afridi sowars deserted during the night. Khajuri Kach was garrisoned by 120 Orakzais and Bangash, who appeared

reluctant to follow him. After firing the post, Lieutenant Barker decided to head for Zhob without them. He and his remaining men had ridden 70 miles in 24 hours.[46]

Mughal Kot was reached on the night of 27 May, although a large number of stragglers continued to stream in throughout the night. The post was garrisoned by 41 men of Zhob Militia and could not cope with the arrival of 400 newcomers due to limited space, food, forage and water. However, due to the exhausted state of the men, no further move could be attempted until they had time to recover. All efforts to bring in water from the river were thwarted by the tribesmen, who wounded eight men of the watering party, besides killing all the bullocks and several horses and camels. A wireless message was sent to Zhob requesting assistance. It was arranged that during the night of 29 May, 130 rifles of Zhob Militia from Mir Ali Khel, 14 miles away, would picquet the route half way to Mughal Kot. At the same time, 100 sowars of their Mounted Infantry would push on to Mughal Kot, so as to reach there by 0630 hours on 30 May. They would then escort Major Russell's column back to Mir Ali Khel. Meanwhile, sniping by the tribesmen resulted in several more casualties. It only added to the misery of the men; overcrowded and suffocating in intense summer heat in a confined space, with little food and water, and no sanitation. Major CW Owen, the Medical Officer, did what he could to treat the sick and wounded with his limited resources.[47]

Next morning, there was no sign of Zhob Militia, who unknown to Major Russell, had been ambushed by the tribesmen, and their commander Captain AF Reilly was killed. Since wireless contact had been lost earlier, there was no way to ascertain the situation. Major Russell decided to push on without Zhob Militia. All the stores in the post were destroyed and the column prepared to move out at 0800 hours. As soon as the gates of the post were opened, they came under heavy fire and had to wait for the

Mounted Infantry to secure a covering position. Lieutenant Barker led 14 sowars after making a hole in the wall, and secured a high position about a mile away.[48]

Meanwhile, the column marched out under fire. The first picquet moved too far out and when signalled to wait, ignored the order and hurried towards Mir Ali Khel. This led to a complete breakdown in the discipline of the column. The men dispersed in small groups and tried to make their way to safety as best as they could. All efforts of the officers to organize them failed. The tribesmen had a field day and picked off targets at leisure. By the time the column reached Lieutenant Barker's position, it had suffered heavy casualties. Among the killed were Captain CT Burn-Hurdock, Captain HR Traill, Lieutenant CS Leese and eight Pathan Officers of South Waziristan Militia, Lieutenant EJ MacCrostie, Garrison Engineer Wana, and Mohammad Yar Khan, Extra-Assistant Commissioner. The wounded included Lieutenant RE Hunt and Major Russell, who was shot in both legs. Around 40 Other Ranks were killed or wounded.[49] Casualties among the non-combatants are not recorded but must have been high.

Lieutenant Barker and his men provided covering fire, as the ragged column continued towards Mir Ali Khel. Meanwhile, the pressure from the tribesmen eased, as they busied themselves in looting the post. After five miles, the first picquet of Zhob Militia was reached. From there, the march to Mir Ali Khel, and then onwards to Fort Sandeman during the night was uneventful. Of the 350 Militia, who had left Mughal Kot that morning, only 140 reached Fort Sandeman, although some stragglers managed to make their way to Derajat.[50] The Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army had this to say about Major Russell's epic march: "Regarded merely as a feat of endurance at this period of year, the withdrawal of the party was of itself a fine achievement; but taking into consideration the almost insurmountable difficulties which beset it on the road and the dangers through which it emerged, the

exploits stand out as one of the finest recorded in the history of Indian frontier".[51]

Major Russell had set a great example of personal courage, endurance and leadership, for which he was awarded a well-deserved Distinguished Service Order. Lieutenant Barker received the Military Cross, while Subedar Major Maqan Khan, the Indian Order of Merit, and Jemadar Taza Gul, the Indian Distinguished Service Medal.[52] The South Waziristan Militia was reassembled at Tank, where it was joined by the garrisons of Nili Kach and Sarwekai, who had withdrawn uneventfully on 27 May. Out of a total strength of 1800 men on 25 May, only 600 remained in South Waziristan Militia. Almost 1100 had deserted with their weapons and 700,000 rounds of ammunition.[53] Remnants of the Militia were now employed in assisting the Frontier Constabulary in dealing with Mahsud and Wazir raiders, who had swept into the settled areas to loot and plunder.[54]

Zhob: In Balochistan, the British pre-empted the Afghans by attacking them from Chaman and capturing the fortress of Spin Baldak on 27 May. However, in Zhob, "It was not from Afghanistan that the peace was to be broken, but from Waziristan". The British debacle in Waziristan and the retreat of Major Russell's column led to the abandonment of Zhob Militia posts in the Gomal, leaving Zhob vulnerable to Wazir incursions from the north. At the same time, it caused much excitement among the Shiranis and Mando Khels of Zhob, who believed that an evacuation of Fort Sandeman was imminent. It also led to disaffection in Zhob Militia.[55]

Security of Zhob Agency was the responsibility of the 1200-strong Zhob Militia with its Headquarters at Fort Sandeman. The Militia was deployed in a number of posts and detachments scattered all over northern Zhob. Half of its strength was made up of Kakars, Achakzais, Mando Khels and Ghilzais from Zhob and Pishin, and Brahuis from Jhalawan, while the rest was drawn from

Pakhtun tribesmen of the Northwest Frontier, primarily Khattaks and Orakzais. The Militia was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel RS Paul, the senior officer at Fort Sandeman. News now started arriving of an uprising of the tribesmen and incidents of desertion in the Zhob Militia. On 3 July, the Ghilzai garrison at Manikhwa, 24 miles northeast of Fort Sandeman, handed over the post to a Shirani *lashkar*. The situation in Zhob continued to worsen and convoys on the road from Loralai to Fort Sandeman were regularly attacked. The evacuation of Militia outposts in the Gomal Valley had allowed the Wazirs to pour into Zhob. They were joined by Shiranis, Kakars and Mando Khels from Balochistan and Suleiman Khel Ghilzais from Afghanistan.[56]

The situation in Zhob Militia rapidly deteriorated and 800 of its men deserted after abandoning their posts, which were then looted by the tribesmen. However, the remaining three Orakzai and Brahui companies of infantry and the Kakar and Brahui squadrons of Mounted Infantry remained steadfast. These men were repeatedly called out to provide escorts to military columns and counter the marauding *lashkars*. They more than made up for their colleagues' disloyalty by giving an excellent account of themselves in these operations.[57]

During the nights of 8 and 9 June, tribesmen launched two raids on Fort Sandeman. After looting and burning the bazar outside the fort, they then retreated into the hills. On 10 June, Captain GAR Spain took 70 rifles of Zhob Militia and drove out the raiders.[58] On 16 July, a military convoy escorted by a detachment of Zhob Militia was ambushed near Kapip and suffered heavy casualties. The survivors straggled towards Fort Sandeman protected by the rearguard of Zhob Militia, the only men to remain disciplined during the action. Meanwhile, 500 deserters of Zhob Militia led by their officers had formed a *lashkar* of their own. On 11 October, Subedar Major Gulab Khan of Zhob Militia led 50 men on a raid on the village of Subedar Haji

Mir, leader of the renegade militiamen. He arrived at the village after marching 60 miles. He then killed the ex-Subedar and ten of his men, and recovered 12 stolen rifles.[59] By the first week of August, the situation in Zhob had calmed down and the tribesmen gradually dispersed.

Chitral: While Khyber and Waziristan were the focus of military activity in 1919, the remote mountain fastness of Chitral in the far north had not escaped the attention of Afghans. Three passages provided access to its remote valleys: from Gilgit in the east through Shandur Top; from Dir in the south through Lowari Pass; and from Afghanistan in the west through the Kunar River Valley, which offered the easiest route in. Only one battalion of the Indian Army was stationed in the State. This, coupled with Chitral's isolation from India and the easy access from Kunar provided the Afghans with a military opportunity.[60]

The Afghans had eight infantry battalions and 12 mountain guns in the Kunar Valley. In early May 1919, they sent five more battalions to the area. On learning this, Major NE Reilly, the Assistant Political Agent and Commandant Chitral Scouts, mobilized the Militia. Military resources available to him were the 1/11th Rajputs, a section each of Mountain Artillery and Sappers & Miners, 1000 rifles of Chitral Scouts and 2000 men of the Mehtar's Bodyguard, armed with obsolete rifles. Prospects of reinforcement from India were remote and it was with these resources that he had to face the superior Afghan force. On 8 May, the Afghan Amir issued a proclamation demanding Chitral's support against the British. Anticipating an incursion, Major Reilly despatched a company of Chitral Scouts to Galapach, six miles south of Mirkhani, to watch the track along River Chitral. At the same time, patrols were sent to monitor the passes leading into Chitral.[61]

On 12 May, 300 Afghan irregulars crossed into Chitral and after seizing the post of Dokalim, advanced towards Mirkhani. The incursion was repulsed by Major Reilly in command of a company



7. Chitral 1919.

of Chitral Scouts and 50 Bodyguards. On 19 May, 600 Afghan soldiers supported by four guns took up position astride River Chitral near Arandu. The British gathered as many armed men as they could muster at Mirkhani to evict the invaders. On 21 May, they advanced towards Arandu in four columns. Two companies of Chitral Scouts under Lieutenant TI Bowers moved along the right bank of River Chitral, while the main column under the Commanding Officer of 11th Rajputs with mountain guns and two companies of Chitral Scouts under Major Reilly, advanced on the left bank. Captain CC Crimmin with three companies of Scouts was to attack the enemy's left flank after passing down Malikhor Ridge. Meanwhile, Nasir ul-Mulk, the Mehtar's son in command of 1000 Bodyguards and a company of Scouts was to arrive in the Afghan rear at Birkot after traversing Patesun Pass. Armed Chitrali and Kafir tribesmen were also drafted in support.[62]

The operation went according to the plan. On 22 May, Nasir ul-Mulk seized the heights overlooking Birkot and destroyed the bridge linking it to Arandu. Early next morning, the British attacked the Afghans, who started retiring, and by late afternoon, had retreated across the frontier. The two companies of Chitral Scouts under Lieutenant Bowers then joined Nasir ul-Mulk at the Afghan cantonment of Birkot, which was looted and burned. During the three days of operations, the casualties of Chitral Scouts were eight killed and 23 wounded, while the Afghans lost 250 men. On 3 June, an armistice was signed between the Afghans and the British. However, on 24 June, the Afghans again occupied Dokalim. In the last week of June, a large Afghan force arrived in Badakhshan from where it could threaten Chitral from the northwest. Four companies of Chitral Scouts were sent north to guard the passes there, while three newly arrived companies of Gilgit Scouts watched the passes over the Pamir.[63]

On 17 July, a force of 400 Afghan regulars and 400 tribesmen invaded Bumboret Valley and arrived within ten

miles of Drosh. They were attacked by a company of Chitral Scouts and driven back after losing 10 men killed. In the meantime, a *lashkar* of 600 Bajauris on Afghan instigation gathered at Lowari Pass and threatened the Chitral Scouts post at Ziarat. On 24 July, two companies of Chitral Scouts drove back the tribesmen. After the signing of the peace treaty on 8 August, all hostilities ceased on the Chitral frontier.[64] The operations in Chitral were conducted in adverse conditions over extremely difficult terrain. It was both a test and an opportunity for Chitral Scouts, who were going into action for the first time, to show their quality. They passed the test with flying colours and earned the reputation of excellent fighting men.

Waziristan Uprising 1919-20

Sir Olaf Caroe has written that, "Unlike other wars, Afghan wars become serious only when they are over".[65] The signing of a peace agreement between Afghanistan and Britain did not bring any peace to Waziristan. In fact, it was only the beginning of the troubles for the British. Withdrawal of the Militia and the Army from large parts of Waziristan allowed the Wazirs to go on a rampage. The Mahsuds, who hitherto had remained aloof, now joined in the mayhem. The tribesmen believed that the peace treaty was only a temporary measure and that hostilities between Britain and Afghanistan would soon resume. Between May and November 1919, more than 182 raids were carried out in the settled areas by these two tribes alone. Defection of the militiamen had augmented their ranks with several hundred trained fighters with intimate knowledge of British tactics and procedures. At the same time, some 2600 modern rifles and 800,000 rounds of ammunition fell into their hands, which were replenished by supplies from Afghanistan. The tribesmen had never before in their history been so well-armed.[66]

By November 1919, the situation for the British had become intolerable. That month they decided to take back control of Waziristan. Two military Moveable Columns were assembled at Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan to begin what was later described as "the most bitter and fiercely fought campaign in the history of the British time in Waziristan".[67] A detachment of 100 infantry and 20 Mounted Infantry of North Waziristan Militia operated against Tochi Wazirs with Tochi Column in November, while the rest of the Corps was deployed for protection of the line of communication.[68] The Militia suffered a number of casualties during these operations.

Meanwhile, the South Waziristan Militia had arrived in Dera Ismail Khan, where it was reorganized by Major Russell. In December, the Derajat Column commenced its operations. The South Waziristan Militia was deployed on line of communication defences, while one company of 100 rifles under Lieutenants WJ Cumming and Percy Clery was attached with Derajat Column for active operations. In January and February 1920, they participated in the fierce battles fought during the advance on Mahsud strongholds of Makin and Kaniguram. The Militia was assigned the tasks of acting as the advanced guard of military columns, protection of their flanks and as covering troops during withdrawals. After the submission of Mahsuds in May, they re-joined South Waziristan Militia at Murtaza.[69]

The campaign in South Waziristan was particularly difficult. Despite overwhelming British military superiority and new weapons of war like aircraft, armoured cars and machine guns, the "Mahsuds fought with reckless gallantry and great skill".[70] The tribesmen's sophistication of organisation and tactics surprised the British. Some of it was attributed to the presence of ex-militiamen in their ranks.[71] Whatever the reasons, a new threshold of violence had been crossed in Waziristan, which would set the tone for the future.

4

The Rise of the Phoenix

The collapse of Lord Curzon's frontier policy and the Militia system led to a re-appraisal of British strategy on the Frontier. Although the militias in Kurram, Chitral and Gilgit had remained loyal, these were peaceful areas, which had never posed a challenge for the British. In the areas that mattered—Khyber and Waziristan, the Militia system broke down. According to Roos-Keppel, "the Militia system grew up as a cheap expedient to relieve regular troops from irksome and arduous duties in a country where service was unpopular". However, to expect small isolated garrisons in hostile territory to withstand the kind of tribal and religious pressure they were subjected to was unreasonable; especially when no military support was available to them.[1]

The British particularly felt betrayed by the Afridis, the most powerful frontier tribe, which provided thousands of soldiers to the Indian Army and Frontier Corps. They disbanded Khyber Rifles and stopped all recruitment of Afridis. Although the ban on recruitment was later lifted, the Khyber Rifles were not re-raised despite the pleas of Afridis.[2] Their place in the Khyber was taken over by Khassadars. Two main defects were identified in the failed Militia experiment. One was the recruitment of local tribesmen, who were vulnerable to tribal pressure, and the other was the failure of the Army to support them. A new frontier policy was finalized in January 1922, which was dubbed as the 'Modified Forward Policy'. Its salient features were the permanent occupation of Waziristan by 5000 regular troops at Wana and Razmak, raising of a force of 4600 Khassadars, and construction of a road network.[3] The choice of these two locations was based on British commanders' conclusion that control of Waziristan rested on the control of Mahsuds. The Razmak Plateau lies in the heart of

Mahsud country from where the Army could quickly move out in any direction; hence the requirement of a road network to give the troops the necessary mobility.[4]

The future of Frontier Corps generated much debate. General Sir Charles Monro, the Commander-in-Chief considered the Militias a failure and their continuing presence as "a grave danger",[5] while Lord Reading, the Viceroy, wanted to convert them into Frontier Constabulary. These assessments were unreasonably harsh. They were painting all units and all tribesmen with the same brush. The Kurram Militia and Chitral Scouts had done well and there were no problems in Mohmand Militia or Gilgit Scouts. At the same time, with the exception of Afridis and Wazirs, the *trans*-Frontier militiamen, such as Mohmands and Orakzais, had remained steadfast despite intense pressure. The same was true for the *cis*-Frontier Khattaks, Yusufzais and Bangash, who made up half the strength of Waziristan Militias. After much deliberation, it was decided to retain the Militias with the exception of Khyber Rifles. As for the Waziristan Militias, it was felt that they could still play a useful role, when reorganized on more military lines with close Army support. However, all local element was to be eliminated from its manpower. Thus, the Frontier Militias survived albeit under a new guise. It proved to be a wise decision and the Waziristan Militias, now called Scouts, rose like a Phoenix from the ashes of Third Afghan War to earn their keep in the following years.[6]

Reorganization of the Frontier Corps

In 1922, the North and South Waziristan Militias were reformed into Tochi and South Waziristan Scouts respectively, around a nucleus of the remnants of the old corps. The remaining manpower was made up by new recruitment. Their primary responsibility was to protect the Army's line of communication by occupying dominating positions and nodal points. On 1 March

1922, the North Waziristan Militia was redesignated as Tochi Scouts. Major CET Erskine, MC, was posted as its Commandant on 4 June.[7] Its sanctioned strength was 2278, with twelve British officers. The Corps was organized into a Headquarters Company of specialists, two battalion-size wings of infantry and two troops of Mounted Infantry. One wing was located at Miranshah, while the other was at Khajuri. Its manpower was equally divided among *cis*-, and *trans*-Frontier tribesmen.[8] The latter were made up of Afridis, Orakzais and Wazirs; the last on the insistence of the Resident of Waziristan.[9] During the year, it was brought up to strength and reoccupied its old posts of Boya and Datta Khel.[10]

On 23 January 1923, the Army occupied Razmak. In the first week of February, it began punitive operations against the Mahsuds of Makin, who were resisting the construction of roads and posts. Tochi Scouts joined the military column conducting these operations.[11] Destruction of the villages in Makin commenced in early February, during a spell of bitterly cold weather. On 9 February, Tochi Scouts were ordered to hold the high hills towards the north of Makin basin near Azdi Khel. As the Army was withdrawing after destroying several villages, it was attacked by the tribesmen. Because of their isolated and exposed position, Tochi Scouts bore the brunt of the tribesmen's fury. Major Erskine immediately counterattacked the assailants and after fierce close-quarter fighting, repulsed the attack.[12] He was awarded the DSO, while three officers received the Military Cross for gallantry during the action.[13]

By the time the decision to retain Waziristan Militias was taken, the South Waziristan Militia had already been disbanded at Manzai in July 1921.[14] Those men, who wished to complete their service were offered the option of transfer to Mohmand Militia. A large number of them opted to continue serving. Captain AJ Cumming was given the responsibility of settling them down in Mohmand Militia at Shabkadar. However, Mohmand Militia,

which had been raised as a temporary measure in 1916, to man the Mohmand Blockade line, had itself become superfluous. After the finalization of the new frontier policy, it was decided to disband Mohmand Militia and replace it with a new corps for South Waziristan to be called Scouts. Consequently, in January 1922, the South Waziristan Scouts were raised at Utopia Camp near Shabkadar by Major OD Bennett, the Commandant of Mohmand Militia, by redesignation of Mohmand Militia. In April 1922, the South Waziristan Scouts were back in Manzai. By a fortunate turn of events, the new Corps had managed to retain a large proportion of the manpower of South Waziristan Militia.[15]

On 7 October, Major GH Russell, DSO, their old Commanding Officer, returned to take over command. The authorized strength of South Waziristan Scouts was 2774, with fourteen British officers. It was organized into three wings of infantry and two troops of Mounted Infantry, besides the Headquarters Company. The Wing Headquarters were at Jandola, Sarwekai and Sararogha. Its new class composition was Khattak, Yusufzai and Bangash from *cis*-Frontier areas, and Afridi, Mullagori, Mohmand, Orakzai and Bhittani from *trans*-Frontier. The proportion of the two groups was 2:1. Platoons of different tribes were mixed in a company to safeguard against any mischief on tribal grounds. The Mounted Infantry was also mixed.[16]

In May 1922, 500 rifles of South Waziristan Scouts were sent to Wana to assist the Khassadars, who were having trouble with Wazirs. They quickly brought the situation under control, for which they were praised by the Commander-in-Chief. Since it was not possible to provide the Scouts immediate military support in case of an emergency, it was decided to withdraw them in April 1923. Instead of the Gomal line, which their predecessors had manned previously, the Corps was now deployed on the Jandola-Sarwekai line, from where they could support the Khassadars.[17] Meanwhile, the Headquarters of South Waziristan Scouts after

spending some time at Murtaza and Khirgi, settled down at Jandola in March. They were brought up to strength and occupied the posts of Sarwekai, Haidari Kach and Chagmalai.[18]

The Kurram Militia had not only escaped the tribulations of its counterparts in Waziristan, but come out of the crisis with much credit to its name. The staunch support of the local Turi tribesmen was largely responsible for the Militia's good fortune. But it still had to prove its worth in battle, which it did emphatically in 1919. Unlike other corps, Kurram Militia was not much taxed with local peacekeeping other than the occasional Shia-Sunni spat. Its main role was to guard the Agency against incursions from Afghanistan, from Zaimukhts and Orakzais in the east and Wazirs in the south. For this, it was deployed on ten posts of platoon-size garrisons. These were mostly situated on the hilltops of Safed Koh. The new arrangements in the Frontier Corps did not affect Kurram Militia significantly. Its strength in 1920, was five British officers in command of 1341 infantry organized into 22 platoons, two troops of Mounted Infantry, and the two mountain guns. Besides Turis, there were two platoons of Khattaks, and one each of Chamkanis and Mangals. In 1927, Mahsuds were reintroduced in place of Khattaks.[19]

Service with Kurram Militia in the quiet and picturesque Parachinar was much prized. The climate was pleasant and the valley was verdant with fruit trees and flowers. There was abundant game for *shikaris* and the numerous mountain streams were teeming with fish. The Militia even cleared a 13-mile ski track on the slopes of Safed Koh. However, life in Kurram Militia was not all fun and games. Kurram was not entirely safe from tribal raids and there was the occasional local feud to keep the Militia busy. It also sent detachments to assist Tochi and South Waziristan Scouts, whenever situation in Waziristan deteriorated.[20] The Chitral and Gilgit Scouts were also unaffected by the changes in the Frontier Corps and continued as before.

The situation was somewhat different in the Zhob Militia, which had always been under the control of Balochistan authorities and had evolved independently from those on the Northwest Frontier. In Balochistan, "they did things differently and, they thought, better".[21] So it was not surprising that following the debacle of 1919, authorities in Balochistan arrived at altogether different conclusions. When the old Zhob Levy Corps was reorganized in 1911, it had been restructured on a more military line and its class composition was changed to include *trans*-Frontier Pakhtuns, who formed half its strength. At the same time, its designation was changed to Zhob Militia. The high standards of discipline and efficiency had turned the Corps into a subsidiary military force, robbing it of the initiative and mobility inherent in an irregular unit. However, its irregular status had been the very basis of its formation in the first place. Meanwhile, recruitment of *trans*-Frontier Pakhtuns turned out to be a disaster, when many of them deserted in 1919.[22]

In 1920, the authorities in Balochistan decided to go back to the original plan and reorganize Zhob Militia into a mobile irregular corps composed of local men, who had intimate knowledge of the area and its people. However, they were only partially successful in implementing their plan. The Pakhtun element from outside Balochistan was reduced and their place was taken by Balochis and Brahuis. The new class composition of Zhob Militia in 1920, was two companies of Brahuis, one each of Rind Baloch and Pishin Kakars, two of Orakzais and one of other *trans*-Frontier Pathans. They were distributed into eight companies of 150 men each, and two troops of Mounted Infantry. Their total strength was 1200 under the command of five British officers. The Militia also reverted to its original designation of Zhob Levy Corps.[23] This arrangement continued until 1928, when it was again renamed as Zhob Militia. It was also re-organized with the strength of the Mounted Infantry raised to a company.[24]

The 'New Model Scouts'

The decade following its reorganization saw the Frontier Corps established on a firm footing. A unique Scout culture with distinct ethos took root, which endures to this day. In the Militias, the number of officers was small and they were selected by the authorities. However, after the reorganization of Frontier Corps, a larger number of vacancies was offered on volunteer basis. As the prestige of the Scouts grew, so did the competition among officers to join the Frontier Corps. The reasons for this were many and officers volunteered for different reasons such as, better pay, a life of action and adventure, escape from the monotony and restrictions of regimental life, the opportunity of an independent command, or the 'romance' of service on the Frontier with Pathans.[25] A Scout officer succinctly summed up his motivation to volunteer: "why serve on the Frontier with a regular regiment, sitting in camp behind barbed wire, and never moving out except on regular piqueting routine, when, instead, you can have the freedom of Scout life, the whole countryside to roam over, carrying shot-gun instead of a revolver".[26]

Generally, only officers from the infantry and cavalry with a minimum of five years of service were accepted in the Scouts. In the days of the Militias, they were mostly from the Punjab Frontier Force. However, officers from Punjabi regiments, whose class composition was similar to the Frontier Force, were also well represented. Besides them, the Gurkhas and Baluchis also provided a fair share, especially in the Zhob Militia. Due to the intense competition, especially in the more prestigious corps, the waiting list for aspiring applicants could be as long as three years. However, service in the Frontier Corps was not for everyone, and especially not for the more career-minded officers, who tended to look down on the Scouts. As a veteran of Frontier Corps drily

remarked, "Monty* would never have gone there, except for the pay, nor would he ever have been accepted!"[27]

The criteria for selection in the Frontier Scouts were even more rigorous than for the old Militias. A good service record along with favourable recommendations from their Commanding Officer and a serving officer of the Frontier Corps were basic requirements along with proficiency in Pashto. After that, they had to undergo further evaluation to ascertain their suitability by everyone from the Chief Commissioner of NWFP to the Commandant and officers of the corps they wished to join. That included a period of probation, at the end of which, any officer including the Subedar Major could veto their appointment.[28]

Colonel HRC Pettigrew of the South Waziristan Scouts recalled that, "vetting was a vital and invariable part of the method of selection of Scouts' officers." With only a handful of officers in a corps, there was no place for misfits. All officers, who had been deemed suitable, were asked to take a week's leave and spend it with their unit. "During that time they visited a good number of the posts and met all the officers, were taken out on *gasht*, encouraged to talk to the Pathan officers. They joined in the usual fun at Jandola in the Mess, were talked to, and listened to, and observed. Sometimes they were accepted and sometimes they weren't. The Commandant and the Wing Commanders, all experienced Scouts on their second tour of duty with the S.W.S., decided. But every one's opinion was asked and considered. If anyone did not take to the applicant he was probably rejected. It could easily so happen that the two of them would be at Ladha or some other post for weeks and weeks, with no other company in the Mess than each other's. Any real dislike, or even a serious clash of personalities, could disturb the whole post. The risk was not worth it. There were plenty more pebbles on the beach, with the Scouts' reputation so

* Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery of El Alamein fame, or Monty, as he was informally known, had the reputation of being ambitious and rather snobbish.

high and the attractions of the outdoor life so strong towards the right men".[29]

Once an officer joined the Frontier Corps, he usually went through the appointment of Wing Officer and after that, the Adjutant, Quartermaster or Signals Officer at the Headquarters. Wing Officers served on the posts and led their men on *gasht*. It was a very different life from the one they had known in the Army. An officer of the Frontier Corps was expected to do his job better than the men under his command, as they would never respect him if he was not as good as them. That meant being physically very fit and active, being decisive and calm under fire, and having good command over the language of his men. All these qualities instilled a lot of pride and confidence in Scout officers, who considered themselves a cut above the rest, and were actually encouraged to do so by their superiors. After the completion of their three-year tenure, they returned to their regiments. They could reapply for the Frontier Corps on completion of 12 years of service, when they were posted as Wing Commanders. Competition this time round was even more intense, and an officer's previous service with the Scouts played an important role in his selection. It was from this pool of officers that Commandants were chosen by the Inspecting Officer, Frontier Corps. By then, they were Majors with about 17 years of service.[30]

The recruitment of men was done by the units themselves. Parties under JCOs* would proceed to villages, often those, which already had men in that corps. There was some competition with the Army but generally, the two did not encroach on each other's

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* Junior Commissioned Officers. In the Indian Army, Subedars and Jemadars (Naib Subedars) were called Indian Officers, while in the Frontier Corps, they were known as Pathan Officers. In 1935, they were designated as Viceroy's Commissioned Officers in the Army. However, the same could not be applied in the Frontier Corps, as their commissions were granted by the Governor NWFP. In 1947, they were designated as JCOs in both the Army and the Frontier Corps. For ease of narrative, the term JCO has been used throughout.

recruitment areas. Although the pay and pension in the Army were better, the Frontier Corps held the attraction of service close to their homes and with men of their own tribe, which was of considerable importance to the tribesmen. As the reputation of the Scouts grew, service with them was much sought after. However, the main reason for enlistment in the Scouts then, as now, was economic. The Frontier Corps offered a regular salary besides much prestige, which raised the status of the men in their villages. A Scout initially enlisted for five years, at the end of which, he could take his discharge. The gratuity he received was enough to help him get married or make a new start in life. For those opting to complete their service, pension was a major incentive.[31] The pensionable service of a sepoy was 15 years, increasing to 18 for NCOs (Non-commissioned Officers) and 21 for JCOs.[32]

The main difference between Scouts and the old Militias was that the Scout no longer served in his own area. This freed him from local tribal pressures, which might test his loyalty. Kurram, Chitral and Gilgit, where such issues did not exist, were exceptions to the rule. The loyalty of the Scout was seldom in doubt. However, monetary benefits alone cannot explain his fidelity. After all, why would men fight for a foreign power with such gallantry and fierce devotion, as did the sepoys of the Indian Army or the Frontier Corps? Early in their conquest of India, the British had found a way to gain the allegiance of the sepoys by exploiting a concept peculiar to South Asia, which was *Izzat* or Honour. As long as his officers were worthy of his respect, the Sepoy would uphold his *Izzat* at all cost. His allegiance was to his Corps and to his officers, which is why their role was so crucial and they were so carefully selected.[33]

The Scouts were trained in their units. The emphasis was on drill, musketry and physical fitness, which formed part of basic training. After that, they were offered various specialist courses such as Signals or Military Transport, and promotion cadres. All

training except for some specialist cadres was carried out in the wings. The Scout was usually well disciplined. However, there were two matters that could test his self-restraint. One was leave, which was "virtually guaranteed when it was due: it was a brave Scout Commandant (or fool-hardy one) who did not keep very closely to his Leave Programme". The other was promotion. Promotions ran in platoons and were based on seniority although promotion cadres were mandatory. Men who were superseded often took it as a loss of face and at times, reacted violently. The Commandants made it a point to inform a man about to be passed over in advance, giving him a chance to take voluntary discharge and thus avoid the stigma of supersession.[34]

JCOs were the backbone of the Frontier Corps. Due to the non-permanency of officers, they provided the vital continuity for maintaining *esprit de corps.* Their experience and guidance were indispensable for the young British officers sent to command them. However, under the *Qaum* System of the Frontier Corps, they wielded considerable influence over their men, and a wrong person could create much trouble in the corps. The basic unit in the Frontier Corps was the Platoon, organized on *qaum* basis. The men's tribal identities were very important to them. In official documents, not only their tribe but also the clan or *khel* were usually mentioned along with their names, e.g. Havildar Gul Khan, Afridi, Kuki Khel.[35] The convention is still being followed in the Frontier Corps.

The Frontier Scouts were organized into a Headquarters Wing with two or three under-command wings, depending on the size of the corps. The Commandant was a Major, who was assisted by an Adjutant, Quartermaster and the Subedar Major. The Scouts, although trained and organized on military lines, were not subject to military laws. They were paid by the local government and maintained under the Silladar System, which was completely different from the Army. Everything from ration, clothing,

equipment, weapons and ammunition to horses and camels were centrally procured by the Commandant. All items other than weapons and ammunition were bought from the local market or through contactors. The cost of ration and equipment was deducted from the allowances of the men. Every corps maintained dairies and fruit and vegetable gardens at the headquarters and wings, to supply fresh milk and vegetables to the men. The Adjutant was responsible for enlistment, coordination of training within the corps and running of promotion courses for JCOs and specialist cadres. The Quartermaster's job was more onerous. Besides commanding the Mounted Infantry, he was responsible for the procurement and distribution of rations, clothing and equipment, and the maintenance of military transport, workshops, buildings and the unit estate.[36]

Each wing was commanded by a Captain, who was responsible for all administration, training and promotions. He was assisted by one or two Wing Officers, who commanded the larger posts. Companies were commanded by Subedars and Platoons by Jemadars. The main purpose of the Scout post was to serve as a base for *gashts*. They were usually sited on higher ground with good observation, keeping in mind water supply, road access and security considerations. Their size depended on the number of men they housed. Construction was done by the Military Engineering Service although the Scouts often did the job themselves. The basic layout of a post consisted of an enclosure surrounded by high walls on which were sited the machine guns. There were sentry posts in each corner. Two gates provided access: the main gate and a smaller 'sally port' in the opposite wall. The post was surrounded by a double layer of barbed wire. The parade and sports grounds, and the vegetable garden were located outside the walls.[37] Each post had a *Chigha* (pursuit party) platoon, a sort of Quick Reaction Force, ready to move out at a moment's notice through the sally port also called the *Chigha* door.[38]

A Scout summarized the *raison d'être* of Frontier Scouts as maintenance of "Law and Order in Tribal Territory to enable the Political Agent to implement the policy of the Government." The principal means by which this was achieved was through regular patrols or *gashts*. By 'showing the flag' in every part of the agency, the Government asserted its authority and gained early warning of trouble. "The Scout's job is to prevent any trouble from starting in his area, and to stop it before it can grow too big. All big disturbances in Waziristan have very small beginnings; it is usually possible to trace any big upheaval back to some very trivial incident, when the whole affair might easily have been stifled at birth". Regular *gashting* allowed the Scouts to gain intimate knowledge of the area and its people. At the same time, it helped them maintain the high standard of physical fitness and training required to out-manoeuvre the tribesmen on their own ground.[39] The tribesmen were extremely wary of the Scouts. As one Mahsud elder at Ladha lamented in 1936, "We'd rather have four brigades of infantry than a thousand Scouts. The Army will sit quietly within its wire and we can sell it eggs and chickens, and if they march out we know exactly where they are going and how far they can go. But the Scouts come from anywhere, and go anywhere, and we never know from which side they are coming next".[40]

There were several types of *gasht*. Every Scout post carried out two routine *gashts* monthly by a platoon of 30 men and two stretcher-bearers. One of these was a long *gasht* of at least 20 miles, while the other shorter *gasht* was of about 12 miles. However, the distances varied according to situation. A *gasht* commanded by an officer was never less than four platoons. It would consist of a *gasht* headquarters, Signals personnel with wireless sets, heliograph equipment and carrier pigeons, and Khassadars to identify local people. Sometimes, the Political Agent or his representatives also accompanied them. A characteristic feature of the Scout *gasht* was its speed. The Gilgit and Waziristan

Scouts were famous for their marching prowess. The key principles of gashting were, “never be alone, never be out of sight, never be surprised and never be slow”. The tribesmen seldom forgave a tactical error. The fact that the Scouts were hardly ever ambushed speaks volumes of their fitness and training.[41]

Besides the routine *gasht*, the Scouts also carried out Training *gasht* and Road Protection or Column *gasht*, in which they provided protection to Army columns on their flanks by deploying picquets on surrounding heights. A Scout officer was usually attached with the column for liaison and to ensure that his men were not mistaken for hostiles by the Army. Another type was the Battle *gasht*, when the Scouts launched a raid on a gathering of hostiles. Depending on the situation, the size of such a *gasht* could vary anywhere from a few to fifteen or more platoons. These operations were sometimes conducted in cooperation with the Army, who provided armoured cars, artillery and sappers. In Balochistan, with its vast distances, it was not possible to cover the area by foot and *gasht* was carried out on camels, and later, in motor vehicles. It was called MT *gasht*.[42] There was close cooperation with the Air Force, which maintained an airfield at Miranshah. Scout officers often flew in the aircraft as observers for reconnaissance. The Air Force provided air support during *gashts* and was widely used for airdropping supplies.[43]

Barampta is essentially a Cordon and Search operation. The village suspected of harbouring ‘undesirables’ would be cordoned by the Scouts during the night and searched at daybreak. Usually these affairs were uneventful but at times, they could end in a firefight. The tricky parts were the approach march, when several parties of Scouts converged on their target in the dark, and during the withdrawal from the village, when they were vulnerable to hostile fire. Safe withdrawal whether during a *barampta* or a *gasht* required speed, coordination and good communication. Besides the wireless equipment, the Scouts had a simple but

efficient method of communicating with small coloured flags carried on walking sticks.[44]

The Scout's mobility was of paramount importance, and he was dressed and equipped accordingly. The Scout carried the .303 rifle with a short bayonet and 70 rounds of ammunition in a leather bandolier and waist pouches. A water bottle, canvas haversack with 48 hours' worth of rations completed his kit. The rations usually consisted of raisins, onions, *chapatis*, tea and *gur*. In cold weather, he carried blankets or *razai* (quilt) with a *durri* (floor matting), and wore a grey woollen jersey or greatcoat. His dress consisted of khaki shirt and shorts, which were substituted by *partug* (*shalwar*) in winters. The South Waziristan Scouts wore grey Mazri shirts. The headgear consisted of a khaki *safa* wound around a khaki *kullah*. Khaki stockings and grey socks with *chaplis* completed his field uniform. The grey and khaki uniform provided excellent camouflage, while the nail-studded heavy leather *chaplis* were ideal for marching on rough mountainous ground. In fact, they were so practical that in the 1930s, *chaplis* were adopted by all Army units deployed on the Frontier. The officers were dressed and equipped exactly like their men except that they carried a .45 revolver instead of the rifle.[45]

The amount of ammunition carried by the Scout on a *gasht* was limited and his tribal adversary was adept at camouflage and guerrilla warfare. This meant that the Scout had to be a good marksman, who could make his every bullet count. That is why so much attention was paid on his musketry training, which took a year to complete. Most of them became excellent shots, while some were exceptional. "No man was safe from a Scout patrol at less than 600 yards range, and many men could almost guarantee to knock a man over, running, at that range with an ordinary, well kept, .303 British type rifle".[46]

The Scout's ceremonial uniform was immaculate: starched shirt with rolled up sleeves and shirt tails outside the shorts, a

neatly tied pagri, burnished buckle and polished brown leather belt and *chaplis*. Although an irregular corps, the Scouts gained a high reputation for their smart turn-out and faultless drill.[47] Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was so impressed by the smartness of Zhob Militia's guard of honour that he requested their presence whenever possible. It might have created a logistic headache for the Commandant but there cannot be a greater compliment to the Zhob Militia or the Frontier Corps.[48] The Scouts have maintained their high standards of turn-out and drill to this day and would give any Army unit a run for their money on the parade ground.

In the decade following their reorganization, the Waziristan Scouts honed their fighting skills to a fine pitch. "No armed men moved faster than a Scouts' gasht in a hurry, none kept more silent and still than a Scouts' ambush, known as a chapao". When they received news of a raiding party returning from the settled areas, the Scouts would immediately move out to lay a *chapao*. After mapping out all likely crossing points, the Chigha Platoon would disperse into small groups and lie in wait for the raiders. It was a test of wits between the raiders and their pursuers and required much patience, cunning and field craft. Not all raiders were caught by the Scouts but enough were intercepted to make raiding an unprofitable business and virtually end it by the late 1920s.[49]

By 1930, the prestige of Frontier Scouts had risen to prodigious heights. However, among them, the ones in Waziristan were considered the *crème de la crème* of the Frontier Corps. This was because most of the action on the Frontier was in Waziristan, and these two corps attracted the best officers. There was intense competition among them to determine which was the "hardest fighting, longest gashting, deepest drinking corps". Naturally, each considered the argument settled in their favour. Tochi Scouts were the more relaxed of the two, while South Waziristan Scouts due to the tougher nature of their area and their opponents, the Mahsuds, were considered the toughest and best trained unit in the Frontier

Corps. This pride in their corps was reflected in the swagger of their officers and their penchant for wearing 'frontier dress' such as Mazri shirts, *chaplis* and *poshteens* in clubs, while on leave.[50]

A difficult task performed by the South Waziristan Scouts and Zhob Militia was the protection of Powindah caravans during their annual migration through the Gomal Pass. Powindahs are nomad Ghilzai tribesmen of Afghanistan, who migrated to India every autumn for trade, complete with their families and flocks of sheep. They offered an irresistible target to the Wazirs and Mahsuds, through whose territory they had to pass. However, the Powindahs were neither meek nor helpless and could fight back as fiercely as their assailants. As a result, their passage invariably resulted in some fracas and was a source of headache for the Scouts, whose job it was to ensure there was no trouble.[51]

No account of the Scouts would be complete without a mention of their Medical Officers. They were drawn from the elite Indian Medical Service (IMS), the predecessor of Army Medical Corps, who served in both military and civilian establishments. In the Scouts, they were appointed by the Indian Political Service and doubled as Agency Surgeons. Their terms of service were the same as other officers and they faced the same risks and dangers. Major CW Owen, the Medical Officer of South Waziristan Militia, who survived the epic march from Wana to Zhob in 1919, is but one such example. These doctors worked under extremely difficult conditions in remote areas, where they were the only medical help available for hundreds of miles. Treating severe and disfiguring trauma was a routine affair and some of them became pioneers of plastic surgery.[52]

Revolt in NWFP

The years following the uprising in Waziristan had been uncharacteristically quiet in the Tribal Areas. However, the same could not be said for the settled districts of NWFP, where social

discontent was simmering. One reason for this was the concentration of land in the hands of a few landlords under British rule, which had driven many small landowners to destitution. Meanwhile elsewhere, the Indian struggle for political rights had gradually forced the British to cede ground. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, led to devolution of local administration to the provinces. But these reforms were not extended to NWFP, which the British intended to keep firmly in their grip for "strategic" reasons.[53] This further alienated the people, who were chafing under the draconian provisions of Frontier Crimes Regulation. All these factors gave birth to a new political force in NWFP called the Khudai Khidmatgars. It was a quasi-paramilitary organization that started as a social reform movement with independence from British rule as its ultimate goal. The British called them Red Shirts because they dyed their clothes red. The movement's leader Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the 'Frontier Gandhi', espoused a strange mix of social reform, Pakhtun cultural revival, militant secularism and Gandhian non-violence. Although it had a strong support base in parts of NWFP, it failed to gain any traction in the Tribal Areas.[54] For some time, the Red Shirts posed a major challenge to the British. However, their alliance with the Indian National Congress spelt their doom, and in the end, they were reduced to nothing more than a nuisance.

On 23 April 1930, arrest of Red Shirt leaders in Peshawar led to widespread demonstrations. The district authorities responded with brute force, killing a large number of protestors. The killings provoked a violent uprising and the British lost control over most of the city. The revolt then spread to other districts of NWFP. The British were surprised by the scale of the violence. In the immediate aftermath of the revolt, the inexperienced Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar and the Military Commander were unable to cope and it fell to Colonel GB Scott, CB, DSO, the Inspecting Officer, Frontier Corps, to take charge of the situation

in Peshawar. He ordered detachments of Kurram Militia, Tochi Scouts and South Waziristan Scouts to Peshawar to shore up its defences.[55]

The unrest provided an opportunity to the tribesmen, and in June, 7000 Afridis descended from Tirah to take advantage of the anarchy in Peshawar. They only relented after the Army permanently occupied Khajuri and Aka Khel plains in October. Meanwhile, unrest was also reported in Bajaur and Mohmand country, where a *lashkar* started gathering north of Peshawar. On 16 June, a military column assembled at Charsadda to deal with them. It included 400 rifles of Kurram Militia and South Waziristan Scouts under Colonel GB Scott. On 18 and 19 June, the force surprised and surrounded the *lashkar*, which then started withdrawing. Only detachments of the Frontier Corps were engaged in the fighting.[56]

A similar irruption occurred in Waziristan, where a *lashkar* of 4000 Wazirs surrounded the Tochi Scouts post at Datta Khel on 11 May. The Scouts put up a spirited defence, while aircraft from the Royal Air Force bombed and strafed the tribesmen. The *lashkar* eventually dispersed on 14 May. Meanwhile further south, a 3000-strong Mahsud and Wazir *lashkar* invested the South Waziristan Scouts posts at Sararogha and Ahnai Tangi on 6 July. The Royal Air Force launched several raids on the *lashkar,* which broke up on 9 July. This was followed by aerial bombardment of Mahsud villages, which eventually led to abatement of violence in South Waziristan by the end of the month.[57]

It took the British almost two years to stamp out unrest in NWFP, although sporadic incidents continued to occur including in the Tribal Territory, where military action had to be taken in Bajaur and Mohmand in 1933 and 1935. Soon however, the focus of all attention again shifted to Waziristan, where the British ‘Modified Forward Policy’ was about to suffer the fate of its predecessors.



8. Waziristan 1936.

The War with Faqir of Ipi

Although the revolt in NWFP was ruthlessly suppressed, one of its consequences was the extension of Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms to NWFP in 1932, when it gained the status of a Governor's Province. However, there was no change in the status of Tribal Areas, which continued as before. But these areas could not remain isolated from the events unfolding in their neighbourhood. The Government of India Act, 1935, devolved power to the provinces including NWFP, where in 1937, Congress formed the government led by Dr Khan Sahib, the elder brother of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. This alarmed the tribesmen, who felt that it would lead to their domination by Hindus. The reaction was not long in coming, and unsurprisingly, Waziristan provided the spark that lit the fire.[58]

The excuse was provided by the Islam Bibi affair in 1936, when a Hindu girl in Bannu eloped with a Wazir tribesman and converted to Islam. On the complaint of her family, a civil court ordered her return to the parents. The tribesmen saw it as "abdication of British power to Hindus".[59] The verdict inflamed the religious sentiments of the tribesmen, and Mirza Ali Khan, a mullah from North Waziristan, better known as the Faqir of Ipi, declared jihad against the British. In response to his call, the Wazirs rose up in revolt and soon the entire Waziristan was ablaze. It took the British two years of hard campaigning with 40,000 troops backed by aircraft, tanks, armoured cars and artillery, to suppress the revolt.[60] Despite that, the wily and skilful Faqir kept them on the run for several more years, tying down a large number of troops. Even after the independence of Pakistan, he continued to cause trouble for the Government. He was never caught.[61]

The Advance to Biche Kashkai: By the end of 1936, the Faqir's stature had grown among the tribesmen, especially among his own tribe of Tori Khel Wazirs in the Khaisora Valley. As restlessness

spread among Tori Khels, the British pressed their Maliks to expel the Faqir from their territory. The Maliks however, expressed their helplessness and requested a demonstration to strengthen their hand. Consequently, on 25 November, the British despatched two military columns to the Khaisora Valley, as a show of force. The Razmak Brigade advanced eastwards from Damdil down the River Khaisora, while the Bannu Brigade moved south from Mir Ali. The two brigades were to rendezvous at Biche Kashkai in the Lower Khaisora Valley, where the Faqir had established his base. Strong detachments of Tochi Scouts were attached with both columns to protect their flanks.[62]

The Razmak Column, called Razcol, had to traverse a difficult route through boulder-strewn waterways, scrub-covered hills and narrow gorges. Eight platoons of Tochi Scouts were to provide protection on the flanks, while six platoons were to move in front of the advanced guard until Zerpezai, from where they were to cover the rearguard. Major Arthur Felix-Williams, MC, the Commandant of Tochi Scouts, was leading their contingent. No opposition was encountered until Zerpezai, where the Scouts were informed by a Khassadar about a gathering of hostile tribesmen in the *tangi* (gorge) ahead. Soon after, the column came under fire. The Scouts immediately launched a flanking attack supported by artillery and secured the high ridges east of Zerpezai. They then continued their advance to another ridge towards the southeast but were held up by heavy fire. The ridge was taken later in the afternoon with the support of the Army. Meanwhile, the eight platoons of Tochi Scouts on the flanks had taken up positions towards the west. By evening, Razcol had arrived at Biche Kashkai. The platoons of Scouts on flank protection then withdrew to Asad Khel, while the rest joined Razcol after the rearguard had cleared the *tangi*.[63] It was the month of Ramadan and the Scouts had been in action for more than thirteen hours in blazing sun while observing the fast.[64]

The Bannu Brigade, called Tocol (Tochi Column), started from Mir Ali early on 25 November. Its right flank was protected by four platoons of Tochi Scouts under Captain VLM Wainright and the left by two troops of Mounted Infantry under Captain TS Taylor. They were accompanied by their Medical Officer, Captain George Graham and Lieutenant RN Beatty, who was the Acting Assistant Political Agent but insisted on accompanying his unit. At River Katira, the column was held up by tribesmen occupying hills towards the west of the track. It was only able to advance after Tochi Scouts drove the tribesmen out of their *sangars* after close-quarter fighting. They lost one man killed and two wounded in the encounter. The Commander of Tocol decided to continue the advance during the night against the advice of Captain Wainright. Tochi Scouts led the way. Within a few hours, they were fired upon at point blank range and were forced to fall back. The Commander then decided to halt for the night. Although the tribesmen kept up a desultory fire, Tocol was able to rendezvous with Razcol at Biche Kashkai the next day without any serious losses.[65]

On 27 November, the two columns started their return journey to Mir Ali with Tocol in the lead. Their advance was covered by Tochi Scouts under Major Felix-Williams, while Captain Wainright brought up the rear. At Jaler Algad (*nullah*), the Scouts surprised and shot up a group of tribesmen, capturing some of them. They then cleared the way for Tocol under continuous fire until the column reached River Katira. The rest of the journey was uneventful and the two columns arrived at Mir Ali by evening. During the three days of operations, the British suffered 131 casualties including 7 killed and 16 wounded among the Scouts.[66] The performance of Tochi Scouts was outstanding. They were awarded one Military Cross, one IOM and two IDSM for this operation, while their Commandant received the Distinguished Service Order.[67]

The aim of the expedition had been to overawe the tribesmen with a show of force. Instead, the opposite happened. The tribesmen considered the engagement to be a victory, which only stiffened their resolve and increased the Faqir's prestige. It set the tone for future operations in Waziristan, where fighting would go on for the next two years with varying intensity. Typical of the Frontier, no major battles took place; the tribesmen preferring their usual tactics of ambush, sniping and attacking isolated picquets. Column after column was despatched in search of the elusive Faqir, who always managed to stay one step ahead. "They sought him here, they sought him there, those columns sought him everywhere".[68]

In December 1936, the British decided to build a new road from Mir Ali to Biche Kashkai to facilitate the movement of troops. Meanwhile, punitive operations were launched against Tori Khel Wazirs and several of their villages were destroyed. The Tochi Scouts were given the responsibility of protecting roads and military columns. By mid-February, the Faqir was driven out of Khaisora Valley and most of his followers dispersed.[69] However, the overall situation in Waziristan did not improve and on 6 February 1937, Captain JC Keogh of South Waziristan Scouts and his orderly were murdered on their way to Jandola from Ladha. The next day, Lieutenant RN Beatty of Tochi Scouts and two Khassadars were killed in an ambush near Boya by Madda Khel Wazirs.[70]

The Ambush at Shahur Tangi: On the morning of 9 April 1937, a military convoy of 53 vehicles escorted by four armoured cars left Manzai for Wana. At Shahur Tangi, a 3-mile long narrow and winding gorge with steep sides, it was ambushed by a group of 80 Mahsuds and Bhittanis. The convoy suffered heavy casualties and was trapped in the defile. Reinforcements of South Waziristan Scouts were despatched from Sarwekai and Jandola and took up positions at both ends of the defile. Three platoons of Scouts under

Captain SD Wilcock from Jandola then attempted to capture the high ground north of Shahur Tangi but were met with fierce resistance by the tribesmen. It was with great difficulty that the Scouts extricated themselves. That evening, another three platoons under Lieutenant FD Robertson arrived from Wana and were ordered to eject the tribesmen from the northern ridge. After some fierce close-quarter fighting, the Scouts achieved their objective in late evening. Meanwhile, frantic efforts continued throughout the day and into the night to extricate the stranded vehicles. Just before dawn, the South Waziristan Scouts again advanced from the east and captured the entire northern ridge dominating Shahur Tangi. The tribesmen however kept on firing from the southern side of the defile until the arrival of further reinforcements at midday, when they withdrew. The British suffered 103 casualties, including seven killed and six wounded in the South Waziristan Scouts.[71] The wounded included Captain Wilcock and Lieutenant Robertson, both of whom were awarded the Military Cross. Havildar Multan was awarded a posthumous IOM for staying back and covering the withdrawal of his platoon, while Subedar Akhmad Shah received the IDSM.[72]

The Iblanke Ridge: At the end of April, several thousand Wazirs, Mahsuds and Afghans started gathering in the Khaisora and Shaktu River Valleys. Two infantry brigades moved into Khaisora Valley and inflicted heavy losses on the tribesmen, who withdrew towards Arsal Kot in Shaktu Valley, the new headquarters of Faqir of Ipi. The Faqir positioned his forces to block any British move from Dosalli into the Sham Plain along Sre Mela *nullah*, which was the likeliest route of advance. The British however, decided to surprise him with a converging attack by two brigades. The Bannu Brigade was to carry out a flanking night move over the Iblanke Ridge east of Sre Mela, while the 1st (Abbottabad) Brigade would advance along Sre Mela the following day. In order to maintain secrecy, no reconnaissance was carried out.[73]

On the night of 11 May 1937, eight platoons of Tochi Scouts under Captain WA Gimson led the advance of Bannu Brigade over the 3-mile long and 1700-foot high Iblanke Ridge. It was an extremely arduous climb over steep and trackless slopes covered with loose rocks and bushes. Despite the difficulties, the Scouts managed to establish themselves on the ridge by midnight. It was an incredible feat of daring, skill and field craft. At dawn, with the brigade column still struggling to catch up, they were ordered to push on and secure the hills on both sides of Iblanke Pass, where the ridge descends into Sham Plain. On reaching the Pass, they faced fierce resistance by the tribesmen but brushing them aside, captured their objectives. The brigade then moved into the plain. It was a brilliant manoeuvre and caught the tribesmen blocking the Sre Mela gorge in the flank and rear. Trapped between the two brigades, they were unable to offer any resistance and soon melted away. On 27 May, the two brigades fought their way to Arsal Kot with Tochi Scouts again leading the advance. Here they were joined by the 2nd (Rawalpindi) Brigade, which then proceeded to destroy the village and cave hideouts of the Faqir, who had managed to escape into Mahsud territory.[74]

The Raid on Gul Zamir Kot: In June 1937, the British made a plan to capture the Faqir of Ipi. The mission was to be carried out by eight platoons each of Tochi and South Waziristan Scouts, who were chosen for their speed, and their ability to break off an engagement and extricate themselves quickly from a difficult situation. On receiving intelligence of the Faqir's presence at Gul Zamir Kot in the vicinity of Arsal Kot, the Scouts were assembled at Dosalli under their Commandants. The two detachments set off on foot from Ghariom on the night of 20 June. By early morning, they had reached their objective undetected. Search parties then started their operation by methodically going through their designated objectives but could not find the Faqir, who had again managed to slip away just in time. However, they arrested eleven

of his associates including Arsal Khan, an influential tribal leader and a staunch opponent of the British. The Scouts then withdrew without any incident.[75] Although they had failed to catch their quarry, the Scouts had demonstrated their formidable capabilities by carrying out the audacious operation.

Operations in the Khaisara and Badar Valleys: The British now decided to reopen their lines of communication to Wana from Jandola and Razmak. The Wana, Bannu and Razmak Brigades were employed for these operations in the latter half of June 1937. Detachments of South Waziristan Scouts were attached with all three brigades. The Bannu and Razmak Brigades were to move south from Ladha towards Torwam, where they were to rendezvous with Wana Brigade after it had opened the road to Jandola. They were then to clear the Badar and Khaisara Valleys, where Mullah Sher Ali, a Mahsud ally of the Faqir was operating. On 23 June, the Bannu Brigade arrived at Sharawangi Narai on the road to Torwam. A platoon of South Waziristan Scouts was ordered to occupy a hill towards the west of the road for protection of the camp. As it reached its objective, it was rushed from two sides by a large number of Mahsuds, who were lying in ambush. In fierce hand-to-hand fighting, two Scouts were killed and eight wounded. Two platoons under Subedar Mohabbat Khan immediately counterattacked and drove away the tribesmen after inflicting heavy casualties on them. During the day's fighting, the South Waziristan Scouts suffered losses of three killed and 13 wounded. By 1 July, the Khaisara Valley had been cleared and the three brigades returned home.[76]

In the meantime, the British had been laying a network of roads in Central Waziristan to improve their communications. Construction work was mostly done by troops including the Scouts, who also provided protection to road construction parties. Desultory operations went on but the Faqir of Ipi, now thought to be in Shawal near the Afghan border, continued to elude the

British. By now, the tribesmen were tiring of the constant fighting and in December, active operations ended. Despite the massive investment of men and treasure, the outcome for the British was most disappointing and their Frontier policy along with their reputation lay in tatters.[77]

The only people to have come out of these operations with credit were the Scouts, whose splendid performance was even acknowledged by the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army.[78] A number of their officers and men were decorated for gallantry including their Commandants, Major Arthur Felix-Williams, MC, of Tochi Scouts, and Major PRH Skrine of South Waziristan Scouts, who were both awarded the Distinguished Service Order.[79] The Scouts had demonstrated their indispensability on the Frontier. However, even though they had been fulfilling their role admirably for the last decade and more, there were many in the Indian Army, who were sceptical of them. There was even talk of converting them into constabulary or disbanding them altogether. Some were of the opinion that the Scouts were a waste of resources and their duties could easily be performed by the Army. To prove their point, a hundred soldiers of an infantry battalion were sent on a 24-mile *gasht* in Scout country. Their officer was brought back on a stretcher, while so many men collapsed that they had to be rescued by the Scouts. That ended all talk of disbandment but the Scouts continued to be looked upon with suspicion.[80]

Waziristan operations finally provided the opportunity for the Scouts to gain official recognition of their unique role in frontier operations.[81] Not only that, but it was the Army that found itself in unfavourable light when compared to the efficiency of the Scouts. During the disturbances in Peshawar in 1930, the Army was found wanting. “In comparison, the high mobility and effectiveness of the lightly equipped South Waziristan Scouts, Kurram Militia and Frontier Constabulary enabled them to deal effectively with elusive tribal raiders, prompting accusations that

the military was incapable of performing its allotted role in the watch and ward of tribal territory".[82] The same was observed in Waziristan, where the Army appeared ponderous and lethargic compared to the mobility of the Scouts. However, it was important to understand then, as it is now that the Frontier Corps and the Army are complementary to each other. Neither can operate independently on the Frontier under war conditions. As long as this simple truth is understood, they can provide a whole that is greater than the sum of the parts.

The Action of Dargai Sar: The termination of military operations in December 1937, did not end hostilities in Waziristan. There were regular incidents of violence, which kept the Scouts busy. In the second week of April 1938, the South Waziristan Scouts received information about a gathering of hostile tribesmen near Dargai Sar, a 5700-foot feature between Kotkai and Splitoi. Suspecting that Mullah Sher Ali himself might be leading them, orders were issued to the Scouts to apprehend him and clear the area. On 14 April, six platoons under Captain IBD Dewar and Lieutenant RHR Alderman moved out from Splitoi, while eight platoons from Jandola and Sararogha under Major DLO Woods, the Acting Commandant, approached the feature from Kotkai.[83]

As Major Woods' party climbed up a ridge of Dargai Sar, it came under fire from tribesmen hidden among the rocks. Several men were wounded and the party was pinned down. Major Woods sent carrier pigeons to Jandola requesting air support. Meanwhile, the Splitoi party had reached the top of the feature without any incident. Major Woods ordered Captain Dewar by heliograph to engage the tribesmen from the top. Dewar immediately moved out with two platoons, leaving the rest under Lieutenant Alderman. Within minutes, the party was ambushed and Captain Dewar was killed. Lieutenant Alderman extricated the two platoons under heavy fire and withdrew to the top, where he was surrounded by the tribesmen. Alderman organized his defences by building a

perimeter of *sangars* and deploying a picquet. With six platoons at his disposal, he was not in any danger of being overrun. However, his main concern was the availability of ammunition, which was limited to 70 rounds per man. Meanwhile, Major Woods had withdrawn to Kotkai.[84]

Heavy fighting went on all afternoon, while aircraft strafed and bombed the tribesmen, although with little effect. A large party of tribesmen attacked an isolated Scout position, killing two men and wounding another two. Jemadar Sahib Nur immediately counterattacked the assailants and drove them off. By late afternoon, the Scouts' ammunition was running low. Pigeons were despatched requesting resupply by air, which was duly delivered through an improvised parachute. Sporadic sniping continued all night but the tribesmen did not attempt an attack. Next morning, a strong relief force was despatched and Lieutenant Alderman withdrew under the cover of artillery and air force. The tribesmen tried to interfere with the operation but withdrew after suffering several casualties. During the action of Dargai Sar, the South Waziristan Scouts suffered losses of 3 killed and 11 wounded.[85] Lieutenant Alderman, who was on his first *gasht*, was awarded the Military Cross, while three of his men received the IDSM.[86]

The Siege of Datta Khel: Dargai Sar was the last major operation of Waziristan Campaign. However, the situation in Tochi Valley remained unsettled for a long time, with raids, sniping and ambushes. The Tochi Scouts were continuously engaged in operations. In May 1938, the post at Datta Khel was besieged by a *lashkar* of Madda Khel Wazirs. The garrison of five platoons was under the command of Lieutenant Godfrey Lerwill. The post was armed with a 4.5-inch howitzer manned by Indian Artillery, who were training the Scouts on it. On 10 May, the post was fired upon by a cannon operated by the tribesmen. The Scouts immediately retaliated with their howitzer neutralizing the cannon. The siege continued for six weeks but the Scouts, who were being supplied

by air, were not seriously troubled.[87] Lieutenant Lerwill was awarded the Military Cross for his successful defence of the post.[88]

The Action of Wune Sar: On 11 July 1938, Mullah Sher Ali attacked a permanent picquet of South Waziristan Scouts at Tarekai near Splitoi under the covering fire of a cannon. Subedar Ghulam Hussein, commanding at Splitoi, decided to make good use of the 4.5-inch howitzer on which his men had recently trained. After two rounds hit their target, Sher Ali withdrew from Tarekai and moved towards the picquet at Katskai near Sararogha. Five platoons under Captain WA Cheeseman moved out from Sararogha to relieve Katskai and occupied Wune Sar, a ridge overlooking the picquet. Meanwhile, another *gasht* was sent out from Jandola but was ambushed and had to fight its way back. Captain Cheeseman was ordered to return to Splitoi but was surrounded by hundreds of Mahsuds before he could move out. He decided to stay on the ridge until relieved. Just before midnight, Lieutenant JWS Warden left Sararogha with four platoons to reinforce Cheeseman. After fighting his way through the gauntlet of tribesmen, he was able to reach Cheeseman's position, which was under heavy attack. The Scouts beat off repeated attacks until the next morning, when the *lashkar* withdrew on the approach of armoured cars. The South Waziristan Scouts suffered casualties of six men wounded.[89] Lieutenant Warden was awarded the Military Cross for his bold action.[90]

Meanwhile in North Waziristan, military operations were renewed against the Faqir of Ipi, who was holed up somewhere near Kharre on the Afghan frontier. The Tochi Scouts in addition to their normal duties also had to support military operations. In September, they along with South Waziristan Scouts and Kurram Militia were even asked to operate against a band of outlaws led by Mehr Dil in the Ahmedzai Salient. The continuous engagement put them under severe strain and several platoons of Kurram Militia were sent to Waziristan to share the work load.[91]

Modernisation of the Frontier Corps

Major DHJ Williams was appointed Commandant of the South Waziristan Scouts in December 1937. He was a remarkable man in many ways. A tough no-nonsense commander, who was completely devoted to his men; he was also a passionate gardener and a keen aviator. But what set him apart from others was his vision and talent for innovation. One of the main weaknesses of the Scouts while on *gasht* was communication. Wireless sets were too heavy to carry by a fast moving *gasht*, while flags worked only at short distances and during daytime like heliographs. Carrier pigeons could take a long time and were not always reliable. After much experimentation with Marconi radio-telephones, Major Williams devised his own man-portable 'walkie-talkie' sets, which had a range of up to 18 miles and were affordable. It was a revolutionary idea, which gave the South Waziristan Scouts, who started using them years before the British or Indian Armies, a big advantage during operations.[92]

The main weapon of the Scout was the .303 rifle. They also had Vickers-Berthier light machine guns but they were too heavy to routinely carry on a *gasht*. The concept of a submachine gun had not yet been grasped by the British and the only armies using them were the German and Austrian. These weapons are excellent for close-quarter fighting and were ideal for the Scouts during *baramptas* or *chapaos.* Major Williams equipped his men with the 9 mm Steyr-Solothurn machine carbines, which he procured from Europe using unit funds, making South Waziristan Scouts the first British unit to use submachine guns.[93] Another of his innovations was the introduction of armoured lorries, which were constructed in the unit workshop. Motor vehicles offered soft targets for snipers and resulted in significant casualties during ambushes. The South Waziristan Scouts procured Chevrolet 3-ton trucks from the market, which were then encased in two sheets of 1/8th-inch steel

by the unit armourers and artificers. The gap between the two sheets provided the requisite protection and could stop a round of .303 fired at point-blank range. Introduction of these armoured lorries made operations on the Frontier much safer. However, other corps were slow to accept these innovations except the Zhob Militia, which adopted them in the 1940s.[94] It was his farsightedness combined with a strong character and professional excellence that led to the selection of Brigadier DHJ Williams as the first Inspector General Frontier Corps after Independence by the Government of Pakistan in 1947.[95]

Artillery had been in use of the Frontier Corps since 1902, when the Kurram Militia was equipped with two 9-pounder smooth-bore field guns. These 'Post Guns' were installed in Parachinar Fort and operated on fixed lines of fire. In 1937, it was decided to equip all units of the Frontier Corps with artillery pieces, starting with the South Waziristan Scouts. Calibre of the guns depended on what the Army could spare. As a result, the Frontier Corps ended up with a wide variety of guns such as the 10, 13 & 25-pounder artillery guns, and 3.7 & 4.5-inch howitzers. The Scouts received eight weeks of basic gunnery training in the local Indian Mountain Artillery units after which an Artillery officer stayed with them for two weeks to ensure that the men had acquired the requisite skills. The guns could be transported on ordinary trucks fitted with ramps and brought into immediate action. The proficiency of Scout gunners was such that "it took about 45 seconds from the moment the truck stopped until the first round was in the air".[96]

It was around this time that major organizational changes took place in the Frontier Corps. The devastating earthquake of 1935, led to administrative reforms in Balochistan. One of these was to bring Zhob Militia to the same standards of training and equipment as the two corps in Waziristan and place it under the administrative control of Frontier Corps. In 1937, the Zhob Militia

was reorganized into platoons. It consisted of 125 Mounted Infantry and 1288 infantry, including wireless and military transport personnel, under six British officers.[97] Their strength was increased to 2000 in 1941. All six of its Commandants from 1936 to 1950, were posted from South Waziristan Scouts, which served as the model. They moulded Zhob Militia in the image of South Waziristan Scouts, and made it as good, if not better than the much-vaunted Waziristan Corps, who were considered to be the best in the Frontier Corps. Lieutenant Colonel PC Garrett, their last British Commandant called it the "Waziristanisation" of Zhob Militia.[98] Meanwhile, the Chagai Levy Corps was also reorganized in 1937, on a similar pattern into three troops of camel sowars and nine platoons of infantry, with a section each of Transport and Signals.[99] There were no significant changes in the Mekran Levy Corps.[100]

The Gilgit and Chitral Scouts had largely remained unaffected by the previous reorganizations of the Frontier Corps. This was due to their vastly different circumstances, where they did not have to contend with any local disturbances or raiders from outside. However, after the withdrawal of Jammu & Kashmir State troops from Gilgit Agency in 1935, its security became the responsibility of Gilgit Scouts. This required a reordering of the Agency's security arrangements. The Gilgit Scouts were reorganized on platoon basis with ten platoons of 50 men each, and embodied for service all year round. In 1937, they were placed under the control of Inspecting Officer, Frontier Corps.[101] A similar change took place in Chitral, when the Army was withdrawn in 1942, and the security of the State was entrusted to Chitral Scouts. They too were embodied as a full-time corps of 1200 men divided into ten companies, with a section each of BL 2.75-inch mountain guns and Vickers machine guns. Their designation was changed to Chitral State Scouts and they too came under the administrative control of Frontier Corps.[102]

Another significant event of 1937, was the renewal of Mahsud enrolment in the Army. The authorities wanted to keep the tribesmen gainfully employed to keep them out of mischief. A large number of Mahsuds were employed as labourers for the new road construction, which was ordered following the outbreak of trouble in Waziristan. However, these men were ill-disciplined and at times more troublesome than useful. By enlisting them in a road construction unit, it was hoped that under military discipline, they would be more efficient and amenable. On 9 August 1937, the 5th Road Construction Battalion composed entirely of Mahsuds was raised by Major RS Johnson at Razmak. Except for being unarmed, it was a regular Army unit in all respects.[103]

The experiment of enrolling Mahsuds was a resounding success and it was decided to retain the battalion after the completion of road construction project in Waziristan. In 1938, it was reorganized into platoons and placed under the Frontier Corps. At the same time, its designation was changed to Mahsud Labour Battalion. However, the men resented the label of labourers and in 1940, it was redesignated as Mahsud Battalion. During the Second World War, it again proved its usefulness by performing duties, which otherwise would have tied down regular infantry battalions. Following up on this success, another unit called the 2nd Mahsud Battalion was raised at Sararogha in June 1944, by Lieutenant Colonel REFG North.[104] The two battalions were reorganized as Scouts in 1960, and redesignated as 1st and 2nd Mahsud Scouts in 1965.[105] They are now called Bara and Maiwand Rifles.

The Officer Corps was opened to the Indians in 1917. By 1937, hundreds of them were serving in different appointments in the Indian Army. However, the Frontier Corps had remained closed to them. Finally on 25 July 1938, Lieutenant Mohammad Yusuf Khan, MC, 6/13th Frontier Force Rifles (1 FF), was posted to the South Waziristan Scouts, becoming the first Pakistani officer to serve with the Scouts. A native of Abbottabad, he was

commissioned from the Indian Military Academy Dehra Dun in 1934. Lieutenant Yusuf was awarded the Military Cross in 1938, while serving with his battalion in Waziristan. He was a larger than life figure, who took to the Scouts like a fish takes to water. An accomplished horseman with a taste for classical music, his military career was cut short by Rheumatic Fever and he was transferred to the IPS in 1942.[106] His first posting as a Political Officer appropriately enough, was as Additional Assistant Political Agent South Waziristan.[107] After Independence, he had a distinguished career in the Civil Service of Pakistan. Yusuf Khan was followed in the Frontier Corps by several Indian Army officers, all of them Muslims. They formed the nucleus of the Officer Corps of Scouts, when the British left after Independence.

Second World War

The outbreak of Second World War in 1939, found India in throes of civil disturbances. The British appeared to be at a loss to deal with Gandhi's 'non-violent resistance'—with an uncanny tendency to turn violent. But it was not only the British, who were bewildered by the methods of Indian National Congress. As 'Indian' nationalism was unmasked as nothing more than 'Hindu' nationalism, the Muslims of India became increasingly alarmed. But now, the British ran into another obstacle. The Congress not only refused to support the war effort but also actively started sabotaging it. As Gandhi launched his 'Quit India' movement in 1942, he "sanctioned destruction of railways, bridges and other line of communication structures and facilities—provided they were destroyed in a non-violent manner."[108] Meanwhile on the Frontier, the Faqir of Ipi continued to cause trouble. But the tribesmen were tired of years of violence and there were no major outbreaks in the Tribal Areas. It gave the British some respite although they still had to station troops on the Frontier, which were desperately needed elsewhere.

The Faqir of Ipi had gathered a private *lashkar* called the Gorwekht Militia made up of men from different tribes. They were well-armed with modern rifles, machine guns and even four 3.75-inch howitzers supplied by the Afghans. Sensing an opportunity due to British preoccupation with war, he tried to pull off a major coup by capturing the Tochi Scouts fort at Datta Khel. On 1 May 1942, the fort was surrounded by a thousand tribesmen, who subjected it to artillery shelling. Lieutenant Mohammad Sharif Khan was commanding at Datta Khel. Since the Army did not have any troops to relieve him, he was on his own. Despite being outnumbered and outgunned, he and his garrison resolutely held out for three months. He even led a dawn raid on the *lashkar* surprising them during their morning ablutions. During the raid, an aircraft bringing supplies crashed nearby. Lieutenant Sharif rescued the badly burnt crew before the tribesmen could reach them. The siege was finally lifted when the Razmak Brigade came to their rescue. This was the last big action by the Faqir. The cat and mouse game between him and the British would go on until they left for good but his star was on the wane, and he ceased to be a serious threat.[109]

The war caused all sorts of problems for the Scouts. The withdrawal of Army troops led to increased responsibilities and extra wings were sanctioned in Tochi Scouts, South Waziristan Scouts, Kurram Militia and Zhob Militia. The Chitral Scouts were embodied for year-round service and made responsible for the external defence of Chitral. At the same time, Scouts, who were only obliged to serve in the Tribal Areas, were now made liable for service anywhere in the world. The expansion required new recruits for which the Frontier Corps had to compete with the Army, which was offering better service conditions. This led to the Scouts experimenting with recruitment of new classes of men. A bigger problem was the posting of officers. Before the war, the Frontier Corps had the pick of army officers because all the action

was on the Frontier. But now, the Frontier had become a backwater and all good officers were opting for war service with the Army. To overcome the crisis, tenures of officers already posted to the Scouts were extended, while selection criteria for new officers were relaxed. These were mostly Emergency Commissioned Officers, who were posted to a special Frontier Corps 'Pool' and attached with Tochi Scouts for a probationary period of six months during which they underwent training. Besides lacking experience, most did not speak Pashto or even Urdu. Despite these handicaps, many of them performed well.[110]

Supply of personnel was not the only challenge facing the Scouts. With the Army getting priority, procurement of arms and equipment became difficult, while wartime inflation made other supplies like clothing and transport very expensive. The Frontier Corps was authorized artillery guns and mortars to shoulder extra burden of defence on the Frontier but weapons and ammunition were in short supply. To better manage these new responsibilities, the appointment of IOFC was upgraded to Inspector General Frontier Corps (IGFC) in 1943, with the rank of Brigadier. A staff officer was posted to assist him, while Lieutenant Colonel WH FitzMaurice was appointed Deputy Inspector General Frontier Corps at Quetta to look after the affairs in Balochistan. Brigadier NRC Cosby, MC, was the first IGFC. He handled the new challenges adroitly and navigated the Frontier Corps safely through the difficult years of the war.[111] It was during his tenure that the North-West Frontier Corps Law, 1941, was promulgated to provide legal cover to the Frontier Corps, which until then had been governed by the North-West Frontier Constabulary Act, 1915, and Zhob Militia Law, 1938.[112]

The revolt in Waziristan had led to a re-appraisal of British policy on the Frontier. In 1939, Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, acknowledged that the Modified Forward Policy had failed. However, before any new policy could be formulated, the outbreak

of Second World War put Frontier affairs on the back burner. Near the end of the war in September 1944, the British formed the Frontier Defence Committee to review the Frontier policy and suggest the way forward.[113] Headed by Lieutenant General Sir Francis Tuker, the Committee concluded that military presence in the Tribal Areas was counterproductive. It recommended a drastic reduction in the military footprint on the Frontier. The Army's role was to be filled by the Frontier Corps, which was to be expanded and equipped accordingly.[114] The military withdrawal however, was deferred until the situation on ground was conducive. In the meantime, restructuring of the Frontier Corps began in earnest. It was overseen by Brigadier RD Ambrose, OBE, MC, who took over as IGFC in 1945. Besides increasing the strength of existing corps, it was decided to re-raise Khyber Rifles and form a new corps in Balochistan.[115]

For years, Afridis of the Khyber had been requesting the Government to re-instate their enlistment in the Army, which had been stopped in 1919. Sir George Cunningham, the Governor of NWFP finally acceded to the demand. On 1 April 1942, the 1st Afridi Battalion composed entirely of Afridis was raised at the Frontier Force Regimental Centre, Sialkot, by Lieutenant Colonel George Brown. Major RN Bacon, OBE, the Political Agent of Khyber Agency was appointed as Second-in-Command, while Captain RVE Hodson, the Assistant Political Agent was posted as Adjutant. The battalion was affiliated with the Frontier Force Regiment. In June, it proceeded to the Middle East. Although it did not see any action, the spirit and conduct of the men was much appreciated. On its return to India, the battalion was reconstituted as Khyber Rifles at Sialkot on 1 March 1946. Lieutenant Colonel JR Booth, DSO, was appointed its first Commandant and Captain Karamat Ullah Khan Afridi as Adjutant. The Corps then proceeded to its old home at Landi Kotal, where it was reorganized as a unit of the Frontier Corps.[116] After an absence of 27 years, Khyber

Rifles were back in the Khyber Pass, where they had always belonged.

Pursuant to the recommendations of Tuker Committee, a new corps of Scouts was sanctioned in Balochistan to look after the disturbed frontier with Afghanistan in Chaman-Pishin area. Consequently on 4 June 1946, Lieutenant Colonel CFS Langridge, MC, raised Pishin Scouts (now Chaman Scouts) at Shelabagh from a draft provided by other units of the Frontier Corps.[117] The new raising further increased the area of responsibility of the Frontier Corps, which now included the entire north-western frontier of India from Gilgit to Pishin.

Towards Freedom

The Second World War left Britain exhausted and unable to maintain its vast empire. Independence for India had become inevitable and the country was gripped in political turmoil and uncertainty. The Frontier became the focus of intense rivalry between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress. In 1946, Congress won the elections in NWFP and formed the provincial government headed by Dr Khan Sahib.[118] But as independence became a reality, the people of NWFP realized that they would be exchanging British rule with Hindu *raj,* and support for Congress and its Khudai Khidmatgar allies plummeted.[119] To shore up their sagging fortunes, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru accompanied by Dr Khan Sahib and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan toured the Frontier in late 1946. The tour was an absolute disaster and he was met with hostility wherever he went. At Razmak, he was abused by a Mahsud *jirga*, while the Wana Wazirs refused to even meet him. Elsewhere in NWFP, he was heckled, stoned and even shot at.[120] For the Congress and Khudai Khidmatgars, it was the end of the road on the Frontier.

As the hour of independence approached, Muslim League intensified political pressure on the British and the Congress

Ministry in NWFP. The British finally ended the impasse by brokering a deal between the Muslim League and Congress by which they agreed on a plebiscite to decide the fate of NWFP. The Red Shirts vehemently opposed the move but their Congress allies had ditched them. Betrayed by Congress, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan called a meeting of Khudai Khidmatgars at Bannu on 21 June, where he rejected Pakistan and demanded an independent 'Pakhtunistan'.[121] He received full support of the Faqir of Ipi, who was virulently opposed to the idea Pakistan.[122] But the Red Shirts and the Faqir had shot their bolt; on 6 July 1947, NWFP overwhelmingly voted for Pakistan. Meanwhile, the tribesmen had already announced their support for Pakistan.[123] On 14 August 1947, Pakistan gained its independence, finally ending the long agony of British rule, which had subjected the Frontier to so much violence for more than a century.

British involvement on the Frontier has been much romanticized in English literature. Rudyard Kipling led a long list of British writers, who emotionally identified with the independence, bravery and wry sense of humour of the Pakhtun. They were fascinated by the Pathan's proud bearing and his code of *Pakhtunwali*, which appealed to their ideals of noble virtues. As one of them waxed lyrical, "There was among the Pathans something that called to the Englishman or the Scotsman—partly that the people looked you straight in the eye, that there was no equivocation and that you couldn't browbeat them even if you wished to. When we crossed the bridge at Attock we felt we'd come home". However, this grudging respect for the Pathan was combined with a revulsion for what they saw as his innate cruelty, treachery and avarice. For them, service on the Frontier was both an adventure as well as a divine mission to civilize the "savage" tribesmen.[124] And on a more cynical note, there has always been a hint of suspicion that they deliberately kept the pot simmering on the Frontier in order to keep their troops in fighting trim.[125]

Whatever the motives, the reality of life on the Frontier was anything but romantic. It was a dull and dreary existence in a harsh and unforgiving land. The military operations can hardly be described as glamorous, with endless marching in search of an elusive foe and the ever-present threat of an ambush. For those, who were captured, the usual outcome was a brutal death and mutilation. For the tribesmen, the results were absolutely disastrous. British punitive expeditions invariably resulted in indiscriminate bombing and destruction of their villages, maiming of children, burning of crops and uprooting of trees—hardly the stuff of romance. Despite a century of warfare, the British were unable to subdue the frontier tribesmen; all they succeeded in was keeping them isolated, ignorant and impoverished.

Lt Col Muhammad Aslam Khan with JCOs of Khyber Rifles.
Black Mountain Expedition, Hazara 1891.

Embodiment of Turi Militia, Balish Khel, Kurram 1892.
Frederick St. John Gore

Khyber Rifles, Jamrud 1899.

Chitral Scouts on *gasht*, Chitral 1910.



Artillery Detachment of Kurram Militia, 1936.



Officers of South Waziristan Scouts having lunch in the field, 1936.
Imperial War Museums



A picquet of Tochi Scouts, North Waziristan 1937.
Major RK Phillips

Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah with Khyber Rifles, 14 April 1948.



Border Guards of Khyber Rifles at Torkham, 22 May 1955.

Tochi Scouts firing team. Winners of the Deane Cup, 1959.

Brig Mahmud Jan, IGFC, inspecting the Quarter Guard of Chitral Scouts, Drosh, 5 May 1971.

Shawal Rifles presenting Guard of Honour to the President
Gen Muhammad Zia Ul Haq, Razmak, 17 November 1982.

Officers & JCOs of Dir Scouts, Timergera, September 1990.

Picquet of South Waziristan Scouts near Wana, South Waziristan.
Operation Al Mizan, 29 August 2004.

Maj Gen Tariq Khan, IGFC, visiting 1 Wing Bajaur Scouts, Nawagai,
Bajaur Agency. Operation Sherdil, 2 December 2008.

Chitral Scouts conducting a Search Operation Exercise, 2015.

T-59 Tank of Independent Scouts Cavalry Regiment, Mohmand 2016.

Gunner of Swat Scouts, Khyber Agency 2016.

Valour and Affection. Sepoy Waqas Khan *Shaheed*, Tirah Militia.

Frontier Corps (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) contingent in Pakistan Day Parade. Islamabad, 23 March 2016.

Lady Scouts marching in Scouts Training Academy, Warsak 2020.

Kurram Militia conducting a Cordon and Search operation,
Matsangar, Kurram Agency, 22 September 2016.

Patrol of Dir Scouts on Pak-Afghan Border, Dir, 20 December 2020.

Frontier Corps recruits in Scouts Training Academy, Warsak 2020.

Maj Gen Noor Wali Khan, IGFC, with Tirah Rifles, Tirah 2023.

Lt Gen Nazir Ahmed Butt, Commander 11 Corps, with
Officers of HQ FC Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (South), Wana, 20 October 2018.

Lt Gen Sardar Hassan Azhar Hayat Khan, Commander 11 Corps, with
Officers of HQ FC Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North), Bala Hisar, 23 June 2023.

Maj Gen Noor Wali Khan, IGFC, inspecting the parade on
8th Annual Parents Day, Cadet College Warsak, 18 December 2023.

Inauguration of Frontier Corps Teaching Hospital, Shakas,
by Maj Gen Noor Wali Khan, IGFC, 13 January 2024.

Kurram Militia border outposts and fence, Kurram.

Mokha Top Post, Bajaur.

Fort Ali Masjid, Khyber Pass.

Fort Ali Masjid after Renovation, 2024.



Fort Bala Hisar with Grand Trunk Road in the foreground, 1860.

Fort Bala Hisar, 2024.



Fort Chakdara 1905.



Fort Chakdara, 2024.

Lord Curzon
Viceroy of India 1899-1905

Col Sir Robert Sandeman
Chief Commissioner Baluchistan 1877-92

Col Sir Robert Warburton
Political Officer Khyber 1879-97

Col Nawab Sir M Aslam Khan
Commandant Khyber Rifles 1881-97

Lt Col Sir George Roos-Keppel
Comdt Kurram Militia & Khyber Rifles
Chief Commissioner NWFP 1908-19

Lt Col WC Barratt
First Inspecting Officer, Frontier Corps
1907-1909

Lt Col Nawab Sir M Akbar Khan
First Pakistani Officer of Frontier Corps

Capt Eustace Jotham, VC
North Waziristan Militia

Inspectors General

Brig Ahmad Jan, MBE
10 March 1950

Brig Kazi Abdur Rahim Khan
15 July 1951

Brig Bakhtiar Rana, MC
4 November 1953

Brig Sadiq Ullah Khan, MC
9 September 1955 & 22 November 1963

Brig Rakhman Gul, SQA, SK, MC
25 October 1958

Brig Bahadur Sher, MC
10 August 1964

Brig Mahboob Khan, TQA
19 April 1966

Brig Mahmud Jan, SQA
18 July 1969

Maj Gen Sherin Dil Khan Niazi
23 July 1971

Brig Iftikhari-Bashir
30 July 1972



Brig Naseerullah Khan Babar, SJ Bar, SBt
27 November 1972

Brig Ghulam Rabbani Khan, SBt
26 November 1974

Maj Gen Agha Zulfiqar Ali Khan, HI (M)
18 February 1978

Maj Gen M Muhammad Afzaal, HI (M), SBt
10 January 1982

Maj Gen M Arif Bangash, HI (M), SBt
23 March 1984

Maj Gen Mohammad Shafiq, HI (M), SBt
17 August 1986

Maj Gen Ghazi Ud Din Rana, HI (M), SBt
24 May 1988

Maj Gen Humanyun Bangash, HI (M), TBt
11 October 1990

Maj Gen Naeem Akbar Khan, HI (M)
7 June 1991

Maj Gen Mumtaz Gul, HI (M), TBt
24 March 1992

Maj Gen Fazal Ghafoor, HI (M), SBt
11 June 1994

Maj Gen Sultan Habib, HI (M)
14 August 1997

Maj Gen Taj Ul Haq, HI (M)
7 March 2000



Maj Gen M Hamid Khan, HI (M), SBt
6 February 2003

Maj Gen M Tariq Masud, HI (M)
11 October 2004

Maj Gen M Alam Khattak, HI (M), TBt
12 March 2006

Maj Gen Tariq Khan, HI (M)
7 September 2008

Maj Gen Nadir Zeb, HI (M)
15 October 2010

Maj Gen Ghayur Mahmood, HI (M), TBt
4 June 2012

Maj Gen M Tayyab Azam, HI (M)
14 March 2014

Maj Gen Shaheen Mazhar Mehmood, HI (M)
15 July 2016

Maj Gen M Waseem Ashraf, HI (M)
26 September 2017

Maj Gen Rahat Naseem A Khan, HI (M)
5 November 2018

Maj Gen Adil Yamin, HI (M)
11 December 2020

Maj Gen Noor Wali Khan, HI (M)
12 September 2022

IGFC Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (South)

Maj Gen Khalid Javed, HI (M)
11 March 2017

Maj Gen Abid Latif, HI (M)
15 January 2018

Maj Gen Azhar Iqbal Abbasi, HI (M)
15 July 2019

Maj Gen M Umar Bashir, HI (M)
9 June 2020

Maj Gen M Munir Afsar, HI (M)
25 November 2021

Maj Gen Haroon Hameed, HI (M)
15 October 2022

5
Dawn of a New era

Independence brought new hope to the people of Pakistan. But it was a bittersweet moment, with the joy of freedom mixed with the horror of genocide. The Partition of British India resulted in up to a million deaths, with many more left homeless. Unspeakable atrocities were committed and millions were forced to flee their homes. Such was the scale of carnage that it completely overwhelmed the state machinery. The first few months were very difficult for Pakistan. There was an acute shortage of everything and not many people gave the young nation any chance of survival. But survive it did; thanks to the determination and selfless efforts of its people, and the inspiring leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The Frontier was spared the bloodbath taking place in Punjab but its non-Muslim population fearing for their lives, fled to India. The Scouts did their best to protect them. The Kurram Militia established a refugee camp at Parachinar, while two of its platoons rescued several hundred Sikh families in Peshawar.[1]

Besides financial and material constraints, there was also a shortage of experienced civil and military officials to run the State. The Government of Pakistan requisitioned the services of several hundred British civil and military officers to assist it during this critical time. Among them was Sir George Cunningham, the former Governor of NWFP, who was asked to take up his old assignment.[2] A number of officers of the Frontier Corps also stayed on for several more years.[3] On the Frontier, Pakistan faced several unique problems. The foremost was the Provincial Government of NWFP, which was still being run by the Congress Party. It was an anomaly that needed to be rectified quickly but the new Governor was reluctant to take any illegal step as Congress

held a majority in the Provincial Assembly. Dr Khan Sahib himself came to the Governor's rescue by failing to attend the flag raising ceremony on 15 August, and refusing to swear allegiance to Pakistan. This provided the Governor with the *casus belli* to dismiss the Congress Ministry on 22 August.[4] Although the Khudai Khidmatgars continued to cause trouble; they stood discredited due to their association with Congress, and never posed a serious threat again.

The other important issue was the accession of Tribal Areas to Pakistan. Even though the tribesmen had repeatedly professed their desire to join Pakistan, but due to the ambiguous status of these areas, there was no legal mechanism to implement the merger. The volatile and fragmented nature of the tribes made the accession a matter of some urgency. Meanwhile, Afghanistan had not only refused to recognize Pakistan but also laid claim to its territory. Tribal accession was achieved through a series of *jirgas*, "where the tribes one by one acceded to Pakistan". Besides declaring their allegiance to Pakistan, they also promised to uphold its integrity and to maintain friendly relations with the Government and the people of settled districts. In return, they were allowed to retain their autonomy and promised a continuation of government subsidies.[5]

Operation Curzon

Pakistan inherited the 'Frontier Problem' from the British. However, the situation on the Frontier had radically changed with the independence of Pakistan. Two of the major irritants for the tribesmen: the British and the Hindus were gone, while the Government of Pakistan had promised to respect tribal independence. That only left the Army, which the tribesmen had always seen as an occupying force. The Tuker Committee had already recommended the withdrawal of the Army, which the Viceroy had approved in 1946, but not followed through. The

upheaval that followed the Partition lent urgency to the matter. The Pakistan Army was beset with numerous problems. It was short of officers and after the departure of non-Muslims, short of men. Many of its units were still overseas, while others were committed in maintaining law and order and protection of refugees. The outbreak of war in Kashmir created yet another commitment. Under these circumstances, retention of troops in the Tribal Areas was untenable, especially since the tribesmen no longer posed a threat. In September, General Sir Frank Messervy, Commander-in-Chief Pakistan Army, told Sir George Cunningham that "the Pakistan Army is in such a parlous state that I must, if possible, withdraw all troops from Waziristan within the next three months". Cunningham, who believed that the British Frontier policy had been a failure, had already recommended the same to the Government of Pakistan. The recommendation was in accord with Quaid-i-Azam's own thinking, and he ordered the withdrawal of all troops from Waziristan before January 1948.[6]

The operation was codenamed 'Curzon' in a nod to the late Viceroy, who had ordered the same half a century earlier. Unsure of the tribesmen's reaction, the withdrawal was conducted like a military operation. One of the reasons for extra precautions were recent events, when three non-Muslim units of Wana Brigade on their way to India were ambushed by Mahsuds in Shahur Tangi. The convoy of 127 vehicles left Wana during the night of 1 October. The South Waziristan Scouts were given the responsibility of protecting the convoy by deploying picquets on the route. Only 12 platoons were available to protect 57 miles of the vulnerable road. As a result, the picquets were widely dispersed and beyond visual range of each other. The rear of the convoy was attacked ahead of Sarwekai, while the front was ambushed in Shahur Tangi. Major JHS Majury with one platoon of South Waziristan Scouts was in the rear of the convoy. He immediately moved out with his platoon and cleared a ridge from which the

tribesmen were firing on the convoy. It was with great difficulty that the convoy was able to extricate itself after suffering heavy casualties including 36 killed. Two Scouts including the gallant Jemadar Shera Baz were among the casualties. They had died protecting men, who were now their enemies. But for the Scouts, getting the convoy to safety was a matter of honour and they gave their lives to uphold it. Some of the stranded Indian troops were later allowed by the tribesmen to proceed to Jandola, while others were flown out of Wana.[7]

During October, all Pakistan Army units were withdrawn from Waziristan. The Wana Brigade was airlifted to prevent any repeat of the Shahur Tangi incident. Its place at Wana was taken by the South Waziristan Scouts. Meanwhile in North Waziristan, Tochi Scouts provided protection by deploying picquets during the withdrawal of Razmak Brigade. Although there was some sniping, the evacuation was largely uneventful. Razmak was handed over to the Khassadars. On 6 November, the tribesmen were informed about the decision to withdraw in *jirgas* held at Miranshah, Wana and Tank. Over the next six weeks, all stores were also retrieved and Operation Curzon was completed on 28 December.[8] The successful withdrawal of troops was a great relief for Pakistani authorities. However, before they could take stock of the situation on the Frontier, events in Kashmir took centre stage.

Kashmir War 1947-48

Jammu & Kashmir was a Muslim-majority Princely State ruled by a Hindu Maharaja. His subjects, who had long suffered under his tyranny, expected to join Pakistan. However, the Dogra Maharaja prevaricated about accession to Pakistan, leading to an uprising of Kashmiri Muslims. They were joined by tribesmen from the Frontier and soon liberated western parts of the State. India responded by invading Kashmir on 27 October, ostensibly on the request of the Maharaja. However, their real motive was

conquest and annexation of the State. The irregular freedom fighters were no match for a professional army and the Indians soon made significant territorial gains. In April 1948, the Government of Pakistan ordered the Army to blunt the Indian offensive towards Muzaffarabad, which posed a direct threat to Pakistan. After some fierce fighting lasting into November, the enemy was pushed back to Tithwal, while his advance towards Muzaffarabad was effectively checked at Chakothi. Fighting finally ended, when a ceasefire came into effect on 1 January 1949. The Frontier Corps took an active part in the Kashmir Campaign even though it lacked the training and equipment for such operations. Meanwhile further north, Frontier Corps took the centre stage, where Gilgit and Chitral Scouts liberated Gilgit and Baltistan after expelling the forces of the Maharaja.

The Gilgit Rebellion: The Gilgit Agency comprised of areas lying on the right bank of the River Indus and included the states of Hunza, Nagar, Yasin, Kuh Ghizar, Punial and Ishkuman. It had been leased by the British for a period of sixty years in 1935, but they decided to relinquish the lease on 1 August 1947. The State of Jammu & Kashmir was unprepared to take over the Agency, which had been under British administration for more than fifty years. Meanwhile the people of Gilgit, who had not been consulted about their fate, were in no mood to allow back the hated Dogras. In this situation, control of Gilgit Scouts, the only armed force in the Agency, became critical. On 1 August, the Kashmir Durbar assumed administrative charge of Gilgit Scouts.[9] However, uncertain about the reaction of the Scouts, services of two British officers were requisitioned by the Maharaja to command the Corps.[10]

The man selected to command Gilgit Scouts was Major WA Brown, who had served with them from 1943 to 1946, and knew the area and its people well. On 29 July, he assumed command of the Corps. He was later joined by Captain AS



9. Gilgit, Baltistan and Northern Kashmir 1947.

Mathieson as his Second-in-Command,[11] along with Captain Mohammad Said, and Lieutenants Mohammad Khan Jarral and Ghulam Haider of Jammu & Kashmir State forces.[12] On 1 August, Brigadier Ghansara Singh took over as the new Governor of Gilgit and the British Political Agent and his staff were withdrawn. For some time, the situation in the Agency remained calm although tense. Due to poor communications, the people of Gilgit were not fully aware of the events unfolding in the rest of the country but there were no doubts about where their sentiments lay.[13]

Major Brown like many British officers of the Frontier Corps empathized with Muslims and was pro-Pakistan. He believed that Kashmir being overwhelmingly Muslim should logically join Pakistan. In September, he secretly prepared a plan for Gilgit's accession to Pakistan, code-named 'Datta Khel'. According to the plan, in the event of the Maharaja opting to join India, Gilgit Scouts would arrest the Dogra Governor, disarm his troops and declare accession to Pakistan. However, due to the prevailing atmosphere of suspicion and uncertainty, he only shared his plans with Captain Mathieson, who agreed to go along with the scheme.[14]

The Dogra position in Gilgit Agency was precarious. Brigadier Ghansara Singh was far from the seat of Government in Srinagar, which itself was facing an existential crisis due to the uprising of Kashmiri Muslims. He was surrounded by a hostile population and did not trust the Scouts or their Commandant, who wielded the real authority in the Agency. The only military force he could rely on was the 6th Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) Infantry stationed at Bunji, 34 miles from Gilgit on the left bank of Indus. It had a mixed strength of Muslims and Sikhs with some Dogras. One of its platoons was deployed at Jaglot, 28 miles southeast of Gilgit on the right bank of Indus, while a detachment was guarding Partab Pul (bridge) over the river.[15] Three platoons of 6th J&K Infantry were stationed at Skardu. Unlike the lightly

armed Scouts, the State Infantry was well-equipped with machine guns and mortars. The strength of Gilgit Scouts was 582, divided into ten platoons. Two of these were at Gupis, one on the Chinese border at Kalamdarchi, while three were at Chilas under Captain Mathieson. The remaining four were at Gilgit.[16]

On 29 October, the Maharaja's accession to India was announced. When the news reached Gilgit, there was an immediate reaction and protests broke out in the city. A nervous Ghansara Singh ordered the 6th J&K Infantry to Gilgit. To avoid any provocation, Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Majid Khan, the Commanding Officer, decided to take only Muslim troops to Gilgit, leaving the rest at Bunji. *En route,* his men led by Captain Mirza Hassan Khan, MC, mutinied and placed him under arrest. Meanwhile, Major Brown after a meeting with his JCOs and men, who themselves were planning a rebellion, put Datta Khel in motion during the night of 31 October. The Gilgit Scouts swore allegiance to Pakistan and then dispersed to carry out their tasks. Subedar Major Babar Khan was sent to the Governor House to arrest Ghansara Singh, who surrendered after brief resistance.[17]

By early 1 November, the situation in Gilgit was completely under the control of the Scouts. Major Brown sent a wireless signal to the Chief Minister of NWFP apprising him of his actions and requesting further instructions.[18] He then ordered a parade of Gilgit Scouts, where the flag of Pakistan was raised.[19] Meanwhile, Captain Hassan had arrived in Gilgit. After much deliberation, a Provisional Government led by ex-Subedar Shah Rais Khan was formed until the arrival of Pakistani officials. Lieutenant Ghulam Haider, the Adjutant of Gilgit Scouts was appointed Commissioner. Committed to the cause of Pakistan from the very beginning, he played an important role in ensuring the smooth transition of power to Pakistan. During the next two days, all the Mirs and Rajas of the surrounding states also declared their accession to Pakistan.[20]

In the meantime, Captain Mathieson despatched a *gasht* of 60 men under Subedar Sher Ali to neutralize the garrison at Jaglot and capture Partab Bridge over Indus. Sher Ali arrived at Jaglot late on 2 November after marching 45 miles. He then detached 30 men under Havildar Nadilo to secure the bridge. Next morning, the entire enemy detachment at Jaglot was wiped out after a fierce firefight in which one Scout was killed and one wounded. Meanwhile, Havildar Nadilo had surprised the picquet guarding Partab Pul and captured the bridge after a brief struggle. All enemy soldiers were killed except one, who managed to escape and alert the garrison at Bunji. Soon after, Sikhs and Dogras were seen advancing towards Partab Pul. Havildar Nadilo immediately set the bridge on fire, forcing them to turn back. Meanwhile, another *gasht* from Chilas had secured Ramghat and Raikote Bridge, completely cutting off the Bunji garrison. Later that day, Bunji was occupied by Captain Hassan Khan after the enemy had fled into the surrounding hills. There was some sporadic firing from the hills but after spending a night out in the cold, most of them surrendered the next day. About a hundred tried to make their way back to Kashmir but most of them perished due to hunger and exposure.[21]

On 16 November, Sardar Mohammed Alam Khan arrived to take over as the new Political Agent of Gilgit.[22] Major Brown was called to Peshawar to brief the Governor and then proceeded to Rawalpindi for a meeting with Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. After gaining his approval, he set about raising the strength of Gilgit Scouts to 1500. The British however, were uneasy about the involvement of their officers in the war and ordered the recall of Major Brown and Captain Mathieson.[23] Their contributions notwithstanding, the Pakistani authorities also wanted their own men in command in Gilgit.[24] Thus ended a remarkable episode in the history of Pakistan, when two British officers at considerable personal risk, played such an important role in shaping the events.

Apparently, the British approved of these actions, as Major Brown was awarded the MBE in 1948. But due to political sensitivities, his citation was kept vague and secret. The Government of Pakistan waited until 1993, when it finally recognized his services to Pakistan by awarding him a posthumous Sitara-i-Pakistan.[25]

The Liberation of Baltistan: On 12 January 1948, Major Mohammad Aslam Khan, MC, who had been commanding Azad forces in Kashmir, was posted as the new Commandant of Gilgit Scouts. He was accompanied by his younger brother Captain Mohammad Anwar Khan, as Mathieson's relief.[26] Major Aslam Khan immediately started planning the liberation of Baltistan and Ladakh. He amalgamated Muslim elements of 6th J&K Infantry with Gilgit Scouts and divided them into three forces. Ibex Force under Major Ihsan Ali Khan was composed of Kashmiris and Gilgit Scouts. It was assigned the task of liberating Skardu and then advancing towards Leh, the capital of Ladakh. Tiger Force under Captain Hassan Khan was to capture Gurais and then exploit towards Bandipura in Kashmir. Eskimo Force under 2nd Lieutenant Shah Khan, ex-Jemadar of Gilgit Scouts, who had been granted a commission, was to strike towards Kargil and Dras through Burzil Pass and secure Zoji La to cut Indian line of advance towards Leh.[27] It was a bold and ambitious plan but was handicapped by a long and tenuous line of communication over extremely difficult terrain, lack of heavy weapons, and a shortage of men and materiel.

Meanwhile, the Indians had been reinforcing their garrison at Skardu. Major Aslam Khan decided to take action before the Dogra forces became too strong. On 29 January, he despatched Ibex Force to capture Skardu. It was made up of 100 Kashmiris in 'A' Wing under Major Mohammad Khan Jarral and 150 Scouts in 'D' Wing under 2nd Lieutenant Babar Khan, the ex-Subedar Major of Gilgit Scouts. After marching along the right bank of the Indus for more than 100 miles in bitter cold, the column arrived

undetected at the gorge of Tsari, 32 miles short of Skardu on 10 February. Tsari was held by two platoons, one of them Muslim under Captain Nek Alam, who immediately changed sides. Leaving two platoons of Scouts and local volunteers under Jemadars Biko and Ismail Khan to deal with the enemy, Major Ihsan proceeded to Skardu. On 12 February, the Dogra platoon was wiped out by Jemadar Biko's men, who then re-joined the main column at Skardu. The Indian garrison at Skardu was located at the foot of the rocky feature of Kharphocho in the centre of Skardu Valley, with some troops deployed in a fort on the hill. It was well-fortified and had been reinforced with men under a capable Dogra officer, Lieutenant Colonel Sher Jang Thapa. The Ibex Force attacked the garrison on 12 February but lacking heavy weapons, failed to capture it. Five Scouts were killed, while one wounded man was taken prisoner. Enemy losses were 7 killed and 16 wounded. Major Ihsan then regrouped and prepared to lay a siege. Meanwhile, Naik Sher Ahmed Khan with some local men occupied the top of Kharphocho from where he kept the Dogras bottled up in their cantonment.[28]

With every passing day, the Dogra situation in Skardu was getting desperate.[29] The Indians tried to airdrop supplies but most of them fell into Pakistani hands. In the second week of March, Major Ihsan learnt that Dogra reinforcements under Brigadier Faqir Singh had left Kargil for Skardu. He immediately sent Major Mohammad Khan with a mixed company of Kashmiris and Scouts to interdict the enemy. On 17 March, they ambushed the Dogra column in the gorge of Nurhbuchung on the River Indus. The Indians suffered heavy casualties including Brigadier Faqir Singh, who was seriously wounded. It was only under the cover of darkness that they were able to escape leaving behind a large number of dead. They were followed by a platoon of Scouts under Jemadar Ismail Khan all the way to Olding and lost more men to their pursuers and local villagers.[30]

Jemadar Ismail Khan and his men were keeping a close eye on Indian activities. In April, he reported the advance of an Indian brigade composed of two battalions of Jammu & Kashmir State Infantry from Kargil. Major Mohammad Khan was tasked with interdicting them with four platoons. He decided to ambush them at Parkutta, halfway between Skardu and Kargil, where the River Indus runs through a narrow gorge. Meanwhile, due to their earlier experience, the Indian advance was extremely cautious. On 18 April, the advance elements of their long column reached Parkutta. However, before the Pakistanis could spring the ambush, they were detected. The ambuscade developed into a month-long battle requiring reinforcements from Skardu so that by early May, only 50 men were left there.[31]

The Indians although alerted and enjoying superiority in men and weapons, were trapped in the gorge. The Pakistanis, who were occupying the surrounding heights, launched repeated raids on the enemy, inflicting heavy losses. On 17 May, the Indian commander was ordered to return to Kargil, which had been captured by Eskimo Force. Major Ihsan, who had arrived at Parkutta, ordered Subedar Dost Mohammad to take two platoons of Gilgit Scouts and cut the enemy off at Kharmang. He was later reinforced with a platoon under Captain Nek Alam. On 20 May, the Indians were surprised and annihilated at Kharmang. Those who managed to escape were closely followed by the Scouts, who killed or captured most of them. Indian losses during the month-long battle were 300 killed and 300 taken prisoner. Kharmang spelt the end of Indian ambitions in the Indus Valley. Major Ihsan now went on the offensive. One platoon of Scouts was despatched to deal with Dogras in the Shyok Valley, who withdrew on their approach. Meanwhile, the rest of Ibex Force was divided into two. One column under Lieutenant Babar Khan advanced towards Leh along the Indus, while the other proceeded to Kargil to reinforce Eskimo Force.[32]

The Battle for Ladakh: While the Ibex Force was engaged in the Indus Valley, Major Aslam was planning a bold stroke to capture Kargil and Zoji La to secure Ladakh. He only had 600 lightly armed Gilgit Scouts to accomplish the task. These men were to traverse more than a hundred miles of rugged snowbound mountains on foot carrying their weapons and supplies in freezing temperatures, with no medical help or prospects of reinforcement. Most of them were inadequately clothed and lacked basic supplies. Once they started on their mission, they were on their own.[33] On the face of it, it was an impossible mission. But what happened next is an epic of superhuman endurance, valour and sacrifice, the like of which has seldom been recorded.

The Scouts assembled at Astore some 80 miles from Gilgit. Here they split into two columns. On 10 April 1948, the Tiger Force of 250 men under Captain Hassan Khan left for Bandipura, 170 miles away. Its mission was to disrupt Indian line of communication and prevent any interference with the operations of Eskimo Force at Kargil. After crossing the Burzil and Tragbal Passes, the column reached Bandipura on 28 April. The Indians were shocked to see the Scouts, who caused considerable mayhem by blowing up bridges on the road to Sonamarg and keeping the enemy engaged with frequent raids.[34]

The remaining 350 Scouts forming Eskimo Force under Lieutenant Shah Khan set out from Chilam on 1 May. Their mission was to capture Kargil and Dras after marching 120 miles over some of the most difficult country imaginable. They had a few 3-inch mortars and light machine guns, and each man carried a blanket, seven days' rations and 150 rounds of ammunition. They had no tents or sleeping bags. After an extremely difficult march through a blizzard, the force reached its objectives undetected. The bulk of Indian forces had left for Skardu and only a company each were left at Kargil and Dras. On the night of 9 May, a company of Gilgit Scouts under Subedar Sher Ali

invested Dras and cut it off from Kargil and Zoji La. The Indians held out until 6 June, when they surrendered, allowing the Scouts to capture much-needed stores. Meanwhile, the rest of Eskimo Force captured Kargil on 10 May after achieving complete surprise. After the destruction of the Dogra brigade at Kharmang on 17 May, elements of Ibex Force linked up with Eskimo Force at Kargil and Major Ihsan reorganized his forces.[35]

Major Ihsan was anxious to capture the strategic Zoji La as soon as possible. The 11,578-foot pass was defended by 1st Patiala Infantry, deployed on the surrounding peaks and supported by artillery. On 12 June, Gilgit Scouts launched their attack on the pass. The main force under Major Mohammad Khan attacked the two forward Indian companies from the front, while Lieutenant Shah Khan led a company in a flanking move from the north over a 17,000-foot ridge. It was a gruelling slog in which the Gilgit Scouts had to fight for every inch of the ground against an entrenched enemy supported by artillery and air force. By the first week of July, Lieutenant Shah Khan's men had fought their way in the enemy's rear, forcing him to withdraw. On 7 July, Gilgit Scouts secured Zoji La.[36]

In the meantime, Lieutenant Babar Khan, who had been sent to Leh after the Battle of Kharmang on 20 May, had made steady progress and by the middle of July, established himself at Nimu, 21 miles from Leh. Lacking the resources to capture the town, he deployed several picquets around Leh to harass the enemy. The Indians made several unsuccessful attempts to dislodge the Scouts, who stayed in their positions until ordered to withdraw later that year. In July, Lieutenant Colonel Mian Ghulam Jilani assumed command of Gilgit Scouts and Major Aslam Khan was posted out.[37]

Pakistani successes greatly alarmed the Indians. Until now, only the State Forces of Kashmir had been engaged in Ladakh. But as the snow started melting and mountain passes opened up,

the Indian Army prepared for a major offensive in Ladakh. They constructed a motorable road to Zoji La and sent reinforcements including artillery to recapture the pass. At the same time, an airstrip was prepared at Leh, which was also reinforced with two regular infantry battalions. Meanwhile, the Pakistanis were also improving their logistics in Northern Areas. The airfields at Chilas and Gilgit were enlarged for a major air supply operation,[38] while an overland link with Gilgit was established over Babusar Pass. The 1st Mahsud Battalion (Bara Rifles) was engaged in construction of the road between Balakot and Chilas.[39]

With the Gilgit Scouts engaged in Ladakh, new militia and Police units were raised in Gilgit and Baltistan augmented by armed volunteers. These were reinforced by the Frontier Constabulary, some of whom were deployed in Tragbal Pass. Such *ad hoc* arrangements however, could be counterproductive, as evinced by the capture of Gurais by an Indian brigade in June, which pushed back the weak Constabulary detachment guarding Tragbal. However, under the circumstances, it was the best that Pakistan could do. The same month, a contingent from Chitral consisting of 400 Chitral State Scouts and Mehtar's Bodyguards with two 3.7-inch howitzers under Colonel Mata-ul-Mulk arrived at Skardu and was given the task of neutralizing the Dogra garrison. The Dogras had put up a gallant resistance but cut-off from all sides with no hope of relief, they eventually surrendered to Chitral Scouts on 14 August 1948.[40]

For the Indians, capture of Zoji La, which links Srinagar with Leh, was of vital importance. In July, they started concentrating their forces for the battle, which would determine the fate of Ladakh. These included a brigade of infantry supported by artillery and armour. The Indian Air Force, which had been active in Northern Areas since the start of the war, was to provide air support. Pakistan had few resources to support the thinly spread and lightly armed Gilgit Scouts. But the morale of the

Scouts was high and they were full of determination. During August, the Indians started building up pressure by launching a number of unsuccessful attacks on Pakistani positions around Zoji La. On 5 September, they put in a major attack on the pass with 77 (Para) Brigade supported by artillery and air force. They were met with fierce resistance and were forced to retreat after suffering heavy casualties. After intense bombardment of Pakistani positions, the enemy renewed his attack on 14 September and suffered the same fate.[41]

After the September setbacks, the Indians paused their operations to regroup and rethink their strategy. Meanwhile, the onset of winter led the Pakistanis to believe that further operations by the enemy were unlikely. A readjustment of manpower was instituted, which included the diversion of some men from Zoji La to Nimu for an attack on Leh. The exhausted Kashmiris were replaced by civilian volunteers and new officers were posted in. Major Ihsan was relieved by Major Mohammad Ismail Khan at Leh and Major Mohammad Khan by Major Mohammad Sadiq Qureshi at Zoji La. The total strength under Major Qureshi was 800 Scouts and volunteers, some of whom were deployed on posts in the Zaskar Mountains towards the east of Zoji La.[42]

Meanwhile, the Indians having concluded that it was not possible to capture Zoji La with infantry alone, came up with an audacious plan to force the pass with armour. After spending six weeks widening the road, they secretly moved a squadron of Stuart tanks to Zoji La. On 1 November, under the cover of snowfall and mist, tanks led the advance of 77 (Para) Brigade into the pass. In the absence of anti-tank weapons, the four platoons of Gilgit Scouts defending the pass were helpless. After fiercely resisting the enemy for 24 hours, they eventually had to give way. Major Qureshi hurriedly organized the defences of Dras but once the Indians had captured Zoji La, it was not possible to stop them with his meagre resources. But the Gilgit Scouts were not

prepared to give up easily and the Indians had to fight for every inch of the ground through a gauntlet of ambush parties of Scouts, who took a heavy toll of the enemy. It took the Indians more than two weeks to reach Dras, which was evacuated by the Pakistanis on 15 November. The Indians then took another nine days to occupy Kargil, which was undefended. The loss of Zoji La and Kargil made Pakistani position in Ladakh untenable. Colonel Jilani, who was at Nimu, ordered the withdrawal of his troops towards Marol to prevent them from being cut-off. Meanwhile, Major Qureshi had regrouped at Marol after a fighting withdrawal from Dras. The Indian advance finally came to a halt at Marol, where they came up against the impregnable defence of Major Qureshi and his men.[43]

Zoji La was the last battle of the war in Northern Areas before the ceasefire on 1 January 1949. The loss of Kargil and Dras was a major setback for Pakistan and secured Ladakh for the Indians. However, the Gilgit Scouts could take pride in their superhuman achievements in liberating Gilgit and Baltistan virtually on their own. For a few hundred lightly armed men operating hundreds of miles from their base, to take on the might of a well-equipped professional army, defies comprehension. There are not many examples of such heroism and sacrifice in the annals of warfare. As if these achievements were not enough, there was one last act of selfless devotion to duty yet to unfold, which beggars belief. An outpost of Gilgit Scouts under Jemadar Mohammad Ali located at Padam, deep in the Zaskar Mountains, was without wireless communication. Unaware of Pakistani withdrawal from Kargil or the ceasefire, they were still at their post on 9 January 1949, when they were surrounded by the Indians. The Scouts refused to surrender and continued to resist the enemy until June, when three of them escaped and reached Kharol. The Padam party was then repatriated on Pakistan's intercession.[45]

The Battle of Tithwal: The Indians had been building up their forces during the winter and by the end of 1947, they had more than 90,000 troops in Kashmir.[46] After making steady progress against Azad forces, they were now ready to complete their conquest of Kashmir. In May 1948, they launched their Summer Offensive with a two-pronged attack through the Jhelum and Kishenganga (Neelum) River Valleys, with Muzaffarabad as their objective. The Indian 19 Division at Srinagar was given the task of capturing Muzaffarabad with three brigades. The 163 Brigade was to advance along the Kishenganga after capturing Tithwal; the 77 (Para) Brigade was to capture the mountains towards the north of River Jhelum; while 161 Brigade was to advance on Uri-Muzaffarabad road along the left bank of the river. Until then, Pakistan Army's involvement had been restricted to providing support to the freedom fighters. However, with the Indians now posing a direct threat to Pakistan, General Sir Douglas Gracey, the Commander-in-Chief, recommended military intervention.[47]

The Frontier Corps was already engaged in Kashmir and several platoons of volunteers had been despatched to the front. The Tochi Scouts were the first to send a contingent of 200 men. Two platoons under Havildar Mardan went to the Uri Sector, while the rest under Subedar Hamid Gul were engaged in harassing Indian line of communication in Rajauri Sector. In March, they took part in the defence of Jhangar; proceeding to Uri Sector in May.[48] Other contingents of Scouts were provided by Khyber Rifles, Kurram Militia and Zhob Militia. The Frontier Corps played an important role in supporting the Army during India's Summer Offensive and were actively engaged in the fighting.[49] Meanwhile, the 2nd Mahsud Battalion (Maiwand Rifles) provided porters in the Tithwal Sector.[50]

Muzaffarabad is situated at the confluence of Rivers Jhelum and Kishenganga. The Indians planned a converging attack on the city through the two river valleys. Pakistan was

expecting an offensive in the Jhelum Valley and was taken by surprise, when the Indians launched a flanking attack through the Kishenganga. After pushing aside the tribesmen defending this sector, the Indian 163 Brigade captured Tithwal on 23 May. Only one company of infantry stood between them and Muzaffarabad. However, the Indians paused for two days to rest, allowing Pakistan to rush 10 Brigade to the front. The area of operation is dominated by the Kafir Khan Range with a ridgeline of more than 7000 feet.[51] Fierce fighting raged in these mountains for the next six weeks and all enemy attempts at breakthrough were repulsed with heavy losses.[52] Tochi Scouts joined the fray on 10 June, when 150 men under Captain RD Khan arrived at Richhmar Gali from Uri Sector as reinforcement. They were immediately sent to Naichian Gali to harass the enemy behind Tithwal. The Scouts carried out their mission to great effect, disrupting the enemy's line of communication for considerable periods of time.[53]

The Battle of Pandu: Responsibility for the defence of Uri Sector was given to 101 Brigade under Brigadier Mohammad Akbar Khan, DSO, who had earlier directed Azad forces under the *nom de guerre* of 'General Tariq'. Before the arrival of 101 Brigade in early May, this sector was being defended by irregular troops including three Azad battalions, tribal *lashkars* and elements of the Frontier Corps. Among the latter were four platoons of Kurram Militia under Captain Mand Ali Khan at Danni on the River Jhelum and four platoons of Khyber Rifles under Major Karamat Ullah Khan in Salamabad Forest south of the river. North of Uri, four platoons of Tochi Scouts were holding the upper reaches of Maidan Nullah west of Zambur Patan.[54] Only one infantry battalion, 1 FF Rifles (7 FF), was initially available to oppose the Indians in Uri Sector. It was deployed ahead of Chakothi, which guards the main approach from Uri to Muzaffarabad. On 22 May, it was joined by 4 Baluch (11 Baloch), which was made responsible for the area north of River Jhelum.[55]

10. The Battle of Pandu, July 1948.

The Indians opened their offensive on 20 May, with 161 Brigade advancing on the main road and 77 (Para) Brigade making its way in the mountains north of the river. The Pakistani forward elements were forced to give way but they fell back in good order, continuously harassing and impeding the enemy's advance.[56] On 18 May, four platoons of Tochi Scouts under Captain AI Akram and a Mahsud *lashkar* ambushed the advanced elements of 77 (Para) Brigade in Maidan Nullah causing heavy casualties. The Tochi Scouts and 4 Azad Battalion resisted the Indian advance all the way to Chhota Kazinag, where they fought a pitched battle lasting for two days.[57]

Meanwhile, the Indian 161 Brigade was also facing stiff resistance. On 22 May, two platoons of Kurram Militia and Tochi Scouts were sent to Urusa, halfway between Uri and Chakothi to resist the enemy's advance. The Scouts put up a fierce fight for several hours and only withdrew after completely exhausting their ammunition.[58] After capturing Urusa, the Indians attacked Sugna. Two platoons of Kurram Militia were rushed to reinforce 3 Azad Battalion defending the position. However, on 25 May, the defenders were forced to give way in the face of intense artillery and air bombardment. As an Indian battalion advanced over a ridge, Subedar Akbar Khan with a platoon of Kurram Militia attacked it in the flank. After inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, he then established himself on the ridge. The Indians immediately counterattacked and after a fierce battle, dislodged the Scouts from the ridge. Akbar Khan, although severely wounded, again led his men in attack and evicted the enemy for the second time, who was then chased away by 3 Azad Battalion. Subedar Akbar Khan succumbed to his wounds soon after. He was awarded Sitara-i-Jurat for his exemplary valour.[59] The same day, a patrol of Tochi Scouts under Subedar Hamid Gul was engaged in a pitched battle with the Indians between Chakothi and Urusa. Five men including the gallant Subedar were killed in the encounter.[60]

By the end of May, the Indians advancing on both sides of River Jhelum had arrived in front of Chakothi and Bib Dori after capturing the feature of Pandu, which dominates Chakothi from the north. They then launched repeated attacks from both directions but were repulsed. Meanwhile, the Pakistanis intensified guerrilla operations in the enemy's rear, forcing him to disperse his forces.[61] In early June, the Khyber Rifles infiltrated into Kandar Kuzi Forest east of Kathai Nullah. From there they regularly ambushed the enemy, severely restricting his movement, while also gathering useful intelligence. On 19 June, the Khyber Rifles and a section of Baluchis waylaid a party of Indians near Khatir Nar, killing 15 of them. By the end of June, the Indian Summer Offensive was all but over. The Indians now decided to make one last attempt to outflank Chakothi, this time from the south. On 27 June, they captured Pir Kanthi, which overlooks Chakothi from the south.[62] This was a dangerous development and after a failed attempt to retake Pir Kanthi, Brigadier Akbar decided to capture Pandu.

The Pandu massif consists of two features: Point 6873 on the western end and Pandu Peak (9178 feet) in the east. Pandu village lies below the peak in a saddle, which is connected by a ridge to Chhota Kazinag and Chinal Dori. The feature is covered with thick pine forests and its southern slopes fall steeply 6000 feet down to the River Jhelum.[63] Pandu was held by 2 Bihar with two companies at Point 6873. A mountain battery was sited nearby. Towards their north, 2 Dogra was located at Chinal Dori with companies at Khatir Nar, Kandar Kuzi, Nandi and Point 10490. Behind them, two companies of 7 Sikh were deployed at Sing, Chhitrian and Chhota Kazinag.[64]

Pandu was a daunting challenge and Brigadier Akbar understood that success depended on achieving complete surprise. Lieutenant Colonel JH Harvey-Kelly, the Commanding Officer of 4 Baluch (11 Baloch), appreciating that a frontal attack was futile,

prepared a brilliant plan for the capture of Pandu. The assault was to be carried out by the Baluchis advancing in two columns from the south, which was the most difficult and thus least expected route. The right column of two companies under Major AH Afridi was to capture Pandu Peak, while the rest of the battalion under the CO was to capture Pandu itself. Meanwhile, a Mahsud *lashkar* under Captain Khalid Khan from Bib Dori would secure Point 6873. To isolate 2 Bihar and prevent any interference from other Indian units in the area, two columns were to infiltrate in the enemy's rear. One company of 2 Azad Battalion (2 AK) and tribesmen under Captain Qudrat Ullah from Nanga Tak would capture Chham and establish a block between Khatir Nar and Sing. Meanwhile, the other column of two companies of 2 Azad Battalion, two platoons of Khyber Rifles and two *lashkars* under Major Karamat Ullah from Nardajian was to proceed to Sufaida Forest and cut off 2 Bihar from 2 Dogra. It was a complex operation, which required meticulous planning and coordination, as well as secrecy. However, just before the attack, Lieutenant Colonel Harvey-Kelly was recalled by British authorities. He was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Malik Sher Bahadur.[65]

The assault on Pandu was launched on the night of 20 July. Major Afridi's column after a difficult climb secured Pandu Peak at daybreak, while the Mahsuds captured Point 6873. However, the main force under the CO came under heavy fire as it approached Pandu village and was held up. In the meantime, Qudrat Ullah's column reached Chhitrian Forest after capturing Chham without incidence. Karamat Force infiltrated into Kandar Kuzi Forest from Nardajian and reached Sufaida after leaving behind an Azad company at Khatir Nar to keep the Dogras pinned down and to protect their line of communication. At Sufaida, the column captured an Indian outpost after a fierce firefight. Major Karamat then established himself on the Pandu-Chhota Kazinag spur and cleared Sufaida Forest of the enemy.[66]

After the failure of the main column to capture Pandu, the battalion withdrew towards Point 6873. Brigadier Akbar now decided to attack 2 Bihar from Pandu Peak and sent two companies of 2 Frontier Force (4 FF) under their CO to bolster Major Afridi. Meanwhile, the Indians at Pandu were in a state of panic. They had been shocked by the appearance of Pakistanis in their front and flanks. When some of Major Karamat's men blundered into Pandu on 22 July, they realized that they were also cut-off from the rear. The night of 23 July was very cold and the Pakistanis in the forests around Pandu lit fires to keep warm. At the sight of this ring of fire, the Indian Commanding Officer lost his nerve. That night, 2 Bihar bolted from Pandu, only to be mercilessly hunted down by the Mahsuds. During the battle, the Indian losses were 309 killed or wounded, while Pakistani casualties were around 100.[67] Pandu was a decisive victory and it effectively ended Indian drive towards Muzaffarabad.

South of Pandu, the Bagh Valley, which was liberated in September 1947, had remained relatively secure. In this sector, Pakistani forces were occupying a salient between Uri and Poonch, preventing a link-up of Indian forces in the two sectors through Hajipir Pass. The Indian capture of Pir Kanthi in June 1948, became a threat to Bagh and 102 Brigade was inducted into Bagh Valley in July. Detachments of Tochi Scouts and Zhob Militia were deployed for the protection of Hajipir Pass. In late August, there were indications that the Indians were preparing for a major operation and Zhob Militia was moved to Pir Kanthi to reinforce the troops there. However, the onset of winter ended all Indian ambitions in Bagh and in December, they withdrew from Pir Kanthi.[68]

By the end of the year, a stalemate had developed all along the front. Both sides were exhausted and in December, they agreed to a ceasefire with effect from 1 January 1949. Although Pakistan had been preparing for an offensive in Jammu, it took

India's offer of a plebiscite to settle the Kashmir dispute at face value and agreed to end hostilities. Kashmir was the first time that the Frontier Corps faced a professional army in war. The Corps rose to the challenge magnificently, particularly the Gilgit Scouts, who liberated Gilgit and Baltistan all on their own. Meanwhile, the units engaged in Kashmir also performed well. Despite being employed piecemeal in detachments in an unfamiliar role, the performance of the Scouts was outstanding. They earned a large number of gallantry awards and came back from the front with their heads held high.

Nationalisation of the Frontier Corps

For a hundred years, the Frontier had been a war zone. But Independence changed that. Peace now prevailed in the Tribal Areas and both the Government and the tribesmen could focus on more productive activities. The tribesmen were no longer treated as hostiles and all restrictions on them were lifted. The Government made a sincere effort for their economic uplift and integration into national society. For the first time in their history, the tribesmen had a stake in the success of the State and it showed in their behaviour and attitude. However, such profound changes cannot take place overnight and the pace of reforms was slow.[69] The agreement with the tribes not to interfere in their affairs, leaving the colonial administrative setup and Frontier Crimes Regulation in place, and withholding universal franchise from the Tribal Areas, all had negative consequences. They hampered the pace of development, which was much slower compared to the rest of the country. Meanwhile, the regional geostrategic scenario had completely changed. The focus of Government's attention had shifted from the western frontier to the east, where India now posed an existential threat. As a result, the Tribal Areas suffered from what might be described as benign neglect. This would have grave consequences in the future.

The changed circumstances on the Frontier had a major impact on the Frontier Corps and created a number of new challenges. Withdrawal of the Army from the Tribal Areas led to an expansion and reorientation of the Frontier Corps, which now became responsible for the entire western and northern frontiers of Pakistan. Although it continued to operate under the control of the Political Agents, but as the Army assumed a more prominent role on the national stage, authority of the Political Agent gradually eroded. Even though tribal raids and uprisings had become a thing of the past, the Frontier Corps still had to contend with tribal feuds, sectarian violence and criminal activity, which kept it busy. Meanwhile, the Faqir of Ipi continued to cause trouble. The departure of the British had no effect on his belligerence and he became an inveterate foe of Pakistan. He was enthusiastically supported by the Afghan Government,[70] whose hostility towards Pakistan increased with every passing day. Although troublesome, these issues were manageable and the situation on the Frontier was generally peaceful.

The first challenge facing the Frontier Corps was finding enough officers to command it. Only a handful of junior Pakistani officers had served with the Frontier Corps before Independence. The Government of Pakistan requested some British officers to stay on until Pakistani officers were ready to take over command. Brigadier DHJ Williams, OBE, was selected as the first Inspector General Frontier Corps. He was an excellent choice with impeccable credentials. The Frontier Corps owes him a debt of gratitude for tactfully guiding it through a difficult period of transition. He oversaw the expansion of the Frontier Corps and its reorientation into a national force from a colonial one.[71] In this he was ably assisted by other British officers, all of whom were volunteers with strong attachment to the Scouts and wished Pakistan well.[72] In 1951, the last of them left and the Frontier Corps became a truly national institution.

In March 1950, Brigadier Sardar Ahmad Jan, MBE, took over as the first Pakistani Inspector General Frontier Corps. He was the grandson of Colonel Nawab Sir Muhammad Aslam Khan of Khyber Rifles. His appointment heralded the start of a new era and completed the nationalisation process of the Frontier Corps.[73] Pakistani veterans of the Frontier Corps formed the nucleus of the new officer corps of the Scouts. Even as they aligned the Frontier Corps with national goals, these officers wisely maintained continuity in the traditions and ethos of the Corps to ensure a seamless transition. Despite the retention of British officers in 1947, there was still a shortage of officers and it led to a relaxation in their selection criteria. Restriction on officers from Supporting Arms and Services was lifted, while more than forty Special Purpose Short Service Regular Commissions were granted, mostly to JCOs, to make up the deficiency.[74]

Reorganization of the Frontier Corps started after the successful completion of Operation Curzon. The Scouts occupied some of the posts evacuated by the Army, while the more remote ones were abandoned. At the same time, new wings were raised to meet extra commitments and the Scouts were equipped with artillery and mortars.[75] Although the basic organization and recruitment policy of the Frontier Corps remained unchanged, a welcome step was the lifting of the ban on the enlistment of Wazirs and Mahsuds.[76] The Headquarters Frontier Corps was established on a proper footing and new staff officers were posted in. In December 1948, the Headquarters shifted to Fort Bala Hisar in Peshawar, which became its permanent home. The Governor NWFP in his capacity as Agent to the Governor-General of Pakistan exercised control over the Frontier Corps. In 1955, when the provinces of West Pakistan were merged in a single unit, this control was exercised by Governor West Pakistan. At the same time, the appointment of Secretary was removed from the designation of IGFC. When Pakistan became a republic in 1956,

the authority of Governor-General was assumed by the President of Pakistan.[77] The working of Frontier Corps continued to be governed by the North-West Frontier Corps Law, 1941, until the promulgation of Frontier Corps Ordinance, 1959, and Frontier Corps Rules, 1961.[78]

Due to the reluctance of the Khan of Kalat to accede to Pakistan at the time of Independence and the ensuing rebellion in the State, it was decided to reorganize Chagai and Mekran Levy Corps as units of the Frontier Corps in order to make them "effective instruments of Pakistan's policy" in the State of Kalat.[79] The Chagai Levy Corps was reorganized into two wings under Major Mohammad Mustapha Ahmad, renamed as Chagai Militia, and placed under the control of Frontier Corps in 1948.[80] A similar change took place in the Mekran Levy Corps, which was redesignated as Mekran Militia on 1 April 1949.[81] At the same time, in order to provide a central reserve force for the Frontier Corps, the Thall Scouts were raised by Major Sanaullah Khan at Thall on 1 April 1949. The Tochi Scouts provided a wing, which formed the nucleus of the new corps.[82]

Meanwhile in Northern Areas, the Gilgit Scouts had been deployed on the Ceasefire Line since the end of hostilities. On 1 November 1949, a new corps called the Northern Rifles, soon after renamed as Northern Scouts, was raised by Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Rafi Khan to take over the responsibility of border defence from Gilgit Scouts, who reverted to their original role of internal security. The Gilgit Scouts were placed under the control of the Political Agent of Gilgit Agency, while the Northern Scouts came under direct operational control of the Army.[83] The post of Officer on Special Duty (OSD) was created to look after the affairs of Frontier Corps in Northern Areas and Colonel EE French, MC, was appointed the first OSD. In 1960, the appointment was redesignated as DIGFC (North), while the DIG at Quetta became DIGFC (South).[84]

In North Waziristan, there was no let-up in the hostility of the Faqir of Ipi. In January 1948, Lieutenant Colonel Sadiq Ullah Khan, MC, a veteran of South Waziristan Scouts, was appointed the first Pakistani Commandant of Tochi Scouts. The Colonel, himself an Orakzai tribesman, was a dynamic officer and it was hoped that his appointment would have a positive impact. The tribesmen welcomed the move but the Faqir was not impressed.[85] In May, he laid siege to Miranshah with a *lashkar* and Pakistan Air Force had to be called in to disperse his men. He then captured Datta Khel, which had been vacated earlier by Tochi Scouts, followed by the post at Boya. By 1949, the entire area between Miranshah and the Durand Line was under his control. The Tochi Scouts conducted several punitive operations, including a raid on his village of Ipi on 6 July 1948. The Government finally decided to reoccupy the posts west of Miranshah, and Boya was secured in 1949. The Faqir resisted these measure and the Scouts were engaged in several major actions near Spinwam and Khajuri Posts in 1950.[86]

In 1950, the Faqir of Ipi declared himself President of the Waziristan branch of Pakhtunistan National Assembly at the behest of his Afghan patrons. But the tribesmen were not interested in secession or waging war on Pakistan and his support soon faded away. Other than some minor skirmishes and ambushes, he did not achieve much and eventually became irrelevant.[87] Ironically, the Faqir, described by a Pakistani official as "a vicious old man, twisted with hate and bitterness",[88] achieved the status of a saint after his death in 1960. His grave at Gurwek in North Waziristan is now a shrine and there is even a road named after him in Islamabad.

After independence, Pakistan faced relentless hostility from Afghanistan. Besides the incitement of the Faqir, propagation of Pakhtunistan and support of Baloch separatists, the Afghans also kept up pressure on the Durand Line, which they obdurately

refused to recognize. The Frontier Corps took a leading role in dealing with these issues. In one such incidence in July 1950, a *gasht* of 25 rifles of Kurram Militia under Subedar Eid Akbar was attacked by an Afghan *lashkar* in Kurram Agency. The intrepid JCO immediately retaliated and beat back the attack. He was awarded Sitara-i-Basalat for this action.[89] Further south in Balochistan, the Pishin Scouts faced constant trouble on the Afghan frontier. In 1951, they had to be reinforced by a tribal *lashkar* and seven platoons of Zhob Militia.[90] Meanwhile, the Thall Scouts and Zhob Militia were engaged in quelling an uprising in Kalat in 1958-59.[91] In September 1958, Pakistan purchased Gwadar from the Sultan of Muscat after several years of tense negotiations. The Mekran Militia, which was poised to occupy the enclave by force in case the negotiations failed, were the first to enter the town and secured it for Pakistani officials, who arrived by sea under naval escort to take possession of the port.[92]

It was during this time that Khyber Pass became an essential stop on the itinerary of foreign dignitaries visiting Pakistan. For more than 75 years, Khyber Rifles, the Guardians of Khyber Pass, have had the honour of hosting a long list of noted personalities from kings, queens and presidents to generals, politicians and celebrities. An eminent luminary of the Khyber Rifles themselves was General Muhammad Zia Ul Haq, President of Pakistan and Chief of Army Staff, who was posted as Wing Commander in Khyber Rifles in 1954.[93]

6
A Watchful Peace

Pakistan had made much progress in the decade following Independence. Despite some political instability, the country had successfully come out of the crisis of its birth. Although its relations with India remained tense, the situation on the western frontier was mostly calm despite Afghan efforts to create trouble. In 1960, the Afghans succeeded in creating a minor crisis, when they raised a *lashkar* to foment trouble in Bajaur in collusion with the Nawab of Dir and his son, the Khan of Jandool. The Afghans were repulsed by local tribesmen but unrest then spilled into Dir. Pakistan responded by sending in the Army and the Frontier Corps. The Nawab and his son were arrested and the unrest was suppressed. However, some hostile tribesmen continued to cause trouble and it took several months to restore order.[1]

Contingents from Tochi and Thall Scouts were despatched to Bajaur to take part in operations. One company of Tochi Scouts with two 20-pounder guns under their Commandant Lieutenant Colonel Amanullah Khan left for Peshawar in August 1960.[2] Next month, a contingent of 400 rifles of Thall Scouts was also sent to Bajaur.[3] With the arrival of 7 Division in October, the Scouts came under the operational control of the Army. In May 1961, picquets of Thall Scouts in Shahi area were attacked by a hostile *lashkar,* which was then dispersed by the Army. The situation gradually calmed down and in January 1962, the troops were withdrawn. To guard against any trouble in the future, a new corps of Bajaur Scouts was raised at Munda by Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Karim on 1 April 1961. The Headquarters of the Corps shifted to Khar in December 1962.[4]

A welcome administrative step during this period was the sanction of free rations to the Frontier Corps in 1960, which until

then were paid for by the Scouts from their salary.[5] The same year, Mekran Militia was disbanded for insubordination.[6] In September, the Mahsud Battalions ceased to be labour battalions and started reorganizing as Scouts. In 1965, they were redesignated as the 1st and 2nd Mahsud Scouts (Mizh).[7] Up in the north, the Northern Scouts had been guarding the entire ceasefire line in Gilgit and Baltistan since 1949. To ensure better operational control, a wing of Northern Scouts at Skardu was converted into the Corps of Karakoram Scouts on 1 January 1964. Major Sardar Mohammad Hussain Shikoh was their first commandant.[8] Later that year, trouble again flared up in Kalat and the 1st Mahsud Battalion was despatched to deal with it.[9] The continuous disturbed state in the area led to the raising of Kalat Scouts at Shelabagh by Major Mosam Khan Wazir, SBt, on 1 March 1965. Their Headquarters shifted to Wadh near Khuzdar in July. The Corps was composed entirely of Pakhtuns.[10]

Meanwhile in the Tribal Areas, there were sporadic outbreaks of trouble, which required the intervention of the Frontier Corps. Most of them were petty feuds among the tribesmen or incitement by troublemakers, often at the behest of the Afghans. One such man was Mullah Dindar, who had taken over the mantle of Faqir of Ipi in North Waziristan. In June 1965, he mobilized a *lashkar* against Daurs of Miranshah. On 21 June, the *lashkar* attacked the Tochi Scouts post at Boya, which was under the command of Subedar Nazarband Shah Afridi. The tribesmen were armed with an artillery piece and a machine gun, which were causing considerable nuisance to the Scouts. At dawn on 24 June, Subedar Nazarband led out a raiding party and captured the machine gun. Unfortunately, he was mortally wounded during the action. The *lashkar* was then dispersed by a *gasht* of Tochi Scouts. Subedar Nazarband was awarded Sitara-i-Jurat for his leadership and gallantry, while Lance Naik Mosam Khan Afridi received a posthumous Tamgha-i-Jurat.[11]

Indo-Pakistan War 1965

India had been steadily consolidating her occupation of Kashmir. All diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute had failed and the international community was losing interest in the issue. Realizing that chances of a peaceful resolution to the dispute were all but gone, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar in August 1965, to encourage a revolt in Indian Occupied Kashmir.[12] The abortive operation gave the enemy the excuse to hit back and he made significant territorial gains in Kashmir. In response, Pakistan launched Operation Grand Slam to threaten Indian line of communication to Rajauri and Poonch. As Pakistan Army advanced towards Akhnur, India attacked across the international border on 6 September. After two weeks of fighting, the war ended in a stalemate, when Pakistan Army stopped Indian advance on all fronts. The Frontier Corps took an active part in the war on the Kashmir Front.

Operation Gibraltar: The responsibility for planning and execution of Operation Gibraltar was given to 12 Division under Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik. The formation was holding a front of 470 miles extending from the Chinese border to the River Chenab. The Northern and Karakoram Scouts were defending Gilgit and Baltistan, while Azad Kashmir was under the watch of four brigade-size 'Sectors' with 18 Azad Kashmir Regular Force (AKRF) battalions, 20 Mujahid companies and the 102 Brigade. Facing them were three Indian infantry divisions and three independent brigades besides a large number of second line troops.[13]

The operation commenced on 7 August 1965. Its objective was to infiltrate teams of guerrillas into Indian Occupied Kashmir to attack and sabotage military targets and strategic installations. It was hoped that the havoc wrought by them would disrupt Indian control over Kashmir and trigger an uprising, creating the

conditions for liberation of the state by Azad Kashmir forces. The Gibraltar Force consisted of six groups of volunteers from Northern Scouts, AKRF and Mujahids led by army officers, JCOs and NCOs. At the same time, another force of fourteen groups, called Nusrat Force, formed from units deployed on the Ceasefire Line was to infiltrate behind enemy lines and contain Indian forces to prevent any interference with the operations of Gibraltar Force.[14]

In Gilgit and Baltistan, the Frontier Corps contributed men to Qasim Force of Gibraltar Force and Groups A and B of Nusrat Force. Qasim Force consisted of 550 men of Northern Scouts and AKRF organized into four companies. Led by Major Ghulam Murtaza of Northern Scouts, it infiltrated from Kel on 29 July, and established itself near Bandipura. They demolished one bridge and damaged several others on the road to Kargil. Despite running out of food and ammunition in August, they managed to stay in enemy territory until the last week of September, when they were ordered to withdraw. Their losses were 5 killed and 11 wounded.[15] Major Ghulam Murtaza was awarded Sitara-i-Jurat for his gallant leadership. The rest of the Northern Scouts remained deployed on the Ceasefire Line, where they were reinforced by a contingent of Gilgit Scouts at Minimarg and Rattu.[16]

Towards their left, the Karakoram Scouts were manning a number of isolated posts in the Kargil Sector. A wing of South Waziristan Scouts under Major Aziz Sheikh was despatched to reinforce them.[17] Fighting had been going on in this sector since 17 May, when the Indian 121 Brigade supported by an artillery regiment captured three isolated picquets at Kala Pahar in the face of stiff resistance by the Scouts. However, subsequent Indian attempts to capture Karkit Top were resolutely repulsed.[18] The enemy suffered losses of 19 killed and 95 wounded. The Indians vacated these positions on 30 June, following the agreement to end hostilities in the Rann of Kutch.[19]

11. Jammu & Kashmir 1965.

During Operation Gibraltar, Groups A and B of Nusrat Force infiltrated through this area in the first week of August. Their target was the Indian line of communication between Dras and Leh. These teams caused considerable havoc and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. They also destroyed two important bridges, which disrupted the movement of Indian troops. The Indians responded by recapturing Pakistani positions on Kala Pahar, which dominated the Kargil-Leh Road.[20] However, this was the extent of their gains in Kargil Sector. During the war, the South Waziristan Scouts suffered losses of nine killed and five wounded. They were awarded one Sitara-i-Jurat and two Tamgha-i-Jurat,[21] while the Karakoram Scouts, who lost 13 men killed, received one Tamgha-i-Jurat.[22]

Operation Gibraltar failed to achieve its objectives. Although some teams of Gibraltar and Nusrat Forces caused much trouble for the Indians, others had mixed results. More importantly,



12. Tithwal and Bagh Sectors 1965.

the hoped-for uprising of the Kashmiris did not materialize. The Indians seized the opportunity to hit back and in the last week of August, launched offensives in Tithwal and Bagh Sectors.[23] Their aim was to eliminate two salients of Pakistani territory jutting into Indian Occupied Kashmir. One of these was on the left bank of River Neelum in front of Jura called the Jura Bulge, while the other was the Bedori Bulge in Bagh Sector, which separated Uri from Poonch. Because of their location, these areas provided ideal launching pads for Gibraltar and Nusrat Forces, making them prime targets for the Indians.[24]

Contingents of the Frontier Corps saw active service in all sectors of Azad Kashmir. These included four companies each of Khyber Rifles and Kurram Militia under Number 1 Sector in front of Tithwal, two wings of Zhob Militia under Number 2 Sector in Bagh, contingents of Thall, Bajaur and South Waziristan Scouts under Number 3 Sector in Kotli,[25] and two wing of Tochi Scouts under Number 4 Sector in front of Chhamb. Meanwhile, three platoons of Tochi Scouts served at Barki[26] and a company of Chagai Militia was deployed at Wagah in Lahore.[27]

The Battle of Jura Bulge: The area from Athmuqam to Pir Kanthi was the responsibility of Number 1 Sector under Brigadier FR Khilji, MC. In the Neelum Valley, 23 AK with two companies of Khyber Rifles was guarding the Jura Bulge, while 16 AK with two companies of Khyber Rifles and four companies of Kurram Militia was deployed in front of Tithwal. On the night of 24 August, the Indians attacked 16 AK positions at Pir Sahaba. The two forwards posts at Danna manned by 16 AK and Kurram Militia were taken by surprise and forced to fall back. Next day, the enemy captured Pir Sahaba, where a platoon of Kurram Militia under Subedar Gulab Hussain offered stiff resistance. Loss of Pir Sahaba posed a threat to Muzaffarabad and 5 Punjab was rushed to Nauseri, where elements of Kurram Militia came under its command. The Indians however, did not follow up on their success in this area.[28]

The Indian objective in Tithwal Sector was to eliminate the Jura Bulge. Having secured their southern flank, they turned their attention north. Meanwhile on 26 August, Number 1 Sector was bifurcated and Brigadier Khilji was made responsible for the Jura Bulge with two AKRF battalions, three Nusrat Groups and three companies of Khyber Rifles. His orders were to infiltrate in the enemy's rear and disrupt his line of communication. Brigadier Khilji established his headquarters at Surjoi, whose defence was entrusted to a company of Khyber Rifles and Kurram Militia. In the meantime, one company of Khyber Rifles under Major Riaz infiltrated behind enemy lines and remained there for three days until recalled. On the night of 3 September, an Indian battalion with artillery support attacked Surjoi. The Scouts under Subedar Yaqub Khan of Khyber Rifles put up a fierce fight. However, in the face of overwhelming enemy strength, they were forced to give way and Surjoi was captured on 4 September.[29] Subedar Yaqub was awarded Sitara-i-Jurat for his gallant leadership.[30] Fighting in the Neelum Valley continued well into October, when the Indians captured most of Jura Bulge.[31] During the war, losses of Khyber Rifles were 4 men killed and 6 wounded,[32] while the casualties of Kurram Militia were 6 killed and 18 wounded.[33]

The Battle of Bedori Bulge: The main Indian offensive was directed in the Bagh Sector, where they planned a pincer attack with two brigades from Uri and Poonch. Their objective was to capture Hajipir Pass, eliminate Bedori Bulge and open the Uri-Poonch road. Artillery of Indian 19 and 25 Divisions was to support their offensive. Defence of this area was the responsibility of Number 2 Sector with three AKRF battalions, two wings of Zhob Militia and some irregulars. The approach from Uri towards Hajipir Pass was being guarded by 6 AK with a wing of Zhob Militia under command, while 10 AK and two groups of Nusrat Force were deployed in the bulge itself. 4 AK with a company of Zhob Militia was guarding the approach from Poonch at Chand

Tekri and Chirikot. A battery of 25-pounders and 3.7-inch howitzers at Hajira made up their entire artillery support.[34]

The enemy attack on Bedori Bulge was preceded by several days of intense shelling, which caused considerable damage to Pakistani defences. On 25 August, two Indian battalions of 68 Brigade advanced from the direction of Uri on both sides of Hajipir Pass. On the left, 1 Para Battalion was to capture Sank, held by C Company 6 AK with a platoon of Zhob Militia. On the right, another Indian battalion was to capture Bedori Top and then link up with the paratroopers. 1 Para's attack was fiercely resisted for two days by C Company 6 AK, which was joined by D Company with a platoon of Zhob Militia the next day. After inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, Kashmiris and Scouts fell back to their alternative position at Bisali on 27 August.[35]

Meanwhile on the right, the Indian attack on Bedori Top was repulsed by Group F of Nusrat Force with heavy losses. The Indians had to commit three battalions to capture the feature, which fell on 28 August, only after its gallant defenders ran out of ammunition. The Zhob Militia company deployed at Dhakkar was ordered to fall back to the eastern shoulder of Hajipir Pass to avoid being out-flanked by the enemy advancing from Bedori Top. During the withdrawal, the company got disorganized and most of them ended up at Galiwala Sank south of Bisali. The remaining men ran into 1 Para advancing towards Hajipir Pass. According to 1 Para's regimental history, "A party of Pathans withdrawing from Sawan Pathri, had seen (Major) Dayal's men and come to the conclusion that they were out to encircle them. With characteristic doggedness, they had decided to take on a much larger force". Despite the heroic resistance by rear parties of Zhob Militia, a vacant Hajipir Pass was captured by the enemy on 28 August. In the meantime, regular Pakistan Army units were rushed to the Bagh Sector. These included 20 Punjab, which took up position on Gitlan-Ghoremar ridge towards the west of Uri-Poonch road.[36]

Having secured the eastern flank of Hajipir Pass, the Indians now decided to secure the western flank by capturing Bisali. Under the cover of an intense artillery barrage, 4 Rajput attacked Bisali during the night of 4 September. The 11232-foot feature was held by a company of 6 AK with a platoon of Zhob Militia. A fierce battle ensued during which the enemy managed to crawl his way up the slope to within 50 yards of the top. It was then that 6 AK launched a furious counterattack with an *ad hoc* company including a platoon of Zhob Militia held in reserve on the reverse slope. After a fierce firefight, the Rajputs were thrown off the feature having suffered more than a hundred casualties.[37]

In the south, the Indian 93 Brigade operating from Poonch opened its offensive on 1 September, with an attack on Chand Tekri. The attack was beaten back with heavy losses. On this front, a company each of 4 AK was deployed at Chand Tekri and Chirikot, while a company of 17 Baluch (2 Sind) was holding Degwar Tirwan.[38] Platoons of Zhob Militia were distributed in all three locations. At Chand Tekri, a platoon of Zhob Militia was deployed at Point 7702. After an intense artillery bombardment, which damaged or destroyed all Pakistani bunkers, the enemy renewed his attack on Chand Tekri on 5 September, with three battalions. The Indians had brought forward Recoilless Rifles, which they used at point-blank range. The outnumbered and outgunned defenders fought with matchless gallantry. At Point 7702, Subedar Fazal Gul of Zhob Militia was killed leading his men. Chand Tekri finally fell early on 6 September after its defenders had suffered fifty percent casualties. There were only five survivors in the Zhob Militia platoon at Point 7702. Subedar Fazal Gul was awarded Sitara-i-Jurat for his valour.[39]

Having secured both ends of Bedori Bulge, the enemy's next objective was to seize the ridges on both sides of Uri-Poonch road. After capturing the eastern ridge on 9 September, the two Indian brigades achieved their link-up the next day. They had

eliminated Bedori Bulge and only needed to capture the Gitlan-Ghoremar ridge held by 20 Punjab and 10 AK, to open the Poonch-Uri road. However, repeated enemy attacks over the next two weeks failed to dislodge the tenacious defenders, and the ridge remained in Pakistani hands. The enemy next turned his attention towards Chirikot ridge, which overlooks Poonch. The ridge was held by a company each of 4 AK and 17 Baluch, with a platoon of Zhob Militia. On 22 September, 7 Sikh launched a surprise dawn attack from Degwar Tirwan and captured the foot hills of Chakias. That night a Gurkha battalion moved up to capture Chirikot but was caught up in its own artillery fire.[40] Kashmiris, Baluchis and Scouts immediately counterattacked and evicted the enemy from Chakias. The retreating Indians left behind 40 dead including four officers. Lance Naik Nur Rahman of Zhob Militia was awarded a posthumous Tamgha-i-Jurat for gallantry during the action.[41] The Zhob Militia lost 26 men killed during the war.[42]

South of Bagh, the defence of Kotli was the responsibility Number 3 Sector. No major fighting took place in this area. Three contingents of Frontier Corps served in Kotli Sector. Fourteen platoons of Thall Scouts were deployed at Tatta Pani, Mara Kot and Chattar under 11 AK.[43] On the night of 6 October, the Indians attacked 11 AK post at Soka Noban. Two sections of Thall Scouts under Captain Riaz Ullah and a platoon of 11 AK were rushed to reinforce the post. The enemy attack was repulsed and he was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses.[44] The casualties of Thall Scout were two killed and five wounded.[45] A contingent of Bajaur Scouts was also deployed in Kotli Sector but was not actively engaged.[46] After the ceasefire, a wing of South Waziristan Scouts also served at Kotli.[47]

Operation Grand Slam: The loss of Hajipir was both a setback as well as an opportunity for Pakistan. With the bulk of Indian forces in Kashmir committed in Bedori Bulge, an opportunity had presented for a bold stroke in the enemy's rear in Jammu.



13. Chhamb 1965.

Operation Grand Slam envisaged a strike towards Akhnur through the Munawwar Gap between the Ceasefire Line and River Chenab. By capturing Akhnur, Pakistan could threaten Indian line of communication to Rajauri towards the north or Jammu in the south.[48] Three infantry brigades and two armoured regiments supported by 4 Corps & 7 Division Artillery were inducted for the operation under 12 Division. Number 4 Sector and 102 Brigade were to clear the enemy west of the River Munawwarwali Tawi followed by the capture of Akhnur by 10 Brigade. It was hoped that any Indian reaction would remain confined to Kashmir.[49]

Two wings of Tochi Scouts served in Chhamb Sector under Number 4 Sector. The first to arrive was No. 5 Wing under Captain Qamar in May. It was employed for guard duties at sensitive installations, filling gaps between infantry battalions and carrying out patrolling. Its strength was distributed among 5, 14 and 19 AK Battalions. On the night of 15 August, one of its companies under Naib Subedar Behram Gul Wazir attached with 14 AK went into action in the hills in front of Patni. Five platoons seized Point 1760, while another platoon along with a platoon of 14 AK captured the Indian post of Ghauri. Sepoy Imam Ghulam was awarded a posthumous Tamgha-i-Jurat for gallantry during the action. The Scouts then repulsed two Indian attempts to recapture the post.[50] Meanwhile, towards their south, 19 AK was ordered to capture Laleali and Red Hill. The features were captured on 15 and 16 August, with a platoon of Tochi Scouts engaged on the Red Hill along with a company of 19 AK.[51] In September, No. 6 Wing also arrived in Chhamb Sector.[52]

Operation Grand Slam was launched on 1 September. The Indians, who had only one brigade in the area, were taken by surprise. 102 Brigade captured Chhamb, while towards its left, 19 AK captured Dewa. Meanwhile 5 AK, leaving Tochi Scouts to hold its area of responsibility, cleared the area towards the north. 14 AK remained deployed in a defensive role. By next morning,

the area west of Munawwarwali Tawi was clear of the enemy. The Indians had been routed and were in disarray. But instead of pressing home the advantage, Pakistanis halted for 24 hours, as the responsibility for further operations was transferred from HQ 12 Division to HQ 7 Division. The change in command in the middle of the battle caused a critical loss of momentum and gave the Indians time to regroup.[53] By the time, 10 Brigade captured Jaurian on 5 September, the enemy had regained his balance. On 6 September, 7 Division arrived in front of Akhnur. However, on the same day, India attacked across the international border, forcing Pakistan to pull out 10 Brigade, 11 Cavalry and 4 Corps Artillery for the defence of Sialkot and Lahore. Departure of these troops spelt the end of the offensive against Akhnur.[54] Operation Grand Slam, which had begun with so much promise, was now reduced to fending off a once defeated enemy.

Number 4 Sector was ordered to secure the left shoulder of Munawwar Gap. In front of Patni, 14 AK launched an attack on Point 3807 during the night of 6 September. The enemy offered stiff resistance and the assault was held up.[55] A fighting patrol of Tochi Scouts under Subedar Behram Khan Wazir, which had moved out from Ghauri Post to gather intelligence, came across an enemy machine gun position, which was holding up the advance of 14 AK. Leaving his men to hold the enemy's attention in the front, Subedar Behram with three men approached the enemy position from one side, while Havildar Azam Khan Khattak with three men moved in from the other. Azam Khan crawled towards the enemy post and silenced the machine gun with a grenade. This was followed by a bayonet charge by Subedar Behram shouting the Tochi Scout battle cry of *Da Turo Shrang*. Eighteen Indians were killed, including a Major, while six were taken prisoner. Three gallant Scouts were also killed, including Havildar Azam Khan, who was awarded Tamgha-i-Jurat, while Subedar Behram Khan received Sitara-i-Jurat.[56]

With the drive towards Akhnur over, 7 Division turned its attention towards the Kalidhar ridge in the north. Seven platoons of Tochi Scouts were deployed in this area under 19 AK on 20 September. Fighting continued in this sector until October,[57] when Tochi Scouts returned home. During the war, they lost 13 men killed including a JCO. They were awarded one Sitara-i-Jurat, two Tamgha-i-Jurat and six Imtiazi Sanad for their excellent performance in the war.[58]

Meanwhile, on the western frontier, the situation remained calm. There were the occasional disturbances by miscreants, which were promptly dealt with by the Frontier Corps. On one of these occasions, a wing of South Waziristan Scouts under Major Mohammad Shafiq proceeded to Kohlu in Balochistan in September 1966, to assist Zhob Militia in operations against the Marri tribe. It returned home in January 1967, after successful completion of the task.[59] Later that year, Zhob Militia was called out to deal with disturbances in District Duki. Two men were awarded Tamgha-i-Jurat for gallantry during the operation.[60]

By the late 1960s, the Frontier Corps had expanded into a large paramilitary force. However, there was no central establishment for standardized training of recruits, who were being trained under the arrangements of individual corps. In October 1969, two Training Wings were raised at Mir Ali and Loralai to impart training to the recruits of Frontier Corps in NWFP and Balochistan. In February 1970, the two wings were amalgamated as the Frontier Corps Training Centre at Mir Ali Camp under Major Mahboob Shah, SBt, who was appointed Commandant.[61] Meanwhile, on 8 July 1969, Major Abdul Quddus raised the Frontier Corps Intelligence Unit (FCIU) at Headquarters Frontier Corps with an initial strength of 82. Its personnel were deployed in eleven detachments in the Frontier Corps' Area of Responsibility. Their mission was intelligence gathering and security of FC units deployed on Pak-Afghan frontier.[62]

The State of Dir had been in an unsettled state since 1960. In 1969, the Government of Pakistan abolished the State and incorporated it into Malakand Agency. Next year, it became a district of NWFP. Since the Police and Levies were finding it difficult to maintain law and order, it was decided to raise a new corps of Scouts to look after the security of Dir. Consequently, Dir Scouts were raised at Chakdara by Lieutenant Colonel Shah Behram Khattak, SJ, on 1 April 1970, by redesignation of a wing of Bajaur Scout.[63] A year later, the Government of Pakistan decided to raise another corps for the security of the restive area of Dera Bugti in Balochistan. The Sibi Scouts were raised at Zhob by Lieutenant Colonel Asad Khan in May 1971. The Corps moved to Dera Bugti soon after.[64]

Indo-Pakistan War 1971

The post-war period saw increasing political instability, especially in East Pakistan, where discontent among the Bengali population had been simmering for some time. This dissatisfaction was exploited by their politicians, who unleashed a vicious propaganda campaign against West Pakistan. In the 1970 general elections, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Bengali-dominated Awami League won a landslide victory in East Pakistan with a majority of National Assembly seats.[65] The party had contested the elections on the basis of 'Six Points', which in effect was a formula for the partition of Pakistan.[66] Awami League demanded an immediate transfer of power. However, the Government of Pakistan was not prepared to accept the demand until Awami League softened its attitude on Six Points. But Awami League was in no mood to compromise. Negotiations led nowhere and mutual distrust and intransigence made reconciliation difficult. On 1 March 1971, President Yahya Khan postponed the inaugural session of the National Assembly. The announcement led to open revolt in East Pakistan.[67]

Operation Searchlight: The Government was stunned by the scale of violence, which involved large sections of East Pakistani population including government officials. For 25 days, the province was held hostage by the supporters of Awami League, who terrorised the non-Bengali citizens and loyal Bengalis, while the Army was besieged in cantonments.[68] After more than three weeks of anarchy, the Government decided to crush the rebellion. On 25 March, Pakistan Army launched Operation Searchlight to restore the writ of the Government. The operation led to mutiny of Bengali military personnel,[69] who with Indian support, organized a militia called Mukti Bahini. From their bases in India, Mukti Bahini launched a brutal campaign of terror against the Pakistani state and its loyal citizens.[70]

In March 1971, Pakistan Eastern Command consisted of 14 Division with 18 infantry battalions. Six of them were of East Bengal Regiment composed of Bengalis, while the paramilitary East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) and Police were also entirely Bengali.[71] Following the mutiny of Bengali personnel, 9 and 16 Divisions were airlifted to East Pakistan in April.[72] To fill the void created by the mutiny of EPR and East Pakistan Police, contingents of the Frontier Corps, West Pakistan Rangers and Police were flown in from West Pakistan. At the same time, a new paramilitary force called East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces (EPCAF) was raised.[73] Two *ad hoc* divisional headquarters were formed for better operational control over the various paramilitary forces.[74] The Frontier Corps provided contingents from the Khyber Rifles, Kurram Militia, Tochi Scouts, Chagai Militia, Thall Scouts and Bajaur Scouts. The Scouts were attached with Army units, with whom they operated throughout the insurgency and the war.[75]

Despite the arrival of reinforcements, the total military strength of Eastern Command never exceeded 35,000. It was with these meagre resources that it fought a 9-month insurgency and a month long war with India. The Army was spread all over the



14. East Pakistan 1971.

province in penny packets. To augment their numbers, platoons of the Frontier Corps and other paramilitary forces were attached with them.[76] At Dinajpur in the northwest, a company of Chagai Militia operated with 26 FF,[77] while a company of Kurram Militia under Captain Farhad was attached with 39 Baluch in the Comilla Sector.[78] The Khyber Rifles sent three companies to East Pakistan, which served at Sylhet.[79] Three companies of Thall Scouts reached Dacca on 9 April and were employed in guarding important installations in Ghazipur District. In May, one company each was sent to Sylhet, Comilla and Chittagong, where they performed border defence duties. Later, the companies at Comilla and Chittagong were also moved to Sylhet.[80] One company of Bajaur Scouts also operated in Sylhet Sector.[81] In the last week of March, a wing of Tochi Scouts under Major Sarwar Khan was sent to Dacca, where it was deployed for the protection of the airport. Some elements were attached with Army units and took part in operations at Bhairab Bazar, Belonia and Sylhet.[82]

Pakistan Army quickly regained control of the province. By the end of May, the rebellion was crushed and the remnants of Mukti Bahini fled to India.[83] It was a remarkable achievement. The units that were rushed to East Pakistan had arrived with barely their personal weapons. Immediately on their arrival, they were committed into action in an unfamiliar environment without any preparation. For the Scouts, it was particularly challenging. Used to the mountains and valleys of the Northwest Frontier, they found themselves in an alien land with an oppressive climate and a hostile population. Instead of operating independently, they were split into small detachments and were employed in a role for which they were untrained. For weeks, they went without proper food or supplies and their heath was affected by the sapping heat of East Bengal. Operating in the environment of a civil war, where it was difficult to differentiate friend from foe, was extremely challenging for them.[84]

15. Sylhet Sector 1971.

Sylhet Sector: India had been reorganizing Mukti Bahini and by November 1971, their strength had reached 100,000. However, the Indians understood that Mukti Bahini could not defeat the Pakistan Army on their own. After fixing Pakistani forces on the frontier through increased guerrilla activity by the Mukti Bahini, they planned to invade East Pakistan from three directions with three army corps and overwhelming air support.[85] Outnumbered, outgunned, isolated and surrounded by a hostile population, Eastern Command was in no position to withstand an all-out invasion. Its best hope lay in holding defensible positions around Dacca. However Eastern Command, obsessed with denying any territory to the enemy, remained stuck in its forward defensive posture based on border outposts.[86] When India invaded East Pakistan on 21 November, Eastern Command found itself thinly spread out on border outposts without any reserves. Despite heroic resistance, Pakistani units were eventually bypassed, cut off and then surrounded by strong enemy pincers.

The area east of River Meghna and north of Salda *Nadi* was the responsibility of 14 Division. The 202 (*ad hoc*) Brigade was defending Sylhet, while towards its south, 313 Brigade at Maulvi Bazar was deployed from Latu to River Titas. Most of the Frontier Corps troops in East Pakistan were under the command of these two brigades. The 313 Brigade consisted of 22 Baluch, 30 FF, EPCAF, Razakars (armed civilian volunteers) and half a wing of Frontier Corps. The latter included elements of Tochi, Thall and Bajaur Scouts distributed among the two infantry battalions, which were strung out on border outposts over the vast front. 22 Baluch was holding the northern flank of 313 Brigade from Latu to Shamsher Nagar. The brigade artillery support consisted of a mortar battery and five 105 mm howitzers. Facing them was the Indian 8 Mountain Division with two infantry brigades, several battalions of Border Security Force, three battalions of East Bengal Regiment and a large number of Mukti Bahini.[87]

Fighting in this sector started well before the general outbreak of hostilities. The enemy started nibbling away at Pakistani territory in early October. It was impossible for the overstretched Pakistani troops to defend the vast front with their meagre resources. East of Srimangal, a composite company of 30 FF and paramilitary troops was holding Dhalai Border Outpost near the Indian town of Kamalpur. The post had defied repeated attempts by an entire enemy brigade to capture it since early October. On the night of 28 October, the Indians were able to cut it off from the rear. On 1 November, Pakistan counterattacked with two companies of 30 FF and a company each of Frontier Corps and Mujahids. However, the attack failed and the company was forced to vacate the post.[88]

Meanwhile at Sylhet, 202 Brigade was looking after a front of 100 miles with 31 Punjab, 91 Mujahid Battalion, three companies of Khyber Rifles, elements of Tochi, Thall and Bajaur Scouts, EPCAF and Razakars. One battery of Field Artillery was in support. Two companies of Khyber Rifles were guarding the northern approach at Sunamganj and Chhatak, while 31 Punjab with paramilitary troops was watching the eastern approaches at Atgram and Zakiganj. One company of Khyber Rifles and two companies of EPCAF made up the brigade reserve.[89] On 15 October, 3 East Bengal attacked Chhatak from the north. The Khyber Rifles Company defending the town held on to it until the arrival of regular troops, who threw out the enemy after a counterattack on 23 October. On 21 November, 59 Mountain Brigade attacked Atgram and Zakiganj, which were being defended by a company each of 31 Punjab with elements of Tochi, Thall and Bajaur Scouts. The defenders offered fierce resistance but were eventually pushed back to Charkhai. The enemy did not make any further advances in this sector and 59 Mountain Brigade moved south in front of Ghazipur for an offensive towards Fenchuganj.[90]

In 313 Brigade area, the enemy planned to advance along the Ghazipur-Kalaura-Fenchuganj axis with 59 Mountain Brigade and Shamsher Nagar-Maulvi Bazar axis with 81 Mountain Brigade. On 28 November, 81 Brigade attacked Shamsher Nagar, held by a platoon of 22 Baluch, a company of Thall and Bajaur Scouts and two companies of EPCAF. The Pakistanis offered stiff resistance until 2 December, when they were ordered to fall back to Maulvi Bazar. North of Shamsher Nagar, 59 Brigade attacked 22 Baluch position at Ghazipur Tea Plantation near Kalaura on 3 December. The position was held by a composite platoon of two sections of 22 Baluch and one section each of Bajaur Scouts and EPCAF under Second Lieutenant Tahir Hussain Kardar. The enemy was repulsed after suffering heavy casualties. On the night of 4 December, the Indians renewed their attack with a fresh battalion. After fierce fighting that raged all night, the enemy finally overran the position.[91] Next day, the Indians resumed their advance towards Kalaura. With the enemy advancing towards Maulvi Bazar and Fenchuganj, Commander 313 Brigade decided to withdraw north towards Sylhet.[92]

With the arrival of 313 Brigade in the second week of December, the strength of Sylhet garrison rose to 6000 men. But after three weeks of constant fighting these men were utterly exhausted. The Indians landed a heliborne battalion near Sylhet on 7 December. However, the Sylhet garrison, which could see the writing on the wall, made no serious effort to dislodge the enemy. On 12 December, 59 Mountain Brigade linked up with its battalion at Sylhet. Five days later, the isolated garrison of Sylhet surrendered to the enemy.[93]

The overwhelming Indian superiority on ground and in air had ensured their success. But it was not an easy victory and they faced fierce resistance from the Pakistanis. By 10 December, all major crossings on River Meghna were captured by them. Soon, they arrived in Dacca, where the Eastern Command surrendered on

16 December. For the men of the Frontier Corps, it had been a particularly cruel ordeal. Throughout the insurgency and war, they were used as second-line troops in small detachments mostly without their officers. They were given tasks, which were impossible to complete even for regular troops. They then had to face the humiliation of surrender and captivity in the hands of the hated enemy. For the proud tribesmen, nothing could be worse. Some preferred death to such a fate. On 21 November, a sepoy of Tochi Scouts captured at Atgram was being escorted by two Gorkha soldiers, who had neglected to search him. The unidentified Scout took out a grenade from his pouch and after calmly telling his captors to run, blew himself up.[94]

Northern Areas: In West Pakistan, Pakistani plans envisaged multiple attacks by their holding formations to fix the enemy in his positions and to draw in his reserves. This was to be followed by an offensive by Pakistani strike formations for which Pakistan had two armoured and three infantry divisions.[95] However, when India invaded East Pakistan in November 1971, Pakistan waited for two weeks before attacking in the west on 3 December. This delay was in the forlorn hope of achieving a diplomatic resolution to the crisis in the east.[96] The Pakistan Army in the west consisted of two armoured and ten infantry divisions. In the north, 12 Division was responsible for the defence of Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir, while 23 Division at Jhelum, was deployed in front of Jammu.[97] As the crisis in East Pakistan deepened, several contingents from the Frontier Corps were despatched to Northern Areas and Kashmir.

The vast front in the Northern Areas was under the watch of Northern and Karakoram Scouts. They were reinforced by two companies of Khyber Rifles under Major Aslam Janjua at Chilam and one company at Minimarg,[98] and one company of Chitral Scouts in Kargil Sector.[99] Facing them were the Indian 3 Infantry Division at Leh and 121 (Independent) Brigade Group at Kargil.[100] In Kargil Sector, the Indians planned an offensive against Olding

near the confluence of Rivers Indus and Shingo. The area was under the watch of a wing of Karakoram Scouts. On 7 December, the Indian 121 Brigade launched its attack along both sides of Shingo with three infantry battalions supported by artillery and air force. Although they captured Pakistani positions in Brachil Pass and on Kala Pahar, they were unable to achieve their main objective of capturing Olding in the face of stiff resistance by the Scouts, who inflicted heavy losses on the enemy.[101] Pakistan had again neglected its defences in Baltistan leading to the loss of these strategic heights, which dominate Kargil-Leh road. However, unlike 1965, these posts were not returned after the ceasefire and Pakistan had to launch a risky operation in 1999, to reclaim them.

Northeast of Kargil, the Indians surprised Pakistan by launching an attack in the Shyok Valley, defended by three companies of Karakoram Scouts. On the night of 8 December, three companies of Ladakh Scouts and four companies of Nubra Guards attacked the Karakoram Scouts posts of Ghaus and Majnoon. The forward elements of Scouts resisted the attack but withdrew towards their main defensive position at Chalunka after losing three men killed. Next day, the enemy captured Chalunka after stiff resistance by the Scouts, who suffered a number of casualties. It was a serious development, which threatened the entire Shyok Valley. Six platoons of Gilgit Scouts were rushed to the front to strengthen Pakistani defences at Siari. After capturing the village of Turtok on 14 December, the Indians arrived at Thang on 17 December, when the ceasefire ended all fighting in this sector.[102]

Jammu & Kashmir: The primary task of 12 Division was defence of the Ceasefire Line in Jammu & Kashmir. In November 1971, it was given the limited offensive role of capturing Poonch. Although it failed to achieve its objective, the operation diverted enemy's attention and tied down large number of his forces. Other than the Poonch operation, no major battle was fought by 12 Division.[103]



16. Lipa 1971.

However, numerous attacks for local gains were launched by both sides and sporadic fighting continued in Kashmir well after the declaration of ceasefire on 17 December. Several contingents of the Frontier Corps served in Kashmir during the war. In the Tithwal Sector, one wing of Dir Scouts under Major Shahid Fakhar was placed under 11 AK. The Scouts were deployed on a number of posts including Ziarat, where they repulsed an Indian attack. Their losses in the war were three men killed.[104] The South Waziristan Scouts sent a wing under Major Fazal Ahmad to Poonch Sector. The contingent took part in the Poonch operation and lost 4 men killed. It was followed by another wing under Major Hussain Shah to Pir Kanthi in Bagh Sector.[105]

Lipa Valley is located in a salient of Pakistani territory between Tithwal and Uri. The area was being defended by 16 AK of 1 AK Brigade and a wing of Tochi Scouts under Captain Muhammad Aslam Chaudhry with elements of Mujahids and Rangers. On 1 December, 16 AK was pulled out for the Poonch

operation. Its place was taken by a Company of 2 FF (Guides).[106] The enemy was quick to exploit the thinning of Pakistani defences in Lipa Valley. On the night of 3 December, the Indian 104 Brigade attacked Tochi Scouts positions on Kontal Ridge south of Tithwal, which the Indians call Ghasla Top and Ring Contour. The posts were manned by three platoons of Tochi Scouts under Captain Aslam Chaudhry.[107] A patrol of Tochi Scouts from Ghasla Top under Havildar Painda Khan was caught up in the enemy attack. Two sepoys were killed, while a third was wounded. Havildar Painda Khan ordered Naik Amin Khan to evacuate the wounded, while he stayed behind to provide cover. However, in the ensuing firefight, both he and Amin Khan were killed. Only three men made it back to the post. Havildar Painda Khan was awarded Tamgha-i-Jurat for his valour and sacrifice.[108] Meanwhile on Kontal Ridge, the Scouts put up a fierce fight that lasted all night. The enemy only managed to capture the feature after the Scouts ran out of ammunition. Twenty Scouts including Captain Aslam Chaudhry were killed, while 15 were captured. Indian losses were 8 killed and 11 wounded.[109]

Next day, 9 Sikh attacking from Tutmari Gali captured the Kaiyan bowl, which was lightly held by Tochi Scouts. However, some Scouts continued to cling on to a small pocket of territory near Kaiyan village.[110] On 8 December, 2 FF repulsed an attack on Shisha Ladi by 8 Rajputana Rifles, which suffered more than a hundred casualties. But on 14 December, the enemy captured four posts on the Wanjal feature held by a mixed force including a platoon of Tochi Scouts. Next day, 9 Sikh captured the dominating heights around Kaiyan in the face of fierce resistance by Tochi Scouts.[111] A patrol of eight Scouts led by Naik Abdul Khan and Lance Naik Hayat Gul attacked an enemy observation post, which was directing artillery fire. After a firefight that lasted for three hours, all of them were killed. Abdul Khan and Hayat Gul were awarded Tamgha-i-Jurat for their valour.[112]

The platoon of Tochi Scouts near Kaiyan continued to hold on to its isolated position throughout the winter. In the first week of May 1972, the Indians tried to evict them by force. The enemy attack was repulsed by Tochi Scouts. Siezing the opportunity provided by the Indian violation of ceasefire, Pakistan hit back with 9 AK and Tochi Scouts and threw out 9 Sikh from the Kaiyan bowl.[113] The Lipa Front remained unsettled throughout the year and Tochi Scouts suffered several more casualties. They finally returned home in January 1973, after 16 months of active service during which they lost more than 30 men.[114] Their conduct in war was once again outstanding.

Towards the south of 12 Division, defence of the Ceasefire Line was the responsibility of 23 Division under Major General Eftikhar Khan Janjua, HJ, SPk, SQA. The divisional front was held by 7 AK Brigade in Mirpur Sector, 4 AK Brigade in Bhimber Sector and 20 Brigade in Chhamb Sector. Two wings of Zhob Militia and a company of 1st Mahsud Scouts were deployed in a defensive role in Mirpur and Bhimber Sectors. The salient of enemy territory extending west of River Munawwarwali Tawi posed a threat to Pakistan. On 30 November 1971, General Eftikhar was ordered to eliminate the salient and capture Chhamb. For this task, he was given additional resources of two infantry and one armoured brigades. Facing him was the Indian 10 Division. The Indians were planning an offensive of their own, when they were pre-empted by the Pakistanis.[115]

23 Division opened its offensive on 3 December. The 4 AK Brigade was ordered to capture Dewa, Laleali and the feature of Mandhar, which dominates Laleali from the north (map 13). The first to go in were a company each of 2 AK and 1st Mahsud Scouts against Mandhar. Unknown to them, it was a well-prepared position held in strength by an Indian company armed with machine guns and mortars. The attackers were spotted in the bright moonlight and subjected to murderous fire. Captain Mujeeb Faqir

Ullah Khan leading the Scouts was killed early in the assault. "Dazed but plucky Scouts tried to storm the hill but were sent reeling back with automatic fire of several well placed machine guns and mortars. Untrained and unaccustomed to such punishment the attack broke and the Scouts sullenly made their way back".[116] Nineteen gallant Scouts were killed in the attack including their Company Commander. Captain Mujeeb and Lance Naik Wali Zar Mahsud were awarded posthumous Sitara-i-Jurat, while Sepoy Abdul Karim Brohi received Tamgha-i-Jurat.[117]

Meanwhile, on the main battlefront, 23 Division eliminated the enemy salient east of Munawwar Tawi and captured Chhamb on 7 December. However, along the international border, the fighting had reached a stalemate. International diplomatic efforts were underway to end the fighting and on 17 December, Pakistan accepted the Indian offer of ceasefire. It was the darkest hour in our history. The war had again exposed Pakistan's crisis in leadership, which allowed the enemy to exploit our internal divisions and dismember the country. In the west too, we failed to take decisive action and our strike formations never even left their assembly areas. In July 1972, the two countries signed an agreement to end the state of war and in October 1973, Pakistani Prisoners of War including those of the Frontier Corps started returning home. These men had fought valiantly and suffered greatly. From the insurgency and war to the long ordeal of captivity, they had upheld the honour of Frontier Corps for which they could be justifiably proud.

Bifurcation of the Frontier Corps

The period after the war was a time of introspection and renewal. It saw major changes in the country and its armed forces including the Frontier Corps. In 1972, Brigadier Naseerullah Khan Babar, SJ & Bar, was appointed IGFC. He was a bold and dynamic officer, who had already shown his initiative and valour in war. He

introduced major changes in the outlook of the Frontier Corps. Relations with Afghanistan were tense and the Afghan Government was actively engaged in subversive activities in Pakistan. Brigadier Babar believed that Pakistan should deal with the problem firmly and proactively. He asserted that since the entire area up to the Durand Line was Pakistani territory, the Frontier Corps should *gasht* right up to it. In what was dubbed as the 'Forward Thrust', he gained the Government's approval for reoccupation of old Frontier Corps posts, which had been handed over to the Khassadars in 1947. To meet the demands of increased responsibilities, sanction was received for the raising of two new corps of Scouts.[118]

The first of these were the North Waziristan Scouts, who were raised at Landi Kotal by Major Akbar Gul Afridi on 1 September 1972. Lieutenant Colonel Aman Ullah Khan Niazi was posted as the first Commandant. The Corps was raised specifically to reoccupy Razmak. It moved to Miranshah and Mir Ali, where it received a wing from Tochi Scouts. In August 1973, its name was changed to Shawal Rifles, probably to avoid any confusion with North Waziristan Militia, the forerunner of Tochi Scouts. Next month, it occupied Razmak in the face of some opposition from the tribesmen, who were unhappy with the move. In the meantime, Tochi Scouts had occupied Datta Khel in April 1973. This was followed by Ghulam Hasan Khan, a small village near Miranshah in 1974.[119] Meanwhile, the South Waziristan Scouts reoccupied Ladha, Tiarza and Sararogha in August 1973, without any incidence.[120] In Bajaur, the Bajaur Scouts occupied Nawagai on the Afghan border in November 1973.[121]

Mohmand Agency was created in August 1951, to foster better relations with the tribesmen, who were a constant source of anxiety for the political authorities. In 1973, they objected to the construction of a road to Nahakki Pass and gathered a *lashkar* to oppose it. A contingent of Khyber Rifles, which had traditionally

looked after the security of Mohmand Agency, was despatched to provide protection for the project. The incidence led to the raising of a separate corps of Scouts for Mohmand Agency. The Mohmand Rifles were raised at Yousaf Khel on 23 November 1973, by Lieutenant Colonel Yar Gul. In 1980, their Headquarters shifted to Ghalanai.[122]

In April 1973, the National Assembly of Pakistan approved a new constitution, which instituted some administrative changes on the Frontier. The Tribal Areas were designated as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the tribesmen were given representation in the National Assembly and Senate for the first time. However, these representatives were tribal Maliks and adult franchise was not extended to the tribesmen. In all other respects, the administrative structure of Tribal Areas remained as before. Pakistani laws still did not apply to FATA, which continued to be governed by the Frontier Crimes Regulation through Political Agents. The Federal Government exercised direct control through the President of Pakistan and his agent, the Governor of NWFP. At the same time, the former Princely States were formed into Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), with a status similar to FATA. A number of Frontier Regions were created with a hybrid system of governance under Deputy Commissioners of the adjoining districts. In December 1973, two new tribal agencies of Bajaur and Orakzai were also created.[123]

In the meantime, trouble was again brewing in Balochistan, which broke out in a full-blown insurgency in 1973. For better operational control of the vast area of responsibility of the Frontier Corps, it was decided to bifurcate it into Frontier Corps (NWFP) and Frontier Corps (Baluchistan), with its Headquarters at Quetta. As a result, Zhob and Chagai Militia, 2nd Mahsud, Pishin, Kalat and Sibi Scouts were transferred to the southern corps in June 1974. The 2nd Mahsud Scouts were redesignated as Maiwand Rifles and a new corps called Mekran Scouts was raised. A

Training Centre was also established at Loralai.[124] The bifurcation of Frontier Corps although necessary for operational and administrative reasons, also brought to an end more than half a century of fraternal association. The problems of Balochistan had always been different from those of the Northwest Frontier but the units of the two corps had been closely linked by bonds of camaraderie and shared history, which sadly were severed.

Balochistan had been in an unsettled state since Independence. Dismissal of the provincial government in 1972, led to a more serious outbreak. The insurgency, which was supported by Afghanistan, smouldered on for several years before it was stamped out. The rebel hit and run tactics of ambush, sniping and sabotage caused widespread disruption, leading to the intervention of the Army. Dir Scouts, a single-wing corps, were moved directly from Azad Kashmir to Sibi to participate in anti-insurgency operations in February 1973. The lightly armed and swift moving Scouts gave an excellent account of themselves, earning much appreciation for their good work. They lost eight men killed during the operations. The Corps returned home in January 1975, after more than three years of active service.[125]

In Northern Areas, units of the Frontier Corps were under an unusual arrangement, in which the Northern and Karakoram Scouts were under the administrative control of DIGFC (North) but under the operational control of the Army. To complicate matters further, the Gilgit Scouts were under the operational control of political authorities during peacetime, coming under the Army during war. To streamline the unwieldy chain of command, HQ Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA) was created in 1971. Operational control of Baltistan was given to 62 Brigade at Skardu, while 80 Brigade assumed responsibility for Astore Sector under DIGFC (North). However, this arrangement was also unsatisfactory both administratively and operationally. During the 1965 and 1971 Wars, the lightly armed Frontier Corps had been

left to fight the Indian Army on its own for which it was ill-prepared. The result had been loss of territory despite heroic resistance by the Scouts. On the request of Frontier Corps, the Army assumed full responsibility for the defence of Northern Areas in 1975. The Corps of Gilgit, Northern and Karakoram Scouts were reconstituted into 10 battalions of Northern Light Infantry (NLI), ending more than half a century of Frontier Corps' association with Gilgit and Baltistan. At the same time, HQ DIGFC (North) was designated as NLI Centre & Record and the DIG was appointed as the Centre Commandant.[126]

The absence of Frontier Corps in the north however, was soon felt, when tribesmen in Kohistan disrupted work on the Karakoram Highway in April 1977. Army had to be called in to control the situation. The Government decided to withdraw Frontier Constabulary, which had been assigned to protect Chinese construction workers, and replace it with a new corps of Scouts. Consequently, the Kohistan Scouts were raised at Fort Milward on 31 December 1977, under the administrative arrangements of 1st Mahsud Scouts. In June 1978, they proceeded to Pattan. Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Haq Mirza was appointed as their first Commandant. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Kohistan Scouts were moved to Spinwam in North Waziristan. The Corps was given the tasks of opening up Kaitu Valley and protecting the Thall-Mir Ali Road, which it successfully carried out in cooperation with Tochi Scouts. On 1 July 1981, the Kohistan Scouts were disbanded.[127]

In the years following the bifurcation, the Frontier Corps (NWFP) was engaged in a number of internal security operations. In 1975, a tribal revolt erupted in South Waziristan Agency and Dir Scouts were despatched to Wana to assist South Waziristan Scouts. They suffered several casualties during the operation. Sepoys Yaqub Khan and Fazal-e-Rahim were awarded posthumous Tamgha-i-Basalat for devotion to duty.[128] The same

year, 1st Mahsud Scouts conducted an operation against the Afridis, who were opposing the construction of a road from Fort Salop to Shin Kamar.[129] In 1976, an armed rebellion broke out in Dir, which required the intervention of the Army. A wing each of 1st Mahsud Scouts, Dir Scouts and Shawal Rifles took part in the operation. Two men of Shawal Rifles were killed in the line of duty. Their Wing Commander Major Akhtar Khan was awarded Tamgha-i-Basalat.[130]

The Afghan War

In April 1978, Soviet-backed Afghan communists seized power in Kabul. However, factional infighting within the regime led to an invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union next year. This triggered an insurgency, which was supported by Pakistan and other countries. The fighting led to an influx of several million Afghan refugees into Pakistan, putting a severe strain on the social and economic fabric of FATA and NWFP. Pakistani support of Afghan Mujahideen raised the ire of Soviet Union, which retaliated with border violations and a campaign of bombings and sabotage. At the same time, a large number of weapons meant for the Mujahideen ended up in the hands of the tribesmen, while the economic disruption led to widespread cultivation of opium on both sides of the frontier. Due to the porous nature of Durand Line and unhindered movement of refugees and Mujahideen, Pakistan became a conduit for drug trafficking.[131] All these factors created multiple new threats for Pakistan and placed Frontier Corps on the frontline of these challenges.

In a continuation of the policy of Forward Thrust, the Frontier Corps was ordered to secure Pakistan's frontier with Afghanistan. In April 1979, Tochi Scouts occupied Dandai and Sidgi areas to secure the approaches from Afghanistan, while Kohistan Scouts occupied Spinwam. Later that year, the two corps also secured Kaitu Valley.[132] In Bajaur Agency, the Bajaur Scouts

secured Ghakhai Pass in September, and established posts on nearby peaks to prevent infiltration. Major Fazal-ur-Rahman Awan and Lance Naik Sardar Akbar were killed on one of these posts by rocket fire from an Afghan gunship in 1980. Both were awarded Sitara-i-Basalat for their sacrifice.[133] Meanwhile, the Mohmand Rifles blocked another possible route of ingress by occupying Nawa Pass on 22 December 1979.[134] In June 1983, some Afghans occupied Pakistani territory in Shahi area of Dir and killed several civilians. A wing of Dir Scouts was moved to evict the invaders and establish a permanent post there to monitor the frontier.[135]

The presence of Afghan refugees led to friction with the local tribesmen, which at times erupted in violence and had to be dealt with by the Frontier Corps. On 20 December 1981, the Kurram Militia was called up to resolve an armed conflict between Turis and Afghans in Landiwan area of Kurram.[136] Meanwhile in North Waziristan, two officers and the Subedar Major of Tochi Scouts were abducted by some Wazir outlaws on 23 September 1982. Although the officers were released, the outlaws retained a rifle and some ammunition. They then took refuge in the village of Karkanwam. Next day, a *gasht* of Tochi Scouts, which had gone to flush out the outlaws, was ambushed and the Political Agent was killed. On 4 October, a punitive force, which included companies of Tochi, Mahsud and Thall Scouts, and Khyber and Shawal Rifles, demolished the village as punishment.[137] Later, Karkanwam was permanently occupied by Tochi Scouts.[138] On 29 April 1987, Tochi Scouts carried out a daring operation, when they rescued the pilot of a Pakistani F-16 fighter, which had crashed in Afghanistan near Sidgi.[139]

It was during this period that the role of Frontier Corps Training Centre was re-evaluated. After much deliberation and experimentation, the responsibility of training recruits was handed back to the units and the Training Centre was reorganized as Frontier Corps Battle School (NWFP) on 1 November 1982. Its

new mission was to run advance professional courses for JCOs, NCOs and Other Ranks of the Frontier Corps and Frontier Constabulary. The Frontier Corps School of Signals and the School of Education at Shagai Fort in the Khyber were also shifted to the Battle School at the same time.[140] Due to the increase in the strength of the Frontier Corps, a need was felt for a separate unit to look after the records, postings, promotions and pensions of FC personnel. Consequently, the Frontier Corps Record Wing was established at Warsak in 1983.[141]

Internal Security Operations

A major fallout of the Afghan War was turning Pakistan into a major hub of narcotics production and trafficking. The instability in war-torn Afghanistan provided the opportunity to criminal elements to smuggle opium from across the border and establish heroin laboratories in FATA. Over the next decade, the Frontier Corps conducted a number of operations against drug traffickers and other lawless elements. In February 1985, the Mohmand Rifles were ordered to flush out some proclaimed offenders in the village of Darwazgai in Mohmand Agency. The operation escalated into a firefight in which five Scouts were killed.[142] Meanwhile in Khyber Agency, the Khyber Rifles conducted a major anti-narcotics operation in which forty heroin-producing laboratories were destroyed. This was followed by another operation in August, when two drug traffickers were killed and 39 apprehended. Lieutenant Colonel Mahboob Ali Shah, Commandant Khyber Rifles, was awarded Tamgha-i-Basalat for successful conduct of the operation.[143] In December, an operation was conducted against Kuki Khel Afridis of Jamrud, who were harbouring criminal elements and challenging the writ of the Government. A combined force of South Waziristan, Tochi, Dir and Bajaur Scouts, Kurram Militia, and Shawal and Mohmand Rifles participated in the operation.[144]

Beginning in 1987, a series of Clean-Up operations were conducted by the Frontier Corps to rid the Tribal Areas of lawless elements. These included the Kurram Agency, where Kurram Militia assisted by Tochi, South Waziristan and Thall Scouts cleared the Agency of criminal elements,[145] and Mohmand Agency, where Mohmand Rifles cleared Shaheed Banda and Michni during May and June.[146] Another Operation Clean-Up against gun-runners was conducted in Dara Adam Khel in 1989, by Khyber and Mohmand Rifles, Kurram Militia, Tochi, Chitral, Mahsud and Dir Scouts.[147] Similar operations to re-establish the writ of the Government were conducted in Bajaur in 1990,[148] and in Mohmand in 1991. In Mohmand Agency, a heavily armed force of rebel tribesmen occupied several commanding hills overlooking major roads and prepared to give battle. A large force of Frontier Corps from Khyber and Mohmand Rifles, Kurram Militia, Chitral, Mahsud, Thall, Bajaur and Dir Scouts supported by armoured cars and artillery was assembled for the operation in August. The area was cleared after seven days of heavy fighting in which the Scouts had to assault each hill in the face of intense fire. Several heroin laboratories were also destroyed. Four Scouts were killed and 24 wounded in the operation.[149]

During the 1989 Dara Adam Khel operation, IGFC Major General Ghazi Ud Din Rana ordered the raising of an armoured car squadron for the Frontier Corps. Consequently, the Independent Armoured Car Squadron was raised at Peshawar on 1 October 1990. Major Hamid Mahmood was appointed the first Officer Commanding.[150] Meanwhile, fighting had flared up in Siachen area following the Indian incursion in 1983. In June 1990, Dir Scouts sent their mortar battery to Siari in Piun Sector. It was actively engaged against the Indians until October 1991, when it returned home.[151] The same year, a wing of Chitral Scouts was also despatched to FCNA. The Chitral Scouts have a long history of service in FCNA from 1991 to 2007, mostly in Piun Sector.[152]

In February 1993, Zakha Khel Afridis, who were opposed to the construction of a road to Tirah Valley, raised a *lashkar* of about a hundred men and occupied Shin Kamar Pass. The Mahsud Scouts had to launch three operations over the next three months to evict the heavily armed tribesmen from the Pass.[153] In November 1994, an uprising took place in Malakand Division by Tanzeem-e-Nifaz-e-Shariah-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) led by Sufi Muhammad, who was demanding the enforcement of *Shariah*. Armed militants challenged the State's writ by setting up roadblocks, attacking public buildings and kidnapping Government officials. Soon, the entire region was in the grip of violence and lawlessness, which also affected the adjoining areas of Bajaur, Kohistan and Northern Areas. Eight wings of Frontier Corps from Khyber and Mohmand Rifles, Kurram Militia, Chitral, Mahsud, Thall and Bajaur Scouts were assembled at Chakdara to restore the writ of the Government. Between 5 and 11 November, the Scouts methodically cleared Swat in the face of stiff resistance by the heavily armed militants. This was followed by a similar operation in Bajaur.[154]

During the 1990s, the Frontier Corps remained engaged in anti-narcotics operations in different areas of FATA. In January 1995, Tochi and Mahsud Scouts destroyed 21 heroin laboratories at Alam Gudar in Khyber Agency. They also seized a huge amount of drugs and arrested 33 drug trafickers. Next month, 143 acres of poppy crop was destroyed in Mohmand Agency by a contingent of Frontier Corps provided by Khyber and Mohmand Rifles, Kurram Militia and Tochi Scouts. In March, another operation was launched in the remote and inaccessible Chura Valley of Khyber Agency. Fifteen heroin laboratories were destroyed and a large amount of illicit drugs seized. A wing each of Khyber Rifles, Kurram Militia, Tochi and Mahsud Scouts took part in the operation.[155]

Besides anti-narcotics measures, the Frontier Corps was also engaged in a number of operations against lawless elements

and sectarian outfits. These included the Bara Operation of August 1995, against a religious organization in Khyber Agency, which was running a parallel government. Elements of Kurram Militia, Shawal and Mohmand Rifles and Thall Scouts participated in the operation in which five Scouts were killed. This was followed by a second operation in August 1996, by Mahsud Scouts against criminals in the same area. Next month, sectarian violence broke out in Parachinar, which required the mobilization of a large force derived from Kurram Militia, Tochi, Mahsud and Thall Scouts, and Shawal and Mohmand Rifles.[156] The increased commitments of Frontier Corps led to the raising of a new corps of Scouts as Frontier Corps Reserve. The Swat Scouts (Tirah Militia) were raised at Timergara by Colonel Asad Munir on 1 March 1996. Their Headquarters moved to Warsak in 1998.[157]

The Kargil Conflict 1999

In 1999, a limited conflict took place in the Kargil, Dras and Batalik Sectors of Northern Areas, when elements of Northern Light Infantry occupied some heights vacated by the Indians during the previous winter. Fighting broke out in May 1999, when the Indians discovered Pakistani presence in the area. It ended in July after foreign diplomatic mediation, although artillery exchanges continued until 2002, when a general ceasefire came into effect. In May 1999, two wings of Frontier Corps (NWFP) from Chitral and Bajaur Scouts were despatched to the conflict area, where they were deployed in a defensive role under 62 Brigade.[158] They were joined by a wing of South Waziristan Scouts in Piun Sector,[159] while the medium artillery battery of Thall Scouts was deployed at Gultari.[160]

2 Wing Chitral Scouts under Major Muhammad Ali Hyderi arrived at Skardu on 28 May. It then proceeded to Hamzigond, from where one company moved to Ganokh and two to Imtiaz Post. The Scouts were subjected to heavy artillery shelling and

airstrikes. Major Hyderi and Captain Zulfiqar Ali were killed in an airstrike on 16 June. Besides manning forward positions, the Scouts were also employed as porters, conveying supplies to the forward posts. The Frontier Corps contingent remained in the operational area until 2002. It suffered losses of 34 men killed during the conflict. Major Muhammad Ali Hyderi and Captain Zulfiqar Ali were awarded Tamgha-i-Basalat. Meanwhile, 1 Wing Chitral Scouts moved to Piun in June, where it occupied the area of Kusting Nullah. This was the first time that this sector was occupied by Pakistan and all the posts, bases and positions were established by Chitral Scouts. A wing of Chitral Scouts was permanently posted in this sector for the next eight years.[161]

United Nations Peacekeeping Missions

Pakistan has been playing a leading role in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations since 1992. Initially, only Army units were selected for these missions. However, since 1999, the Frontier Corps has actively participated in 49 UN missions. These include United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 1999-2008, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 2004-17, United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) 2006-12, United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) 2006-15, and United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) 2009-21. A total of 1948 officers and men from different units of the Frontier Corps have served on these missions.[162] The Scouts have acted as worthy ambassadors of Pakistan and earned appreciation and praise for their dedication, professionalism and exemplary conduct.

7

The Breaking of the Storm

The war in Afghanistan had disastrous consequences for Pakistan, which was inundated with refugees, guns and narcotics. The Soviet withdrawal in 1989 did not ease the pressure, as it was followed by a long civil war. In 1996, the Taliban faction emerged victorious. The various foreign jihadis, who had fought on the side of the Mujahideen, found a safe haven under the new regime. These included Arabs, Uzbeks, Uighurs, Chechens and Pakistanis. The predominant group among them was Al Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden, who exercised considerable influence over the Taliban leadership. Al Qaeda advocated an extreme interpretation of Islam and unlike the Taliban, had a global agenda. After the defeat of Soviet Union, they turned their attention towards the West. Several terrorist attacks against Western interests culminated in the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. An enraged America demanded the extradition of Al Qaeda leadership. However, the Taliban refused to comply with the ultimatum and in October, an American-led coalition of Western countries invaded Afghanistan, turning the entire region into a battlefield.[1]

In the wake of American invasion, many foreign fighters fled to the Tribal Areas of Pakistan. For years, they had freely moved across the Durand Line and had established relationships with the tribesmen. When Pakistan Army moved into the Tribal Areas to interdict them, they turned their guns on Pakistan. The tribesmen also resented the presence of the Army in FATA, which they considered a violation of the 1947 treaty. Many of them were also opposed to any alliance with the United States. Soon, Pakistan found itself embroiled in an insurgency in the Tribal Areas. The Government had neglected FATA, which was underdeveloped with low literacy and high unemployment rates. Years of poor

governance, poverty and continued enforcement of the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulation had led to discontent among the tribesmen and made them vulnerable to exploitation by unscrupulous elements. In the absence of any meaningful economic opportunities, jihad became an attractive alternative.[2] It was a toxic mixture of these factors that produced the perfect storm, which engulfed Pakistan in 2002.

Pakistan Army's move into FATA was violently resisted. Within a short period, militancy spread across FATA and then into the settled areas. The opposition was led by an unholy alliance of criminals and religious extremists, whose ranks were bolstered by foreign jihadis. Numerous terrorist groups sprang up in different parts of FATA and NWFP, seizing control of large parts of territory. Although working on separate agendas, by 2007, they had coalesced under the loose umbrella of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).[3] The ruthlessness of these groups, who espouse an extreme Islamic ideology alien to local religious mores, upended a thousand years of tribal traditions. Those who opposed them, including tribal elders, were mercilessly eliminated. The rebellion in Tribal Areas was followed by a bloody campaign of terror against the Pakistani state, which resulted in tens of thousands of casualties. The foreign jihadis introduced new tactics of terror never seen before in Pakistan. These included suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and indiscriminate targeting of civilians, producing mayhem on an unprecedented scale.[4]

Pakistan's early military efforts were handicapped by a lack of training in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, shortage of equipment, lack of mobility and unfamiliarity of the Army with the area. The Frontier Corps worked in close cooperation with the military during these operations, which were mostly intelligence based cordon and search operations, destruction of terrorist hideouts and denial of space to the miscreants. The Army or FC would throw a cordon around a

location suspected of harbouring terrorists, while the other would move in to apprehend them. These were dangerous missions, as the miscreants often hid among civilians, and resulted in heavy casualties due to IEDs, ambushes, snipers and attacks on isolated posts. Other operations were of more conventional nature, where terrorist hideouts were identified and neutralized, sometimes with air support.[5] The Scouts were also vulnerable when visiting their villages, where they became easy targets for terrorists, while others faced pressure from their kinfolk for fighting on the Government's side. It took Pakistan more than a decade to re-establish its writ in FATA at great human and financial cost. It was only after instituting major organizational and training reforms, re-equipment of forces and re-thinking of its counterinsurgency strategy that it was able to turn the tide of the war. The Frontier Corps, which was on the frontline of these operations, faced its greatest challenge since its birth.

Restructuring of the Frontier Corps

The operations in FATA should logically have been led by the Frontier Corps, which is ideally suited for such tasks due to its familiarity with the area and its people. But the Frontier Corps was ill-prepared to take the field. Since 1947, there had been relative peace in the Tribal Areas. The duties of the Frontier Corps were limited to border management and internal security of FATA, which were not unduly taxing. As a result, there was an inevitable deterioration in its efficiency and standards, while its training and equipment were neglected. The Scouts still went into action dressed in *shalwar kameez* and *chaplis*. They had no personal protection gear, their weapons were antiquated, the communication equipment was obsolete, there was a deficiency of transport and their forts and posts were in a dilapidated state. They did not attract the best officers, were poorly paid and had no training in counterterrorism or counterinsurgency operations.[6]

These deficiencies soon became apparent, when they faced an enemy, who was heavily armed and adept at guerilla tactics, which he had honed during years of fighting in Afghanistan. Assassination of tribal elders by the terrorists and relegation of Political Agents to the side-lines after assumption of operational control by the Army, disrupted the usual channels through which the Frontier Corps operated.[7] At the same time, these operations were opposed both by the tribesmen as well as the Pakistani public, who saw it as America's war. Unsurprisingly, early military operations had disappointing results. Under political pressure, the Government negotiated a number of peace agreements in the hope of ending violence. But the terrorists saw it as weakness of the State. Emboldened by their perceived success, they repeatedly violated peace agreements and unleashed a vicious nation-wide campaign of terror, which eventually turned public opinion in favour of military action.[8]

Meanwhile, wide-ranging reforms were instituted in the Frontier Corps, which are still ongoing. The immediate focus was on training and equipment. In April 2005, the Frontier Corps Battle School was converted into Scouts Training Academy (STA) to impart standardized basic and specialist training. In August, a company of Special Operations Group (SOG) was formed to conduct operations on the pattern of Special Service Group (SSG) of Pakistan Army. Since then, several more companies have been raised. At the same time, the Frontier Corps was re-equipped with modern weapons and equipment. They are now dressed in combat uniform similar to the Army with full protection gear including new helmets and body armour. Their communication equipment was upgraded and they were issued with essential items like Night Vision Devices. All existing Frontier Corps posts and forts were renovated and fortified; while a number of new ones were established.[9] The ration allowance and health facilities were also improved to boost their fitness and morale.

Other organizational changes included the formation of four Sector Headquarters in 2007, for better operational control. Designated as North, Centre, Southwest and South, each Sector was placed under the command of a Brigadier. The number of wings in each corps was increased to six, while two new corps of Scouts were raised. Colonel Bashir Ahmad raised Jandola Scouts at Manzai on 10 July 2007. They were redesignated as Khushal Khattak Scouts in 2008, Khattak Scouts in 2010, and Gomal Scouts in 2020. The Orakzai Scouts were raised at Thall by Colonel Arshad Mahmood on 1 August 2007. At the same time, two armoured squadrons were raised by Majors Furqan Shabbir and Zahid, which became the Independent Scouts Cavalry Regiment in 2010, based at Shakas near Peshawar. The regiment is equipped with T-69, T-59 & T-55 Main Battle Tanks.[10]

The appointment of Major General Tariq Khan as IGFC in 2008, gave further impetus to the reforms. The standard of officers was improved and their strength increased, while the command of wings was upgraded to that of Lieutenant Colonel. Under the new IGFC, the Frontier Corps underwent a complete re-orientation in its posture. Instead of being *qila-band,* it became more proactive by conducting night patrols and ambushes. The new measures had a dramatic effect on its morale and performance allowing it to emerge as a well-honed modern paramilitary force.[11]

A bold new step was the induction of Lady Scouts in the Frontier Corps. They were initially inducted for conducting physical search of females during search operations. They are also employed at border crossings and for security duties at official functions. Due to the dangerous nature of their job, they are imparted basic military training in weapons, field craft and drill at the STA. At the same time, enrolment of female nurses was also started. Induction of women in the Frontier Corps is a positive step and these trailblazers are proving to be excellent role models for the women of the traditionally conservative tribal society.[12]

17. NWFP and FATA.

Operation Al Mizan

Following the American invasion of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda operatives and other foreign fighters fled to the Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Those in Kurram were immediately handed over to the authorities by the local tribesmen. However, a large number found refuge in Bajaur, Mohmand and South Waziristan.[13] In early 2002, Pakistan Army launched Operation Al Mizan to clear the Tribal Areas of terrorist groups especially the foreign fighters, who posed a direct threat to Pakistan.[14] In South Waziristan, where most of them were located, there was an immediate reaction by Al Qaeda and their local supporters. In June, Al Qaeda attacked the military camp at Azam Warsak causing a number of casualties. They also carried out several terrorist acts within Pakistan, including two attempts on the life of President General Pervez Musharraf. Initially, the fighting was confined to the Ahmedzai Wazir area around Wana and Shakai Valley. But as the terrorists came under increasing military pressure, they fled into Mahsud areas, which became the centre of terrorist activity in 2004. By 2006, the fighting had also spilled into North Waziristan.[15]

Numerous militant factions cropped up all over FATA. In South Waziristan, the main opposition was led by an Ahmedzai Wazir called Nek Muhammad. When he was killed in a drone strike in 2004, his mantle was taken over by Maulvi Nazir Ahmed, who was opposed to foreign jihadis. At the same time, Baitullah Mahsud, who was closely allied with Al Qaeda and other foreign terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), emerged as the dominant terrorist leader in South Waziristan. Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a Tori Khel Wazir, was the leading militant leader in North Waziristan.[16] It was against this backdrop that Pakistan Army conducted Operation Al Mizan with close support from Pakistan Air Force (PAF). The Frontier Corps mostly played a supporting role.[17]



18. North & South Waziristan Agencies.

In the initial phase of Operation Al Mizan, the Frontier Corps occupied entry points on the Pak-Afghan border to prevent the terrorists from seeking refuge in the Tribal Areas. In October 2001, there were clashes between Bajaur Scouts and terrorists, when they were stopped from entering Bajaur through Nawa Pass.[18] In the meantime, Tochi Scouts established a number of posts in North Waziristan,[19] while a wing each of Khyber Rifles and Swat Scouts entered the remote Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency in December 2001, to secure the frontier.[20] In the following years, there was nonstop violence in FATA, as the Army and Frontier Corps conducted operations to flush out the terrorists, who responded by laying ambushes and IEDs.

Operation Kazha Panga: On 25 June 2002, intelligence was received about the presence of some 35 Al Qaeda terrorists in a compound near Kazha Panga, south of Azam Warsak in South Waziristan Agency. The South Waziristan Scouts and 23 Baloch were ordered to conduct a cordon & search operation to apprehend the terrorists. The troops faced fierce resistance and reinforcements had to be despatched. By early next day, the compound was cleared but most of the terrorists had managed to escape. Only two of them were killed. The South Waziristan Scouts lost Captain Naeem Tufail and four ORs killed.[21]

Operation Al Mizan III: In June 2003, the Army and Frontier Corps conducted a joint operation in Khawaizai and Baizai Tehsils of Mohmand Agency, where the militants were challenging the writ of the Government. An infantry brigade and two wings each of Mohmand Rifles and Swat Scouts participated in the operation, which lasted from 18 to 26 June. The entire area up to the Afghan border was cleared and the frontier was secured by construction of 32 new border outposts. However, after the withdrawal of Army troops in 2004, most of these posts had to be abandoned due to a shortage of manpower, allowing the miscreants to infiltrate back into the area.[22]

Operation Kalosha: On 8 January 2004, a joint force of 23 Baloch and two companies of South Waziristan Scouts were despatched to Kalosha, 15 km southwest of Wana, to apprehend a group of 40-60 Uzbek terrorists of IMU, who were reported to be present in the area along with their leader Tahir Yuldashev. No terrorists were found but the Army convoy was ambushed at Sholam on its way back. On 13 March, new information was received about the presence of foreign terrorists in the residential compounds of Nek Muhammad and his associates in Kalosha. An operation was planned to apprehend them. Two wings of South Waziristan Scouts and one wing of Thall Scouts were earmarked for the task, while one wing of Dir Scouts was held in reserve. The Field Battery and Mortar Platoon of South Waziristan Scouts along with four Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) were also part of the force. The Scouts were distributed into road protection, roadblock, and inner and outer cordon parties. The whole force was under the command of Colonel Khalid Usman, Commandant South Waziristan Scouts.[23]

Early on 16 March, the Scouts surrounded the houses of Nek Muhammad, Noor Islam and Haji Muhammad Sharif in Kalosha. The militants offered fierce resistance in which they were joined by the local tribesmen. At noon, the Scouts were ordered to disengage. While withdrawing, they came under heavy mortar and rocket fire from a nearby hill and suffered a number of casualties besides damage to vehicles. The Commandant requested Army's assistance and 25 FF was despatched but was unable to rendezvous after coming under heavy fire. The Scouts then dispersed and returned to Wana in small parties. Their casualties were 16 killed, 22 wounded and 12 taken prisoner. The field guns along with a number of other weapons and several vehicles were abandoned. Around 30-35 terrorists were also killed. The failure of the operation was due to faulty intelligence and poor coordination. The terrorist compounds were connected by tunnels, which made the

cordon ineffective, while failure to include nearby features in the cordon allowed the militants to bring withering fire from these dominating positions. At the same time, the strength of the terrorists and local reaction were not anticipated.[24]

On 18 March, another operation was launched in the same area by the Army with eleven infantry battalions and five wings of Mahsud, Dir, Thall and South Waziristan Scouts, supported by Cobra gunships. The operation concluded on 28 March, after a large number of terrorists were killed or captured.[25] Al Qaeda command and control centre in the area was disrupted, while their network of tunnels with its sophisticated electronic equipment was destroyed. The operation was followed by a peace agreement with Nek Muhammad known as the Shakai Agreement, which was perceived by him as a victory. He soon violated the agreement and Pakistan had to conduct another operation in Shakai Valley in June, in which more than 50 foreign and local militants were killed. On 18 June, Nek Muhammad was also killed in a drone strike.[26] With his death, all pretence of peace collapsed and violence resumed with increasing intensity. On 12 September, militants blocked the Razmak-Ladha road at Makin and a wing each of Dir and Swat Scouts were engaged in a clearing operation. The road was reopened on 17 September.[27]

Zara Mela, North Waziristan: While South Waziristan was the main focus of fighting, North Waziristan did not escape unscathed. The Agency remained a victim of sporadic violence, in which the Frontier Corps was continuously engaged. On the night of 2 October 2005, miscreants attacked Tochi Scouts post at Zara Mela near Mir Ali. The attack was repulsed and six militants were killed.[28] In March 2006, the area witnessed another attack, when the convoy of Colonel Qaisar Alam, Commandant Khyber Rifles, on his way to Mir Ali to take over command of the sector task force from Thall Scouts, was ambushed by 25-30 militants in a defile near Zara Mela. One of the vehicles overturned and Colonel

Qaisar stopped to assist his men. The ambush developed into an intense firefight lasting well into late evening. Colonel Raja Tariq Mahmood, Commandant Thall Scouts, who had rushed to the site with a platoon of Special Operations Group (SOG), was wounded while leading his men in action. Most of the militants were killed in the encounter and only a few managed to escape. The casualties of Scouts were 6 killed and 5 wounded, including Colonel Tariq, who was awarded Tamgha-i-Basalat, while Subedar Nazakat Khan received the Imtiazi Sanad.[29]

Operation Shin Warsak: Uzbek fighters had a presence in South Waziristan since the days of Afghan Jihad. In 2001, their ranks were bolstered by those fleeing Afghanistan. Considered the most vicious of the foreign jihadis, their depredations had made the lives of local tribesmen a nightmare. In the last week of March 2007, a Wazir *lashkar* led by Maulvi Nazir Ahmed attacked a group of 500 Uzbeks and their local allies in Shin Warsak, south of Wana. The *lashkar* was supported by two companies of South Waziristan Scouts, who were embedded with nine groups of tribesmen. The Uzbeks offered fierce resistance and the attack was called off when the tribesmen started deserting and the Scouts ran out of ammunition. Losses of South Waziristan Scouts in the action were two killed, three wounded and three missing. Even though the operation failed to evict the Uzbeks, it greatly raised the morale of the tribesmen,[30] who in a series of clashes over the course of the year, inflicted punishing losses on the Uzbeks.[31]

Although a large number of Al Qaeda and other foreign terrorists were killed or captured by Pakistan, Operation Al Mizan failed to achieve its objectives of eliminating terrorists from FATA. By 2007, Pakistan resembled a war zone. Following the Lal Masjid operation in Islamabad, which greatly inflamed tribal sentiments, the various terrorist factions came together under the umbrella of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. They not only controlled wide swathes of territory in Waziristan and other parts of FATA

but were also wreaking havoc with terror attacks all over Pakistan. The traditional tribal means of resolving conflict through *jirga* and tribal elders were virtually eliminated, replaced by a brutal regime of terror and intimidation. A powerful nexus had emerged between religious extremists and criminal elements leading to widespread lawlessness. It also led to turf warfare among them for control of the lucrative business of drug trafficking, kidnapping and extortion. Each faction was working on its own agenda, which further complicated the picture. While Baitullah Mahsud and his foreign allies were waging a vicious war on Pakistani State, Maulvi Nazir Ahmed's faction was inflicting heavy losses on Uzbek terrorists in South Waziristan. Meanwhile, Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan was avoiding conflict with the Army.[32] It was in this confused and chaotic situation that Pakistan made another attempt to clear South Waziristan.

Operation Zalzala: Operation Zalzala was launched by Pakistan Army in 2008, in response to rising incidences of terrorism and repeated violations of peace agreements by Baitullah Mahsud. In January, hundreds of heavily armed militants attacked the South Waziristan Scouts fort at Sararogha. The 42-man garrison put up a stiff fight but was eventually overrun. At the same time, TTP attacked FC forts at Sarwekai, Splitoi and Ladha, where 1 Wing Dir Scouts under Major Abdul Karim repulsed 18 attacks in an epic defence which lasted 44 days. On 24 January, 14 Division launched Operation Zalzala to dismantle the terror network of Baitullah Mahsud group. By May, large areas in Spinkai and Kotkai had been cleared and the group's activities were disrupted. However, many of these gains were lost, when the Army withdrew from the area.[33] It was around this time that responsibility for further operations was divided between the Army and the Frontier Corps. The Army was to take the lead in North and South Waziristan Agencies, while the Frontier Corps took over command in the rest of FATA and in Dir.[34]



19. Operation Sherdil – Bajaur & Mohmand

Operation Sherdil – The Turning Point

By 2008, Pakistani commanders had come to the conclusion that it was futile to negotiate with terrorists and that the menace of militancy had to be rooted out by force. The experience of recent years had allowed them to learn valuable lessons, while their forces had been re-equipped and re-trained for counter-insurgency operations. Dealing with the ruthless militants, who hid among civilians, required new thinking and new tactics. To minimize civilian casualties, Pakistan Army decided to evacuate the civilian population of the target area before launching an operation. It was an unprecedented measure, which caused severe dislocation and hardship to the people. But it was preferable to the alternative of heavy civilian casualties. This time, the military would not only clear the area of the terrorists but also hold it to ensure that the miscreants did not creep back in. Besides the military component, the new doctrine envisaged wide-ranging measures, which included countering the terrorist propaganda and involving the local population, who were encouraged to raise *lashkars* to assist the Government. The new doctrine was tested in Bajaur Agency, where a rejuvenated Frontier Corps took the lead under a new IGFC.[35]

The man chosen to command the Frontier Corps came with impeccable credentials. Major General Tariq Khan, a native of Tank, had already gained valuable experience of military operations in FATA, while commanding 14 Division in South Waziristan. He was a bold and dynamic commander, who believed in leading from the front. He spearheaded Pakistan's new counterinsurgency doctrine and was instrumental in turning the tide of the war against militancy and transforming the Frontier Corps. The IGFC understood the role of Frontier Corps and encouraged its officers and men to be aggressive in their approach and to take the battle to the enemy. In Bajaur, the Frontier Corps

rose to the occasion and at the end of the operation, emerged as a confident and effective force.[36]

The Battle of Bajaur: The topography of Bajaur made it a haven for militants. Its mountainous frontier has numerous passes, which allow access for infiltration from Afghanistan. Western Bajaur is traversed by four parallel valleys running northwest to southeast. They are inhabited by Tarkalani tribesmen, among whom the Mamunds have traditionally been prone to militancy.[37] Bajaur was a major staging area for the Afghan War and jihadis exercised considerable influence among some sections of the tribesmen. Faqir Muhammad, a leader of Tanzeem-e-Nifaz-e-Shariah-e-Muhammadi actively aided Al Qaeda operatives fleeing Afghanistan in finding refuge in the Agency. The American drone strike on a *madrassa* in Damadola in October 2006, further inflamed local sentiments and allowed Faqir Muhammad to gain more influence.[38] Besides Faqir Muhammad, there were several other militant groups operating there; the Qari Zia-ur-Rahman Group being the second most powerful. The total strength of TTP in Bajaur Agency was estimated to be 7000-9500, including foreigners. They were heavily armed and had prepared elaborate defences in anticipation of military action.[39]

The situation in Bajaur had been worsening since early 2008. The Bajaur Scouts had vacated some of their isolated posts, which were then destroyed by the militants and portrayed as a victory. On 6 August, a company of Bajaur Scouts under Major Ijaz Hussain was sent to establish a post at Loi Sum, an important communication hub situated between Khar and Nawagai. The company was attacked and surrounded by 1500 militants. Next day, elements of Khyber Rifles and 63 FF with a tank were despatched to extricate the Scouts but were ambushed at Tang Khata between Khar and Loi Sum. On 8 August, Colonel Nauman Saeed, the newly posted Commandant of Bajaur Scouts led a company of Khyber Rifles to relieve the besieged troops. He was

accompanied by a T-59 tank commanded by Major Furqan Shabbir. The force was again ambushed at Tang Khata. The ambush developed into a 10-hour long pitched battle, during which the Scouts came under intense fire.[40] Major Furqan's tank was hit by 43 Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). The officer was severely wounded and had to make his way back on foot after destroying his disabled tank. He had gone into action with broken ribs after receiving a burst of fire the previous day, when he had survived only due to his bulletproof vest. He was awarded Tamgha-i-Basalat for his gallantry.[41]

The fighting at Tang Khata distracted the militants and drew them away from Loi Sum. This provided the Scouts at Loi Sum an opportunity to exfiltrate in small groups. One young Scout, who was wounded in the foot, was unable to escape. Lance Naik/Nursing Assistant Zar Wali Yusufzai volunteered to stay back with the wounded man. Both were captured by the terrorists. When a peace deal was concluded with Faqir Muhammad in February 2009, Zar Wali was one of six prisoners selected for release. But this brave and generous man offered his place to an ailing elderly Havildar. In February 2010, as the Army closed in on Damadola, he was again selected for release but offered his place to a sepoy of 34 Baloch, whom he felt, was more vulnerable than the Scouts. Lance Naik Zar Wali was finally released in March, when Pakistan Army captured Damadola. He was awarded Imtiazi Sanad for his gallantry and sacrifice.[42]

Meanwhile, conditions in Bajaur were deteriorating rapidly. The writ of the Government was restricted to Khar, which itself was besieged. All land communication was cut and there were reports of desertions especially among the Levies. The Scouts were confined to their bases and had to be supplied by air. They came under intense pressure but grimly held on to their positions. It was in this setting that Operation Sherdil was launched to clear the militants from Bajaur and restore the Government's writ.[43] The

26 Brigade under Brigadier Abid Mumtaz and ten wings of Frontier Corps from Khyber Rifles, Bajaur, Dir, Thall and Chitral Scouts were inducted for the operation under the overall command of Frontier Corps.[44]

The operation commenced on 6 September, when 26 Brigade advancing from Torghundi in Lower Dir, arrived unopposed at Khar on 8 September. Next day, it was ordered to clear Loi Sum. Elements of Bajaur Scouts and Khyber Rifles under Colonel Nauman were to secure the line of communication. The advance was led by 7 Sind, which faced fierce resistance at Rashakai, short of Loi Sum. 34 Baloch was then sent forward in a flanking move but could make no headway. On 10 September, the IGFC's convoy was ambushed on its way to Rashakai but fortunately, he remained unhurt. In the meantime, the militants cut off the two battalions by establishing roadblocks in their rear. They had prepared a fortified zone along a 5-mile stretch of road between Dhalai Bridge and Tang Khata, with a network of bunkers, trenches and tunnels, from where they brought down withering fire, making all movement impossible. Colonel Nauman with 40 Scouts at Dhalai Bridge held on to his position under severe pressure. Meanwhile 25 Punjab, deployed on Torghundi-Khar road, was relieved by a company each of Dir and Chitral Scouts, and ordered to link-up with 7 Sind and 34 Baloch after clearing the roadblock. However, the battalion faced stiff resistance, and 63 FF and 10 AK had to be inducted for further operations. It took 18 days of fierce fighting to finally clear the roadblock on 27 September. After securing Loi Sum on 23 October, 26 Brigade linked-up with the besieged 1 Wing Bajaur Scouts at Nawagai on 2 December.[45]

Clearance of road Khar-Nawagai was a major achievement. The troops had fought bravely, while their commanders had set a great example by leading them from the front. The IGFC had been on the frontline during the battle, Brigadier Abid Mumtaz had

remained with his troops at Rashakai throughout, while Colonel Nauman had personally commanded his men at Dhalai. However, the Battle for Bajaur was far from over. The Mamund and Charmang Valleys were under the control of terrorists, while the road link from Khar to Kit Kot, where 2 Wing Bajaur Scouts was besieged, was still closed. Since no Army troops were available for further operations, the responsibility for opening the road to Kit Kot was given to the Frontier Corps. It was the first time that the Scouts were assigned an offensive role. The decision was an indication of their rapidly improving performance and confidence. It was also a reflection of the IGFC's implicit trust in their capabilities and his desire to transform the Frontier Corps into a proactive force.[46]

The task of capturing Inayat Killi, a town on the road to Kit Kot, was given to the newly arrived 3 Wing Swat Scouts, supported by elements of Khyber Rifles, Thall and Bajaur Scouts.[47] The operation commenced on 6 February 2009. The Scouts faced fierce resistance from the well-entrenched militants and Inayat Killi was only cleared after 13 days of intense bombardment. However, the town could not be secured until the militants were also evicted from the nearby dominating feature of Bai China. On 19 February, the SOG of Bajaur Scouts under Captain Tariq launched a night attack on Bai China and captured it after surprising the terrorists. The feature was then secured by 4 Wing Bajaur Scouts.[48]

Capture of Bai China and Inayat Killi secured the entrance of Mamund Valley, prompting Faqir Muhammad to sue for peace. However, he soon started violating peace terms, while a defiant Qari Zia-ur-Rahman established himself in Charmang Valley. It was decided to clear the militants from Charmang before moving against other pockets of resistance. On 9 June, a two-pronged attack was launched in the valley, with 34 Baloch advancing from Loi Sum, while a company of Thall Scouts under Major Afzaal

Ahmed was transported to Nawa Pass by helicopters. From there the Scouts established a block at Matak on the Pak-Afghan border, cutting off the militants from their base in Afghanistan. The terrorists made repeated unsuccessful attempts from the Afghan side to evict the Scouts, who gradually expanded their control of the ridge. On 19 June, Major Afzaal was killed in an ambush, while leading a patrol. The gallant officer was awarded Tamgha-i-Basalat. In the meantime, 34 Baloch secured most of Charmang Valley in the face of fierce resistance by the militants.[49]

It was now time to clear Mamund Valley, where Faqir Muhammad was openly defying the Government. The task of linking up with 2 Wing Bajaur Scouts at Kit Kot was given to the newly arrived 2 Wing Tochi Scouts, which was successfully completed on 4 September. The next phase was the clearance of the valley by Tochi Scouts and 5 Wing Khyber Rifles assisted by a *lashkar* of pro-Government Salarzai tribesmen from Pashat Valley. However, before commencing operations in Damadola, it was vital to capture the dominating heights of Mullah Said Pass and Khazai Sar on the ridge separating Mamund and Pashat Valleys. In a surprise dawn attack on 14 October, Tochi Scouts captured Mullah Said Pass but faced stiff resistance from well-prepared militant positions on Khazai Sar. With Tochi Scouts under severe pressure at Mullah Said and Khyber Rifles under attack in the valley below, three infantry and one commando battalions were inducted to break the impasse.[50]

The operation commenced on 27 January 2010. 7 Commando Battalion assisted by 3 Wing Bajaur Scouts, SOG Bajaur Scouts and Tochi Scouts at Mullah Said Pass captured Khazai Sar after a fierce battle that lasted until 1 February. Around 75 militants were killed during the action. At the same time, 25 Punjab, 12 NLI and 2 Wing Bajaur Scouts cleared Sewai and Damadola. Meanwhile, untiring efforts of Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Saleem, CO 2 Wing Bajaur Scouts had triggered an

uprising of Mamund tribe against the TTP, forcing Faqir Muhammad and his remaining men to flee to Afghanistan. On 2 March, IGFC announced the end of major military operations in Bajaur.[51] Operation Sherdil was a turning point in Pakistan's war against militancy. From here onwards, the militants would remain on the back foot. It was also a turning point for the Frontier Corps, which emerged from the operation a confident and rejuvenated force. But success came at a heavy price. Pakistani military losses in the operation were 163 killed and 607 wounded, including 72 killed and 208 wounded in the Frontier Corps.[52]

Mohmand Agency: The situation in Mohmand Agency could not remain unaffected by the events in Bajaur. The militants in Mohmand were led by Abdul Wali *alias* Omar Khalid Khorasani. In 2007, he made his bid for power by taking over the local crime syndicates after eliminating all competition. Soon, he was running his own courts, imposing taxes and killing his opponents with impunity.[53] Emboldened by the lack of Government response to their activities, the militants began threatening the main line of communication in Mohmand Agency. In late 2008, the Government extended Operation Sherdil to Mohmand Agency. The conduct of operation was entrusted to the Frontier Corps.

By December 2008, the militants in Mohmand had established positions on the Mamad Gat-Lakaro road, cutting off the Mohmand Rifles post at Lakaro, which had to be supplied by air. On 22 December, a company each of Mohmand Rifles and Khushal Khattak Scouts (Gomal Scouts) supported by tanks of 21 Horse advanced from Mamad Gat towards Lakaro. The force returned to Mamad Gat after replenishing the post. The miscreants responded by closing the Ghalanai-Mamad Gat road. They also launched an attack on Mamad Gat on 10 January 2009 but were repulsed after losing 42 men. Between 17 and 22 January, another operation was launched to open the road and punish the miscreants. 3 Wing Mohmand Rifles and SOG company supported

by tanks, artillery, attack helicopters and PAF conducted a number of cordon and search operations against militant targets between Ghalanai and Mamad Gat. On 21 January, a company of 3 Wing Mohmand Rifles under Major Amjad Hussain captured the dominating feature of Z-2 (Amjad Post) near Lakaro, opening the road for traffic. Major Amjad was awarded Imtiazi Sanad for his bold action.[54]

Operations continued during the rest of the year, as the Frontier Corps methodically cleared Mohmand of miscreants. On 3 February, Mohmand Rifles with elements of Chitral and Khushal Khattak Scouts conducted a successful clearance operation in Pindiali Tehsil. On 12 March, the operation was extended to Khawaizai and Kandharo areas. On 28 March, Michni area in the south was cleared by a company each of Mohmand Rifles, Khushal Khattak and Tochi Scouts. In early April, a wing each of Mohmand Rifles, Khushal Khattak and Swat Scouts with armour and air support conducted a major operation in Ambar and Pindiali Tehsils. A number of militant hideouts were destroyed and five abducted soldiers of Khushal Khattak Scouts were recovered. In June, Mohmand Rifles, Khushal Khattak Scouts and 4 FF launched an operation to clear Suran Valley on the Afghan frontier, where the militants were operating with impunity. The miscreants offered stiff resistance but after several days of fighting, 53 of them were killed, while 60 hideouts were destroyed. The operation was then extended to the area adjoining Nawa Pass in Bajaur. The main phase of Operation Sherdil in Mohmand concluded in October 2009, when most of the Agency was cleared. However, clearance operations continued into May 2010, in which 3 & 4 Wings Swat Scouts, 1 Wing Bajaur Scouts and 3 Wing Khattak Scouts participated along with Mohmand Rifles.[55]

Operation Brekhna: Although large portions of Mohmand were cleared during Operation Sherdil, due to the vast area and porous nature of the frontier, militants were still active in the western parts

of the Agency. Meanwhile, terrorists fleeing from military operations in other parts of FATA had started collecting in Mohmand, making the situation in the Agency critical. Operation Brekhna was launched on 27 January 2011, to completely rid the Agency of the menace of militancy. It was conducted in three phases lasting from January to November. In the first phase, the focus was Dawazai sector in the north, where many militants had concentrated. Over a period of 10 days, 22 Punjab, 24 Baloch, 1 Wing Khattak Scouts and two SOG companies cleared the area after killing 86 miscreants and capturing a large amount of arms and ammunition.[56]

The second phase was conducted in the Suran Valley and Bohai Dag sector by 77 Brigade with two commando battalions, two wings each of Mohmand Rifles and Khattak Scouts, one wing of Swat Scouts, one SOG company and a squadron of Independent Scouts Cavalry Regiment (ISCR). The operation lasted from April to September, during which the militants offered fierce resistance. A large number of them were killed, while some fled south to the Khawaizai-Baizai area, which was cleared by Mohmand Rifles in the third phase. Colonel Muhammad Azeem Khan, Commandant Mohmand Rifles was awarded Tamgha-i-Basalat for the successful conduct of operation. Operation Brekhna concluded in November. By then Mohmand Agency had been cleansed of militancy and the western frontier was secured. During the operation, 294 militants were killed, 112 wounded and 484 captured. Military casualties were 75 killed and 274 wounded. In 2012, Mohmand Agency was de-notified as a conflict zone.[57]

The Malakand Division

Malakand Division had been a hotbed of religious agitators since 1994, when an armed uprising by Tanzeem-e-Nifaz-e-Shariah-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) was suppressed by the Frontier Corps. As militancy gained strength in FATA, TNSM led by Sufi

Muhammad and his son-in-law Fazlullah again raised its head and became increasingly confrontational. The Government's efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis only emboldened the militants, who took it as a sign of weakness and openly started challenging the writ of the State. By 2007, the situation in Swat had become intolerable. As militants started moving into the adjoining district of Shangla, the Provincial Government requested military action to stem the tide of militancy.[58]

Operation Rah-e-Haq: Pakistan Army launched Operation Rah-e-Haq in November 2007. Fazlullah and his men fled to the mountains, from where they continued their attacks. In May 2008, the Government signed a peace agreement with the militants but the agreement soon broke down, when Fazlullah demanded that the Army withdraw from Swat. In June, military operations were resumed. Heavy fighting continued into the next year, causing widespread death and destruction. In February 2009, the Provincial Government signed another agreement with the TNSM, who promised to lay down their arms in return for implementation of *Shariah*.[59]

Operation Rah-e-Haq was conducted by the Army, with the Frontier Corps in a supporting role. At the start of the operation four wings of Frontier Corps from Khyber Rifles, Chitral, Thall and Dir Scouts were deployed in Swat. They were joined by 1 Wing Swat Scouts in September 2008. The Frontier Corps was mostly deployed for the protection of vital assets such as Saidu Sharif airport, bridges and other sensitive installations.[60] However, it also participated in several minor operations. On 26 October 2007, a company of Dir Scouts with the Mortar Troop of Mahsud Scouts and Artillery observers was airlifted from Kabal by helicopters to a dominating feature near Khwaza Khela, to establish an observation post overlooking the Khwaza Khela-Shangla road. The militants launched repeated attacks on the isolated position and the Scouts were withdrawn on 2 November.[61]

At the same time, 3 Wing Khyber Rifles was ordered to occupy Manglor heights near Fiza Ghat on the road Mingora-Khwaza Khela. While on its way to the objective, a company of Khyber Rifles under Major Akbar Alam was ambushed and surrounded by 150-200 miscreants in the foothills of Manglor on 27 October. The ambush developed into an intense firefight until the arrival of reinforcements under Colonel Qaisar Alam, Commandant Khyber Rifles. Caught between the two forces, the militants fled after suffering heavy losses.[62]

Operation Rah-e-Rast: Despite the promulgation of Nizam-e-Adal Regulation by the Government, there was no letup in the depredations of the militants, whose brutalities shocked the entire nation. They also made inroads into the adjoining districts of Dir and Buner. Like elsewhere, they had signed the peace agreement only to buy time to regroup. In May 2009, the Army launched Operation Rah-e-Rast to crush the militants. The civilian population was evacuated from large parts of the district and seven infantry brigades were inducted for a decisive blow against militancy in Swat.[63] After a determined operation lasting into July, the entire area was cleared. A total of 3423 militants were killed and 7421 captured.[64] However, Fazlullah managed to escape to Afghanistan. The operation was conducted by the Army, with three wings of Frontier Corps from Chitral, Dir and Swat Scouts deployed in a supporting role. On 4 May 2009, militants surrounded the Mingora grid station, which was being guarded by a company of Swat Scouts under Subedar Fazal Hameed. The Scouts put up a stout defence of the station for 21 days, despite running out of ammunition and supplies. The siege was finally lifted on 24 May, with the arrival of the Army.[65]

Operation Tor Tandar: Dir and Buner had become unsettled due to militancy in neighboring Swat. The situation deteriorated further, when a large number of militants fled to these areas following military operations in Bajaur and Swat. Operation Tor

Tandar was launched in April 2009, to stem the tide of militancy in Lower Dir and Buner. In Lower Dir, two wings of Dir Scouts, one wing of Chitral Scouts and two infantry battalions supported by elements of 21 Horse were employed in the first phase of operation, which lasted from April to August. All entry points into the district were sealed followed by a methodical clearance of the whole district. It led to an appreciable reduction in violence and restoration of the lines of communication. The casualties of Frontier Corps were 11 killed and 16 wounded in Chitral Scouts, and 4 killed and 8 wounded in Dir Scouts. Three Imtiazi Sanad were awarded to personnel of Chitral Scouts.[66]

At the same time, another operation was launched for the clearance of Buner. A wing each of Khyber Rifles and Tochi Scouts along with SOG-1, two infantry battalions and a commando battalion supported by armour and artillery were inducted for the operation in April 2009. The troops cleared the whole district after advancing on multiple axes. The militants offered stiff resistance but were overcome after suffering heavy losses including 420 killed. Military casualties were 13 killed, 39 wounded and 2 missing. In 2010, miscreants again started infiltrating into Dir from Afghanistan. The final phase of Operation Tor Tandar was launched in December, to sanitize the sanctuaries of terrorists and seal the frontier. Troops from 9 AK, 14 NLI, 7 Commando and Dir Scouts participated in the operation.[67]

The Khyber Agency

The situation in Khyber Agency was somewhat different from the rest of FATA. Here, the foreign jihadis did not find any traction. However, there was strong rivalry among tribesmen belonging to the Barelvi and Deobandi schools of thought. The two factions formed their own private militias called Ansar-ul-Islam and Lashkar-e-Islam, the latter led by a notorious criminal called Mangal Bagh. A vicious and protracted feud among them resulted

in a large number of casualties. Both groups were opposed to the TTP, which helped keep the terrorists at bay. However, Mangal Bagh later made peace with the TTP, allowing them to make inroads in Khyber Agency. Beginning in 2008, the Frontier Corps conducted a number of operations in Khyber Agency and the adjoining areas of Kohat to root out militancy.[68]

Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem: The first phase of Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem was launched in June 2008, against the Mangal Bagh group, which was suspected of kidnapping some women and Christians from Peshawar. A wing each of Khyber Rifles, Tochi, Chitral and Mahsud Scouts took part in the cordon and search operation.[69] In March 2009, second phase of the operation was conducted against the group in Bara Tehsil and Frontier Region Peshawar. A company each of 3 Sind, Mahsud Scouts and SOG participated in the operation in which 54 militants were apprehended and a large amount weapons and ammunition along with 20 tons of hashish were seized. The operation led to significant reduction in crime in Bara Tehsil.[70]

Operation Daralam: The law and order situation in Khyber Agency continued to deteriorate in 2008, due to the activities of militants and criminals, who besides threatening the security of Peshawar, were also attacking NATO convoys. Operation Daralam was conducted from 30 December 2008 to 4 January 2009, to secure the Jamrud-Torkham road. A cordon and search operation was carried out by elements of 3 Sind, Khyber Rifles, Mahsud Scouts and SOG after imposing a curfew and sealing the administrative boundary with Peshawar by Frontier Constabulary and Police. Sixty-four militants were killed and 280 apprehended during the operation. Casualties of the Frontier Corps were one killed and four wounded.[71]

Operation Bia Daralam: After the military operations in Bajaur, Mohmand and Swat, some militants took refuge in Khyber and Orakzai Agencies. There were reports of Mangal Bagh group

providing protection to these men. In September 2009, a major operation was conducted in Bara by 4 FF, 45 Baloch, 2 Wing Khyber Rifles and a company each of Mahsud and Swat Scouts. The area was sanitized after killing 149 miscreants and capturing 243. Five Scouts were killed and 30 wounded.[72]

Operation Eagle Swoop: Dara Adam Khel in Frontier Region Kohat adjacent to Khyber Agency had become a hotbed of terrorist activity. The Taliban faction in Dara was led by Tariq Afridi, whose activities posed a threat to Peshawar.[73] The group was also providing refuge to foreign terrorists. The first phase of Operation Eagle Swoop in Dara Adam Khel was launched in January 2008. 6 Wing Chitral Scouts and 2 Wing Orakzai Scouts participated in the operation.[74] The operation did not yield the desired results and was renewed in September. A wing each of Khyber Rifles, Mahsud and Swat Scouts took part in the operation along with the Army. Two hundred and five terrorists were killed and 390 were apprehended during the operation.[75]

Operation Rah-e-Nijat

Emergence of Hakimullah Mahsud as the new leader of TTP after the death of Baitullah Mahsud in a drone strike in August 2009, led to an upsurge in terrorism. In October, Pakistan Army decided to dismantle the TTP network in South Waziristan, which was the nerve centre of terrorist activity in Pakistan. Following the pattern of Swat, civilians were evacuated from the target area and blocks were established to isolate the terrorists. Six infantry brigades then advanced on multiple axes to surround TTP strongholds of Ladha, Sararogha and Makin after seizing the high ground and nodal points. By March 2010, the area was cleared and TTP network disrupted.[76] A large number of terrorists were killed or captured, while the rest fled to Afghanistan or other parts of FATA. The South Waziristan Scouts were employed in a holding role during the operation.[77]

Kurram & Orakzai

Kurram and Orakzai Agencies were already vulnerable due to the age-old sectarian conflict between Shias and Sunnis. This rivalry was exploited by the TTP, which started making inroads in the two agencies and laid siege to Parachinar in 2008. This cut off Thall-Parachinar road for nearly two years, forcing the people to make a long detour through Afghanistan to travel to Peshawar.[78] The already tense situation was further exacerbated, when following Operation Rah-e-Nijat, a large number of terrorists including foreigners fled to Kurram and Orakzai, where they unleashed a reign of terror on the local population. Pakistan had to launch several military operations to clear the two agencies.[79]

Operation Khwakh Bade Sham: The operation was conducted to disrupt terrorist networks and restore lines of communications in Kurram and Orakzai along with Khyber Agency, where it was a sequel to Operation Bia Daralam. Despite military action, criminal activity in the Bara area of Khyber Agency had not been fully suppressed. On 24 November 2009, 40 FF, 9 NLI and a wing each of Khyber Rifles and Mahsud Scouts conducted a clean-up operation in Bara. It was followed by occupation of positions overlooking Chapri Feroz Khel in northern Orakzai, which was a centre of militant activity. A large amount of weapons and ammunition was seized, while 127 militants were killed and 443 apprehended during the operation.[80]

The terrorist network in Orakzai overlapped with their bases in the adjoining areas of Hangu. Shahu Khel was a militant stronghold from where they were disrupting the line of communication between Hangu and Thall. The objective of the first phase of operation in Orakzai was to clear Shahu Khel and seal all entry points into Orakzai. In the last week of November 2009, 31 FF, 2 Wing Dir Scouts and 2 Wing Swat Scouts cleared Shahu Khel and secured the line of communication.[81] By January

20. Khyber, Kurram & Orakzai.

2010, all entry points into Orakzai Agency were sealed by the Frontier Corps. At the same time, a *lashkar* of Stori Khel Orakzais supported by Pakistani forces commenced operations against militants in northern Orakzai.[82] On 15 March, 2 Wing Swat Scouts under Lieutenant Colonel Anwar Abbas Butt was ordered to secure Kalaya. The advance of Pakistani forces was fiercely resisted by the militants. On the night of 26 March, they launched an attack on Swat Scouts' main supply route and managed to capture Mitti Post. Lieutenant Colonel Anwar immediately led his Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to recover the post. The assault was personally led by the CO and was successful in capturing the post. However, the gallant officer was killed during the fighting in which a large number of militants were also killed. He was awarded Sitara-i-Basalat for his valour.[83]

In July 2010, 2 Wing Orakzai Scouts under Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Yousaf arrived at Ghiljo from Mir Ali to participate in the operation. The Wing conducted 33 cordon and search operations in which the area around Ghiljo was cleared and 59 terrorists were killed. The Wing suffered losses of eight killed, including the CO in an IED blast on 22 October.[84] Meanwhile, a company of Chitral Scouts, which had arrived in Orakzai in May, was deployed near Daburi. It repulsed a major attack on its position during the night of 21 June, in which 43 militants were killed and 56 wounded. Losses of Chitral Scouts were two killed and 16 wounded.[85] By the end of 2010, most of Orakzai Agency had been cleared and a large number of militants were eliminated.

Meanwhile in Kurram Agency, operations started in the second week of December 2009. In the first phase, Thall-Parachinar road was opened for traffic by Kurram Militia in the face of fierce resistance by the militants. This was followed by clearance of the area Sadda-Tindo-Badama by 31 FF, Kurram Militia and a company of Thall Scouts. Their next objective was the militant stronghold of Dogar, near the border with Khyber and

Orakzai. This was a particularly challenging operation due to the difficult mountainous terrain, which made the troops vulnerable to ambush especially on the Badama-Dogar route. The key to success was the Todai Oba Bridge over River Khurmana near Dogar, which provided access to Khyber and Orakzai. It was surrounded by four dominating features, which were held in strength by the militants.[86]

On 12 December, the main force comprising of two companies of 31 FF, a wing of Kurram Militia and the company of Thall Scouts fought its way towards Todai Oba Bridge on the Badama-Dogar road. At the same time, two companies of 31 FF moved to Tindo in a feint, while another force of a company each of 35 Punjab and Kurram Militia made a flanking move from Parachinar and captured the heights around Todai Oba with the support of helicopter gunships. After linking up at Todai Oba Bridge on 14 December, the two columns then proceeded to clear Dogar of miscreants. Four Scouts were killed, while 15 were wounded in the operation. Despite the successful conduct of operation, the situation in Central Kurram remained unsettled and there were sporadic incidences of violence.[87]

Operation Koh-i-Sufaid: After the successful completion of Operation Khwakh Bade Sham, the militants shifted to the adjacent areas of Central Kurram. The area from Manatu, Mandan and Chinarak to Sperkot and Sarobi had become a major centre of militant activity and launching base for acts of terrorism. Operation Koh-i-Sufaid was conducted to eliminate these centres of militancy in Kurram and the adjoining areas of Orakzai. The operation was launched with two converging prongs from west and east. In the west, the Kurram Militia was to secure the base of operation at Gawaki Killi from where two infantry battalions and a company of Kurram Militia were to capture the area Manatu-Mandan-Chinarak. The force was under command Kurram Militia. The eastern prong under command Thall Scouts consisted of an

infantry battalion and a company of Thall Scouts. It was to advance from Thall and link-up with the western prong after capturing the area Sarobi-Sperkot-Dumbakai. Meanwhile, a company each of Thall Scouts and 42 Punjab were to establish blocks at Pastawana and Sangroba respectively, to prevent the militants from escaping. SOG-1, attached with the eastern prong, was to capture Dumbakai ridge. Success of the operation depended on speed and seizure of the dominating features in the area. The operation was supported by the guns of Kurram Militia and two medium regiments, a troop each of 25 and 33 Cavalry, Cobra gunships and PAF.[88]

The operation commenced on the night of 3 July 2011. The militants were surprised by the multidirectional attack and its speed. The advance along the ridgeline reduced the risk of IEDs, while night operations by troops equipped with night vision devices and capture of dominating features restricted the militants' fighting capability. Despite stiff resistance, the two prongs attained their objectives and linked up on 24 July. They then began mopping up and search operations, which continued until October. During the operation, more than a hundred terrorists were killed and 39 were captured. Military casualties were three killed and 30 wounded.[89]

In the next phase of operation, 73 Brigade, 1 Wing Tochi Scouts and SOG-4 were given the task of clearing Murghan Sector adjacent to Orakzai Agency. The Kurram Militia was tasked with securing the main supply route of the brigade and establishing blocking positions to prevent the militants from escaping. The operation lasted from November 2011 to October 2012.[90] In March 2012, it was extended to the adjacent areas of Orakzai Agency, where it was conducted by 2 Artillery Division with 2 Wing Orakzai Scouts under command. The entire area from Daburi to Shinkai was cleared of militants and link-up was achieved with 73 Brigade in October.[91]

Operation Zarb-e-Azb

The North Waziristan Agency was a major base of operation for terrorists and a refuge for those fleeing military action elsewhere. With Pakistani forces committed in other areas, it had not been possible to conduct an operation in North Waziristan, which required a major military effort. By 2014, most of the Tribal Areas had been cleared and the Government could now turn its attention towards the last remaining stronghold of terrorists. In June 2014, Pakistan Army launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb to eliminate terrorists in North Waziristan. Civilians were evacuated and all important communication centres were sealed. After isolating the terrorists, the core areas were methodically cleared by August. This was followed by the clearance of peripheral areas in the next phase. It was the largest military operation conducted in the Tribal Areas and successfully dismantled the terrorist network leading to an appreciable decrease in incidences of terrorism in Pakistan. By the time the operation concluded in 2016, up to 5000 terrorists had been killed and 21,193 apprehended, 992 militant sanctuaries were destroyed and 18,000 weapons along with 253 tons of explosives were seized.[92]

Operation Zarb-e-Azb was an Army operation, with the Frontier Corps assigned a holding role. However, both Tochi Scouts and Shawal Rifles, the two corps based in North Waziristan, were fully engaged in supporting operations and suffered a number of casualties. These included establishing blocks and carrying out cordon & search and sanitization operations, conducting raids on terrorist hideouts and ambush of militant parties. The losses of Tochi Scouts during Operation Zarb-e-Azb were 28 killed and 47 wounded.[93] At the same time, the Frontier Corps was engaged in concurrent operations in other agencies to interdict the movement of militants and clear their remaining pockets.

Operation Zarb-e-Azb also extended into Orakzai Agency, where foreign terrorists affiliated with Daesh group had found sanctuary in the inaccessible mountain region between Orakzai and Khyber Agencies. The Orakzai Scouts established several posts overlooking Aka Khel Valley to interdict terrorists moving between their sanctuaries. On 31 October 2014, 300 militants attacked and captured Zawan Post, which was manned by 30 men of 231 Wing Orakzai Scouts.* The post was recaptured by the QRF of Orakzai Scouts after a counterattack the same day. On 10 November, the Scouts repulsed an attack on Sherin Dara and Noor Top Posts. The same night, they captured the Lashkar-e-Islam position at Khazana Kandao. On 1 December, a large force of militants attempted to recover Khazana Kandao but were repulsed with heavy losses after a counterattack by Orakzai Scouts QRF. In April and May 2015, two wings and SOG of Orakzai Scouts participated in the clearance of Sheikhan Valley, which was a transit area for terrorists moving between North Waziristan and Khyber Agencies. The Scouts established blocking positions, while the Army cleared the area.[94]

Operation Khyber

Operation Khyber was launched for the clearance of Bara and Tirah Valleys in Khyber Agency in conjunction with Operation Zarb-e-Azb. These areas had continued to cause trouble despite previous operations. The operation included the capture of Maira Sar feature overlooking Shin Kamar Pass on 17 February 2012, by two infantry battalions, 2 & 3 Wings Mahsud Scouts, 3 Wing Khyber Rifles and two SOG companies. Three Scouts

* In September 2014, the nomenclature of Frontier Corps wings was streamlined by giving each wing a unique number. The system is based on assigning each corps a number, followed by the number of the wing. Thus, 231 Wing means Number 1 Wing of Orakzai Scouts, who are numbered 23rd in the Frontier Corps.

were killed in the action. In February 2013, Mirozai Sar, a dominating feature on the Pak-Afghan border in Tirah Valley under the control of Mangal Bagh group, was captured by 2 Wing Khyber Rifles and a Zakha Khel *lashkar*.[95] In June and July 2014, Operation Tora Shapa was conducted in Frontier Region Peshawar to sanitize the area. The Mahsud Scouts and 4 Wing Chitral Scouts participated in the successful action. Operations were then extended to Khyber Agency in a series of actions spread over five years called Operation Khyber.[96]

Operation Khyber-I was launched in October 2014, to clear the area between Bara and Shah Kot. It was conducted by three infantry brigades with five wings of Frontier Corps in a holding role. More than 200 terrorists were killed and some 400 apprehended during the 2-month operation, which dealt a serious blow to Lashkar-e-Islam. A large amount of arms and ammunition was recovered besides 21,500 kg of hashish. Capture of the Shah Kot Gap closed the main entry point of terrorists into Peshawar and Lower Orakzai. Military casualties during the operation were 31 killed and 134 wounded, including 12 Scouts killed and 3 wounded.[97]

Operation Khyber-II was conducted from March to June 2015. Its objective was to clear the eastern part of Tirah Valley. It was undertaken in cooperation with troops operating in Orakzai, who were given the task of clearing the Aka Khel Valley, located between Tirah and Orakzai. On 9 May, Orakzai Scouts captured Badgore feature at the western end of Aka Khel. This was followed by the capture of Shah Kot feature on the eastern end on 14 May. Aka Khel Valley was then cleared by 231 Wing Orakzai Scouts and 56 Baloch during May and June.[98] In the meantime, troops under command 21 Artillery Division cleared the eastern portion of Tirah Valley in the face of fierce resistance. One company each of Khyber Rifles and SOG took part in the operation. This was followed by the clearance of Shilman Sector adjoining Mohmand

in December. 204 Wing Mohmand Rifles, 213 & 214 Wings Swat Scouts, one company of Khyber Rifles and SOG-2 & 4 took part in the operation.[99]

During Operation Khyber-III in August 2016, the area of China Nau on the Afghan frontier was cleared by 27 Brigade and two SSG battalions. All mountain passes leading into Pakistan were occupied and a base established for further operations. This was followed by the clearance of the remote Rajgal Valley during Operation Khyber-IV from July to August 2017. The operation was conducted by seven infantry and four commando battalions along with the Frontier Corps wings in the area. The fifth phase called Khyber-V took place in August and September 2019, when the remaining area of Rajgal Valley adjoining Afghanistan was also cleared. Two wings from Khyber Rifles and Mahsud Scouts with two SOG companies participated in the operation.[100]

Securing the Frontier

By 2017, all seven agencies of FATA and the adjoining Provincially Administered Tribal Areas of Malakand Division had been cleared of terrorists. More than 27,600 militants were killed and 12,500 captured.[101] However, many of them managed to escape into Afghanistan, from where they continued to launch terrorist attacks by infiltrating through the porous Pak-Afghan border. Recognizing that control of the frontier was vital for preventing cross-border terrorism, Pakistan launched a series of operations to secure the entire Pak-Afghan border. Bajaur Agency, with its mountainous frontier and numerous passes is particularly vulnerable to infiltration by terrorists. Pakistan conducted a series of operations to secure this frontier. Operation Kit Kot was launched in July 2012, by Bajaur Scouts and 14 Sind to clear Mamund Valley up to the Afghan frontier. This was followed by Operation Faseel-e-Aahan conducted by the Army and Bajaur Scouts in four phases from 2014 to 2017. The entire frontier region

was cleared and new posts established to plug all gaps. In April 2018, the last remaining area in the north was also brought under control during Operation Saperasar.[102]

Similar operations were conducted all along the western frontier. In 2016, the international border of Mohmand and Kurram was sealed and sixteen new posts established. Operations Zarb-e-Azb and Khyber achieved similar objectives in North Waziristan and Khyber Agencies.[103] In 2017, the Government decided to fence the entire 2600-km frontier with Afghanistan and establish more than 400 new forts and posts to prevent cross-border infiltration. The successful completion of the project in 2022, is a great achievement of the Frontier Corps, which worked tirelessly with the Army to complete this arduous task in the inaccessible mountainous area. The fencing has been augmented by the installation of state of the art Anti-infiltration Grid System with motion detectors, thermal imaging, radar, surveillance cameras and drones, along with deployment of Small Action Teams. At the same time, modern methods of border control have been implemented at border crossings to manage the unregulated movement of more than 50,000 people, who pass through these checkpoints each day.[104] These new measures have started paying dividends by reducing cross-border infiltration.

Pakistan's success in the war against militancy and terrorism came at a huge price. The financial losses ran in excess of US$ 120 billion, while the human cost in terms of lives lost, destruction of homes and displacement of millions, is incalculable. Over 50,000 people were killed, including some 6000 security personnel.[105] The losses of Frontier Corps (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) until August 2017, were 1327 killed and 3899 wounded. Although peace has been restored in most of the Tribal Areas, the threat of terrorism has not been eradicated and the Frontier Corps remains committed in operations.[106] Besides military action, the Frontier Corps has also been engaged in the public domain to win hearts

and minds of the tribesmen by providing support to them. This includes resettlement of internally displaced persons, running of free medical camps and vocational training centres, and assistance in health and irrigation projects. It has also established 16 Frontier Corps Public Schools and six Cadet Colleges at Swat, Warsak, Mamad Gat, Razmak, Wana and Spinkai, to provide quality education to the tribesmen as well as wards of FC personnel.[107]

Military operations are only one aspect of the fight against terrorism. Identifying and removing the causes, which give rise to militancy, are even more important. This was recognized by Pakistani leadership early in the war but there was a lack of political will to deal with it. It was the horrific attack on Army Public School Peshawar on 16 December 2014, which forced the political leadership into taking concrete decisions to meet the challenge of militancy. In 2015, the Government formulated the National Action Plan (NAP) to comprehensively address the issue. The plan, which was revised in 2021, has wide-ranging objectives from development of a counter-militancy narrative, curbing of terror financing, deradicalization of militants and capacity building of civilian law enforcement agencies to economic uplift and good governance through administrative reforms. Unfortunately, the implementation of NAP has been poor.[108]

One of the more significant measures taken in the aftermath of the insurgency was to integrate FATA into the national mainstream. On 31 May 2018, the Parliament abolished FATA through a constitutional amendment. The Political Agencies were designated as Districts and merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The jurisdiction of Pakistani courts was extended to the new Newly Merged Tribal Districts (NMDs) and FCR was abolished. These were all laudable steps. Unfortunately, no serious effort was made at capacity building of the new civil administration. The Political Agents were redesignated as Deputy Commissioners, while the Khassadars and Levies became Police without any training. The

old system of governance was a relic of the past, which should have been replaced long ago. But no matter how flawed, it had been delivering some semblance of governance for more than a hundred years. Its precipitous dissolution without a functional alternative has led to an administrative vacuum. The Tribal Districts were already economically deprived. The destruction and displacement caused by the war further aggravated these problems. However, economic help from the Government has been slow in arriving, exacerbating an already bad situation.[109] It has also increased the commitments of the Frontier Corps, which in addition to its own responsibilities, is at times called upon to perform the duties of the Police, while its officers have to fulfil the role previously performed by the Political Agents. Hopefully, these issues will be resolved and the Tribal Districts would be able to develop at par with other districts of the province.

Transformation of the Frontier Corps

With the weakening of militancy in the Tribal Areas, the authorities could once again turn their attention towards the restructuring of the Frontier Corps. The period since the implementation of earlier reforms had provided an opportunity to critically assess them and make the necessary adjustments. In the meantime, raising of Bhittani Rifles in 2015, added another unit to the Frontier Corps. They were initially formed as an *ad hoc* corps by Colonel Rana Muhammad Siddique-ur-Rahman at Mir Ali in August 2015. They were officially raised as Bhittani Rifles on 12 August 2017.[110] The raising of new corps and wings led to further expansion of the Frontier Corps. To streamline control of this large force, it was decided to divide it into two. In 2017, the Frontier Corps was bifurcated into FC Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North), with its Headquarters at Peshawar, and FC Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (South), at Wana, each headed by its own Inspector General. The Kurram Militia, Tochi, South Waziristan, Thall and

Khattak Scouts, and Shawal and Bhittani Rifles were transferred to the southern corps, severing an association of more than a century. The bifurcation led to the raising of a new Scouts Training Academy at Mir Ali by Colonel Shahzad Saleem.[111] At the same time, a new Scouts Cavalry Regiment was raised by the transfer of 36 tanks and 6 APCs to FC Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (South).[112] Similar changes were implemented in FC Balochistan.[113]

The dissolution of Tribal Agencies and replacement of Political Agents by Deputy Commissioners in 2018, brought to an end a century of close working relationship between the Frontier Corps and tribal political authorities. Units of the Frontier Corps were under the operational control of Political Agents. Although this control had been eroding since Independence, abolition of the agencies ended this relationship permanently. The Government will have to carry out new legislation to replace the Frontier Corps Ordinance, 1959, and Frontier Corps Rules, 1961, which have now become redundant. Although the Frontier Corps is still a part of the Civil Armed Forces of Pakistan under the Ministry of Interior, it works in close coordination with Pakistan Army.

The ongoing restructuring and reorganization of the Frontier Corps has completely transformed it. These changes were necessitated by shortcomings exposed during the recent military operations. Some age-old practices had to be done away with because they had become antiquated. The most notable among them is the *Qaum* System. For a hundred years, each platoon of the Frontier Corps was composed of men from a single tribe led by their own JCOs. Promotions ran in platoons and were based on seniority rather than merit. The system was instituted by the British to foster *esprit de corps* by encouraging inter-platoon competition and to act as a safeguard against mutiny. However, over the years it had become a liability, as it provided an opportunity for intrigue, while the promotion system allowed advancement of less qualified individuals over more capable men. The *Qaum* System has now

been abolished. Men from different tribes are now mixed in a platoon and promotions are on merit.[114]

Another major change is in the recruitment and training of Scouts. Until recently, this was the responsibility of each corps. All recruitment is now centralized. The minimum educational qualification has been raised to Matric. The recruitment area is restricted to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while it is nation-wide for Frontier Corps Balochistan. To ensure standardization, both basic and advanced training is now carried out in Scouts Training Academies. It is proposed to convert the STAs into Frontier Corps Training Centres on the pattern of Regimental Training Centres of the Army, with integration of other training facilities and the Record Wing. The Training Centres will host a biannual Wing Commanders' Conference and an annual Subedar Majors' Conference presided over by Colonels Commandant, who would be serving or retired Lieutenant Generals with previous affiliation with the Frontier Corps. Posting of officers in the Frontier Corps down to the level of wings is now controlled by the Military Secretary's Branch at General Headquarters.[115] Increase in the number and improvement in the quality of officers is a positive step, which will enhance the efficiency of the Corps.

With the end of active military operations on the Frontier, the Army is being withdrawn to be replaced by the Frontier Corps. Towards this end, a complete re-articulation of the command structure of the Frontier Corps is underway. Wings have been reorganized and re-equipped as self-sustained basic fighting units on the pattern of infantry battalions with four rifle companies. Each wing has an authorized strength of eight officers and is commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, with the requisite administrative, financial and legal authority. Each wing will have a section of Field Engineers as its integral part. Meanwhile, SOG companies have been redesignated as Special Operations Companies, with one company attached with each corps.[116]

For seamless and efficient operational control, a three-tiered command structure is being implemented in the Frontier Corps similar to the Army. The Headquarters Frontier Corps are already functioning as Formation Headquarters. Under them, each corps will assume the status of a brigade under the command of a Brigadier and Sector Headquarters will be disbanded.[117] The process started in 2022, when Bajaur Scouts in the north and Badar Rifles in the south started operating as brigades. Since then, several corps have undergone the conversion, which will be completed by the middle of 2024. With the de-induction of the Army, the remaining infantry battalions will come under the command of Frontier Corps. For example, the Bajaur Scouts Brigade consists of eight integral wings and three infantry battalions,[118] while Badar Rifles has six integral wings, two infantry battalions and a medium artillery regiment.[119]

Headquarters Frontier Corps has been augmented with the raising of Logistics Branch. A wing each of Signals and Electrical & Mechanical Engineers (EME) and a company each of Engineers and Frontier Corps Police have also been sanctioned. A Logistics Hub has been established at Shakas. It is a central logistic support facility that would significantly enhance the efficiency of Frontier Corps by eliminating procedural delays and reducing stress on Army resources. The hub will provide repair, maintenance and storage facilities for which five workshops of EME Wing and six laboratories of Signals Wing have been established along with Ordnance stores.[120]

Disparity in the pay scales of the Army and Frontier Corps had been a longstanding grievance of the Scouts. Their case was vigorously pursued by Major General Noor Wali Khan, the present IGFC, and with the support of the Army, the Government has now brought the salaries of all Civil Armed Forces at par with the Army. Another deficiency in the Frontier Corps was the lack of specialist medical care for its men and their families. Their sole

health providers were Regimental Medical Officers, who had limited facilities and expertise at their disposal. The idea of a tertiary care hospital for the Frontier Corps was first conceived by IGFC Major General Muhammad Alam Khattak in 2007. It was a daunting undertaking especially due to financial constraints but his successors persevered with the task. In January 2024, their combined efforts bore fruit, when Major General Noor Wali Khan inaugurated the Frontier Corps Teaching Hospital at Shakas. It is a state of the art multi-disciplinary 500-bedded hospital with the latest diagnostic and specialist treatment facilities. The hospital will provide quality medical care to all Frontier Corps personnel and their families including those from FC Balochistan.[121]

In 2020, the naming criteria for Frontier Corps were standardized. Now all corps are named after the geographical location, where they are permanently based. As a result, Mahsud Scouts were redesignated as Bara Rifles, Swat Scouts as Tirah Rifles, Khattak Scouts as Gomal Scouts and Bhittani Rifles as Badar Rifles. A new corps called Preghar Scouts has been raised in FC Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (South). This has brought the number of corps in FC Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to 16 with 100 Rifle Wings; 51 in the north and 49 in the south. In 2024, Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North) adopted the motto of *Jwand da Nang, Marg da Nang*, which is Pashto for 'Live with Honour, Die for Honour', and exemplifies the ethos by which the Scouts live and die.[122]

Custodians of Tribal & Historical Heritage

Besides guarding the western border of Pakistan, the Frontier Corps also plays an important role in preserving and promoting its tribal heritage, which is the very essence of Scouts. This is reflected in its museums and galleries,[123] tribal dance troupes, and well-maintained historical buildings. Tribal culture and traditions are showcased every year during the Frontier Corps Week, where the general public is invited to take part in the

festivities. Another cultural event associated with the Frontier Corps is the internationally renowned Shandur Polo Festival held in July each year. Polo in its original form is a passion in Chitral and Gilgit-Baltistan. The traditional rivalry between Chitral and Gilgit provides a thrilling spectacle in the picturesque setting of the 12,000-foot high Shandur Top in Ghizar. In the past, this rivalry also extended within the Frontier Corps, when Polo teams of Chitral Scouts vied with those of Gilgit, Northern and Karakoram Scouts. The Chitral Scouts continue to uphold this tradition and maintain highly competitive Polo teams, who have won the Chitral District Polo Tournament 14 times.[124]

Headquarters Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North) at Fort Bala Hisar is also the custodian of the historical heritage of the entire Frontier Corps, including FC Balochistan and Gilgit, Northern and Karakoram Scouts, which became the Northern Light Infantry in 1975. It is a role that it takes very seriously. Bala Hisar houses a large and impressive museum of the history of Frontier Corps, along with galleries showcasing tribal culture. The Frontier Corps also maintains a number of historical sites steeped in the folklore of the Frontier, such as the forts at Ali Masjid, Chakdara, Drosh,* and most notably, the fabled Khyber Pass itself. IGFC Major General Noor Wali Khan has a keen interest in the preservation of this national heritage and has overseen a major renovation of Bala Hisar and other historical buildings. At the same time, the famous Jamrud and Shagai forts† have been reclaimed from the Army and are undergoing restoration.[125]

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* Fort Ali Masjid is located on a dominating feature in the Khyber Pass between Shagai and Landi Kotal. It was built by the Afghan King Dost Mohammad Khan in 1837. Qila Drosh, 47 km south of Chitral, was constructed in 1900. It served as the Headquarters of Chitral Scouts from 1926 to 1992.

† Fort Jamrud is located at the entrance of Khyber Pass. It was built by the Sikh General Hari Singh Nalwa in 1837. Fort Shagai is situated 21 km from Jamrud. It was constructed by the British in 1927, to guard the eastern end of the Pass.

Two exciting new projects of the Frontier Corps conceived by Major General Noor Wali Khan are the development of Khyber History Trail and Chakdara Heritage Trail for tourists. The former is a journey of discovery through the Khyber Pass from Bala Hisar to Torkham, with stops at historic places like Jamrud, Shagai, Ali Masjid, Sphola Stupa,* mausoleum of the famous Pashto poet Amir Hamza Khan Shinwari, Landi Kotal Railway Station, Michni Post,† and Khyber Rifles Officers Mess. Attractive new museums have been established at Ali Masjid, Michni and Khyber Rifles Mess, which have undergone major renovation after the untiring efforts of a dedicated team of Scouts and civilian experts.[126]

Chakdara, on the right bank of River Swat, is an ancient centre of civilization going back 3000 years. The British constructed a fort there in 1896, to guard the strategically vital river crossing. The fort is a symbol of the historic role Malakand region has played in shaping the destiny of many civilizations and dynasties, and in interaction between different cultures and religions. It stands at the confluence of Malakand, Swat and Dir, making it an attraction for travellers as well as history lovers. Restoration of Chakdara Fort in all its grandeur has been completed and other heritage sites are being explored for restoration in Dir and Swat, which will make Chakdara Heritage Trail an attractive new destination for tourists. Besides encouraging tourism, these projects will preserve ancient national heritage for future generations and promote awareness of the remarkable history of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It is this pride and ownership of history and culture that sets the Frontier Corps apart and makes it a national treasure worthy of preservation itself.

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* The Sphola (also spelt Shpola) Stupa is a Buddhist monument of the Kushan period, when Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was a vibrant centre of Buddhism. It is situated near the village of Zarai between Ali Masjid and Landi Kotal.

† Michni (or Michnay) Post was established in 1913. Situated at 3600 feet on the western end of Khyber Pass, it offers a panoramic view of Pak-Afghan frontier at Torkham and is a popular destination for tourists and visiting dignitaries.

Epilogue

The strength of every progressive institution lies in its ability to evolve and adapt to changing circumstances. Over the years, the Frontier Corps has gone through many tribulations in its fortunes but every time it has emerged renewed like a Phoenix. The recent restructuring of Frontier Corps has changed it beyond recognition. Dressed, equipped, trained and organized on military lines, it has become virtually an extension of the Army. However, this is where the authorities need to exercise caution, lest this great institution becomes subsumed in the Army and loses its purpose and identity. It would not be the first time that such a thing has happened.

The Punjab Frontier Force was raised for a mission similar to that of the Frontier Corps. They were so good at their job that they were taken over by the Army in 1886. A scant decade or so later, the British had to raise the Frontier Corps to fill the vacuum left by the Punjab Frontier Force. Within a few years, the excellent performance of the Frontier Corps prompted the Government to ask Sir George Roos-Keppel, the Chief Commissioner of NWFP, whether it could be merged with the Army. Roos-Keppel replied that it could be done but then you would have to raise another Frontier Corps.[1] That is exactly what happened when Gilgit, Northern and Karakoram Scouts were converted into Northern Light Infantry in 1975. In 2003, the Government had to raise Northern Areas Scouts to fill the void left by their predecessors.[2]

There is a reason why the Frontier Corps has existed for more than a century. While times and circumstances change, some things are permanent. No nation can escape its geography or history. Pakistan is situated in a strategically vital part of the world over which Great Powers have vied for centuries. It is safe to assume that we will continue to ‘live in interesting times’. Our problems with Afghanistan will not go away in the foreseeable

future, while a thousand years of tribal customs cannot be wished away by a constitutional amendment. Which means that the *raison d'être* for maintaining the Frontier Corps will also remain. The Frontier Corps was raised for a very specific purpose: to have a mobile paramilitary force recruited from the tribesmen of the Frontier, who know the area and its people intimately.[3] This simple truth should always be kept in mind when introducing changes in the Frontier Corps.

The repeated bifurcations of the Frontier Corps, while necessary for administrative and operational reasons, have also weakened bonds of comradeship forged over more than a century. The administrative arrangements notwithstanding, there is but only one Frontier Corps. The officers and men of all four corps will do well to bear that in mind and should strive to maintain these bonds and uphold the traditions of the Frontier Scouts, which are the bedrock of this great institution.

In the end, what Charles Chenevix Trench wrote forty years ago still holds true today and should serve as a fitting epitaph to this History: “The Frontier Corps are still supremely active, efficient, hard-hitting, mobile, irregular mountain troops. They have terrific pride. They still knock spots off the army at rifle-shooting. They are very much a corps d'elite.”[4]

Appendix I
Nomenclature of the Frontier Corps

The term 'Frontier Corps' was first used in 1903, to refer to a heterogeneous group of paramilitary units operating on the western frontier of British India. Until 1899, these were Khyber Rifles, Kurram Militia and the Zhob Levy Corps. After the raising of North and South Waziristan Militias in 1900, they were mentioned for the first time in the Indian Army List of 1901, as 'Frontier Levies'. From 1903 onwards, the term 'Frontier Militia Corps' or 'Frontier Corps' was used for them collectively even though no such organization existed. It was only after the appointment of Inspecting Officer, Frontier Corps, in 1907, that the Frontier Corps was established on a firm footing.

The designations of Frontier Corps units do not follow a uniform nomenclature. Some are called Rifles, while others Militia or Scouts. In military lexicon, Rifle regiments were a special type of infantry first raised in the early 19th century to act as skirmishers and scouts at a time when the rest of the infantry, called 'Line Infantry', advanced into the battle in formation. Dressed in green for camouflage and armed with rifles from which they got their name, they were considered elite troops due to the dangerous nature of their job. By the end of the century, infantry tactics had changed and infantry battalions were standardized. However, the designation of 'Rifles' was retained and it was usually bestowed as a reward to units that had performed well in war. The 'Militia' on the other hand were paramilitary units embodied in times of emergency. They were recruited locally and employed for service in their own territory. The term 'Scout' usually refers to lightly armed mobile troops used for reconnaissance, although there is no example of such units in the British Indian Army. The closest model of a unit of scouts in the Indian Army was the Corps of Guides but it was regularized within a few years of its raising.

Which brings us to the question of Frontier Corps units having designations of such diverse background. In short, there was no fixed formula for naming these units. Different corps were raised at different times for different purposes and under different circumstances. The Khyber Jezailchis were a tribal levy[1] armed with the jezail, from which they got their name. When they were rearmed with rifles, they were renamed as Khyber Rifles. They had no connection to the Rifle regiments of infantry. In 1898, the Government decided to reorganize them as a paramilitary militia. Lord Curzon wanted to rename them as Khyber Militia to distinguish them from their tribal levy predecessors.[2] But since they had already gained recognition as Khyber Rifles, the name was allowed to continue.

Meanwhile, Kurram Militia, a paramilitary unit raised in 1892, was designated as such because it was a militia in its true meaning of the word. It was this model that was followed, when the Khyber Rifles were reorganized in 1899. The success of the militia model led to the raising of two more militia corps called North and South Waziristan Militias. Thus, there were four corps of militia on the Northwest Frontier and the term Militia was used for them both officially as well as informally. Collectively, they were referred to as the Frontier Militia Corps, later shortened to Frontier Corps.

A different terminology was adopted in Balochistan, where Sir Robert Sandeman had raised tribal levies in 1866. However, his request to organize them on paramilitary lines under army officers was refused. In 1889, when he finally got the approval, he proposed the name of Zhob and Bori Rifles for his new unit.[3] But the Government changed the name to Zhob Levy Corps incorporating the term 'Levy' in the designation, which was

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[1] A quasi-official armed tribal force enlisted for local law enforcement duties.
[2] *Foreign Department Proceedings, Secret F, July 1898, No. 209.*
[3] *Foreign Department Proceedings, External A, March 1894, No. 53.*

already in use in Balochistan. The same nomenclature was adopted for the Mekran Levy Corps and Chagai Levy Corps, when they were raised in 1904 and 1905 respectively. The men of Zhob Levy Corps resented their designation, which they felt identified them as ordinary levies.[4] After several representations for a change in its designation, the Corps finally succeeded in being renamed as Zhob Militia in 1911, adopting the nomenclature in use in NWFP. When the Chagai and Mekran Levy Corps were reorganized as units of the Frontier Corps in 1948 and 1949, they were redesignated as Chagai Militia and Mekran Militia following the example of Zhob Militia.

However, when a new militia was raised in Chitral in 1903, it was called Chitral Scouts. This was because it was specifically raised as a 'Corps of Scouts', recruited from among the skilled Chitrali mountaineers to guard against the Russian threat from the north.[5] The situation in Chitral was different from other agencies, as there were no internal threats. The mission of Chitral Scouts was to scout the inaccessible mountain passes, and in case of a Russian incursion, to act as a screen and delaying force until the arrival of the Army.[6] The same applied to Gilgit, a peaceful agency, which the British had formed due to the Russian threat. In 1913, they raised a militia called the Corps of Gilgit Scouts on the pattern of Chitral Scouts and with the same purpose.

The Militia model suffered a setback during the Third Afghan War of 1919, when Zhob Militia, Khyber Rifles and North & South Waziristan Militias disintegrated under tribal pressure. After the war, the Khyber Rifles were disbanded,[7] while the Zhob Militia reverted to its old designation of Zhob Levy Corps.[8] Meanwhile, the Waziristan Militias were reorganized and

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[4] *Foreign Department Proceedings, External A, March 1897, Nos. 66-67.*
[5] *Administration Report of the North-West Frontier Province for 1903-04,* p. ii.
[6] *Military Report and Gazetteer on Chitral, 1928,* p. 61.
[7] The Khyber Rifles were re-raised in 1946.
[8] In 1928, the Zhob Levy Corps was again designated as Zhob Militia.

redesignated as Tochi Scouts and South Waziristan Scouts. This was because the term Militia no longer applied to them, as recruitment from Waziristan was stopped and all the men were from outside. The name Scouts was probably chosen because the two corps in Chitral and Gilgit were carrying that designation although the exact reason is not recorded.

Thus by 1922, only Kurram Militia was left with the designation of Militia, while four corps were designated as Scouts. Soon, the term Scout gained wide usage and became synonymous with the Frontier Corps. Starting with Pishin Scouts in 1946, all new Frontier Corps units were designated as Scouts. However, since 1973, several new corps have been designated as Rifles, probably to break the monotony of terminology. But whatever the designation of the corps, their men are called Scouts.

The naming of new Frontier Corps units also did not follow any fixed formula. Some were named after a place, while others after a tribe.[9] One was even named after a person.[10] In 2020, the naming criteria for the Frontier Corps were standardized. Now all corps are named after the geographical location, where they are permanently based.

[9] The Mahsud and Khattak Scouts, and the Bhittani Rifles.
[10] From 2008 to 2010, the Gomal Scouts were called Khushal Khattak Scouts, after Khushal Khan Khattak.

Appendix II
Genealogy of the Scouts

Genealogy of the older units of Scouts is complicated by their diverse origins. Some of them are descended from tribal levies that were disbanded on the raising of the militias. By claiming descent from these levies, they count their seniority from the dates of raising of the levies, which might not be technically correct. The seniority of each corps should logically be counted from the date they were organized as paramilitary militias. However, in keeping with the practice in vogue, the following list reckons the seniority from the dates of raising of the predecessors units of Frontier Corps.

The Khyber Rifles

1878 The Khyber Jezailchi Corps
1887 The Khyber Rifles
1919 Disbanded
1946 Re-raised

The Zhob Militia[*]

1889 The Zhob Levy Corps
1911 The Zhob Militia
1920 The Zhob Levy Corps
1928 The Zhob Militia

The Gilgit Scouts

1889 Punial Levies
1913 The Corps of Gilgit Scouts
1975 1 & 2 Northern Light Infantry

The Kurram Militia

1892 The Turi Militia
1893 The Kurram Militia

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[*] Frontier Corps (Balochistan).

The Tochi Scouts

1895 Tochi Levies
1900 The North Waziristan Militia
1922 The Tochi Scouts

The South Waziristan Scouts

1895 Wana Levies
1900 The South Waziristan Militia
1921 Disbanded
1922 The South Waziristan Scouts

The Nushki Militia*

1896 Chagai Levies
1905 The Chagai Levy Corps
1921 Disbanded
1925 Re-raised
1948 The Chagai Militia
2014 The Nushki Militia

The Chitral Scouts

1903 The Chitral Scouts
1942 The Chitral State Scouts
1956 The Chitral Scouts

The Mekran Militia

1904 The Mekran Levy Corps
1949 The Mekran Militia
1960 Disbanded

The Mohmand Militia

1916 The Mohmand Militia
1922 Disbanded

The Bara Rifles

1937 5th Road Construction Battalion
1938 The Mahsud Labour Battalion

1940 The Mahsud Battalion
1944 1st Mahsud Battalion
1965 1st Mahsud Scouts (Mizh)
1981 The Mahsud Scouts
2020 The Bara Rifles

The Maiwand Rifles*
1944 2nd Mahsud Battalion
1965 2nd Mahsud Scouts (Mizh)
1974 The Maiwand Rifles

The Chaman Scouts*
1946 The Pishin Scouts
2014 The Chaman Scouts

The Thall Scouts
1949 The Thall Scouts

The Northern Scouts
1949 The Northern Rifles
1949 The Northern Scouts
1975 3, 4, 5, 9 & 10 Northern Light Infantry

The Bajaur Scouts
1961 The Bajaur Scouts

The Karakoram Scouts
1964 The Karakoram Scouts
1975 6, 7 & 8 Northern Light Infantry

The Kalat Scouts*
1965 The Kalat Scouts

The Dir Scouts
1970 The Dir Scouts

The Sibi Scouts*
1971 The Sibi Scouts

The Shawal Rifles
1972 The North Waziristan Scouts
1973 The Shawal Rifles

The Mohmand Rifles
1973 The Mohmand Rifles

The Mekran Scouts*
1974 The Mekran Scouts

The Kohistan Scouts
1977 The Kohistan Scouts
1981 Disbanded

The Loralai Scouts*
1977 The Loralai Scouts

The Bambore Rifles*
1977 The Bambore Rifles

The Taftan Rifles*
1977 The Taftan Rifles

The Ghazaband Scouts*
1977 The Ghazaband Scouts

The Tirah Militia
1996 The Swat Scouts
2020 The Tirah Rifles
2023 The Tirah Militia

The Qilla Saifullah Scouts*
2003 The Bolan Scouts
2014 The Qilla Saifullah Scouts

The Panjgur Rifles*
2005 The Panjgur Rifles

The Dalbandin Rifles*
2006 The Dalbandin Rifles

The Awaran Militia*
2006 The Awaran Militia

The Gomal Scouts
2007 The Jandola Scouts
2008 The Khushal Khattak Scouts
2010 The Khattak Scouts
2020 The Gomal Scouts

The Orakzai Scouts
2007 The Orakzai Scouts

The Sui Rifles*
2010 The Sui Rifles

The Chiltan Rifles*
2016 The Chiltan Rifles

The Badar Rifles
2017 The Bhittani Rifles
2020 The Badar Rifles

The Kharan Rifles*
2018 The Kharan Rifles

The Dasht Scouts*
2018 The Dasht Scouts

The Buleda Rifles*
2023 The Buleda Rifles

The Preghar Scouts
2024 The Preghar Scouts

Appendix III
Headquarters Frontier Corps

At its inception in 1907, Headquarters Frontier Corps was called Office of the Inspecting Officer, Frontier Corps. It was housed in a building near the present Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The entire staff consisted of the Inspecting Officer and a few clerks. An Orderly Officer was posted in 1907, but a year later, the post was abolished. In 1932, the Inspecting Officer (IOFC) was redesignated as Inspecting Officer and Secretary, Frontier Corps, NWFP. The IOFC worked directly under the supervision of the Chief Commissioner (later Governor) NWFP. The responsibilities of IOFC were supervisory and administrative. He controlled the budget allocation of the various corps and co-ordinated their affairs including allotment of weapons and equipment. He also supervised their training and organization, and acted as liaison with the Army. During peacetime, units of the Frontier Corps were under the orders of Political Agents, while the Army assumed operational control in times of emergencies.

Initially, only the Khyber Rifles, Kurram Militia, and North & South Waziristan Militias were in the charge of Inspecting Officer. Between 1935 and 1944, Gilgit Scouts, Zhob Militia, Chitral Scouts and the two Mahsud Battalions were also placed under his supervision. Withdrawal of some military units from the Frontier during the Second World War led to an increase in the responsibilities of Frontier Corps. As a result, the appointment of Inspecting Officer was upgraded to that of a Brigadier in 1943, and redesignated as Inspector General Frontier Corps (IGFC). In 1945, two staff officers were posted to assist him. These included a Lieutenant Colonel as Deputy Inspector General (DIG) at Quetta to look after the affairs in Balochistan, and a Lieutenant Colonel (Administration) at Peshawar. A Mechanical Transport Officer (MTO) was posted in 1947.

Soon after independence, Pakistan withdrew the Army from Tribal Agencies and their place was taken by the Frontier Corps. Headquarters Frontier Corps was established on a proper footing, and in December 1948, it shifted to Fort Bala Hisar in Peshawar, which became its permanent home. In 1949, the post of Officer on Special Duty (OSD) was created to look after the affairs of the Frontier Corps in Gilgit and Baltistan. In 1960, the OSD was redesignated as DIGFC (North), while the DIG at Quetta became DIGFC (South). Growing professional commitments of Frontier Corps led to an increase in its staff. By 1967, there were nine staff officers posted in HQ Frontier Corps to look after operational and administrative affairs. Headed by a Lieutenant Colonel Staff, they included a GSO II, DAA&QMG, and GSO III, besides officers from Signals, Ordnance, EME and Education Corps. The post of Deputy Inspector General with the rank of Colonel was sanctioned in 1969; upgraded to Brigadier in 1983. The post of IGFC was upgraded to Major General in 1978.

At the time of independence, Governor NWFP as Agent to the Governor-General of Pakistan exercised control over the Frontier Corps. In 1955, when the provinces of West Pakistan were merged to form a single unit, this authority was assumed by Governor West Pakistan and the appointment of Secretary was removed from the designation of IGFC. On the dissolution of One Unit Scheme in 1970, the role of Governor NWFP was restored. The States & Frontier Regions Division of President's Secretariat looked after the affairs of Frontier Corps. In 1974, the Frontier Corps came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior.

To provide legal cover to the Frontier Corps, the North-West Frontier Constabulary Act, 1915, was applied to the Frontier Corps in 1925, after making the necessary modifications. It was further amended in 1937, followed by the promulgation of North-West Frontier Corps Law, 1941. After independence, the Government promulgated the Frontier Corps Ordinance, 1959, and

the Frontier Corps Rules, 1961, to regulate the affairs of Frontier Corps. The ordinance was amended in 1965, 1974 and 1981.

In 1974, the Frontier Corps was bifurcated into Frontier Corps (NWFP) and Frontier Corps (Baluchistan); the latter with its Headquarters at Quetta under its own Inspector General. The DIGFC (South) was redesignated as DIGFC (Baluchistan). A year later, the Gilgit, Northern and Karakoram Scouts were converted into Northern Light Infantry, and the appointment of DIGFC (North) was abolished. In 1983, a Record Wing was established at Warsak to look after records, postings, promotions and pensions of Frontier Corps personnel. Next year, 62 acres of land were acquired at Hayatabad to cater for the increased requirement of space. Since then, the FC Complex Hayatabad has grown into a large facility housing residential accommodations, schools and the new Frontier Corps Officers Mess, which was completed in 2017. The old mess is located on Kohat Road. HQ Frontier Corps maintains a brass band, which was raised in 1981.

The outbreak of militancy in 2001, led to restructuring of the Frontier Corps. In 2007, four Sector Headquarters were raised to meet new operational needs. In 2017, the Frontier Corps was bifurcated into FC Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North) at Peshawar, and FC Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (South), with its temporary Headquarters at Javed Sultan Camp, Wana. It will move to Chehkan near Dera Ismail Khan in 2024. After the merger of FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and abolition of Political Agencies in 2018, the Army assumed full administrative and operational control of FC. Since 2020, the Frontier Corps is in the process of reorganizing into formations on the pattern of infantry divisions under 11 Corps. Headquarters Frontier Corps have undergone further expansion and are organized into General Staff, Logistics, Administration, Coordination and Works Branches, each headed by a Colonel. Meanwhile, Sector Headquarters have been disbanded and each corps of Scouts is being reorganized as a brigade.

Fort Bala Hisar:[1] The imposing and historic Fort Bala Hisar in Peshawar has come to symbolize the Frontier Corps. Since 1948, Headquarters Frontier Corps has lovingly preserved this national treasure for posterity. Bala Hisar means 'high fortress' in Persian. The name was first used by the Afghan King Taimur Shah in the late 18th century, probably because it stands on a mound. Due to its strategic importance, the city of Peshawar has been fought over for centuries. It is quite conceivable that a fortress of some sort would have stood in the city from the time of its founding in the 6th century BC. However, the first recorded description of such a place is by the Chinese pilgrim Hiuen Tsang, who visited Peshawar in 630 AD. He mentions a fortified portion of the city, which housed the royal palace. Dr AH Dani, the eminent historian, has identified Hiuen Tsang's royal palace with Bala Hisar.

The first written account of a fort at the actual site of Bala Hisar is recorded in *Babur Nama* by the Mughal Emperor Babur, who captured it on his way to India. This fort was destroyed by Dilazak tribesmen but was rebuilt by Emperor Humanyun in 1553. It was again damaged in 1586, by followers of the Roshania sect during the reign of Emperor Akbar. A vast and beautiful garden was laid towards the north of the fort by the Mughal Governor Ali Mardan Khan during the reign of Emperor Shah Jahan. He was the same man, who had planned the Shalimar Gardens of Lahore, which is probably why the garden in Peshawar was also known by the same name. The garden survived until 1823, when it was destroyed by the Sikhs. Only portions of it now remain as Shahi Bagh and Jinnah Park.

In 1748, Ahmad Shah Abdali captured Peshawar from the Mughals. His son Taimur Shah made Peshawar the winter capital of Durrani Empire, with his palace in Fort Bala Hisar. Mountstuart Elphinstone, a British official, who visited Peshawar in 1809, has

[1] AH Dani, *Peshawar: Historic City of the Frontier,* pp. 168-171; and, Major Muhammad Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* pp. 45-57.

described the king's opulent palace at Bala Hisar in much detail, with its ornamented arches and pillars, and a large and beautiful garden. Unfortunately, the glory of Mughal and Durrani Bala Hisar did not last. In 1823, the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh captured Peshawar and in a fit of vindictiveness, demolished the fort and its surrounding gardens. However, realizing the folly of destroying a fortress of strategic importance, they rebuilt it in 1834. It was built with unburnt bricks and mud, and was but a shadow of its former splendour. The fort was renamed as Sumeir Garh. However, the name of Sumeir Garh did not survive the demise of the Sikh Kingdom.

After the conquest of the Sikh Kingdom in 1849, Peshawar came under the control of the British, who utilized Bala Hisar as an arsenal, storehouse and prison. Military barracks were constructed to house troops and artillery guns were sited on the inner bastions. Some of these guns still adorn the battlements. In the early 20th century, they replaced the old mud walls with masonry and gave the fort its present form. The fort is quadrangular in shape with outer and inner walls. There are four large circular bastions in the corners of the inner wall, which is 92 feet high and 13 feet wide at the top. The outer wall of the fort is 30 feet high and has 12 smaller bastions. The fort is spread over 15.4 acres. Most of the buildings in the fort date from the British period or were constructed after Independence.

In December 1948, Bala Hisar became the Headquarters of Frontier Corps, who have carefully preserved the old structures. There are two shrines on the premises of the fort, which is open to citizens on public holidays. The fort houses an impressive museum of the Frontier Corps, along with galleries depicting the tribal culture of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In 2022-23, the fort underwent major renovation work, which has restored its walls and other structures to their former glory.

Frontier Corps Week: The Frontier Corps Week is an annual week-long event held at Peshawar in November. It pre-dates Independence, and previously, it was held at different locations hosted by individual corps. It is an elaborate gala affair that combines the Annual Command Conference and the Subedar Majors' Conference with a Reunion of the Frontier Corps. Important issues related to the Frontier Corps are discussed during these conferences, while the reunion provides an opportunity for the veterans to reconnect with their old comrades and share their experiences with serving officers and men. These interactions maintain continuity of traditions and help foster *esprit de corps*.

Inter-corps sports, firing and training competitions form an important part of the celebrations. The highlight of these is the IGFC Polo Tournament. Besides showcasing the martial spirit of the Scouts, other events promote their history, culture and traditions with band and tribal dance displays. A unique feature of the Frontier Corps Week, which sets it apart from other regimental reunions, is the engagement of civil authorities and the general public in the festivities. It gives the people an opportunity to appreciate the role and services of the Frontier Corps and develop an ownership of it. It is also a time to honour and remember the sacrifices of *Shuhada* and their families, who are also part of the celebrations. The week culminates in the Frontier Corps Dinner, attended by serving and retired officers, and other dignitaries.

Because of the unsettled conditions prevailing in the country due to militancy, it has not been possible to hold the event on a regular basis in recent years. It was last held in 2019, after a gap of three years. It is hoped that after improvement in the security situation, this great Frontier Corps tradition will once again become a regular event.

Appendix IV
Units of the Frontier Corps

The Khyber Rifles

Torzan*

Khyber Rifles, the Guardians of Khyber Pass, were raised as a tribal levy at the start of the Second Afghan War in 1878, for the protection of Khyber Pass. They were initially known as Khyber Jezailchis, becoming Khyber Rifles in 1887, when they exchanged their jezails for rifles. Captain Gilbert Gaisford was their first Commandant. The Corps was disbanded in 1919. It was re-raised in 1946, by reconstitution of 1st Afridi Battalion, a war-raised unit of the Frontier Force Regiment, which had served in the Middle East during the Second World War. The Khyber Rifles have seven wings with their Headquarters at Landi Kotal. Their mission is to guard the international border with Afghanistan, manage the border crossing at Torkham and internal security of Landi Kotal, Jamrud and Jarobi in District Khyber. They are part of Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).

Major Operations

1.	Black Mountain Expedition	1888
2.	Black Mountain Expedition	1891-92
3.	Frontier Uprising	1897
4.	Bazar Valley Expedition	1908
5.	Third Afghan War	1919
6.	Indo-Pakistan War	1948
7.	Indo-Pakistan War	1965
8.	Indo-Pakistan War	1971
9.	Counterterrorism Operations	2001-18

Shuhada 155

* Valiant.

Gallantry Awards

Indian Order of Merit	8
Sitara-i-Jurat	1
Sitara-i-Basalat	4
Tamgha-i-Jurat	3
Tamgha-i-Basalat	17
Imtiazi Sanad	8

Honorary Colonels

1. Lt Col Muhammad Aslam Khan, CIE, OBI	1897
2. Lt Col Sir George Roos-Keppel, GCSI, KCIE	1909
3. Brig Sir Hissam-ud-Din, HQA, CIE, OBI, IDSM	1947

Commandants

1. Capt Gilbert Gaisford	1879
2. Lt Col Muhammad Aslam Khan, CIE, OBI	1881
3. Capt FJH Barton	1897
4. Lt Col GO Roos-Keppel, CIE	1900
5. Maj BEM Gurdon	1908
6. Capt JR Broun	1909
7. Maj AL Bickford	1910
8. Maj CW Keene	1912
9. Lt Col CH Campbell	1916
Disbanded in 1919. Re-raised in 1946.	
10. Lt Col JR Booth, DSO & Bar	1946
11. Lt Col M Sharif Khan, MBE	1947
12. Lt Col JM Penly	1948
13. Lt Col HP Hearn	1948
14. Lt Col Sardar Iftikhar-ud-din	1949
15. Lt Col M Zarif Khan, MC	1951
16. Lt Col M Abbas Khan	1954
17. Lt Col M Sherin Khan	1956
18. Lt Col M Nisar Ahmad	1958
19. Lt Col M Ibrahim	1961
20. Lt Col Ghulam Dastgir, TQA	1965

21. Lt Col Gaideen Khan Abdullai	1966
22. Lt Col Rashid Ahmed, SJ	1971
23. Lt Col AH Moghal	1972
24. Lt Col Ali Gohar, SBt	1973
25. Lt Col DP Gilani	1975
26. Lt Col Mosam Khan Wazir, SBt	1978
27. Lt Col Muhammad Asif Khan	1979
28. Lt Col Sher Ur Rehman, SJ	1981
29. Lt Col Azmat Riaz	1983
30. Lt Col Mahboob Ali Shah, TBt	1985
31. Lt Col Muhammad Iqbal Khattak	1987
32. Lt Col Syed Khizar Hayat	1988
33. Col Hassan Shah	1992
34. Col Muhammad Saddiq Khan	1994
35. Col Malik Naeem Ullah Khan	1996
36. Col Muhammad Fareed Ullah Khan	1999
37. Col Taqdees Ahmad Lodhi	2001
38. Col Muhammad Riaz Shahid	2003
39. Col Qaisar Alam	2005
40. Col Furqan Ullah Khan Tareen	2008
41. Col Amir Akbar Khan	2010
42. Col Asad Farooq	2010
43. Col Muhammad Fayyaz Mughal	2011
44. Col Mansoor Ahmad Janjua	2013
45. Col Tariq Hafeez	2014
46. Col Umar Farooq Hayat	2016
47. Col Farrukh Humanyun	2017
48. Col Bilal Mahmud	2019
49. Col Rizwan Ullah Nazir	2020
50. Col Muhammad Nauman Ul Haq	2022
51. Col Asim Aziz Kayani	2023

The Kurram Militia

Har Dam Tayyar*

The Kurram Militia was raised as Turi Militia at Balish Khel on 18 October 1892, by Captain CM Dallas, Assistant Commissioner Kurram. In December, Captain EWSK Maconchy, DSO, was posted as its first Commandant. In 1893, it was renamed as Kurram Militia and moved to Parachinar, which became its permanent home. The mission of Kurram Militia is the protection of international border and internal security of Parachinar, Kharlachi and Ali Mangola in District Kurram with six wings. It is part of Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (South).

Major Operations

1. Frontier Uprising	1897
2. Third Afghan War	1919
3. Indo-Pakistan War	1948
4. Indo-Pakistan War	1965
5. Indo-Pakistan War	1971
6. Counterterrorism Operations	2001-18

Shuhada 90

Gallantry Awards

Distinguished Service Order	1
Indian Order of Merit	3
Indian Distinguished Service Medal	7
Sitara-i-Jurat	1
Sitara-i-Basalat	2
Tamgha-i-Jurat	1
Tamgha-i-Basalat	8
Imtiazi Sanad	4

Commandants

1. Capt EWSK Maconchy, DSO	1892

* Fighting Fit.

2. Capt GO Roos-Keppel, CIE	1894
3. Capt GL Carter	1897
4. Capt JF Finnis	1904
5. Capt G Chrystie	1905
6. Maj JS Kemball	1906
7. Maj GJ Davis	1912
8. Maj AC Tancock	1914
9. Maj PCR Dodd, DSO	1917
10. Maj RH Wilson, MC	1920
11. Maj FCG Campbell, MC	1923
12. Maj AHA Empson	1925
13. Maj KGH Cates	1928
14. Maj BMacM Mahon, DSO, MC	1931
15. Maj SS Lavender	1934
16. Maj GF Taylor	1937
17. Maj RS Johnson	1941
18. Lt Col WD Francis, MBE	1943
19. Lt Col HE Garland	1946
20. Lt Col EE French, MC	1947
21. Lt Col HP Hearn	1949
22. Lt Col Aziz Ud Din	1950
23. Lt Col Said Ali Khan	1951
24. Lt Col Sardar Abdul Alim Khan	1953
25. Lt Col Sultan Mohammad Khan	1955
26. Lt Col Fazal-e-Haq	1958
27. Lt Col SN Shah Khan	1959
28. Lt Col Arham Khan Effendi	1961
29. Lt Col Raja Khurshid Ahmed	1965
30. Lt Col Ghulam Dastgir, TQA	1966
31. Lt Col Agha Aman Shah, SBt	1968
32. Lt Col Faqir Gul Khattak	1972
33. Lt Col Aman Ullah Khan Niazi	1973
34. Lt Col Muhammad Hanif Malik, SJ	1976

35. Lt Col Aziz Khan Khattak	1980
36. Lt Col Sher Ur Rehman, SJ	1983
37. Lt Col Rahat Khan	1985
38. Lt Col Inam Ullah Khan	1987
39. Lt Col Shakir Ullah Jan	1989
40. Lt Col Abdul Salam	1990
41. Col Rab Nawaz Khan	1992
42. Col Syed Abid Shah	1994
43. Col Shah Jam Khan	1998
44. Col Hamid Iqbal Khattak	2001
45. Col Muhammad Ashfaq Afridi	2002
46. Col Ahmad Yar Bhatti	2005
47. Col Qaisar Zulkiffal Bhatti	2005
48. Col Qazi Muhammad Riaz	2007
49. Col Tausif Akhtar	2009
50. Col Shirjeel Agha	2011
51. Col Maqbool Ahmad Khan	2013
52. Col Malik Muhammad Umar	2015
53. Col Rasheed Javed	2017
54. Col Jameel Ur Rehman Dehpal	2019
55. Col Amin Ul Haq	2021
56. Col Taimur Sultan	2022

The Tochi Scouts

Da Turo Shrang*

The Tochi Scouts were raised as North Waziristan Militia at Idak, North Waziristan, on 1 June 1900, by Captain AF Ferguson-Davie, DSO. In 1904, their Headquarters moved to Miranshah, where they have stayed ever since. In 1922, they were renamed as Tochi Scouts. Their mission is to guard the international border with Afghanistan and internal security of Miranshah and Ghulam Khan in District North Waziristan with six wings. They are part of Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (South).

Major Operations

1. First World War	1914-15
2. Third Afghan War	1919
3. Waziristan Uprising	1919-20
4. Waziristan Uprising	1936-37
5. Operation Curzon	1947
6. Indo-Pakistan War	1948
7. Dir-Bajaur Operation	1960-61
8. Indo-Pakistan War	1965
9. Indo-Pakistan War	1971
10. Counterterrorism Operations	2001-18
Shuhada	279

Gallantry Awards

Victoria Cross	1
Distinguished Service Order	2
Indian Order of Merit	11
Military Cross	15
Indian Distinguished Service Medal	36
Sitara-i-Jurat	3

* Swift as a Slashing Sword.

Sitara-i-Basalat	2
Tamgha-i-Jurat	6
Tamgha-i-Basalat	95
Imtiazi Sanad	13

Commandants

1. Capt AF Ferguson-Davie, DSO	1900
2. Capt G Dodd	1904
3. Capt CW Keene	1908
4. Maj DH McNeile	1909
5. Maj CA Smith	1911
6. Maj GB Scott, DSO	1913
7. Maj GH Russell, DSO	1919
8. Capt FCG Campbell, MC	1921
9. Maj CET Erskine, DSO, MC	1922
10. Maj WL Farwell	1927
11. Maj FH Mardall	1930
12. Maj RD Ambrose, MC	1933
13. Maj A Felix-Williams, MC	1936
14. Maj WH Fitz-Maurice	1939
15. Lt Col RP Taylor	1942
16. Lt Col PB Janson, OBE	1943
17. Lt Col W Sandison, DSO, OBE	1946
18. Lt Col Sadiq Ullah Khan, MC	1948
19. Lt Col Aziz Ud Din	1951
20. Lt Col Rakhman Gul, MC	1952
21. Lt Col Sarfaraz Khan	1956
22. Lt Col Aman Ullah Khan, TPk	1958
23. Lt Col Taifur Ul Islam	1961
24. Lt Col Muhammad Aslam	1962
25. Lt Col Muhammad Hanif, SJ	1967
26. Lt Col Muhammad Akram	1968
27. Lt Col Muhammad Azam	1971
28. Lt Col Muhammad Ashiq Shah	1972

29. Lt Col Bashir Hussain	1975
30. Lt Col Muhammad Akram, TI (M)	1978
31. Lt Col Nabi Ahmed	1980
32. Lt Col M Anwar Khan Amir	1982
33. Lt Col Fazl-e-Moeed, SJ	1985
34. Lt Col Hidayat Ullah	1986
35. Lt Col Hazrat Ghulam Afridi	1987
36. Lt Col Nowsher Muhammad	1991
37. Lt Col Zahid Pervez	1993
38. Lt Col Khurshid Alam	1995
39. Lt Col Saadullah Baig, TI (M)	1997
40. Col Ghulam Hassan	1998
41. Col Wajahat Ahmed Chaudhry	2000
42. Col Ashiq Hussain	2002
43. Col Waheed Khan Bangash	2004
44. Col Yousaf Iqbal	2005
45. Col Tariq Mahmood	2007
46. Col Muhammad Ashraf	2009
47. Col Amir Akbar Khan	2010
48. Col Syed Wajahat Irfan Hamdani	2011
49. Col Mushtaq Hussain	2013
50. Col Fayyaz Ahmed Khan Sial	2014
51. Col Jahanzeb Sahi	2016
52. Col Shahzad Nazir	2018
53. Col Zarar Qadir Baluch	2019
54. Col Syed Usman Haider	2020
55. Brig Muhammad Rizwan Sharif	2022

The South Waziristan Scouts

Narina Pa Maidan Ke Mree*

The South Waziristan Scouts were raised as South Waziristan Militia at Tank, by Major Richard Harman, DSO, on 1 July 1900. They were disbanded in 1921, only to be re-raised in 1922, as South Waziristan Scouts. Their Headquarters are located at Wana. Their mission is to guard the international border with Afghanistan and internal security of Wana and Angoor Ada in South Waziristan with seven wings. They are part of Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (South).

Major Operations

1. Third Afghan War	1919
2. Waziristan Uprising	1919-20
3. Waziristan Uprising	1936-37
4. Operation Curzon	1947
5. Indo-Pakistan War	1965
6. Indo-Pakistan War	1971
7. Kargil Conflict	1999
8. Counterterrorism Operations	2002-18

Shuhada	138

Gallantry Awards

Distinguished Service Order	2
Indian Order of Merit	11
Military Cross	8
Indian Distinguished Service Medal	31
Sitara-i-Jurat	2
Sitara-i-Basalat	6
Tamgha-i-Jurat	2
Tamgha-i-Basalat	49
Imtiazi Sanad	19

* Men Prefer Death in the Field.

Commandants

1. Lt Col Richard Harman, DSO	1900
2. Maj ALeG Jacob, DSO	1905
3. Maj RS Paul	1906
4. Maj G Dodd	1910
5. Maj JC Simpson	1914
6. Lt Col GEP Davis	1917
Disbanded in July 1921. Re-raised in January 1922.	
7. Maj OD Bennett	1922
8. Maj GH Russell, DSO	1922
9. Maj SP Williams	1924
10. Capt HH Johnson, MM	1929
11. Maj NRC Cosby, MC	1930
12. Maj PRH Skrine, DSO	1935
13. Maj DHJ Williams, OBE	1937
14. Lt Col DLO Woods, OBE	1941
15. Lt Col DR Venning, MC	1944
16. Lt Col ACS Moore	1947
17. Lt Col KH Chambers	1947
18. Maj DK Oldrini, MC	1948
19. Lt Col Khushwaqt-ul-Mulk	1948
20. Lt Col JH Harvey-Kelly	1950
21. Lt Col Abdul Jabbar	1950
22. Lt Col Abdul Hafiz Afridi	1953
23. Lt Col Aman Ullah Khan	1954
24. Lt Col M Nawaz Khan	1955
25. Lt Col Karamat Ullah Khan, TPk	1956
26. Lt Col Mohammad Ishaq	1962
27. Lt Col M Mobin Khan	1962
28. Lt Col SAR Durrani, TQA	1964
29. Lt Col Abdul Matin	1966
30. Lt Col Ahmad Khan	1969
31. Lt Col Ali Gohar	1972

32. Lt Col Raja Khan	1973
33. Lt Col Faqir Gul Khattak	1975
34. Lt Col M Mumtaz Ali	1979
35. Lt Col M Javid Yunus, SJ	1980
36. Lt Col Shamim Alam Lodhi	1981
37. Lt Col Abdur Rahman	1984
38. Lt Col Iftikhar Ahmad	1985
39. Lt Col Mohammad Shafique	1986
40. Lt Col Aziz Ur Rahman	1988
41. Lt Col Rahim Zad Khan	1990
42. Lt Col Faqir Tariq Masud	1994
43. Col Asmat Jamal	1998
44. Col Absar Ahmed	1999
45. Col Muhammad Saeed, TBt	2001
46. Col Khalid Usman	2003
47. Col Zar Muhammad	2004
48. Col Muhammad Saqib	2007
49. Col Hamid Farooq	2009
50. Col Ali Atif	2011
51. Col Muhammad Ejaz	2013
52. Col Tamour Daud Khan	2015
53. Col Ajaz Ahmed Khan	2017
54. Col Muhammad Waseem Altaf	2019
55. Brig Muhammad Awais Shamim	2021

The Chitral Scouts

Chaq o Choband *

The Chitral Scouts were raised at Chitral, by Captain Henry de Courcy O'Grady on 23 July 1903. Their Headquarters shifted to Drosh in 1926, and then back to Chitral in 1992. Their mission is to guard the frontier with Afghanistan and internal security of Drosh, Garam Chashma and Domail in District Chitral with six wings. The Corps is mostly composed of Chitralis and is part of Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).

Major Operations

1. Third Afghan War	1919
2. Indo-Pakistan War	1948
3. Dir-Bajaur Operation	1960-61
4. Indo-Pakistan War	1971
5. Kargil Conflict	1999
6. Counterterrorism Operations	2007-18

Shuhada 129

Gallantry Awards

Distinguished Service Order	1
Indian Order of Merit	3
Military Cross	1
Indian Distinguished Service Medal	2
Tamgha-i-Basalat	6
Imtiazi Sanad	2

Honorary Commandants

1. Sir Shuja ul-Mulk, KCIE, Mehtar of Chitral	1903
2. Lt Col Sir Nasir ul-Mulk, KCIE, Mehtar of Chitral	1936
3. Lt Col Muzaffar ul-Mulk, Mehtar of Chitral	1943
4. Saif ur-Rahman, Mehtar of Chitral	1949

* Ready Aye Ready.

Commandants

1.	Capt HdeC O'Grady	1903
2.	Capt R Ducat	1906
3.	Capt TRH Keppel	1909
4.	Capt HFD Stirling	1912
5.	Capt RDO Hill	1914
6.	Maj DLR Lorimer	1915
7.	Maj NE Reilly	1915
8.	Capt WR Hay	1921
9.	Capt TI Bowers, MC	1923
10.	Capt CEU Bremner, MC	1924
11.	Capt WL Farwell	1925
12.	Capt WPH Gorringe	1927
13.	Capt WV Crapp	1931
14.	Capt HCL Youngman	1932
15.	Capt RJFA Lawder	1935
16.	Capt HS Stansfeld	1938
17.	Maj MWH White, MBE	1939
18.	Capt RF Barbour	1946
19.	Capt DH Foskette	1947
20.	Maj DK Oldrini, MC	1949
21.	Maj M Bashir Ahmed	1949
22.	Lt Col M Zarif Khan	1951
23.	Lt Col Sardar Iftikhar-ud-din	1951
24.	Lt Col Arham Khan Effendi	1952
25.	Lt Col M Nawaz Khan	1955
26.	Lt Col Mir Wali Khan	1955
27.	Lt Col Fazl-e-Haq	1957
28.	Lt Col Muhammad Sadiq Maan	1958
29.	Lt Col Malik Gul Sher Khan	1959
30.	Lt Col Zia Ul Haq	1961
31.	Lt Col Shaukat Sultan	1964
32.	Lt Col Mohammad Sher Khan, SJ	1966

33. Lt Col IA Shah Gillani	1970
34. Lt Col Fahim Ullah Khan Khattak	1971
35. Lt Col Muhammad Afzal Khan	1971
36. Lt Col Basharat Ahmed Sultan, SJ & Bar	1974
37. Lt Col Murad Khan Nayyar, TI (M), TBt	1977
38. Col Hameed Ullah Pawar	1989
39. Col Akhtar Zamin	1990
40. Col Syed Amjad Mukhtar Shah	1991
41. Col Javed Kamal Meyer	1993
42. Col Faheem Anwar	1994
43. Col Zahirullah	1995
44. Col Umar Hayat Khan	1997
45. Col Muhammad Tariq Khan, SI (M), SBt	1999
46. Col Muhammad Hanif	2000
47. Col Tasadduq Hussain Zahid	2001
48. Col Khalil Tahir	2003
49. Col Zahid Hussain	2005
50. Col Sohail Iqbal	2007
51. Col Rizwan Rafi, TBt	2009
52. Col Zafar Iqbal Kasana	2010
53. Col Haroon Rashid	2010
54. Col Nasir Khan Jadoon	2011
55. Col Naeem Iqbal	2013
56. Col Nizam Ud Din Shah	2015
57. Col Moeen Ud Din	2017
58. Col Muhammad Ali Zafar	2020
59. Col Sami Zaman Khan	2021
60. Col Bilal Jawaid	2023

The Bara Rifles

Ting Sha Mizh Daraghlu *

The Bara Rifles were raised as the 5th Road Construction Battalion at Razmak by Major RS Johnson on 9 August 1937. It was composed entirely of Mahsuds. In 1938, it was designated as Mahsud Labour Battalion and placed under the Frontier Corps. In 1940, it became Mahsud Battalion, and in 1944, 1st Mahsud Battalion. In 1960, the unit was reorganized as Scouts. In 1965, its designation was changed to 1st Mahsud Scouts (Mizh); becoming Mahsud Scouts in 1981; and Bara Rifles in 2020. Their Headquarters are located at Fort Salop in Bara Tehsil of District Khyber since 1962. Their mission is the internal security of Bara with six wings. They are part of Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).

Major Operations

1. Indo-Pakistan War	1948
2. Dir-Bajaur Operation	1960-61
3. Kalat Operation	1964
4. Indo-Pakistan War	1971
5. Counterterrorism Operations	2007-18

Shuhada 148

Gallantry Awards

Sitara-i-Jurat	3
Sitara-i-Basalat	4
Tamgha-i-Jurat	1
Tamgha-i-Basalat	48
Imtiazi Sanad	15

Commandants

1. Maj RS Johnson	1937
2. Lt HG Conroy	1938

* Get Ready We Are Coming.

3. Maj JH Souter, MC	1938
4. Maj WD Francis, MBE	1939
5. Lt Col REFG North	1942
6. Maj HTL Cole	1944
7. Maj ACA Ward	1944
8. Lt Col DHJ Williams, OBE	1945
9. Lt Col EE French, MC	1946
10. Maj M Hasham Khan Mahsud	1947
11. Lt Col ED Tims, OBE	1948
12. Maj Mir Badshah	1951
13. Maj M Said Hanif	1959
14. Maj Sayyed Mian Badshah, TBt	1961
15. Maj Muhammad Sabir Khan	1964
16. Maj Saghir Ahmad Ansari	1966
17. Maj Abdul Qadir	1968
18. Maj Saghir Ahmad Ansari	1969
19. Maj Jaffar Khan	1969
20. Maj Akbar Gul Afridi	1969
21. Maj SM Durrani	1970
22. Maj Mohammad Effendi	1970
23. Maj Abdul Samad	1971
24. Maj Abdul Raheem Khan	1972
25. Maj S Riaz Abbas Haider	1972
26. Maj DK Afridi	1972
27. Maj Arbab Hamid Ahmad	1973
28. Maj M Khurshid Khan	1973
29. Maj M Alamgir Khan	1973
30. Maj Sikandar Muhammad	1975
31. Lt Col Abdul Qadir	1975
32. Lt Col Mosam Khan Wazir, SBt, TI (M)	1979
33. Lt Col Shah Dad Khan	1980
34. Lt Col Fazl-e-Moeed, SJ	1982
35. Lt Col Abdul Jameel	1984

36. Lt Col Abdul Akbar	1987
37. Lt Col Anwar Jan Babar	1989
38. Lt Col Muhammad Arif	1991
39. Lt Col Sabir Hussain	1993
40. Col Sikandar Ilyas Lodhi	1993
41. Col Muhammad Tariq Khan, SI (M), SBt	1995
42. Col Zakir Hussain	1999
43. Col Israr Ul Haq	2001
44. Col Hameed Iqbal, TBt	2003
45. Col Mahmood Raza	2005
46. Col Mujahid Hussain	2007
47. Col Naseer Ahmad Janjua	2009
48. Col Jawad Zia	2011
49. Col Muhammad Naeem Sarwar, TI (M), TBt	2013
50. Col Muhammad Ayub Sabir Sukhera	2014
51. Col Ahmad Saeed	2016
52. Col M Ahmad Madni	2018
53. Col Nadeem Mushtaq Warraich	2020
54. Col Zabih Ullah	2022
55. Brig Muhammad Ali Adil	2023

The Thall Scouts

Pasdaran*

The Thall Scouts were raised at Fort Thall as Frontier Corps Reserve by Major Sanaullah Khan on 1 April 1948. Their Headquarters are located at Thall and their mission is to guard the frontier with Afghanistan and the internal security of Thall and Alizai with six wings. They are part of Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (South).

Major Operations

1. Kalat Operation	1959
2. Dir-Bajaur Operation	1960-61
3. Indo-Pakistan War	1965
4. Indo-Pakistan War	1971
5. Kargil Conflict	1999
6. Counterterrorism Operations	2002-18

Shuhada 148

Gallantry Awards

Tamgha-i-Basalat	38
Imtiazi Sanad	4

Commandants

1. Maj M Sanaullah Khan	1948
2. Maj Muhammad Iqbal Khan	1951
3. Maj Khawaja Muhammad Khan	1955
4. Maj Muhammad Iqbal Khan	1957
5. Maj Muhammad Ajaib Gul	1959
6. Maj Hamid Ahmad Kaleem	1961
7. Maj Muhammad Hayat	1962
8. Maj Muhammad Hanif	1963
9. Maj Khushlim Khan	1964

* The Custodians.

10. Maj Mosam Khan Wazir, SBt	1971
11. Maj Muhammad Sarfaraz Khan	1977
12. Maj Abdul Jalil Afridi	1978
13. Lt Col Sardar Khan	1982
14. Lt Col Muhammad Ateeq	1983
15. Lt Col Saif Ur Rahman Afridi	1986
16. Lt Col Abdul Salam	1989
17. Col Nusrat Abbas	1990
18. Col Shahbaz Ul Haq	1991
19. Col Muhammad Tariq Khan	1993
20. Col Syed Shahadat Hussain	1994
21. Col Mushtaq Hussain	1995
22. Col Faiz Muhammad Afridi	1998
23. Col Khalid Mahmood Janjua	2001
24. Col Abdul Qayyum Janjua	2003
25. Col Raja Tariq Mahmood, TBt	2005
26. Col Khizar Asad	2007
27. Col Muhammad Shuaib Anwar	2009
28. Col Zia Ullah	2011
29. Col Muhammad Salman	2013
30. Col Munir Ahmad Asad	2015
31. Col Mubashir Nadeem	2017
32. Col Muhammad Atif Mushtaq	2019
33. Col Atif Ijaz Chaudhry	2021
34. Col Khubaib Rasool	2022

The Bajaur Scouts

Nangyalai da Zamanai *

The Bajaur Scouts were raised at Munda, Lower Dir, by Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Karim on 1 April 1961. Their Headquarters shifted to Khar in 1962. Their mission is to guard the frontier with Afghanistan and internal security of Khar, Kit Kot and Pashat in Bajaur with eight wings. They are part of Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).

Major Operations

1. Dir-Bajaur Operation	1961-62
2. Indo-Pakistan War	1965
3. Indo-Pakistan War	1971
4. Kargil Conflict	1999
5. Counterterrorism Operations	2001-18

Shuhada 201

Gallantry Awards

Sitara-i-Jurat	1
Sitara-i-Basalat	3
Tamgha-i-Jurat	2
Tamgha-i-Basalat	35
Imtiazi Sanad	8

Commandants

1. Lt Col Abdul Karim	1961
2. Lt Col Muhammad Mumtaz Khan, SJ	1966
3. Lt Col Saeed Ullah Khan	1968
4. Lt Col Ishtiaq Ali Shah Gilani	1971

* Most Honourable Men of the Time. Adapted from the famous couplet of Khushal Khan Khattak inscribed on his tombstone: *Da Afghan pa nang mai watarala toora, nangyalai da zamanai Khushal Khattak yem* (I have taken up the sword to defend the pride of the Afghan, I am Khushal Khattak, the honourable man of the age).

5. Lt Col Raja Khan	1972
6. Lt Col Abdul Haq Mughal	1973
7. Lt Col Muhammad Azam	1974
8. Lt Col Bashir Khan, TBt	1977
9. Lt Col Sabir Hussain	1979
10. Lt Col Zafar Mahmood	1982
11. Lt Col Fazle Wadud	1984
12. Lt Col Syed Amin Shah	1986
13. Col Muhammad Iqbal Khan	1989
14. Col Jamshaid Khan	1992
15. Col Zahin Ullah Khan	1994
16. Col Qazi Sheraz	1995
17. Col Abdul Matin Afridi	1999
18. Col Saleem Zaman	2001
19. Col Manzar Akbar	2003
20. Col Amal Zada Khan	2006
21. Col Muhammad Nauman Saeed, SBt	2008
22. Col Muhammad Nawaz	2010
23. Col Muhammad Shakeel Janjua	2011
24. Col Mir Ameer Ali	2013
25. Col Nayyar Zaman	2015
26. Col Rekhman Kadir Khan	2017
27. Col Suleman Khalid	2019
28. Col Waqas Shoaib Jan	2021
29. Brig Rao Imran Sartaj	2022
30. Brig Mohsin Javaid	2023

The Dir Scouts

Shaheen Da Dango Ghrono*

The Dir Scouts were raised at Chakdara by Lieutenant Colonel Shah Behram Khattak, SJ, on 1 April 1970. The Headquarters shifted to Timergara in 1978. Their mission is to guard the frontier with Afghanistan and internal security of Timergara and Torghundi in Dir with six wings. They are part of Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).

Major Operations

1. Indo-Pakistan War	1971
2. Balochistan Insurgency	1973
3. Counterterrorism Operations	2004-18

Shuhada 103

Gallantry Awards

Sitara-i-Basalat	1
Tamgha-i-Basalat	27
Imtiazi Sanad	3

Commandants

1. Lt Col Shah Behram Khattak, SJ	1970
2. Lt Col Muhammad Taufiq Mirza	1973
3. Lt Col Sanjaf Khan	1977
4. Lt Col Abdul Qadir, TI (M)	1979
5. Lt Col Saadat Hussain	1985
6. Lt Col Javed Ahmed	1988
7. Col Gul Yousaf	1990
8. Lt Col Muhammad Yousaf	1990
9. Col Khalid Latif Janjua	1992
10. Col Ihsan Ullah Khan, SJ, SI (M)	1993
11. Col Asad Munir	1995

* Mountain Eagles.

12. Col Shah Jahan Khan	1997
13. Lt Col Wazir Muhammad	1998
14. Lt Col Khalid Khan	1998
15. Lt Col Abdul Rauf	2001
16. Lt Col Tila Muhammad	2002
17. Lt Col Muhammad Imtiaz Khan	2005
18. Col M Arshad Javed Kasana	2007
19. Col Nadeem Mirza	2009
20. Col Qadeer Ahmed	2010
21. Col Muhammad Kamran Aslam	2011
22. Col Nusar Umar Hayat Laleka	2013
23. Col Khalid Mahmood Shafi	2015
24. Col Shahzad Amir	2017
25. Col Mujtaba Haider	2019
26. Col Musawar Khan	2021
27. Brig Sana Ullah	2023

The Shawal Rifles

Da Ghrono Zalmee*

The Shawal Rifles were raised as North Waziristan Scouts at Landi Kotal by Major Akbar Gul Afridi on 1 September 1972. In 1973, they were redesignated as Shawal Rifles and their Headquarters were established at Razmak. Their mission is to guard the frontier with Afghanistan and internal security of Razmak, Mana and Utman Khel in North Waziristan with six wings. They are part of Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (South).

Major Operations

Counterterrorism Operations	2002-18

Shuhada 157

Gallantry Awards

Sitara-i-Basalat	1
Tamgha-i-Basalat	64
Imtiazi Sanad	2

Commandants

1. Maj Akbar Gul Afridi	1972
2. Lt Col Aman Ullah Khan Niazi	1973
3. Lt Col Faqir Gul Khattak	1973
4. Lt Col Aman Ullah Khan	1973
5. Lt Col Abdul Waheed Mughal	1976
6. Lt Col Sheraz Khan	1978
7. Lt Col Asadullah Khan	1981
8. Lt Col Masud Pervez	1982
9. Lt Col Nasrullah Khan	1985
10. Lt Col Muhammad Riaz	1988
11. Lt Col Muhammad Ali Khan	1990

* Men Who Dare Mountains.

12. Lt Col Muhammad Rahman	1991
13. Col Javed Kamal	1992
14. Col Muhammad Aslam Khattak	1993
15. Lt Col Haider Ali Khan	1995
16. Lt Col Eid Marjan	1996
17. Lt Col Dil Nawaz Wazir	1997
18. Maj Ch Muhammad Arif	2000
19. Lt Col Syed Khalid Hassan	2001
20. Lt Col Muhammad Shafiq Khan	2003
21. Lt Col Aurangzeb Khan	2005
22. Col Ali Raza Malhi	2007
23. Col Muhammad Asif	2009
24. Col Zakir Ahmed Khan	2010
25. Col Mazhar Hussain, TBt	2011
26. Col Tariq Javed	2013
27. Col Mahmood Ejaz Malik	2015
28. Col Shakil Ahmed	2015
29. Col Muhammad Shahzad Saeed	2017
30. Col Waheed Alam	2019
31. Col Muhammad Nazim Hanif Khan	2021
32. Brig Muhammad Noman Munir	2022

The Mohmand Rifles

Narina Jang Ta Pa Khanda Zi [*]

The Mohmand Rifles were raised on 23 November 1973, at Yousaf Khel, Mohmand Agency, by Lieutenant Colonel Yar Gul Bangash. In 1980, their Headquarters shifted to Ghalanai. Their mission is to guard the frontier with Afghanistan and internal security of Ghalanai, Mamad Gat and Yousaf Khel in Mohmand with seven wings. They are part of Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).

Major Operations

Counterterrorism Operations	2003-18

Shuhada 211

Gallantry Awards

Sitara-i-Basalat	2
Tamgha-i-Basalat	37
Imtiazi Sanad	18

Commandants

1. Lt Col Yar Gul Bangash	1973
2. Lt Col Mosam Khan Wazir, SBt	1976
3. Lt Col Qudrat Ullah Khan	1978
4. Lt Col Muhammad Shoaib	1979
5. Lt Col Dil Faraz Khan	1982
6. Lt Col Nawab Khan Bangash	1984
7. Lt Col Khizar Hayat Khan	1986
8. Lt Col Meraj Gul	1989
9. Col Ghulam Rasul Sahi	1990
10. Col Mehar Muhammad Khan	1991
11. Col Muhammad Aslam Khattak	1994
12. Col Abbas Ali Khan	1995

[*] Valiant Go to War With Smiling Faces.

13. Col Waheed Ullah Khan	1997
14. Lt Col Abdul Qudoos	1998
15. Col Farooq Shah	1998
16. Col Muhammad Iqbal	2002
17. Col Muhammad Khalid Khan	2004
18. Col Muhammad Zubair Masood	2006
19. Col Saif Ullah Orakzai	2008
20. Col M Azeem Khan, TBt	2010
21. Col Mushtaq Hussain	2012
22. Col Umar Haider Bukhari	2013
23. Col Hafiz Asif Iqbal	2015
24. Col Muhammad Irfan Ali	2017
25. Col Muhammad Jamil	2019
26. Col Mir Kamran Khan Mengal	2021
27. Col Muhammad Furqan Shabbir, TBt	2022

The Tirah Militia

Pa Watan Mu Zaan Qurban [*]

The Tirah Militia were raised as Swat Scouts at Timergara by Colonel Asad Munir on 1 March 1996, as Frontier Corps Reserve. Their Headquarters shifted to Warsak in 1998, and then to Tor Dara in Tirah Valley in 2021. They were redesignated as Tirah Rifles in 2020, and Tirah Militia in 2023. Their mission is to guard the frontier with Afghanistan and internal security of Rajgal and Maidan Valleys in Khyber with six wings. They are part of Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).

Major Operations

Counterterrorism Operations	2001-18

Shuhada 139

Gallantry Awards

Sitara-i-Basalat	3
Tamgha-i-Basalat	49
Imtiazi Sanad	7

Commandants

1. Col Asad Munir	1996
2. Lt Col Wazir Khan	1997
3. Lt Col Qasim Khan	1999
4. Lt Col Shuja Ahmed	2001
5. Lt Col Abdul Majid	2004
6. Col Faiz Iqbal	2004
7. Col Aftab Ahmed	2006
8. Col Muhammad Aslam Malik	2009
9. Col Ali Amir Awan	2010
10. Col Zia Ud Din Ahmad Khan	2011
11. Col Muhammad Asim Rauf	2013

[*] Ready to Sacrifice Our Lives for the Motherland.

12. Col Naeem Ullah	2015
13. Col S Ahmed Abbas	2017
14. Col Muhammad Tahir Khattak	2018
15. Col Khurram Rashid	2020
16. Col Asim Malik	2022
17. Brig Imran Arshad	2023

The Gomal Scouts

Turyali [*]

The Gomal Scouts were raised as Jandola Scouts at Manzai by Colonel Bashir Ahmad on 10 July 2007. They were redesignated as Khushal Khattak Scouts in 2008; as Khattak Scouts in 2010; and as Gomal Scouts in 2020. Their mission is the internal security of Jandola, Manzai and Mana Gurbaz in South Waziristan with six wings. They are part of Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (South).

Major Operations

Counterterrorism Operations	2007-18

Shuhada 74

Gallantry Awards

Tamgha-i-Basalat	18
Imtiazi Sanad	10

Commandants

1. Col Bashir Ahmad	2007
2. Col Ghulam Jilani	2009
3. Col Mian Rifat Ullah Khan	2011
4. Col Muhammad Naeem Sarwar	2012
5. Col Waseem Ijaz	2013
6. Col Rizwan Butt	2015
7. Col Asghar Ali	2017
8. Col Mazhar Hussain	2019
9. Col Muhammad Jhangiz Zeb	2021
10. Col Mueen Ud Din Ahmed	2023

[*] The Sword Bearers.

The Orakzai Scouts

Baryali [*]

The Orakzai Scouts were raised at Thall by Colonel Arshad Mahmood on 1 August 2007. They moved to Mir Ali in 2008, and then to Kalaya, Orakzai Agency, in 2012. Their mission is the internal security of Orakzai and Central Kurram with five wings. They are part of Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).

Major Operations

Counterterrorism Operations	2008-18

Shuhada 39

Gallantry Awards

Sitara-i-Basalat	1
Tamgha-i-Basalat	16
Imtiazi Sanad	1

Commandants

1. Col Arshad Mahmood	2007
2. Col Atif Zahid Khokar	2008
3. Col Atif Shafique	2010
4. Col Rizwan Maqbool	2012
5. Col Faisal Ahmed Khan	2014
6. Col Mirza Sohail Yousaf	2016
7. Col Zakirullah Khan	2018
8. Col Rai Kashif Ameen	2020
9. Col Muhammad Tasneem Khan	2022
10. Col Saadat Hasan	2023

[*] Victorious.

The Badar Rifles

Da Allah Azmari [*]

The Badar Rifles were raised on *ad hoc* basis at Mir Ali by Colonel Rana Muhammad Siddique-ur-Rahman in August 2015. Their Headquarters moved to Spinwam, North Waziristan, in 2016. They were officially raised as Bhittani Rifles on 12 August 2017, becoming Badar Rifles in 2020. The Corps has six wings. It is part of Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (South).

Major Operations

Counterterrorism Operations	2017-18

Shuhada 38

Gallantry Awards

Tamgha-i-Basalat	21
Imtiazi Sanad	6

Commandants

1. Col Rana Muhammad Siddique-ur-Rahman	2015
2. Col Tahir Hameed	2017
3. Col Anzar Ul Hassan	2019
4. Col Sheheryar	2020
5. Brig Anjum Riaz	2022
6. Brig Iftikhar Ahmed	2023

[*] The Lions of Allah.

Scouts Training Academy

By 1969, the Frontier Corps had expanded into a large paramilitary force. However, there was no central establishment for standardized training of recruits, who were being trained under the arrangements of individual corps. In October 1969, two Training Wings were raised at Mir Ali and Loralai to impart training to recruits of the Frontier Corps in NWFP and Balochistan. In February 1970, the two wings were amalgamated as the Frontier Corps Training Centre at Mir Ali Camp under Major Mahboob Shah, SBt, who was appointed Commandant. The first batch of 422 recruits passed out in August that year. In September 1971, the Centre moved to Thall; returning to Mir Ali in December 1973. When the Frontier Corps was bifurcated in June 1974, the personnel of FC (Baluchistan) left to establish their own Training Centre at Loralai. Meanwhile, the Centre at Mir Ali was redesignated as Frontier Corps Training Centre (NWFP).

On 1 November 1982, the responsibility of training recruits was given back to the units and the Training Centre was reorganized as Frontier Corps Battle School. Its new mission was to run advance professional courses for JCOs and Other Ranks of Frontier Corps and Frontier Constabulary. The Frontier Corps School of Signals and the School of Education at Fort Shagai in the Khyber were also shifted to the Battle School. The emergence of terrorist threat at the turn of the century led to a reorientation of the Frontier Corps, which required a change in training methods and assimilation of new equipment and technology. Consequently, in April 2005, the Battle School was reorganized as Scouts Training Academy. In November 2010, it moved to Jalozai, and in 2013, to its present location at Warsak.

Since 2017, training of recruits in the Frontier Corps has been centralized. Besides imparting basic military training to recruits, the Academy runs professional and technical courses,

promotion cadres, and other specialized courses such as training in Special Operations. Personnel of other law enforcement agencies such as the Police, Customs and Forest Department also undergo training at the Academy, which has the capacity to train more than 3000 students every year. A new Scouts Training Academy was raised at Mir Ali for Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (South) in 2017. Under the ongoing transformation of the Frontier Corps, it is proposed to reorganize Scouts Training Academies into Frontier Corps Training Centres on the pattern of Regimental Training Centres of Pakistan Army.

Commandants

Frontier Corps Training Centre[1]

1. Maj Mahboob Shah, SBt	1970
2. Lt Col Fahim Ullah Khattak	1971
3. Maj Muhammad Nasim Siddique	1971
4. Lt Col Muhammad Ismail	1972
5. Lt Col Ghulam Abbas Pasha	1972

Frontier Corps Training Centre (NWFP)

6. Lt Col Naseem Ahmed	1974
7. Lt Col Muhammad Idris	1977
8. Maj Muhammad Saleem	1979
9. Maj Abdul Ghaffar Khan	1980

Frontier Corps Battle School[2]

10. Lt Col Wali Ahmed Khan	1980
11. Lt Col Mir Habib Shah	1983
12. Lt Col Aziz Rahman	1987
13. Maj Makhdoom Hussain	1987
14. Maj Muhammad Waseem Khalid	1988
15. Maj Farid Faiz Chaudhri	1989
16. Maj Muhammad Sadiq	1992

[1] Raised as No. 1 and No. 2 Training Wings in October 1969. Amalgamated as the Frontier Corps Training Centre in February 1970.
[2] Reorganized as Battle School on 1 November 1982.

17. Lt Col Muhammad Rahman	1992
18. Lt Col Muhammad Abid Nawaz	1994
19. Maj Muhammad Akram Shaheen	1995
20. Lt Col Muhammad Jahanzeb	1995
21. Maj Ehtesham Ud Din	1997
22. Lt Col Athar Rahman Khan	1998
23. Maj Adnan Akbar Khan	2000
24. Lt Col Ghulam Abbas	2001
Scouts Training Academy	
25. Lt Col Ghulam Mustafa	2005
26. Lt Col Syed Asif Iqbal Zaidi	2007
27. Col Ahsan Raza	2009
28. Col Riaz Ud Din Kasi	2011
29. Col Muhammad Kamran Khan	2013
30. Col Muhammad Rafique Ahmad	2015
Scouts Training Academy (North)	
31. Col Muhammad Ramzan Khan	2017
32. Col Zahoor Ul Haq	2019
33. Col Muhammad Tariq Majeed	2021
34. Col Muhammad Ijaz Khattak	2022
35. Col Zabih Ullah	2023
Scouts Training Academy (South)	
1. Col Shahzad Saleem Sheikh	2017
2. Col Salah Ud Din	2019
3. Brig Tariq Rashid	2021
4. Col Muhammad Ali Chaudhry	2023

Appendix V
Inspectors General

Inspecting Officer, Frontier Corps

1.	Lt Col William Cross Barratt, DSO **	25 Mar 1907
2.	Col Arthur Robert Dick, CB	31 Mar 1909
3.	Lt Col John Shaw Kemball	16 May 1914

Inspecting Officer, Frontier Corps, and Secretary to the Chief Commissioner[1]

4.	Lt Col Alexander Charles Tancock, CIE	16 Oct 1918
5.	Col Gerald Bassett Scott, CB, DSO	1 Sept 1926

Inspecting Officer and Secretary, Frontier Corps, NWFP[2]

6.	Col Guy Hamilton Russell, CIE, DSO	1 Sept 1931
7.	Col Claude Ernest Torin Erskine, CIE, DSO, MC	5 Apr 1934
8.	Col Richard Henry Wilson, CIE, MC	1 Oct 1937

Inspector General and Secretary, Frontier Corps, NWFP[3]

9.	Brig Noel Robert Charles Cosby, CIE, MC	10 Jun 1941
10.	Brig Robert Denis Ambrose, CIE, OBE, MC	10 Jun 1945
11.	Brig Michael Henry Hamilton Baily, DSO	10 Aug 1947
12.	Brig David Henry James Williams, OBE	1 Oct 1947
13.	Brig Ahmad Jan, MBE	10 Mar 1950
14.	Brig Kazi Abdur Rahim Khan **	15 Jul 1951
15.	Brig Bakhtiar Rana, MC ***	14 Nov 1953

Inspector General Frontier Corps[4]

16.	Brig Sadiq Ullah Khan, MC	9 Sept 1955
17.	Brig Rakhman Gul, SQA, SK, MC ***	25 Oct 1958
18.	Brig Sadiq Ullah Khan, MC	22 Nov 1963
19.	Brig Bahadur Sher, MC ***	10 Aug 1964
20.	Brig Mahboob Khan, TQA	19 Apr 1966
21.	Brig Mahmud Jan, SQA	18 Jul 1969
22.	Maj Gen Sherin Dil Khan Niazi	23 Jul 1971
23.	Brig Iftikhar-i-Bashir	30 Jul 1972
24.	Brig Naseerullah Khan Babar, SJ & Bar, SBt **	27 Nov 1972

[1] Designation changed in 1921.
[2] Designation changed in 1932.
[3] Designation changed in 1943.
[4] Designation changed in 1955.

Inspector General Frontier Corps (NWFP)[5]

25. Brig Ghulam Rabbani Khan, SBt **	26 Nov 1974
26. Maj Gen Agha Zulfiqar Ali Khan, HI (M)	18 Feb 1978
27. Maj Gen Mian Muhammad Afzaal, HI (M), SBt ***	10 Jan 1982
28. Maj Gen Muhammad Arif Bangash, HI (M), SBt ***	23 Mar 1984
29. Maj Gen Mohammad Shafiq, HI (M), SBt ***	17 Aug 1986
30. Maj Gen Ghazi Ud Din Rana, HI (M), SBt	24 May 1988
31. Maj Gen Humanyun Khan Bangash, HI (M), TBt ***	11 Oct 1990
32. Maj Gen Naeem Akbar Khan, HI (M) ***	7 Jun 1991
33. Maj Gen Mumtaz Gul, HI (M), TBt ***	24 Mar 1992
34. Maj Gen Fazal Ghafoor, HSt, HI (M), SBt & Bar	11 Jun 1994
35. Maj Gen Sultan Habib, HI (M)	14 Aug 1997
36. Maj Gen Taj Ul Haq, HI (M)	7 Mar 2000
37. Maj Gen Mohammad Hamid Khan, HI (M), SBt ***	6 Feb 2003
38. Maj Gen Muhammad Tariq Masood, HI (M)	11 Oct 2004
39. Maj Gen Muhammad Alam Khattak, HI (M), TBt ***	12 Mar 2006
40. Maj Gen Tariq Khan, HI (M) ***	7 Sept 2008

Inspector General Frontier Corps (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)

41. Maj Gen Nadir Zeb, HI (M)	15 Oct 2010
42. Maj Gen Ghayur Mahmood, HI (M), TBt ***	4 Jun 2012
43. Maj Gen Muhammad Tayyab Azam, HI (M)	14 Mar 2014
44. Maj Gen Shaheen Mazhar Mehmood, HI (M) ***	15 Jul 2016

Inspector General Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North)[6]

45. Maj Gen Muhammad Waseem Ashraf, HI (M) ***	26 Sept 2017
46. Maj Gen Rahat Naseem Ahmad Khan, HI (M) ***	5 Nov 2018
47. Maj Gen Adil Yamin, HI (M)	11 Dec 2020
48. Maj Gen Noor Wali Khan, HI (M)	12 Sept 2022

Inspector General Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (South)

1. Maj Gen Khalid Javed, HI (M)	11 Mar 2017
2. Maj Gen Abid Latif, HI (M)	15 Jan 2018
3. Maj Gen Azhar Iqbal Abbasi, HI (M)	15 Jul 2019
4. Maj Gen Muhammad Umar Bashir, HI (M)	9 Jun 2020
5. Maj Gen Muhammad Munir Afsar, HI (M) ***	25 Nov 2021
6. Maj Gen Haroon Hameed, HI (M)	15 Oct 2022

[5] Frontier Corps bifurcated into FC (NWFP) and FC (Baluchistan) in 1974.
[6] Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa bifurcated into North and South in 2017.

Appendix VI
Gallantry Awards[1]

PRE-INDEPENDENCE AWARDS	
Victoria Cross (VC)[2]	1
Distinguished Service Order (DSO)[3]	6
Indian Order of Merit (IOM)[4]	36
Military Cross (MC)[5]	24
Indian Distinguished Service Medal (IDSM)[6]	76
POST-INDEPENDENCE AWARDS	
Sitara-i-Jurat (SJ)	11
Sitara-i-Basalat (SBt)	33
Tamgha-i-Jurat (TJ)	15
Tamgha-i-Basalat (TBt)	540
Imtiazi Sanad[7]	133

[1] The list is for Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa only and does not include corps, which now form part of FC Balochistan or were converted into NLI.
[2] Highest gallantry award of the British Empire. Equivalent to Nishan-i-Haider.
[3] Awarded for instances of distinguished service in war. Given to officers in command, usually above the rank of captain. Equivalent to Hilal-i-Jurat.
[4] Awarded for conspicuous acts of gallantry in war by JCOs and men. Until the extension of Victoria Cross to Indians in 1911, it was the highest gallantry award conferred upon Indian ranks. It does not have any equivalent in Pakistan.
[5] Awarded for acts of gallantry by officers up to the rank of Major and JCOs. Equivalent to Sitara-i-Jurat.
[6] Awarded for distinguished service in the field by JCOs and men. Equivalent to Tamgha-i-Jurat.
[7] Equivalent to Mention in Despatches.

Appendix VII
Uniform and Badges

A distinctive feature of the Frontier Corps is their iconic uniform of Mazri *shalwar kameez* and *chaplis*. However, at their inception in the late 19th century, the Scouts were dressed in the standard army khaki tunic (*kurta*) and knee-length knickerbockers (loose baggy trousers) with putties (strips of cloth wound around lower legs). The only difference being the *chaplis* for footwear. Khaki shorts for summer dress were adopted after the raising of the Waziristan Militias in 1900. In the 1930s, *partug* (*shalwar*) replaced knickerbockers. Khaki jersey was worn in winters. The South Waziristan Scouts introduced shirts of dark grey Mazri cloth, later adopted by other corps. Mazri, a palm tree, which grows abundantly on the Frontier, was the source of the grey dye used to colour fabrics. The grey and khaki uniform provided excellent camouflage, while the nail-studded heavy leather *chaplis* were ideal for marching.

Pagri was the standard headdress from the outset. It consisted of five yards of khaki muslin *safa* (*lungi*) wound around a khaki *kullah*. Chitral and Gilgit Scouts wore the same dress with the exception of their distinctive flat-crowned woollen caps called *pakol* in Chitral and *khoi* in Gilgit. Accoutrements were of brown patent leather. Badges, buttons and other devices were in white metal for Other Ranks and silver for officers, who were dressed like their men. The pre-Independence Scout's ceremonial uniform consisted of a starched Mazri shirt with rolled up sleeves and shirt tails outside khaki shorts, a neatly tied khaki pagri, brown leather belt and silver buckle with regimental crest, and *chaplis* with white socks and grey hose-tops. Each corps had its own distinctive badge and shoulder titles. Officers wore the Mess Dress of their parent units.

There was no change in the uniform at Independence other than the adoption of a green beret in 1948, although the pagri continued to be worn on ceremonial occasions. The South Waziristan Scouts and Zhob Militia had been wearing Mazri *shalwar kameez* since before Independence. In 1951, it was also adopted by the rest of the Frontier Corps, along with a green pagri and red *kullah*. Khaki shorts remained in use especially for ceremonial occasions. However, their use gradually declined until 1991, when they were discontinued on the adoption of khaki *shalwar kameez*. Mazri uniform was restored in 2007, while the colour of jersey was changed from brown to black in 2014. Counterterrorism operations led to the introduction of an olive combat dress with field cap in 2012. It was replaced by a camouflage design in different shades of green in 2015.

Working Dress of the modern Scout is Mazri *shalwar kameez,* rifle green beret, brown leather belt with regimental crest on a flat silver buckle, and *chaplis* with white socks. Rifle green pagri with red *kullah,* red kamarband and regimental scarf are worn on ceremonial occasions. Colonels and above wear *kullah* of Peshawari *zari*. The ceremonial headdress of Chitral Scouts is a white *pakol* with plume. Combat dress with beret is also worn as normal Working Dress. Cap badges, shoulder titles and badges of rank are in white metal. They are worn with felt backings of distinctive colours for each Wing. The crest of Frontier Corps depicts two crossed Pathan knives in front of a mountain surmounted by the Islamic Star and Crescent. The mountain and knives represent the tribal heritage of the Scouts, while the star and crescent proclaim their Pakistani identity. The Frontier Corps regimental necktie (and scarf) has broad brown, dark and light grey stripes, separated by thin black lines. It was designed by Captain JC Simpson of South Waziristan Militia in 1905, and is patterned on the feathers of Chikor, known for its agility and camouflage. The necktie was adopted by the entire Frontier Corps in 1958.

Badges of the Frontier Corps

The Frontier Corps (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)

Khyber Rifles

Kurram Militia

Tochi Scouts

South Waziristan Scouts

Chitral Scouts

Bara Rifles

Thall Scouts

Bajaur Scouts

Dir Scouts

Shawal Rifles

Mohmand Rifles

Tirah Militia

Gomal Scouts

Orakzai Scouts

Badar Rifles

References and Notes

Preface

1. Sir Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans,* pp. xvi-xvii, 14. Also called Pashtun, Pathan or Afghan. These names are used interchangeably. The difference between Pakhtun and Pashtun is of pronunciation. The former is used in north Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while the latter in the south and in Afghanistan. Afghan can refer to a Pakhtun or a citizen of Afghanistan. I have used Afghan to denote the latter. Pathan, also in common usage, was the name given to the Pakhtuns in India. It was also used by some to refer to Pakhtun tribesmen of the Tribal Areas.
2. Due to its turbulent history, the term 'Frontier' became synonymous with the Northwest Frontier of India.
3. Militias are paramilitary units embodied in times of emergency. They are recruited locally and employed for service in their own territory.

Chapter 1: Enigma of the Frontier

1. Arthur Swinson, *North-West Frontier,* pp. 26-28.
2. Victoria Schofield, *Afghan Frontier: At the Crossroads of Conflict,* p. 63. The term was first used in 1840, by Capt Arthur Conolly, a British intelligence officer.
3. Maj Gen JG Elliott, *The Frontier 1839-1947: The Story of the North-West Frontier of India,* pp. 15-26.
4. Maj RTI Ridgway, *Pathans,* pp. 18-20; and, Sir William Barton, *India's North-West Frontier,* pp. 16-18. Literally, 'the way of the Pakhtun'. Pakhtunwali is the code of honour by which every Pakhtun aspires to live his life. It encompasses a host of qualities such as honour (*nang*), bravery (*tora*), hospitality (*melmastia*), asylum (*nanawatai*), safe passage (*badragga*) and revenge against a wrong (*badal*).
5. Maj John Biddulph, *Tribes of the Hindoo Kush*, pp. 8-11, 62, 156-157. Tribes of Kohistan are sometimes referred to as Dardic, a rather vague and misleading term for a heterogeneous group of people.
6. Swinson, *North-West Frontier,* pp. 20-21.
7. Caroe, *The Pathans,* pp. 236, 258.
8. Barton, *India's North-West Frontier,* p. 56.
9. Ibid., p. 19.
10. CC Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908,* pp. 24-25.
11. Ibid., p. 27. Blockade was a crude instrument of collective punishment. With limited local opportunities, the tribesmen often sought work in the

settled areas, while in winters, they brought their flocks to lowland pastures. By stopping these activities including commerce, the British were able to inflict economic pain on the tribesmen. However, it was not possible to impose a complete blockade and the measure generally failed to bring about any change in the behaviour of the tribes.

12. Elliott, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* pp. 94-95. The Border Military Police was raised in 1852. In 1913, it was merged with Samana Rifles and reorganized as Frontier Constabulary under British Police officers. The Samana Rifles, raised in 1879, were a tribal police deployed on Samana Ridge in Kohat.
13. Ibid., pp. 102-103; Swinson, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* pp. 109-110, 116-117; and, Lt Gen Sir Henry Daly, *The Punjab Frontier Force,* RUSI Journal 1884, 28:127, 907-924. The Punjab Frontier Force was broken up in 1903. Its units continue to exist in Pakistan Army, as the Frontier Force Regiment, Guides Cavalry, 11 & 12 Cavalry, and 1st (SP) Medium Regiment, Artillery.
14. Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908,* pp. 3-4.
15. Swinson, *North-West Frontier,* p. 115.
16. Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908,* p. 20. In 1858, the three regiments of Scinde Irregular Horse joined Jacob's Rifles (12 Baloch) and a battery of Mountain Artillery to form the Sind Frontier Field Force (redesignated as Sind Frontier Force in 1873), with a role similar to that of their counterparts on the Punjab frontier.
17. Ibid., p. 21.
18. Elliot, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* p. 37.
19. TH Thornton, *Sir Robert Sandeman: His Life and Work on Our Indian Frontier,* pp. 301-305. Col Sir Robert Sandeman, KCSI (1835-1892), 11th Bengal Lancers (5 Horse), was the Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan (1877-92). Sandeman is credited with pioneering the Forward Policy by actively engaging with the tribes and advancing British frontier to Afghanistan by acquiring Quetta and Bolan.
20. Elliot, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* pp. 30-33. Amir Sher Ali, who was distracted by personal affairs, would probably have agreed to receive the British mission. However, the British acted with petulant haste in invading Afghanistan.
21. Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908,* pp. 35-36. The Chief Commissioner's Province of Baluchistan comprised of Quetta, Pishin, Zhob, Loralai, Chagai and Sibi. It was separate from Baluchistan Agency consisting of the States of Kalat, Kharan, Mekran and Las Bela.
22. Barton, *India's North-West Frontier,* pp. 64-67. The Durand Line particularly affected the Mohmands, half of whom were left in Afghanistan, while Wazirs also found themselves divided by the new frontier.

23. Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908,* pp. 92-94, 97-98.
24. Barton, *India's North-West Frontier,* pp. 67-68; and Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908,* pp. 99-104.
25. Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908,* pp. 172-173. Weakened Russian position after the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, and the looming common threat from Germany led to the *entente* between the two imperial rivals.

Chapter 2: Birth of the Frontier Corps

1. HC Lipsett, *Lord Curzon in India 1898-1903,* pp. 32-33. George Nathaniel Curzon, 1st Marquess Curzon of Kendleston, KG, GCSI, GCIE, PC, FRS, FBA (1859-1925). Viceroy and Governor-General of India (1899-1905), Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1919-24), Leader of the House of Lords (1924-25).
2. The Earl of Ronaldshay, *The Life of Lord Curzon,* Volume 2, pp. 40-41.
3. Lovat Fraser, *India Under Curzon & After,* pp. 51-52.
4. Ibid., pp. 55-59. Lord Lytton's proposal was to form a large frontier province consisting of the trans-Indus districts of Punjab and Sindh.
5. Caroe, *The Pathans,* pp. 383-386, 414. Major provinces of British India were administered by Governors and Lieutenant Governors depending on their size, while minor provinces were managed by Chief Commissioners. The Viceroy, also called Governor-General, exercised direct control over Chief Commissioner's Provinces, while as Foreign Minister, he was also responsible for all frontier regions of India. The tribal agencies of North & South Waziristan and Malakand were initially called Tochi, Wana, and, Chitral, Dir and Swat, respectively. Lt Col Sir Harold Deane, KCSI (1854-1908), was the first Chief Commissioner of NWFP (1901-08).
6. Barton, *India's North-West Frontier,* pp. 28-35. Tarkalani (also called Tarkani, Tarkanri and Tarkalanri) Pakhtuns of Bajaur are divided into the branches of Utman Khel, Mamund and Salarzai. Kohistan is inhabited by a heterogeneous group of people speaking Pashto and Dardic languages.
7. Amar Singh Chohan, *The Gilgit Agency 1877-1935,* p. 50. In 1881, the British Political Agent was recalled from Gilgit. Renewed concerns about the Russian threat led to re-establishment of Gilgit Agency in 1889. In 1935, the British leased Gilgit from the Maharaja of Kashmir for a period of 60 years and the Maharaja's troops were withdrawn from the Agency. The lease was relinquished on 1 August 1947.
8. Barton, *India's North-West Frontier,* pp. 44-47. The principal Afridi clans are Qambar Khel, Kuki Khel, Zakha Khel, Adam Khel, Malikdin Khel,

Kamar Khel, Aka Khel and Sipah. The southern portion of Tirah in Khyber Agency is occupied by the Orakzais. The Mohmand area lies between Bajaur and Khyber and the tribe was under the political control of Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar.

9. Ibid., pp. 48-51.
10. Ibid., pp. 52-54. Daur is also spelled Dawar. The Wazirs, also called Darwesh Khel, are found in both North and South Waziristan, and are divided into the clans of Utmanzai and Ahmedzai, while the Mahsuds, who are related to Wazirs, inhabit South Waziristan and are divided into the clans of Alizai, Bahlolzai and Shaman Khel.
11. Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908,* pp. 71-73. Balochistan was divided into the Agencies of Zhob, Loralai, Sibi, Quetta, Chagai and Kalat, which was a semi-independent state.
12. Lal Baha, *NWFP Administration Under British Rule 1901-1919,* pp. 27-31.
13. Jules Stewart, *The Savage Border: The Story of the North-West Frontier,* pp. 151-153. Section 21 of the FCR deals with collective punishment of the tribes, which includes arbitrary arrests, seizure or destruction of property, fines and economic blockade.
14. Christian Tripodi, *Edge of Empire: The British Political Officer and Tribal Administration on the North-West Frontier 1877-1947,* pp. 22-27. The IPS was called the Secret and Political Department in 1783, becoming the Foreign Department in 1843, the Foreign and Political Department in 1914, and the Indian Political Service in 1937. While civil servants formed the majority of Political Officers; on the Frontier, most were army officers. Besides stringent scrutiny, volunteers for IPS also had to fulfil other conditions such as being unmarried and under the age of 26 years for army officers and having less than five years of service for officers of the Indian Civil Service. A few officers were also accepted from the Provincial Civil Service, the Indian Medical Service and Indian Police.
15. WM Hogben, 'An Imperial Dilemma: The Reluctant Indianization of the Indian Political Service', *Modern Asian Studies* 1981, 15:4, 751-769. Nawab Khan Bahadur Sahibzada Sir Abdul Qayyum Khan, KCIE (1863-1937) belonged to a Lodhi family of Topi. He started his career as a Naib Tehsildar in 1887, and later served as Assistant Political Agent to Sir George Roos-Keppel in Khyber. In 1918, he became the first Indian to be accepted in the Political Service and was appointed Political Agent of Khyber Agency. He joined politics after his retirement in 1919. He was the co-founder of Islamia College Peshawar.
16. Lt Col Rifat Nadeem Ahmad, 'Pioneers of Pakistan Army: The First Muslim Officers', *Bugle & Trumpet* 2022, 4:1, 10-18. Maj Gen Sahibzada

Syed Iskander Ali Mirza, CIE, OBE (1899-1869), 33rd QVO Light Cavalry. First President of Pakistan (1956-58). Col Abdur Rahim Khan (1898-1966), Guides Cavalry. Pakistan's first Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Maj Sahibzada Mohammad Khurshid (1901-50), 1/14th Punjab (5 Punjab). First Pakistani Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan (1949) and Governor NWFP (1949-50).

17. TC Coen, *The Indian Political Service: A Study in Indirect Rule,* pp. 4-5.
18. Ibid., p. 14. The same principle applied in the Princely States, which although theoretically independent, were subject to British paramountcy. British Political Officers posted to these states were called Residents. They were ostensibly advisers but in reality, exercised final authority in all matters concerning British interests.
19. CC Trench, *Viceroy's Agent,* p. 56.
20. Stewart, *The Savage Border,* pp. 191-193.
21. *Report of the Tribal Control and Defence Committee 1931,* pp. 13-14.
22. Ibid., pp. 18-19; and, Baha, *NWFP Administration Under British Rule 1901-1919,* p. 79. The Frontier Constabulary was a Civil Armed Force, separate from the Police. It was organized into district units under Police officers called District Officers. The force was commanded by a Commandant, who reported to the Chief Commissioner. It is now a Federal Paramilitary Force under the Ministry of Interior. Another Civil Armed Force in the frontier districts were District Levies, recruited from tribesmen within NWFP for the protection of areas with special security needs.
23. TD Farrell, 'The Founding of the North-West Frontier Militias', *Asian Affairs* 1972, 3:2, 165-178. Robert Sandeman had proposed the name of Zhob and Bori Rifles for the new corps but it was raised as the Zhob Levy Corps. The Zhob and Bori valleys lie between Bolan and Gomal. Their occupation shortened the British line of defence, secured an important trade route and denied an escape route to raiders.
24. Ibid. In 1895, RI Bruce introduced the Maliki system in South Waziristan by paying allowances to selected Maliks and raising tribal levies, who were deployed on posts in the Gomal Pass. However, the posts were soon attacked by local tribesmen. In the following years, a number of levies were killed along with several Maliks, leading to the abandonment of the scheme.
25. CC Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 15, 51. In the Indian Army, Subedars and Jemadars (Naib Subedars) were called Indian Officers (IOs), while in the Frontier Corps, they were known as Militia or Pathan Officers. In 1935, IOs were redesignated as Viceroy's Commissioned Officers (VCOs) in the Indian Army. However, the same designation could not be used in the Frontier Corps, as their commissions were granted by the Governor NWFP.

In 1947, they were designated as Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) in both the Army and the Frontier Corps.

26. Farrell, 'The Founding of the North-West Frontier Militias', *Asian Affairs* 1972, 3:2, 165-178.
27. Coen, *The Indian Political Service,* p. 209. The Zhob Levy Corps and the two Waziristan Militias were mixed from the outset, with half of their strength recruited from outside their agencies.
28. Elliot, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* pp. 95-96. The Military Column in frontier operations was usually the size of an Army Brigade.
29. Fraser, *India Under Curzon & After,* pp. 52-54.
30. Coen, *The Indian Political Service,* p. 216. The exclusively frontier character of the Punjab Frontier Force had been under threat since 1886, when the Indian Army took over its operational control from the Government of Punjab.
31. Stewart, *The Savage Border,* pp. 89-91, 148. Lord Curzon's tour of the Frontier was in response to the criticism he faced from the military and the press, who were sceptical about the raising of Waziristan Militias.
32. Lt Gen Sir Charles Godwin, 'The Raising of the North Waziristan Militia', *Durbar* 2005, 22:2, 26-48.
33. Lt Gen Sir George MacMunn, 'A Study in Martyrdom', *Blackwood's Magazine* 1930, 241:1372, 287-296.
34. *Proceedings of the Army in India Committee, 1912. Minutes of Evidence,* Volume II, pp. 332, 351.
35. Col HRC Pettigrew, *Frontier Scouts,* p. 4.
36. Farrell, 'The Founding of the North-West Frontier Militias', *Asian Affairs* 1972, 3:2, 165-178.
37. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 24-25.
38. Farrell, 'The Founding of the North-West Frontier Militias', *Asian Affairs* 1972, 3:2, 165-178; and, *Administration Reports of the Baluchistan Agency for 1890-91,* pp. 131, 175-176; and, *1891-92,* pp. 178-180. Pakhtun recruits included Kakars, Kasis and Achakzais, while Ghilzais were Afghan nomads settled in Zhob. Fort Sandeman was a new cantonment that was established near Apozai in 1890. It was renamed as Zhob in 1976. The Zhob Levy Corps' first operation was the Kundar Expedition against a renegade Kakar chief called Bungal Khan in October 1890. Col WAD O'Mealy, CB (1853-1909), 1st Regiment of Cavalry, Punjab Frontier Force (11 Cavalry).
39. Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908,* pp. 72-73.
40. *The Imperial Gazetteer of India 1908: Baluchistan,* p. 78; *Administration Report of the Baluchistan Agency for 1911-12,* p. 71; and, *Report of the Tribal Control and Defence Committee 1931,* p. 24.

41. *Administration Reports of the Baluchistan Agency for 1920-21,* pp. 6-7, 34; *1928-29,* p. 64; *1937-38,* p. 1; and, *1938-39,* p. 45.
42. Elliot, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* pp. 35, 219-220.
43. Maj Muhammad Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier: The Frontier Corps NWFP,* pp. 99-100. In 1902, the two battalions were amalgamated. Brig Gen EWSK Maconchy, CB, CMG, CIE, DSO (1860-1945). Commandant Kurram Militia (1892-94).
44. *Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India,* Volume 2, pp. 253-255.
45. Ibid., pp. 265-273.
46. Ibid., pp. 273-274. Capt Roos-Keppel at the time was Political Officer of Kurram. He had recently relinquished the command of Kurram Militia.
47. Ibid., pp. 445-448.
48. Jules Stewart, *The Khyber Rifles: From the British Raj to Al Qaeda,* pp. 40-45.
49. EA Morphy, *The Khyber,* pp. 54-55. Henceforth, only British authorities had the right to levy toll on caravans passing through Khyber Pass.
50. Caroe, *The Pathans,* pp. 379-380; and, Elliot, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* pp. 191-193. Col Sir Robert Warburton, KCIE, CSI (1842-99), was commissioned in the Royal Artillery in 1861. His father was an officer of Bengal Artillery, while his mother was the niece of Amir Dost Mohammad of Afghanistan. He was Political Officer of Khyber 1879-97. He retired in 1898. Col Nawab Sir Muhammad Aslam Khan, Sardar Bahadur, KCIE, KCVO, ADC, OBI (1838-1914), 5th Bengal Cavalry (1857-79); Risaldar Major (1877-79). Assistant Political Officer Jalalabad (1879-80) and Landi Kotal (1880-81), Commandant Khyber Jezailchis/Rifles (1881-97), Political Officer Khyber Agency (1897-98). Honorary Colonel Khyber Rifles 1897. Retired in 1898. His son, Brig Sir Hissam-ud-Din also served in Khyber Rifles before joining 3rd Punjab Cavalry (11 Cavalry) in 1896.
51. Col HB Hanna, *The Second Afghan War 1878-79-80: Its Causes, Its Conduct and Its Consequences,* Volume 1, pp. 345-346; Volume 2, pp. 168-169; *Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India,* Volume 2, pp. 48-52; and, Tripodi, *Edge of Empire,* pp. 72-73. The British had been trying without much success to broker a deal with the tribesmen since October 1878, even before they invaded Khyber on 20 November.
52. *A Soldier Civilian,* pp. 4-9; and, *The New Annual Army Lists for 1880,* p. 446; and *1881*, p. 446. Lt Col Gilbert Gaisford (1849-1898), 5th Punjab Infantry (10 FF). Commandant Khyber Jezailchis (1879-81). He was murdered at Smallan, Balochistan in 1898, while serving as Political Officer of Thal Chotiali.

53. *Allen's Indian Mail and Official Gazette 1881*, Volume 39, p. 483; and, *Foreign Department Papers Relating to Afghanistan (1881) No. 5,* p. 54.
54. Morphy, *The Khyber,* pp. 71-72.
55. Col Sir Robert Warburton, *Eighteen Years in the Khyber 1879-1898,* pp. 102-103.
56. Elliot, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* p. 194.
57. Ibid. *Kafilas* (caravans) passed through the Khyber Pass twice a week on Mondays and Thursdays. They assembled at Jamrud from where they were escorted by Khyber Jezailchis to Torkham, where Afghan Khassadars took over. At the same time, they handed over the incoming caravans, which were then escorted to Jamrud by the Jezailchis.
58. Stewart, *The Khyber Rifles,* pp. 144-145. The decision to employ Zakha Khel Jezailchis against the raiders was a deliberate one taken by Jezailchi officers.
59. Ibid., p. 85.
60. Ibid., pp. 99-100.
61. *Papers Regarding British Relations with the Neighbouring Tribes on the North-West Frontier of India and Punjab Frontier Administration,* p. 33.
62. Stewart, *The Khyber Rifles,* pp. 149-150.
63. Col HC Wylly, *From the Black Mountain to Waziristan,* pp. 42-47.
64. Stewart, *The Khyber Rifles,* pp. 146-148. The British authorities wanted to gauge the fighting spirit and military capabilities of Khyber Rifles.
65. Capt HL Nevill, *Campaigns on the North-West Frontier,* p. 104.
66. Warburton, *Eighteen Years in the Khyber,* pp. 186-190. The total casualties of Khyber Rifles during the operation were five men wounded. The gallantry award winners received their medals from Lord Lansdowne, the Viceroy, during a grand parade at Peshawar on 31 October 1888.
67. Stewart, *The Khyber Rifles,* pp. 156-157.
68. Elliot, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* pp. 195-196; and, *Foreign Department Proceedings, Secret F, February 1898, Nos. 606-615.* Out of a total of 825 men in Khyber Rifles, 271 were at Jamrud, 374 at Landi Kotal, while the rest were distributed on seven posts at Fort Maude (42), Ali Masjid (40), Jehangira (13), Bagiar (7), Katta Kushtia (7), Gurgurra (10) and Fort Tyler (20). Around 200 loyal tribesmen were also present at Fort Maude and Ali Masjid. Capt (later Maj) FJH Barton, Corps of Guides, was posted as European Assistant to the Political Officer in the Khyber on 31 October 1896. He was appointed Commandant Khyber Rifles on 10 March 1897. He had briefly commanded the Khyber Rifles in March 1891, during the Black Mountain Expedition, when Lt Col Aslam Khan was injured. At the time,

he was serving as a staff officer with the Field Force. Maj Barton died in an accident, while playing polo at Mardan in 1902.

69. Stewart, *The Savage Border,* pp. 124-126; *Foreign Department Proceedings, Secret F, February 1898, Nos. 606-615*; and, Warburton, *Eighteen Years in the Khyber,* p. 229. Subedar Mursil Khan was a decorated veteran of the Corps of Guides, who had been wounded more than thirty times during his distinguished military career.
70. Elliot, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* pp. 194-196. By September 1897, 274 out of 836 men of Khyber Rifles were unaccounted for.
71. Stewart, *The Khyber Rifles,* p. 181.
72. Stewart, *The Savage Border,* pp. 127-132.
73. Stewart, *The Khyber Rifles,* p. 186.
74. *Papers Regarding British Relations with the Neighbouring Tribes on the North-West Frontier of India and Punjab Frontier Administration,* p. 21.
75. *Administration Report of the Khyber Rifles for the Year 1899-1900;* and, Morphy, *The Khyber,* pp. 68-70.
76. *Papers Regarding British Relations with the Neighbouring Tribes on the North-West Frontier of India and Punjab Frontier Administration,* p. 59.
77. Nevill, *Campaigns on the North-West Frontier,* pp. 332-336. 2nd Battalion 5th Gurkha Rifles.
78. Stewart, *The Khyber Rifles,* pp. 189-195. The gun running operation was based at Muscat from where guns were smuggled via Iran and Afghanistan through Ghilzai and Afridi middlemen. The British finally put an end to it by enforcing a naval blockade in the Persian Gulf from 1910 to 1914.
79. Ibid., pp. 195-196.
80. *Summary of the Principal Events and Measures of the Viceroyalty of HE the Earl of Minto, November 1905 to July 1910,* Volume 1: NWFP, p. 64.
81. Stewart, *The Khyber Rifles,* pp. 200-202.
82. Caroe, *The Pathans,* pp. 182-184; and, Coen, *The Indian Political Service,* pp. 422-424. Lt Col Sir George Roos-Keppel, GCIE, KCSI (1866-1921), Royal Scots Fusiliers (1886-92) and IPS (1892-1919). Commandant Kurram Militia (1894-97), Political Agent Khyber Agency & Commandant Khyber Rifles (1900-08), Chief Commissioner NWFP (1908-1919).
83. *Summary of the Principal Events and Measures of the Viceroyalty of HE the Earl of Minto, November 1905 to July 1910,* Volume 1: NWFP, p. 63.
84. Barton, *India's North-West Frontier,* pp. 52-53.
85. Farrell, 'The Founding of the North-West Frontier Militias', *Asian Affairs* 1972, 3:2, 165-178.
86. Baha, *NWFP Administration Under British Rule 1901-1919,* pp. 35-38. Miranshah is also called Miramshah.

87. Farrell, 'The Founding of the North-West Frontier Militias', *Asian Affairs* 1972, 3:2, 165-178; and, *The Quarterly Indian Army List for January 1, 1900,* pp. 404-405. Also called Northern and Southern Waziristan Militias. Lt Col Richard Harman, DSO (1864-1905), Commandant Wana Levies (1899-1900) and South Waziristan Militia (1900-05). Lt Col AF Ferguson-Davie, CIE, DSO (1867-1916), Commandant Tochi Levies (1899-1900) and North Waziristan Militia (1900-04). Died of Wounds, Mesopotamia 1916, while commanding 51st Sikhs (3 FF).
88. Godwin, 'The Raising of the North Waziristan Militia', *Durbar* 2005, 22:2, 26-48. Lt Col JF Finnis (1870-1916). Commandant Kurram Militia (1904-05). Died of Wounds, Mesopotamia 1916, while commanding the 53rd Sikhs (5 FF). Lt Gen Sir Charles Godwin, KCB, CMG, DSO & Bar (1873-1951). Commanded Staff College Quetta and Peshawar District before his retirement in 1930.
89. Ibid.; and, Maj Aamir Mushtaq Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* p. 45. In 1903, they were armed with Martini-Henry rifles.
90. Ibid. The Army remained in Tochi Valley until the construction of Militia posts. However, they stayed inside their compounds at Miranshah and Datta Khel and only moved out to support the Militia.
91. Ibid.
92. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* p. 49.
93. *The Frontier Corps: An Introduction,* p. 61.
94. Farrell, 'The Founding of the North-West Frontier Militias', *Asian Affairs* 1972, 3:2, 165-178.
95. *Operations in Waziristan 1919-1920,* p. 5.
96. Elliot, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* p. 85.
97. Maj Gen Rafiuddin Ahmed, *History of the Baloch Regiment 1820-1939,* p. 183.
98. Alan Guy and PB Boyden, *Soldiers of the Raj,* p. 110.
99. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 17; and, Farrell, 'The Founding of the North-West Frontier Militias', Asian Affairs 1972, 3:2, 165-178.
100. Baha, *NWFP Administration Under British Rule 1901-1919,* p. 41.
101. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 17-18.
102. Ibid., pp. 20-24.
103. Baha, *NWFP Administration Under British Rule 1901-1919,* pp. 44-45.
104. Farrell, 'The Founding of the North-West Frontier Militias', *Asian Affairs* 1972, 3:2, 165-178.
105. Elliot, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* p. 231.

106. Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908,* pp. 83-88. Until then, the British had not penetrated Malakand. In 1905, they built a road from Peshawar to Chitral and occupied Malakand Pass.
107. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 13; and, *Administration Report of the North-West Frontier Province for 1903-04,* p. ii.
108. Maj Aamir Mushtaq Cheema, *An Illustrated History of Chitral Scouts 1903-2014,* p. 9. Brig Gen Henry de Courcy O'Grady, CIE (1873-1949), 59th Scinde Rifles (1 FF). Commandant Chitral Scouts (1903-06).
109. Ibid., pp. 27, 41; Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 31-32, 216-219; and, *Military Report and Gazetteer on Chitral, 1928,* p. 61.
110. AH Dani, *History of Northern Areas of Pakistan,* pp. 310-311. The Gilgit Scouts trace their origins to Punial Levies, raised by the Raja of Punial in 1889. These levies fought on British side during the Hunza-Nagar War of 1891. They were incorporated into the levies raised by Col Algernon Durand in 1892, which formed the nucleus of Gilgit Scouts in 1913.
111. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 13.
112. *The Quarterly Indian Army List, October 1914,* p. 50. Major FH Bridges (1876-1916).
113. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 209-211; Chohan, *The Gilgit Agency 1877-1935,* pp. 192-198; and, *Military Report and Gazetteer of the Gilgit Agency, 1927,* pp. 78-79.
114. Maj WA Brown, *Gilgit Rebellion,* pp. 28-29.
115. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 213.
116. *The Frontier Corps: An Introduction,* p. 142.
117. Brown, *Gilgit Rebellion,* p. 26; and, Chohan, *The Gilgit Agency 1877-1935,* pp. 198-199.
118. *Administration Reports of the Baluchistan Agency for 1903-04,* p. 2; and, *1904-05,* pp. 9, 70. Lt Col Frank McConaghey, CIE (1871-1924), 5th Punjab Cavalry (12 Cavalry). There were periodic changes in the class composition of Mekran Levy Corps, which led to the introduction of Baloch and Pakhtun element. By 1931, its strength had risen to 540. The Corps was maintained by the Khan of Kalat. In 1949, Mekran Levy Corps was reorganized as a unit of Frontier Corps and renamed as Mekran Militia. It was disbanded in 1960. A new unit called Mekran Scouts was raised in 1974. It claims descent from Mekran Camel Corps, raised in 1897, originally formed by the State of Kalat as a company of Infantry in 1895. However, this claim is untenable, as the Mekran Camel Corps was disbanded in 1899.
119. *Administration Reports of the Baluchistan Agency for 1896-97,* p. 18; and, *1908-09,* p. 17. On 15 November 1896, Lt FCW Ware, Political Assistant, Chagai, raised a tribal levy of 50 camel sowars at Nushki. By 1905, their

strength had risen to 179. This levy formed the nucleus of Chagai Levy Corps in 1905. Lt Col FCW Ware, CIE (1866-1924), 7th Bombay Lancers (15 Lancers), IPS.

120. *Report of the Tribal Control and Defence Committee 1931,* p. 25.
121. *Administration Report of the Baluchistan Agency for 1920-21,* p. 37.
122. *Administration Report of the Baluchistan Agency for 1925-26,* p. 55. Its sanctioned strength was 175, mostly Baloch Sanjranis, who were enlisted for the first time. The rest of the men were from other Baloch tribes along with a few Pathans. By 1931, their strength had risen to 340.
123. *The Quarterly Indian Army List for January 1, 1905,* p. 52.
124. *Summary of the Principal Events and Measures of the Viceroyalty of HE the Earl of Minto, November 1905 to July 1910,* Volume 1: NWFP, p. 61. In 1921, the designation of Inspecting Officer, Frontier Corps, was changed to Inspecting Officer, Frontier Corps, and Secretary to the Chief Commissioner. It became Inspecting Officer and Secretary, Frontier Corps, NWFP, in 1932; Inspector General and Secretary, Frontier Corps, NWFP, in 1943; and, Inspector General Frontier Corps in 1955.
125. Ibid. Maj Gen WC Barratt, CB, CSI, DSO (1862-1940), 51st Sikhs (3 FF). IOFC (1907-09). Barratt resigned as IOFC in 1909, after developing differences with Lt Col Sir George Roos-Keppel, the Chief Commissioner of NWFP, over his insistence on transforming the Militias on military lines.
126. *Summary of the Principal Events and Measures of the Viceroyalty of HE the Earl of Minto, November 1905 to July 1910,* Volume 1: NWFP, p. 61. Orderly Officers were responsible for security and administration. The post was especially created for Akbar Khan and was discontinued after he left.
127. Ahmad, 'Pioneers of Pakistan Army: The First Muslim Officers', *Bugle & Trumpet* 2022, 4:1, 10-18.
128. Lt Col PC Garrett, *Notes on Frontier Corps (The Garrett Papers);* and, *The Quarterly Indian Army List, April 1921,* p. 95. Lt Col Peter Croft Garrett (1913-82), 2/12th FF (4 FF), South Waziristan Scouts (1938-43) and Zhob Militia (1943-45). Commandant Zhob Militia (1947-50).
129. Ibid.

Chapter 3: The Militia Experiment

1. Elliot, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* p. 242.
2. *The Frontier Corps: An Introduction,* p. 32.
3. Despatch of Gen Sir Beauchamp Duff, Commander-in-Chief, India, dated 9 March 1916, *Supplement to the London Gazette, 4 July 1916,* p. 6697. Col GB Scott, CB, DSO (1875-1964), 27th Punjabis (11 Punjab). Commandant North Waziristan Militia (1913-19) and IOFC (1926-31).

4. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 28; and, *Supplement to the London Gazette, 23 July 1915,* p. 7279. Capt Eustace Jotham, VC (1883-1915), 51st Sikhs (3 FF). According to *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts*, Capt Jotham managed to rescue the wounded sowar and made it back to Miranshah, where both of them died of their wounds.
5. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* pp. 59-60. Darim Khan later became a Subedar of Khassadars and attained legendary status in Waziristan for his strength and fidelity. He was murdered in 1945, at the behest of the Faqir of Ipi.
6. Despatch of Gen Sir Beauchamp Duff, Commander-in-Chief, India, dated 9 March 1916, *Supplement to the London Gazette, 4 July 1916,* p. 6697.
7. Extract from the Gazette of India No. 12563-1, dated 18 September 1915, *Second Supplement to the London Gazette, 17 March 1916,* pp. 3037-3038.
8. Elliot, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* p. 176.
9. Stewart, *The Khyber Rifles,* p. 205.
10. *The Quarterly Indian Army List, July 1917,* p. 50. Lt Col EC Smith (1879-1954), 22nd Punjabis (7 Punjab). Commandant Mohmand Militia (1916).
11. *Administration Report of the North-West Frontier Province, 1917-18,* p. 23.
12. *Operations in Waziristan 1919-1920,* pp. 33-35.
13. Ibid., p. 37-39.
14. Elliot, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* p. 243. Six militiamen were killed and eight wounded, while about a dozen raiders were also killed. Among the dead militiamen was their brave telegrapher, who managed to send a message to Datta Khel before being knifed by a raider.
15. *Administration Report of the North-West Frontier Province, 1917-18,* p. v.
16. Baha, *NWFP Administration Under British Rule 1901-1919,* pp. 101-103. The Rowlatt Act was passed in March 1919, to curb the nationalist movement in India. It authorized arrest without warrant and indefinite detention without trial. The Act provoked widespread protests, culminating in the Jallianwala Bagh massacre at Amritsar on 13 April, when a contingent of Indian Army under Brig Gen 'Rex' Dyer opened fire on a gathering of peaceful protesters, killing several hundred of them.
17. *The Third Afghan War, 1919: Official Account,* pp. 14-15, 22-23.
18. Despatch of Gen Sir Charles Monro, Commander-in-Chief in India, dated 1 November 1919, *Second Supplement to the London Gazette, 12 March 1920,* p. 3274.
19. Baha, *NWFP Administration Under British Rule 1901-1919,* p. 100.
20. Despatch of Gen Sir Charles Monro, Commander-in-Chief in India, dated 1 November 1919, *Second Supplement to the London Gazette, 12 March 1920,* p. 3275.

21. *The Third Afghan War, 1919: Official Account,* pp. 21-27.
22. Stewart, *The Khyber Rifles,* p. 210. On 7 May 1919, Indian nationalists and Afghan agents tried to stage an insurrection in Peshawar but the plan was foiled, when an infantry brigade on its way to Khyber was diverted to Peshawar. This delayed the reinforcement of troops in Khyber and likely resulted in the failure of British attack on 9 May.
23. *The Third Afghan War, 1919: Official Account,* pp. 43-46.
24. Stewart, *The Khyber Rifles,* p. 211. Most of the Militia Officers and NCOs chose not to take up the offer of discharge.
25. *The Third Afghan War, 1919: Official Account,* pp. 47-48, 132.
26. Ibid., pp. 52-53. Mohammed Nadir Shah (1883-1933), King of Afghanistan (1929-1933), was a member of the ruling Barakzai clan, who seized power in 1929. He was assassinated in 1933.
27. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 33-35; and, *The Third Afghan War, 1919: Official Account,* pp. 53-54.
28. *The Third Afghan War, 1919: Official Account,* pp. 64-65.
29. Ibid., pp. 65-66.
30. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 36. The 3rd Guides Infantry was a war-raised battalion. It arrived at Parachinar as reinforcement in May 1919. The battalion was disbanded in August 1921.
31. *The Third Afghan War, 1919: Official Account,* pp. 67-68.
32. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 36.
33. *Supplement to the London Gazette, 3 August 1920,* p. 8052. Lt Col PCR Dodd, DSO, MVO (1885-1967), 31st Lancers (13 Lancers). Commandant Kurram Militia (1917-20).
34. *The Frontier Corps: An Introduction,* p. 33.
35. Despatch of Gen Sir Charles Monro, Commander-in-Chief in India, dated 1 November 1919, *Second Supplement to the London Gazette, 12 March 1920,* p. 3278.
36. *The Third Afghan War, 1919: Official Account,* pp. 55-57, 61.
37. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 37. The captured Mohmands later escaped and returned to Miranshah.
38. Ibid., pp. 37-38. The mutinous officers were Subedar Paki Jan, IOM, IDSM, and Jemadar Adjutant Tarin.
39. *Operations in Waziristan 1919-1920,* pp. 67-68.
40. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 38.
41. *Operations in Waziristan 1919-1920,* p. 68. Two British officers were on leave. Col GH Russell, CIE, DSO (1882-1958), 126th Baluchistan Infantry (7 Baloch). Commandant South Waziristan Militia (1919), Tochi Scouts (1919-21) and South Waziristan Scouts (1922-24). IOFC (1931-34).

42. Elliot, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* p. 246.
43. *Operations in Waziristan 1919-1920,* pp. 69-70; and, Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 39-40.
44. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 40-41. The camp followers were tailors, cobblers, shopkeepers, washermen, sweepers, water carriers, etc.
45. Ibid., p. 42.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p. 43; and, *Operations in Waziristan 1919-1920,* p. 71.
48. Ibid., pp. 43-44; and, *Operations in Waziristan 1919-1920,* pp. 71-72.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 44; and, *Operations in Waziristan 1919-1920,* p. 72.
51. Despatch of Gen Sir Charles Monro, Commander-in-Chief in India, dated 1 November 1919, *Second Supplement to the London Gazette, 12 March 1920,* p. 3280.
52. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 45. Brig AR Barker, DSO, OBE, MC (1898-1984), 124th DCO Baluchistan Infantry (6 Baloch) and 2nd Gurkha Rifles. Known as Tochi Barker.
53. *Operations in Waziristan 1919-1920,* p. 73. 400 of these men were from the garrisons of Sarwekai and Nili Kach, who had made it to Murtaza without any losses. Only five men, all Wazirs, had deserted from Sarwekai.
54. Lt Col WJ Cumming, *Frontier Fighters: On Active Service in Waziristan,* pp. 56-59.
55. *The Third Afghan War, 1919: Official Account,* pp. 110-111. Lt Col Robert Sears Paul (1868-1942), 126th Baluchistan Infantry (7 Baloch). Commandant Zhob Militia (1917-20).
56. Ibid., pp. 111-112.
57. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 46.
58. *Operations in Waziristan 1919-1920,* p. 113.
59. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 46.
60. *The Third Afghan War, 1919: Official Account,* pp. 87-89.
61. Ibid., p. 89. River Chitral is known as River Kunar in Afghanistan.
62. Ibid., pp. 89-91. Lt Col Sir Nasir ul-Mulk, KCIE (1897-1943). Mehtar of Chitral (1936-43) and Honorary Commandant Chitral Scouts (1936-43).
63. Ibid., pp. 91-93.
64. Ibid., p. 94.
65. Caroe, *The Pathans,* p. 397. This quote has also been attributed to Sir Evelyn Howell, a distinguished Political Officer.
66. *Operations in Waziristan 1919-1920,* pp. 84-86, 97.
67. Farrell, 'The Founding of the North-West Frontier Militias', *Asian Affairs* 1972, 3:2, 165-178.

68. *Operations in Waziristan 1919-1920,* pp. 164-167.
69. Cumming, *Frontier Fighters,* pp. 61-99; and, *Operations in Waziristan 1919-1920,* pp. 164-167. Major engagements in which the detachment of South Waziristan Militia participated included the actions at Kotkai and Ahnai Tangi, and the advance to Kaniguram. On 22 December 1920, 400 rifles of South Waziristan Militia reoccupied Wana but were withdrawn in March 1921.
70. Elliot, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* p. 269.
71. *Operations in Waziristan 1919-1920,* p. 108.

Chapter 4: The Rise of the Phoenix

1. Baha, *NWFP Administration Under British Rule 1901-1919,* p. 105.
2. Barton, *India's North-West Frontier,* pp. 47, 79-80, 159.
3. Baha, *NWFP Administration Under British Rule 1901-1919,* p. 105.
4. Despatch of Gen Lord Rawlinson of Trent, Commander-in-Chief in India, dated 25 July 1923, *Supplement to the London Gazette, 26 February 1924,* p. 1811. A circular road was built linking Jandola, Wana and Razmak with Tank, which in turn was linked to the Bannu-Miranshah-Datta Khel road.
5. Despatch of Gen Sir Charles Monro, Commander-in-Chief in India, dated 1 November 1919, *Second Supplement to the London Gazette, 12 March 1920,* p. 3276.
6. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 50. Since the new corps no longer recruited from Waziristan, they could not be called Militias. It is not recorded why they were designated as Scouts. A possible explanation could be that since this name was already in use in Chitral and Gilgit, it was also given to the re-raised corps in Waziristan.
7. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* p. 70. Col CET Erskine, CIE, DSO, MC (1887-1964), Guides Infantry (2 FF). Commandant Tochi Scouts (1922-27) and Inspecting Officer, Frontier Corps (1934-37).
8. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 51, 59-60.
9. *Report of the Tribal Control and Defence Committee 1931,* p. 55. The enlistment of Wazirs was contrary to the policy of excluding Mahsuds and Wazirs from the Frontier Corps. However, George Cunningham, the Resident of Waziristan, insisted on recruiting them due to their local knowledge and contacts. Eventually 100 Wazirs were enlisted in Tochi Scouts, half of them from Bannu.
10. Despatch of Gen Lord Rawlinson of Trent, Commander-in-Chief in India, dated 24 May 1922, *Supplement to the London Gazette, 1 December 1922,* pp. 8601-8602. In December 1921, 360 rifles of North Waziristan Militia

moved to Datta Khel with an Army column. After the construction of a fortified post, the Army withdrew, leaving its defence in the hands of the now redesignated Tochi Scouts.

11. Despatch of Gen Lord Rawlinson of Trent, Commander-in-Chief in India, dated 25 July 1923, *Supplement to the London Gazette, 26 February 1924,* pp. 1808-1811.
12. *Official History of Operations on the N-W Frontier of India 1920-35,* pp. 24-25, 55.
13. *The Edinburg Gazette, 3 June 1924,* p. 749; and, *The London Gazette, 12 June 1924,* p. 4134. Captain JH Pringle and Lieutenants BP Ross-Hurst, and LM Barlow.
14. *Administration Report of the North-West Frontier Province, 1921-22,* p. ii.
15. Cumming, *Frontier Fighters,* pp. 125-127; and, *The Quarterly Indian Army List, April 1922,* p. 95. Posts of Mohmand Militia were taken over by the Frontier Constabulary. Lt Col OD Bennett (1885-1987), 26th Punjabis (10 Punjab). Commandant Mohmand Militia (1917-22) and South Waziristan Scouts (1922). Lt Col WJ Cumming (1897-1989), Guides Infantry (2 FF), South Waziristan Militia (1917-21), Mohmand Militia (1921-22) and South Waziristan Scouts (1922-24).
16. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 51, 53, 57.
17. Despatch of Gen Lord Rawlinson of Trent, Commander-in-Chief in India, dated 25 July 1923, *Supplement to the London Gazette, 26 February 1924,* pp. 1808, 1811.
18. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* p. 193.
19. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 72-74.
20. Ibid., p. 75.
21. Ibid., p. 76.
22. *Administration Report of the Baluchistan Agency for 1920-21,* pp. 6-7, 34.
23. Ibid.
24. *Administration Report of the Baluchistan Agency for 1928-29,* p. 64. The Corps was reorganized into Headquarters Company, one company of Mounted Infantry and eight companies of infantry.
25. *The Garrett Papers*. Novels and Hollywood films such as *Gunga Din* and *The Lives of a Bengal Lancer* contributed to some of this 'romance'.
26. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 54. The reference to shotgun is an allusion to *shikar*, a favourite pastime of British officers in India.
27. *The Garrett Papers*. Envy of the independence and high status of Scouts contributed towards some of the hostility they faced from the Army.
28. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 51-52.
29. Coen, *The Indian Political Service,* p. 213.

30. *The Garrett Papers.* These officers ran the risk of being typecast as 'Professional Scouts'. They were often viewed with suspicion by the regular Army, resulting in diminished career prospects. However, those who reapplied for a posting in Frontier Corps were usually not interested in becoming Generals.
31. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 63. Another attraction for enlistment in the Scouts was that their casualties could be buried in their own villages, since they never served far from their homes, unlike in the Army, where they might die in some other faraway place. Burial in their own villages was important to the tribesmen.
32. *The Garrett Papers.*
33. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 63.
34. *The Garrett Papers.* There were incidences of disgruntled sepoys shooting their officers on being denied promotion both in the Indian Army as well as in the Frontier Corps. However, such occurrences were rare.
35. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 59-61.
36. *The Garrett Papers.* Many Scout officers became expert gardeners through their experience of supervising vegetable gardens in the Frontier Corps.
37. Ibid. In larger corps like the South Waziristan Scouts, wings and platoons were rotated on 6-monthly basis to allow everyone to serve in 'soft' and 'hard' areas.
38. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 100.
39. *The Garrett Papers.*
40. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 99-100.
41. *The Garrett Papers.* There was no fixed length of a *gasht*. The distances varied according to the area, the attitude of the local tribesmen and operational requirements.
42. Ibid. The Road Protection or Column *gashts* were intensely disliked by the Scouts, as these tied them down to specific locations, hampered their mobility and interfered with their independence of action. The Scouts almost never deployed picquets on their *gashts*, as they did not have any slow-moving transport to protect.
43. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 132-133.
44. *The Garrett Papers.*
45. Ibid.; and, Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 65. Mazri is a palm tree, which grows abundantly on the Northwest Frontier. It was the source of a grey dye used to colour fabric, which was also called Mazri. *Safa* is Pashto for *lungi*. The Scout *safa* was five yards of khaki muslin cloth. The present 10 Baloch claims the distinction of being the first Army unit to adopt *chaplis* for service on the Frontier.

46. Ibid.
47. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 65.
48. *The Garrett Papers.* This anecdote has been narrated by Lt Col PC Garrett, Commandant Zhob Militia (1947-50).
49. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 113-115. These tactics were pioneered by Maj SP Williams, Commandant South Waziristan Scouts (1924-29).
50. Ibid., p. 71.
51. Ibid., p. 118. The Powindahs were not always innocent victims. Given half a chance, they could be as aggressive as the Mahsuds and Wazirs.
52. Ibid., pp. 93-94.
53. Brandon Marsh, *Ramparts of Empire: British Imperialism and India's Afghan Frontier, 1918-1948,* pp. 59-60. These strategic reasons were the security concerns regarding the old Russian threat, which had now morphed into the 'Red Scare' of the Soviet Union. The British were particularly worried about the prospect of an alliance between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.
54. Ibid., pp. 85-93. Khudai Khidmatgar literally means Servant of God. They were formed in 1929, as the militant wing of Frontier Provincial Youth League (Afghan Jirga), the nationalist party founded by Abdul Ghaffar Khan in 1927. In 1931, they merged with the Indian National Congress.
55. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 130.
56. *Official History of Operations on the N-W Frontier of India 1930-35,* pp. 79-80. There was some collusion between the tribesmen and the Red Shirts. However, the tribesmen's motives were more opportunistic than ideological.
57. Ibid., pp. 85-88.
58. Marsh, *Ramparts of Empire,* pp. 131, 140, 219-220. Khan Abdul Jabbar Khan (1883-1958), popularly known as Dr Khan Sahib, was the elder brother of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. He joined the Indian Medical Service and served as Medical Officer of the Corps of Guides. He resigned his commission in 1920, and joined politics. Remained a staunch supporter of Indian National Congress until 1948, when he swore allegiance to Pakistan. Served as Congress Chief Minister of NWFP in 1937-39 and 1945-47. Appointed Chief Minister of West Pakistan in 1955. He was assassinated in 1958.
59. Ibid., p. 220.
60. Ibid., pp. 213-214.
61. Swinson, *North-West Frontier,* pp. 388-389.
62. Despatch of Gen RA Cassels, Commander-in-Chief in India, *Supplement to the London Gazette, 29 October 1937,* pp. 6811-6816.

63. *Official History of Operations on the NW Frontier of India 1936-37,* pp. 8-10. Brig Arthur Felix-Williams, DSO, MC (1896-1965), 1/13th FF Rifles (7 FF). Commandant Tochi Scouts (1936-39).
64. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 150.
65. *Official History of Operations on the NW Frontier of India 1936-37,* pp. 10-13; and, Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 151-154.
66. Ibid., pp. 13-15. The total strength of the tribesmen, who opposed the two columns was 500, increasing to 2000 by 27 November. Their casualties were estimated to be 41 killed and 32 wounded.
67. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* pp. 99-100; and, *The London Gazette, 10 December 1937,* p. 7737.
68. Elliot, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* pp. 273-274.
69. Ibid., pp. 274-275.
70. *Official History of Operations on the NW Frontier of India 1936-37,* p. 39.
71. Ibid., pp. 55-65. There were two Scout posts at Splitoi and Chagmalai at both ends of Shahur Tangi. These however, had been abandoned some time earlier and Khassadars were made responsible for the protection of the defile. On 9 April, the Khassadars deserted their post. Initially, the strength of the assailants, who were led by Khonia Khel, a Jalal Khel Mahsud, was around 80. But as more tribesmen joined them during the course of the day, their number increased to 300. They suffered losses of 16 killed and 26 wounded.
72. *The London Gazette, 13 August 1937,* p. 5177; and, *Civil & Military Gazette,* 23 May 1937, p. 6.
73. Despatch of Gen RA Cassels, Commander-in-Chief in India, *Second Supplement to the London Gazette, 15 February 1938,* pp. 1057-1066.
74. Maj WDA Lentaigne, '"Iblanke" – The Advance to the Sham Plain, 11/12th May 1937', *Journal of United Service Institution of India* 1938, 68:290, 131-152.
75. 'Raid on Arsal Kot and Gulzamir Kot, 21st June 1937', *Journal of United Service Institution of India* 1939, 69:294, 28-32.
76. *Official History of Operations on the NW Frontier of India 1936-37,* pp. 140-151.
77. Elliot, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* pp. 279-280.
78. Despatch of Gen RA Cassels, Commander-in-Chief in India, *Supplement to the London Gazette, 10 June 1938,* pp. 3819-3824.
79. *The London Gazette, 10 December 1937,* p. 7737; and, *21 December 1937,* p. 7998. Lt Col PRH Skrine, DSO & Bar, (1898-1941), 1/6th Rajputana Rifles. Commandant South Waziristan Scouts (1935-37).

80. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 108. There was also an element of envy involved in the hostility towards Scouts. The Scout officers were more confident and independent-minded than the average army officer, which aroused jealousy among junior army officers and irritation among the senior commanders, some of whom viewed them as insolent and insubordinate.
81. *Official History of Operations on the NW Frontier of India 1936-37,* pp. 235-236.
82. TR Moreman, *The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947,* p. 141.
83. After Ops Report, Dargai Sar Action, 14-15 April 1938, South Waziristan Scouts, *The Garrett Papers*.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 186; and, *The London Gazette, 19 July 1938,* p. 4677.
87. Ibid., pp. 186-187.
88. *The London Gazette, 23 August 1938,* p. 5415.
89. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 189-190.
90. *The London Gazette, 18 October 1938,* p. 6500.
91. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 193-195.
92. Ibid., pp. 182-183; and, *The Garrett Papers.* Brig DHJ Williams, OBE (1899-1963), 6/13th FF Rifles (1 FF). Commandant South Waziristan Scouts (1937-41) and 1st Mahsud Battalion (1945-46). IGFC (1947-50).
93. Ibid., p. 183. It was not until the outbreak of the Second World War that submachine guns like the American Tommy gun and the British Sten gun were adopted by the British and Indian Armies.
94. Maj DHJ Williams, 'Armoured Lorries', *Journal of United Service Institution of India* 1941, 71:304, 277-279; and, *The Garrett Papers.*
95. *The Garrett Papers.*
96. Ibid.; and, Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 186.
97. *Administration Report of the Baluchistan Agency for 1937-38,* p. 43. This led to a complicated chain of command, as the IGFC reported to two Agents to the Governor General: Governor NWFP for the corps on the Northwest Frontier and Chief Commissioner Baluchistan for the corps in Balochistan. Previously, Zhob Militia had been under the administrative control of the Chief Commissioner Baluchistan.
98. *The Garrett Papers.*
99. *Administration Report of the Baluchistan Agency for 1937-38,* p. 47. The new class composition of Chagai Levy Corps was Mengals, Mashwanis, Sanjranis, Jamaldinis, Rekis, Ismailzais and Badinis.

100. Ibid, p. 87.
101. Brown, *Gilgit Rebellion,* p. 26; and, Chohan, *The Gilgit Agency 1877-1935,* pp. 198-199.
102. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 219; and, Cheema, *An Illustrated History of Chitral Scouts 1903-2014,* pp. 9, 41.
103. *The Garrett Papers;* and, Historical Records of Bara Rifles. Brig Raymond Sinclair Johnson, OBE (1900-88), 1/1st Punjab (1 Punjab). Commandant 5th Road Construction Battalion (1937-38) and Kurram Militia (1940-42).
104. Ibid. Lt Col REFG North (1897-1980), 1/12th FF Regiment (3 FF). Commandant Mahsud Battalion (1942-44) and 2nd Mahsud Battalion (1944-45).
105. *The Frontier Corps: An Introduction,* pp. 157-158, 165. In 1974, the 2nd Mahsud Scouts were transferred to FC Baluchistan, where they were redesignated as Maiwand Rifles. The 1st Mahsud Scouts became Mahsud Scouts in 1981, and Bara Rifles in 2020.
106. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 183; *The Garrett Papers;* and, *The Indian Army List, October 1938,* p. 735. Lt Col Mohammad Yusuf Khan, MC, *b.* 1913, 6/13th FF Rifles (1 FF), South Waziristan Scouts and IPS.
107. *The Indian Army List, October 1943,* p. 1264.
108. Byron Farwell, *Armies of the Raj,* p. 310. Muslim League offered full support to the British for the war effort.
109. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 243-248. The Gorwekht Militia was made up of men from several frontier tribes including Afghans. It had a number of ex-servicemen and Scouts in its ranks, making it a potent force. Lt Col Mohammad Sharif Khan, MBE, 5/10th Baluch (12 Baloch). Commandant Khyber Rifles (1947-48) and Northern Scouts (1951-53).
110. *The Garrett Papers.* 'Pool' officers found unsuitable during the probation period were sent back to their units.
111. Ibid. Brig NRC Cosby, CIE, MC (1890-1981), 5/1st Punjab (4 Punjab). Commandant South Waziristan Scouts (1930-35) and IGFC (1941-45). The appointment of Commandant was upgraded to Lieutenant Colonel in 1942.
112. External Affairs Department File No. 333-F/1937. The North-West Frontier Constabulary Act, 1915, was extended to the Frontier Corps in 1925, after making the necessary modifications. It was further amended in 1937.
113. Marsh, *Ramparts of Empire,* pp. 222-224.
114. Ibid., 248; and, Alan Warren, *Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi and the Indian Army: The North West Frontier Revolt of 1936-37,* p. 258.
115. *The Garrett Papers.* Brig RD Ambrose, CIE, OBE, MC (1896-1974), 1/6th Rajputana Rifles. Commandant Tochi Scouts (1933-36) and IGFC (1945-47).

116. Lt Col Mahboob Ali Shah, *History of Khyber Rifles,* pp. 29-41; Brig WEH Condon, *The Frontier Force Regiment,* pp. 542-547; and, Stewart, *The Khyber Rifles,* pp. 215-219. Brig JR Booth, DSO & Bar (1901-71), 4/14th Punjab (8 Punjab). Commandant Khyber Rifles (1946-47).
117. *The Frontier Corps: An Introduction,* pp. 121-122. Lt Col CFS Langridge, MC (1899-1977), 3/14th Punjab (7 Punjab). Commandant Pishin Scouts (1946-47). The Pishin Scouts were renamed as Chaman Scouts in 2014.
118. MS Ahmad, A Memon and F Rabbi. 'Electoral Politics in the North West Frontier Province of Colonial India 1946-47', *History and Sociology of South Asia* 2014, 8:1, 1-19. The Frontier Muslim League was ill-organized and perceived as aligned with the interests of big landlords, which led to its defeat in elections.
119. Coen, *The Indian Political Service,* pp. 195-196.
120. Trench, *Viceroy's Agent,* pp. 323-327. Nehru's arrogance and ignorance of Pakhtun culture and sentiments contributed to the fiasco.
121. Erland Jansson, *India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan? The Nationalist Movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47,* p. 213.
122. Ibid., p. 237.
123. Ibid., pp. 189, 199, 203.
124. Akbar S Ahmed, 'Colonial Encounter on the North-West Frontier Province: Myth and Mystification', *Economic and Political Weekly* 1979, 14:51/52, 2092-2097. Joseph Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936). Famous English author, poet and journalist. Ardent proponent of British Imperialism.
125. Coen, *The Indian Political Service,* p. 193. Field Marshal Lord Chetwode, Commander-in-Chief Indian Army (1930-35), admitted to Capt BH Liddell Hart, the eminent military historian that the Army welcomed turmoil on the Frontier because "it provided them with so fine a training ground".

Chapter 5: Dawn of a New Era

1. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 266.
2. Marsh, *Ramparts of Empire,* p. 269. Sir George Cunningham, GCIE, KCSI, OBE (1888-1963), ICS (1911-14), IPS (1914-46). Governor NWFP (1937-46 and 1947-48). He was personally selected by the Quaid-i-Azam as the first Governor NWFP after the independence of Pakistan.
3. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 265.
4. SWA Shah, 'Khudai Khidmatgars and the Partition of India: A Re-Appraisal', *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress,* 2000, 61: 802-816. Soon after the dismissal of Dr Khan Sahib's Ministry, several of his legislators joined Muslim League, handing it a majority in the Provincial Assembly. In February 1948, the Khan brothers swore allegiance to

Pakistan. Dr Khan Sahib joined mainstream politics and was appointed the first Chief Minister of West Pakistan in 1955. Abdul Ghaffar Khan however, never fully reconciled with Pakistan.

5. Jansson, *India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan? The Nationalist Movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47,* p. 237.
6. Marsh, *Ramparts of Empire,* pp. 272-273. Sir George Cunningham had made his recommendation in a telegram to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan on 10 September 1947, while Gen Messervy conveyed his request to the Governor on 20 September.
7. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 267-269; and, Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* pp. 209-211. These units were a battalion each of Gurkhas and Rajputana Rifles along with a Sikh Mountain Battery. They were being escorted by a squadron of Guides Cavalry.
8. Warren, *Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi and the Indian Army,* pp. 261-262.
9. Alastair Lamb, *Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947-1948,* pp. 190-191. In 1947, Gilgit-Baltistan was made up of three entities: Gilgit Agency comprising the *trans*-Indus area along with the northern states of Hunza, Nagar, Yasin, Kuh Ghizar, Punial and Ishkuman; Gilgit *Wazarat*, which extended from the Indus to Burzil Pass; and Ladakh *Wazarat*, made up of Skardu, Kargil and Leh.
10. Brown, *Gilgit Rebellion,* pp. 52-53.
11. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* pp. 269-270. Maj William Alexander Brown, MBE, SPk (1922-84), was commissioned in the Frontier Force Regiment in 1942. He served with South Waziristan, Tochi, Chitral and Gilgit Scouts. For his role in the liberation of Gilgit, he was made a Member of the Order of the British Empire (MBE) in 1948, and was posthumously awarded Sitara-i-Pakistan in 1993. Capt AS Mathieson was selected by Maj Brown. The two had served together in North Waziristan.
12. Brown, *Gilgit Rebellion,* pp. 62, 70.
13. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 270.
14. Ibid., p. 271; and, Brown, *Gilgit Rebellion,* pp. 97-98, 101, 104, 132.
15. Ibid.; and, Brown, *Gilgit Rebellion,* p. 107.
16. Brown, *Gilgit Rebellion,* p. 117.
17. Ibid., pp. 143-153; and, Dani, *History of Northern Areas of Pakistan,* pp. 348-349. One Scout was shot dead by the retinue of the Governor.
18. Ibid., pp. 154-155.
19. Ibid., p. 167. According to *History of Northern Areas of Pakistan,* the flag hoisting ceremony took place on 3 November.
20. Ibid., pp. 175-176. Lt (later Lt Col) Ghulam Haider Khan was the only officer of Gilgit Scouts present at Gilgit other than Maj Brown. Lt (later

Maj) Mohammad Khan Jarral was attached with 6th J&K Infantry at Bunji, while Capt (later Col) Said Mohammad Durrani was supervising the withdrawal of Scouts from Kalamdarchi.

21. Ibid., pp. 196-203; and, *History of Northern Areas of Pakistan,* p. 353.
22. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 278.
23. Brown, *Gilgit Rebellion,* pp. 230-239.
24. Dani, *History of Northern Areas of Pakistan,* p. 366. Major Aslam Khan first visited Gilgit on 30 November 1947, to assess the situation and report back to GHQ. Azad Forces consisted of Muslim elements of J&K State Infantry, Kashmiri veterans of the Indian Army and frontier tribesmen.
25. Lamb, *Incomplete Partition,* p. 193. No recognition was accorded to Capt AS Mathieson.
26. Brown, *Gilgit Rebellion,* pp. 264-265. Brig Mohammad Aslam Khan, HJ, MC (1918-94), 4th J&K Infantry and 4 FF Rifles (9 FF). Awarded the Military Cross in Burma in 1944. Served with Azad Forces in Kashmir in 1947. He used the *nom de guerre* of 'Colonel Pasha', while commanding Gilgit Scouts in 1948, and was awarded Hilal-i-Jurat. Retired as a Brigadier in 1963. He was the elder brother of Air Marshal Asghar Khan.
27. Maj Gen Shaukat Riza, *The Pakistan Army 1947-49,* pp. 291-293. Lt Shah Khan later transferred to Pakistan Air Force and retired as a Group Captain in 1980.
28. *The Kashmir Campaign 1947-48,* pp. 11-15; and, Maj KB Singh, *History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles 1820-1956,* p. 251.
29. Singh, *History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles 1820-1956,* p. 252.
30. *The Kashmir Campaign 1947-48,* pp. 16-18; and, Prasad, SN, and Pal, D, *History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir (1947-48),* p. 288.
31. Ibid., pp. 18-20. The Indian brigade, sometimes referred to as Z Brigade, was composed of the 5th and 7th Jammu & Kashmir Infantry under Col Kripal Singh.
32. Ibid., pp. 20-22; Singh, *History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles 1820-1956,* pp. 256-258; and, Prasad, *History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir (1947-48),* p. 296.
33. Ibid., pp. 22-23. Only 100 Scouts were left at Gilgit after the despatch of Tiger and Eskimo Forces.
34. Ibid., pp. 24, 27.
35. Ibid., pp. 24-27. The Eskimo Force was accompanied by local porters. During the march to Kargil, four men died, while 60 suffered frostbite.
36. Ibid., pp. 28-30.
37. Ibid., pp. 28, 32. Maj Gen Mian Ghulam Jilani, SQA (1913-2004), 4/19th Hyderabad and 4 FF Rifles (9 FF). Commandant Gilgit Scouts (1948-

49). GOC 14 & 15 Divisions, Master General Ordnance and Commandant Command & Staff College. Retired in 1962.

38. Ibid., p. 27.
39. Ibid., p. 46.
40. Ibid., pp. 27, 30-31; and, Cheema, *An Illustrated History of Chitral Scouts 1903-2014,* p. 46. Around 180 Dogras escaped from Skardu during the night of 12 August. They were rounded up by the detachment of Gilgit Scouts at Kamri. A contingent of Chitral Scouts and Bodyguards was also deployed in Kamri Sector. Col Mata-ul-Mulk was the younger brother of the Mehtar of Chitral. Chitral Scouts lost three men killed during the Kashmir War.
41. Ibid., pp. 33-35; and, Prasad, *History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir (1947-48),* pp. 353-355.
42. Ibid., pp. 35-36.
43. Ibid., pp. 36-39.
44. A large number of gallantry awards were given to Gilgit Scouts, who lost 85 men killed during the war. These included Hilal-i-Jurat to Major Mohammad Aslam Khan and Sitara-i-Jurat to Majors Ihsan Ali Khan, Mohammad Sadiq Qureshi and Mohammad Ismail Khan, 2nd Lieutenant Mohammad Shah Khan, Subedars Rustam and Amir Hayat, and Jemadar Mohammad Ismail Khan. Nine JCOs and ORs received Tamgha-i-Jurat.
45. Dani, *History of Northern Areas of Pakistan,* pp. 400-401.
46. Lamb, *Incomplete Partition,* p. 197.
47. Maj Gen Fazal Muqeem Khan, *The Story of the Pakistan Army,* pp. 98-101; and, Riza, *The Pakistan Army 1947-49,* pp. 275-276. In October 1947, Gen Gracey had resisted Quaid-i-Azam's orders to commit Pakistan Army in Kashmir on the plea that the Army was not ready to engage in military operations, which might lead to a general war with India.
48. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* pp. 148-149.
49. *The Frontier Corps: An Introduction,* pp. 33, 109; and, Historical Records of Zhob Militia.
50. Historical Records of Maiwand Rifles.
51. *The Kashmir Campaign 1947-48,* pp. 141-145. Until the arrival of 10 Brigade, the Tithwal Sector was the responsibility of 101 Brigade.
52. Fazal Muqeem Khan, *The Story of the Pakistan Army,* pp. 104-106.
53. *The Kashmir Campaign 1947-48,* pp. 153, 155, 161.
54. Ibid., pp. 135-138, 172. Maj Gen Mohammad Akbar Khan, DSO (1912-93), 6/13th FF Rifles (1 FF). Brigadier-in-Charge Kashmir (1947-48) and Chief of General Staff (1950-51). Implicated in Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case and

court-martialled in 1951. National Security Adviser (1972-74) and Ambassador (1974-77).

55. Riza, *The Pakistan Army 1947-49,* pp. 276-277
56. Maj Gen Akbar Khan, *Raiders in Kashmir,* p. 85.
57. *The Kashmir Campaign 1947-48,* pp. 173-175. Lt Gen Agha Ali Ibrahim Akram, HI (M), SBt (1923-89), 6/13th FF Rifles (1 FF) and Tochi Scouts (1947-48). Famous historian of early Muslim conquests.
58. Ibid., p. 175.
59. Ibid., pp. 177-178.
60. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* p. 149. The Tochi Scouts lost 12 men killed in Kashmir War.
61. Akbar Khan, *Raiders in Kashmir,* pp. 90-92.
62. *The Kashmir Campaign 1947-48,* pp. 184-185.
63. Ibid., p. 189.
64. Col JK Achuthan, 'Learning from our Enemy: An Analysis of the Losses in the 1948 Indo-Pak Kashmir War', *Indian Defence Review,* Oct-Dec 2018, 33.4. These battalions were part of 77 (Para) Brigade.
65. *The Kashmir Campaign 1947-48,* pp. 193-195. On 17 July 1948, the British Government ordered the recall of all British officers from Kashmir. The decision was taken following the death of Maj AM Sloan in Tithwal Sector on 10 July. Lt Col JH Harvey-Kelly, who had volunteered for service in Kashmir, obeyed the orders under protest. He later served as Commandant South Waziristan Scouts in 1950. Maj Gen Malik Sher Bahadur, SPk, was Chief of General Staff Pakistan Army during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War.
66. Ibid., pp. 196-197. The other two platoons of Khyber Rifles remained at Bib Dori in a defensive role. Maj Afridi's column consisted of D Company 4 Baluch (11 Baloch) and C Company 17 Baluch (19 Baloch) under Capt Said Ghaffar Shah. The main column under the CO was made up of A, B and C Companies 4 Baluch. Seven Artillery forward observers were deployed during the battle. They did a most commendable job in providing highly effective fire support during the Battle of Pandu. Capt Khalid Khan was killed while leading the Mahsud *lashkar* to its objective.
67. Ibid., pp. 199-206; and, Achuthan, 'Learning from our Enemy: An Analysis of the Losses in the 1948 Indo-Pak Kashmir War', *Indian Defence Review,* Oct-Dec 2018, 33.4. The Indians only acknowledge losses of 35 killed and 32 wounded. 2 Bihar abandoned a large number of mortars, machine guns and rifles, besides a thousand mortar shells and half a million rounds of small arms ammunition at Pandu. However, their regimental history claims that the battalion was ordered to withdraw after running out of ammunition.
68. Ibid., pp. 218-226.

69. JW Spain, 'Pakistan's North West Frontier', *Middle East Journal* 1954, 8:1, 27-40; Warren, *Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi and the Indian Army,* pp. 264-265; and, Swinson, *North-West Frontier,* p. 399.
70. Swinson, *North-West Frontier,* p. 400.
71. *The Garrett Papers.* Before 1947, only 12 Indian officers, all of them Muslims, were posted to Frontier Corps. All except one opted for Pakistan.
72. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* pp. 163-164.
73. Maj Gen Syed Ali Hamid, *Life and Times of Brig Sardar Ahmed Jan, MBE (1903-1978),* The Friday Times, 12 July 2019. Brig Sardar Ahmad Jan, MBE (1903-78), was commissioned in 7th Light Cavalry in 1927. He was the son of Brig Sir Hissam-ud-Din and grandson of Col Nawab Sir Aslam Khan. Served with Bhopal State Forces (1943-47) and commanded 1/14th Punjab (5 Punjab) (1947), and 114 & 52 Brigades (1948-50). First Pakistani IGFC (1950-51). Retired in 1954.
74. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* pp. 33-34.
75. Elliott, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* pp. 288-289.
76. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 281.
77. *The Frontier Corps: An Introduction,* p. 5.
78. *Compendium of Permanent Orders, The Frontier Corps,* p. 13.
79. *Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah Papers,* Volume 8, p. 203.
80. *The Frontier Corps: An Introduction,* p. 153. The Chagai Militia was also entrusted with guarding the Iranian frontier. It repulsed two Iranian incursions in 1949 and 1957. It was renamed as Nushki Militia in 2014.
81. *Administration Report of the Baluchistan Agency for 1949-50,* pp. 1, 61.
82. *The Frontier Corps: An Introduction,* pp. 131-132.
83. Lt Col Ghulam Jilani Khan, *Northern Light Infantry Regiment,* pp. 334-335. After their liberation in 1947-48, these areas were divided into Gilgit and Baltistan Agencies, administered by Political Agents under a Resident appointed by the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs. In 1970, they were redesignated as Northern Areas, becoming Gilgit-Baltistan in 2009. Maj Gen Mohammad Rafi Khan, 1/14th Punjab (5 Punjab). Commandant Gilgit Scouts (1949) and Northern Scouts (1949-50).
84. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* pp. 37-38.
85. Ibid., pp. 158-159. Brig Sadiq Ullah Khan, MC (1910-2009), 6/13th FF Rifles (1 FF). South Waziristan Scouts (1942-46), Commandant Tochi Scouts (1948-51), IGFC (1955-58 and 1963-64).
86. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* pp. 150-151. The Pakistan Air Force continued to maintain the old British airfield at Miranshah until 1961.
87. Warren, *Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi and the Indian Army,* pp. 260-262.

88. Swinson, *North-West Frontier,* p. 388.
89. *The Frontier Corps: An Introduction,* p. 33.
90. Ibid., p. 121; and, Historical Records of Zhob Militia.
91. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* pp. 304-305; and, Historical Records of Zhob Militia. The rebellion was in protest against the One Unit Scheme. The Zhob Militia was awarded 3 Sitara-i-Basalat.
92. Nayyar Agha, 'The Annexation of Gwadar', *Memoirs of an Army Officer's Wife*; and, *Story of the Pakistan Navy 1947-1972,* pp. 198-199.
93. Maj Aamir Mushtaq Cheema, *An Illustrated History of Khyber Rifles 1878-2015,* pp. 72-75.

Chapter 6: A Watchful Peace

1. Maj Gen Shaukat Riza, *The Pakistan Army: War 1965,* pp. 60-61.
2. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* p. 165.
3. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* p. 305.
4. Ibid., pp. 323-325. The Corps was composed of Khattaks, Afridis, Orakzais, Bangash and Mahsuds.
5. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* p. 166.
6. AH Amin, 'Remembering Our Warriors: Babar "the great"', *Defence Journal* 2001, 4:9 (Interview with Maj Gen Naseerullah Khan Babar). The Mekran Militia was disbanded for refusing to participate in Dir-Bajaur Operation in 1960. A new corps called Mekran Scouts was raised in 1974.
7. *The Frontier Corps: An Introduction,* pp. 157-167. 'Mizh' means 'We' in the southern dialect of Pashto. The Mahsuds refer to themselves as 'Mizh Mahsud'. In September 1962, the 1st Mahsud Battalion moved to Fort Salop in Bara, Khyber Agency, which became its permanent home.
8. Ibid., p. 191. Half the manpower was drawn from Baltistan, while the rest was from Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Yasin, Punial, Gupis and Chilas.
9. Ibid., p. 160.
10. Ibid., pp. 198-199. Khattak, Bangash, Mullagori, Turi, Mahsud, Bhittani and Orakzai.
11. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* pp. 172-179; and, Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* p. 164. Losses among the tribesmen were 25 killed and 12 wounded.
12. Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed, *History of Indo-Pak War – 1965,* pp. 19-21.
13. Ibid., p. 26. AKRF was formed from Kashmiri irregular forces after the 1948 Indo-Pakistan War. AKRF battalions were regularized as The Azad Kashmir Regiment in 1971. Mujahid Force is a paramilitary force of

Pakistan recruited locally for border defence. Sectors in Azad Kashmir were redesignated as AK Brigades in 1970.

14. Ibid., pp. 29-32.
15. Ibid., pp. 34-35.
16. Khan, *Northern Light Infantry Regiment,* p. 333.
17. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* p. 213.
18. *The Frontier Corps: An Introduction,* pp. 191-192.
19. BC Chakravorty, *History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965,* p. 49-53.
20. Ahmed, *History of Indo-Pak War – 1965,* pp. 40-41; and, Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh, *War Despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict 1965,* p. 32.
21. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* p. 213.
22. *The Frontier Corps: An Introduction,* p. 192.
23. Ahmed, *History of Indo-Pak War – 1965,* p. 82.
24. Harbakhsh Singh, *War Despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict 1965,* p. 47.
25. *The Frontier Corps: An Introduction,* pp. 33, 65, 77, 109, 133, 178.
26. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* p. 179.
27. Historical Records of Nushki Militia.
28. Ahmed, *History of Indo-Pak War – 1965,* pp. 53-55; and, Historical Records of Kurram Militia.
29. Ibid., pp. 56-57; and, Historical Records of Kurram Militia. Surjoi is referred to as Sunjoi by some sources.
30. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of Khyber Rifles 1878-2015,* p. 74.
31. Ahmed, *History of Indo-Pak War – 1965,* pp. 57-60.
32. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of Khyber Rifles 1878-2015,* p. 74.
33. Historical Records of Kurram Militia.
34. Ahmed, *History of Indo-Pak War – 1965,* p. 60.
35. Ibid., pp. 61-62; and, *History of the Azad Kashmir Regiment (1949-1970),* pp. 97-98. The Indian attack from Uri was codenamed Operation Bakshi. It was carried out by 68 Brigade of 19 Division with 1 Para, 4 Rajput, 19 Punjab, 6 Dogra, 4 Sikh Light Infantry and 6 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles. Meanwhile, two battalions (6 & 7 Bihar) of 161 and 41 Mountain Brigades attacked Bedori Bulge from the east.
36. Ibid., pp. 62-63. These were 10 Baluch at Seru ka Dhara and 17 Baluch (2 Sind) at Bela Chenar.
37. Ibid., p. 65; and, *History of the Azad Kashmir Regiment (1949-1970),* pp. 98-100. The losses of 4 Rajput were 65 killed and 51 wounded.
38. Ibid., p. 64. The Indian attack from Poonch was codenamed Operation Faulad. It was carried out by 93 Brigade of 25 Division with 2 & 7 Sikh, 3 Dogra and 3/11 Gorkha Rifles.

39. *History of the Azad Kashmir Regiment (1949-1970),* pp. 60-61.
40. Ahmed, *History of Indo-Pak War – 1965,* pp. 66-69.
41. *History of the Azad Kashmir Regiment (1949-1970),* p. 62.
42. *The Frontier Corps: An Introduction,* p. 78.
43. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* p. 305.
44. *History of the Azad Kashmir Regiment (1949-1970),* p. 181.
45. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* p. 305.
46. Ibid., p. 327.
47. Ibid., p. 213.
48. Ahmed, *History of Indo-Pak War – 1965,* p. 70.
49. Riza, *The Pakistan Army: War 1965,* pp. 114-115.
50. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* pp. 179-181; and, *History of the Azad Kashmir Regiment (1949-1970),* pp. 230-231.
51. *History of the Azad Kashmir Regiment (1949-1970),* pp. 269-270.
52. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* p. 179. No. 6 Wing under Capt Abdul Habib Khan was initially sent to Kharian and Wazirabad, from where it moved to Chhamb Sector in September. Three platoons were sent to Lahore in Barki Sector.
53. Ahmed, *History of Indo-Pak War – 1965,* pp. 92-95. The reason given for the change of command was that 12 Division could not effectively control its vast front and that it had been given command of Grand Slam only due to the urgency of situation. Meanwhile, HQ 7 Division was lying idle.
54. Ibid., pp. 110-111.
55. *History of the Azad Kashmir Regiment (1949-1970),* pp. 232-234.
56. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* pp. 181-182. *Da Turo Shrang* is Pashto for 'Swift as a Slashing Sword'.
57. Ahmed, *History of Indo-Pak War – 1965,* pp. 113-114.
58. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* p. 180.
59. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* pp. 213-214. Lt Gen Mohammad Shafiq, HI (M), SBt. IGFC (NWFP) 1986-88.
60. Historical Records of Zhob Militia.
61. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* pp. 452-453.
62. Historical Records of the Frontier Corps Intelligence Unit.
63. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* pp. 377-378.
64. Ibid., p. 466.
65. Lt Gen Kamal Matinuddin, *Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crisis 1968-1971,* p. 153.

66. Ibid., p. 116.
67. Ibid., pp. 207-208; and, Brig Siddiq Salik, *Witness to Surrender,* pp. 43-44.
68. Maj Gen Fazal Muqeem Khan, *Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership,* pp. 57-59; and, Salik, *Witness to Surrender,* pp. 44-58.
69. Salik, *Witness to Surrender,* pp. 63-64; and, Matinuddin, *Tragedy of Errors,* pp. 247-258. Besides military personnel, these included the East Pakistan Rifles, Mujahid Force, Razakar Force and East Pakistan Police.
70. Ibid., p. 99.
71. Matinuddin, *Tragedy of Errors,* pp. 224-225.
72. Maj Gen Shaukat Riza, *The Pakistan Army 1966-71,* p. 86.
73. Salik, *Witness to Surrender,* p. 90. Half the strength of EPCAF was recruited from West Pakistan.
74. Fazal Muqeem Khan, *Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership,* p. 126.
75. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* pp. 70-71, 109, 165, 306, 327.
76. Riza, *The Pakistan Army 1966-71,* p. 102. Besides 35,000 military personnel, Pakistan had around 73,000 paramilitary forces, which included the Frontier Corps, West Pakistan Rangers, East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces, Mujahids and Razakars.
77. Historical Records of Nushki Militia.
78. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* p. 109. The Kurram Militia lost four men killed in East Pakistan.
79. Mahboob Ali Shah, *History of Khyber Rifles,* p. 49.
80. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* p. 306.
81. Riza, *The Pakistan Army 1966-71,* p. 153.
82. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* p. 185.
83. Matinuddin, *Tragedy of Errors,* p. 267.
84. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* p. 185.
85. Matinuddin, *Tragedy of Errors,* pp. 351-352.
86. Ibid., p. 347.
87. Riza, *The Pakistan Army 1966-71,* p. 150-151. Razakars were Bengali volunteers, who were given 10 days of military training, armed with old .303 rifles and employed for protection of vulnerable places in the interior. Later, they were also deployed on Border Outposts and fought in the war alongside Pakistan Army. Their strength was around 50,000. After the surrender, they suffered a terrible fate at the hands of the Mukti Bahini.
88. Ibid., p. 129. After the mutiny of Bengalis in March 1971, new Mujahid battalions were raised mostly from non-Bengali citizens of East Pakistan. Like the Razakars, they too paid a heavy price for their loyalty to Pakistan.

89. Ibid., pp. 150-151; Two companies of 12 AK arrived at Sylhet from West Pakistan in the last week of November.
90. Ibid., p. 153; Salik, *Witness to Surrender,* pp. 168-169; SN Prasad, *History of the 1971 India Pakistan War,* p. 238; and, Brig Rattan Kaul, 'Battle of Atgram', *Bharat Rakshak,* 9 October 2015.
91. Lt Col Rifat Nadeem Ahmad, *History of the Baloch Regiment,* pp. 233-235; and, Prasad, *History of the 1971 India Pakistan War,* p. 238.
92. Matinuddin, *Tragedy of Errors,* p. 406.
93. Riza, *The Pakistan Army 1966-71,* p. 154.
94. Kaul, 'Battle of Atgram', *Bharat Rakshak,* 9 October 2015. Casualties of Frontier Corps in East Pakistan were: Khyber Rifles, 7 killed; Kurram Militia, 4 killed; Chagai Militia, 2 killed; Tochi Scouts, 11 killed; Bajaur Scouts, 5 killed; and, Thall Scouts, 33 killed, 23 wounded and 18 missing believed killed.
95. Fazal Muqeem Khan, *Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership,* p. 112.
96. Matinuddin, *Tragedy of Errors,* p. 431.
97. Fazal Muqeem Khan, *Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership,* p. 113.
98. Mahboob Ali Shah, *History of Khyber Rifles,* p. 49.
99. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of Chitral Scouts 1903-2014,* p. 53.
100. Prasad, *History of the 1971 India Pakistan War,* p. 300.
101. Ibid., pp. 304-308; and, Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh, *India's Wars since Independence,* Volume 2, pp. 27-29. India captured 36 Pakistani posts in Kargil Sector at the cost of 55 killed, 198 wounded and 28 missing.
102. Ibid., pp. 302-304; and, Khan, *Northern Light Infantry Regiment,* pp. 336-337. The loss of territory in the Shyok Valley was a major setback for Pakistan, which lost five villages with a population of 1400. Casualties of Gilgit Scouts in the 1971 War were 7 killed. They were awarded three TJs. Losses of Northern Scouts were 13 killed. They received two SJs, one TJ and one Imtiazi Sanad. The Karakoram Scouts lost 72 killed and were awarded two SJs, four TJs and two Imtiazi Sanad. More than 50 Scouts were taken POW.
103. Riza, *The Pakistan Army 1966-71,* p. 168; and, Fazal Muqeem Khan, *Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership,* p. 212.
104. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* pp. 381-382.
105. Ibid., p. 214.
106. Maj Gen Fazal Muqeem Khan, *History of the 2nd Battalion (Guides) Frontier Force Regiment (1947-1994),* pp. 123, 125; and, Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* p. 186.
107. Maj Muhammad Nawaz, *The Valiant Scouts,* p. 55.

108. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* pp. 187-188.
109. Prasad, *History of the 1971 India Pakistan War,* p. 310; and, Nawaz, *The Valiant Scouts,* p. 55.
110. Sukhwant Singh, *India's Wars since Independence,* Volume 2, pp. 37-39.
111. Prasad, *History of the 1971 India Pakistan War,* pp. 311-312. The casualties of 2 FF were 10 killed and 14 wounded. It left Lipa on 11 December.
112. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* p. 188.
113. Ibid., p. 189; and, Sukhwant Singh, *India's Wars since Independence,* Volume 2, p. 41. 9 AK was commanded by Lt Col Haq Nawaz Kayani, SJ & Bar, who was Killed in Action on 5 May 1972.
114. Ibid., p. 186.
115. Lt Col Ahmad Saeed, *Battle of Chhamb (1971),* pp. 10-11; and, Fazal Muqeem Khan, *Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership,* p. 197.
116. Ibid., p. 21. Dewa was captured on 7 December, after heavy fighting. Mandhar and Laleali remained in Indian hands despite repeated Pakistani attacks. The 1st Mahsud Scouts have been incorrectly identified as Zhob Militia in *Battle of Chhamb (1971)*.
117. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* p. 281.
118. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* pp. 193-194. Maj Gen Naseerullah Khan Babar, SJ & Bar, SBt, (1928-2011) Artillery/Aviation. IGFC (1972-74), Governor NWFP (1975-77), Minister for Interior (1993-96).
119. Ibid., pp. 194-195.
120. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* p. 214.
121. Ibid., p. 328.
122. Ibid., pp. 434, 437-438. Mohmand Rifles can be considered as successor to Mohmand Militia, which was raised in 1916, and disbanded in 1922.
123. Articles 246 & 247 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Frontier Regions Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Tank, Lakki and DI Khan.
124. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* pp. 34-35, 453.
125. Ibid., pp. 382-383.
126. Khan, *Northern Light Infantry Regiment,* pp. 337-340. The Gilgit Scouts were reconstituted as 1 and 2 NLI, the Northern Scouts as 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10 NLI, and the Karakoram Scouts as 6, 7 and 8 NLI. The remaining manpower was formed into three mountain batteries.
127. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* pp. 466-468.
128. Ibid., p. 384.
129. Ibid., p. 282. Shin Kamar Pass provides access to Tirah from Bara Valley.

130. Ibid., p. 282, 384-385, 413.
131. Schofield, *Afghan Frontier,* pp. 274-281, 295, 299-300, 328.
132. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* p. 204.
133. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* pp. 329-330.
134. Ibid., pp. 439-440.
135. Ibid., pp. 385-386.
136. Ibid., p. 109.
137. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* pp. 211-215. 1st Mahsud Scouts were redesignated as Mahsud Scouts in 1981.
138. Ibid., p. 225.
139. Ibid., p. 219.
140. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* pp. 451-452.
141. Ibid., p. 34.
142. Nawaz, *The Valiant Scouts,* pp. 57-59.
143. Mahboob Ali Shah, *History of Khyber Rifles,* pp. 49-50.
144. Nawaz, *The Valiant Scouts,* pp. 61-65.
145. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* p. 110.
146. Ibid., p. 441.
147. Nawaz, *The Valiant Scouts,* p. 78.
148. Ibid., pp. 87-89. Contingents from Khyber and Mohmand Rifles, Chitral, Thall, Bajaur and Dir Scouts took part in the operation.
149. Ibid., pp. 91-97.
150. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North). Maj Gen Ghazi Ud Din Rana, HI (M), SBt, 6 FF, IGFC (1988-90), is the son of Lt Gen Bakhtiar Rana, HJ, SPk, SQA, MC (1910-99), 6/13th FF Rifles (1 FF), IGFC (1953-55). They are the only father and son to have served as IGFC.
151. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* pp. 386-387.
152. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of Chitral Scouts 1903-2014,* pp. 136-137.
153. Nawaz, *The Guardians of the Frontier,* pp. 382-283.
154. Nawaz, *The Valiant Scouts,* pp. 101-112.
155. Ibid., pp. 114-121.
156. Ibid., pp. 123-133.
157. Historical Records of Tirah Militia.
158. JH Gill, 'Military Operations in the Kargil Conflict', *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict,* pp. 94-129.
159. Historical Records of South Waziristan Scouts.

160. Historical Records of Thall Scouts.
161. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of Chitral Scouts 1903-2014,* pp. 60-61.
162. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).

Chapter 7: The Breaking of the Storm

1. Schofield, *Afghan Frontier,* pp. 325-347.
2. MMK Wazir, 'Geopolitics of FATA After 9/11', *IPRI Journal* 2011, 11:1, 59-76.
3. KZ Burki, 'Rise of Taliban in Waziristan', *The Dialogue* 2010, 5:3, 188-211.
4. TH Johnson and MC Mason, 'No Sign Until the Burst of Fire', *International Security* 2008, 32:4, 41-77.
5. Shuja Nawaz, *Learning by Doing: The Pakistan Army's Experience with Counterinsurgency,* pp. 7-8.
6. Ibid., p. 6; W Rosenau, *Irksome and Unpopular Duties: Pakistan's Frontier Corps, Local Security Forces, and Counterinsurgency,* pp. 6-10; and, TM Ashraf, 'The Pakistan Frontier Corps in the War on Terror – Part One', *Terrorism Monitor* 2008, 6:15, 1-4.
7. Wazir, 'Geopolitics of FATA After 9/11', *IPRI Journal* 2011, 11:1, 59-76.
8. Johnson and Mason, 'No Sign Until the Burst of Fire', *International Security* 2008, 32:4, 41-77.
9. Shuja Nawaz, *Learning by Doing,* pp. 8, 14.
10. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North). The Armoured Squadrons were raised from volunteers by Maj Furqan Shabbir, 31 Cavalry, and Maj Zahid, 54 Cavalry. The men were sent to the School of Armour & Mechanised Warfare, Nowshera, for training. After their induction, the tanks and their crews were distributed among different corps according to operational requirements.
11. Shuja Nawaz, *Learning by Doing,* p. 9. Lt Gen Tariq Khan, HI (M), 4 Cavalry. GOC 1 Armoured Division (2006-07) and 14 Division (2007-08), IGFC (2008-10), Commander 1 Corps (2010-14).
12. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).
13. Abubakar Siddique, *The Pashtun Question,* p. 73.
14. SG Jones and CC Fair, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan,* p. 46.
15. Siddique, *The Pashtun Question,* p. 74.
16. Burki, 'Rise of Taliban in Waziristan', *The Dialogue* 2010, 5:3, 188-211. By 2007, more than 40 militant groups were operating in different parts of FATA, NWFP and the rest of Pakistan.
17. Jones and Fair, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan,* pp. 46-47.
18. Ibid., p. 43.

19. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* pp. 245-247.
20. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North). 7 Punjab and 101 Engineers Battalion also participated in the operation.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.; and, Historical Records of Tirah Militia.
23. Ibid.; and, Jones and Fair, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan,* pp. 47-49.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid. Six terrorists were killed, while 163 were apprehended. Military casualties were 17 killed and 8 wounded.
26. Jones and Fair, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan,* pp. 49-53.
27. Historical Records of Tirah Militia.
28. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* pp. 292-293.
29. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of Khyber Rifles 1878-2015,* pp. 92-93; and, Historical Records of Khyber Rifles.
30. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).
31. Jones and Fair, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan,* pp. 57-58.
32. Ibid., p. 55; Gretchen Peters, *Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan,* pp. 69-70; and, Siddique, *The Pashtun Question,* pp. 75-76.
33. Ibid., pp. 56-62. Maj Abdul Karim was awarded Sitara-i-Basalat.
34. Shuja Nawaz, *Learning by Doing,* p. 13.
35. Sameer Lalwani, 'The Pakistan Military's Adaptation to Counterinsurgency in 2009', *CTC Sentinel* 2010, 3:1, 9-13.
36. Ibid; Eric Schmitt, 'Officer Leads Old Corps in New Role in Pakistan', *New York Times,* 6 March 2009; and, Nawaz, *Learning by Doing,* p. 14.
37. Maj Gen Abid Mumtaz, *Operation Sherdil: Battle for Bajaur,* pp. 16-18. The Tarkalanis of western Bajaur are subdivided (from north to south) into Salarzai, Mamund, Chaharmang and Chamarkand branches, while the Utman Khel occupy southern and eastern parts of Bajaur.
38. Siddique, *The Pashtun Question,* pp. 95-97.
39. Mumtaz, *Operation Sherdil,* p. 20.
40. Ibid., pp. 24-26; and, Historical Records of Bajaur Scouts. The casualties of Frontier Corps during the three days of fighting were 22 killed, 81 wounded and 30 missing. Brig Muhammad Nauman Saeed, SI (M), SBt, 20 Lancers. Commandant Bajaur Scouts (2008-10).
41. Historical Records of Bajaur Scouts. Col Muhammad Furqan Shabbir, TBt, 31 Cavalry. OC Armoured Squadron (2007-08), 2IC No. 1 Wing and Troop Leader Bajaur Scouts (2008) and Commandant Mohmand Rifles (2022-24).

42. Mumtaz, *Operation Sherdil,* pp. 87-89.
43. Ibid., p. 26.
44. Historical Records of Bajaur Scouts.
45. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).
46. Mumtaz, *Operation Sherdil,* pp. 52-53. Col Nauman Saeed was awarded SBt for his gallant and inspiring leadership during Operation Sherdil.
47. Historical Records of Bajaur Scouts.
48. Mumtaz, *Operation Sherdil,* pp. 54-56.
49. Ibid., pp. 58-63. Major Afzaal Ahmed was awarded a posthumous Tamgha-i-Basalat for gallantry during an action, when a patrol of Thall Scouts was ambushed.
50. Ibid., pp. 64-67. Pashat Valley is inhabited by the pro-Government Salarzai tribe, who raised a *lashkar* to support military operations.
51. Ibid., pp. 67-72, 77.
52. Ibid., p. 122. Forty-eight Scouts and one soldier were taken captive in Bajaur. All of them except one, were released or liberated.
53. Siddique, *The Pashtun Question,* pp. 98-99. Omar Khalid Khorasani was killed in a bomb blast in Afghanistan in 2022.
54. Historical Records of Mohmand Rifles.
55. Ibid.
56. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).
57. Ibid.
58. Siddique, *The Pashtun Question,* pp. 119-120.
59. Anwar Shah, 'Talibanization and Military Operation Rah-e-Rast: The Final Knockback in Swat', *Pakistan Journal of Society, Education and Language* 2018, 4:2, 142-154.
60. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of Chitral Scouts 1903-2014,* p. 136; and, Historical Records of Khyber and Tirah Militia.
61. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).
62. Historical Records of Khyber Rifles.
63. Anwar Shah, 'Talibanization and Military Operation Rah-e-Rast: The Final Knockback in Swat', *Pakistan Journal of Society, Education and Language* 2018, 4:2, 142-154.
64. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North). Military casualties during Operation Rah-e-Rast were 419 killed and 1070 wounded.
65. Historical Records of Tirah Militia.
66. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North) and Dir Scouts.
67. Ibid.

68. Siddique, *The Pashtun Question,* pp. 100-101.
69. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of Khyber Rifles 1878-2015,* p. 100.
70. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).
71. Ibid.
72. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of Khyber Rifles 1878-2015,* pp. 101-102.
73. Siddique, *The Pashtun Question,* p. 101. Tariq Afridi was killed in an airstrike in 2012.
74. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of Chitral Scouts 1903-2014,* p. 137; and, Historical Records of Orakzai Scouts.
75. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of Khyber Rifles 1878-2015,* p. 101.
76. Jones and Fair, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan,* pp. 70-74. Operation Rah-e-Nijat was conducted by 7, 9 and 14 Divisions.
77. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North). Military casualties during Operation Rah-e-Nijat were 272 killed and 785 wounded.
78. Siddique, *The Pashtun Question,* pp. 102-103.
79. Reza Jan, *The FATA Conflict After South Waziristan,* p. 5.
80. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).
81. Ibid.
82. Jan, *The FATA Conflict After South Waziristan,* pp. 5-6.
83. Historical Records of Tirah Militia.
84. Historical Records of Orakzai Scouts.
85. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of Chitral Scouts 1903-2014,* p. 133.
86. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North) and Kurram Militia.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid. The eastern prong consisted of 18 Sind, a company each of 42 Punjab, 42 FF, Thall Scouts, SOG-1 and a troop of 33 Cavalry. The western prong was made up of 3 AK, NLI Light Commando Battalion, a company of Kurram Militia and a troop of 25 Cavalry.
89. Ibid.
90. Historical Records of Kurram Militia; and, Cheema, *An Illustrated History of North Waziristan Militia & Tochi Scouts 1895-2012,* pp. 394-398.
91. Historical Records of Orakzai Scouts.
92. U Elahi and U Javaid, 'Operation Zarb-e-Azb: A Decisive Strike', *Journal of Pakistan Vision* 2020, 21:1, 438-450. 490 military personnel were killed and 1914 were wounded during Operation Zarb-e-Azb.
93. Historical Records of Tochi Scouts.
94. Historical Records of Orakzai Scouts.
95. Cheema, *An Illustrated History of Khyber Rifles 1878-2015,* pp. 105-108.

96. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).
97. Ibid.
98. Historical Records of Orakzai Scouts.
99. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).
100. Ibid.
101. Safdar Hussain, *Pakistan's Achievements in War on Terror But at What Cost: A Special Review of the Current Decade,* pp. 14, 26.
102. Historical Records of Bajaur Scouts.
103. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).
104. Amina Khan, 'Pak-Afghan Border: A Case Study of Border Management', *Strategic Studies* 2017, 37:3, 22-40; and, *In Wink of an Eye: Sector Headquarters North 2007-2022*. Some area in Dir and Chitral has not been fenced due to the difficult mountainous terrain.
105. Hussain, *Pakistan's Achievements in War on Terror But at What Cost: A Special Review of the Current Decade,* pp. 39-45.
106. *Da Ghrono Azmari,* p. 223.
107. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North). The Frontier Corps Public Schools are patterned on Army Public Schools. Eight of them also provide boarding facilities.
108. Hussain, *Pakistan's Achievements in War on Terror But at What Cost: A Special Review of the Current Decade,* pp. 29-35.
109. Saeed Khan, 'FATA's Merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP): Challenges and Way Forward', *Journal of Contemporary Studies* 2021, 10:1, 103-119.
110. Historical Records of Badar Rifles.
111. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North). Headquarters Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (South) temporarily shifted to Javed Sultan Camp, Wana, while a new building complex was being constructed at Chehkan near Dera Ismail Khan.
112. Historical Records of Independent Scouts Cavalry Regiment. There are 105 tanks in the inventory of Frontier Corps (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). These include T-69, T-59 and T-55 tanks with three Armoured Recovery Vehicles.
113. The Frontier Corps Balochistan (North) with its Headquarters at Quetta, has eleven corps with 61 wings: Zhob Militia, Nushki Militia, Maiwand Rifles, Chaman Scouts, Sibi Scouts, Bambore Rifles, Loralai Scouts, Ghazaband Scouts, Qilla Saifullah Scouts, Sui Rifles and Chiltan Rifles. The Frontier Corps Balochistan (South) with its Headquarters at Turbat, has nine corps with 51 wings: Kalat Scouts, Mekran Scouts, Kharan Rifles, Panjgur Rifles, Taftan Rifles, Awaran Militia, Dalbandin Rifles, Dasht Scouts and Buleda Rifles.
114. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).

115. Ibid. Previously, posting of officers within the Frontier Corps was controlled by HQ Frontier Corps.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
118. Historical Records of Bajaur Scouts.
119. Historical Records of Badar Rifles.
120. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).
121. Ibid. The Frontier Corps also runs primary care hospitals at Chitral, Wana and Manzai. A 500-bedded hospital for FC Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (South) is planned at Chehkan, DI Khan. FC Balochistan established a tertiary care hospital at Quetta in 2013.
122. Ibid. عزت کی زندگی عزت کی موت *Nang* can have multiple meanings and is translated variously as Honour, Dignity, Courage, Chivalry, Pride and Modesty.
123. These include museums and galleries at Fort Bala Hisar at Peshawar, the Khyber Rifles Officers Mess at Landi Kotal, Fort Ali Masjid and Michni Post in the Khyber Pass, the Tochi Museum at Miranshah, and the Archive Gallery at Wana. A new museum is planned at Fort Chakdara.
124. Historical Records of Chitral Scouts. The Shandur Polo Festival dates back to 1937, when it was first organized by Lt Col Evelyn Hey Cobb, OBE (1899-1972), 25th Cavalry (1919-21), Kurram Militia (1921-22), South Waziristan Scouts (1922-24) and IPS (1924-47). A passionate polo player, he served as the Political Agent of Malakand (1937-40), North Waziristan (1940-42) and Gilgit (1942-45). The Shandur Polo Festival is organized by the Frontier Corps.
125. Historical Records of HQ Frontier Corps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North).
126. Lt Col Umar Zafar, *The Khyber Pass: Whispers Through the Hills,* pp. 136-138.

Epilogue

1. *Proceedings of the Army in India Committee, 1912. Minutes of Evidence,* Volume II, pp. 350-351.
2. Redesignated as Gilgit Baltistan Scouts in 2011. They identify themselves with Gilgit, Northern and Karakoram Scouts, which were converted into Northern Light Infantry in 1975.
3. Elliot, *The Frontier 1839-1947,* pp. 95-96.
4. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts,* p. 282.

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